Analysis of India's Ability to Fight a 2-front War 2018

by Ravi Rikhye

  power status, equality with the US. And after the 2050s or 2060s, it will want global hegemony. This is the natural order of things; right or wrong plays no part. No tonnage of words, agreements, treaties can stop the process.

  It’s worth remembering that India has acted the same way when it could. In 1971, we invaded East Pakistan, which led to the most lopsided vote against any country in the UN General Assembly. We took over Sikkim to prevent it falling to China. We’ve controlled Bhutan and Nepal since independence. We intervened in the Maldives and Sri Lanka because we believed it was in our interest. We took Siachin. We pressure Nepal when we want to change its behavior in our favor. National security comes first: in each case India acted, rightly or wrongly in retrospect, to protect itself.

  India too should not waste time on discussions, agreements, treaties or whatever with China. Between 1993 and 2004, India signed no less than five agreements with China concerning the border. The number of high-level rounds of talks as of end 2017 had reach twenty. [31] meetings must have reached twenty. Has China stuck to any agreement? No. As it has become more economically and militarily powerful, it has become more aggressive than it was before the agreements.

  The Chinese, by extending their road to the south, create a major strategic problem for India. (a) The road will lead to the foot of the Jampheri Ridge, ending opposite a Bhutan Army post on the ridge. Access to the ridge will outflank Indian defenses of the narrow Siliguri Corridor. (b) The road, enroute to the ridge, also brings Chinese troops 3.5-km south of Dokula, and that much closer to the corridor. (c) The Corridor, pinched between Bangladesh to the south and Bhutan to the north, is 17-km at its narrowest point. A Chinese infantry advance through Bhutan of four hours will cut the Corridor. (d) Access to India’s seven northeastern states will be lost, isolating three army corps and several airbases in Eastern Command. (e) This in turn will permit China to attack through Arunachal and to gain the 90,000-square-km they claim. (f) Because now they will be sitting on the Himalayan ridge line between India and Tibet, by their method of claim lines, they can claim Indian territory to the north bank of the Brahmaputra River.

  The Chinese, understandably, were upset at India’s resistance at Doklam. They reinforced. We reinforced. They talked nasty. We escalated, moving up the annual autumn Eastern Command-wide exercises to August, and sent four corps and 10-11 divisions to their wartime stations. The foreign media salivated with frissons of excitement for a war to erupt. The dramatic reporting made war seem imminent. India was nervous, but eager to put the Chinese in their place. Then suddenly there was de-escalation: China announced a halt to its road construction.[32] India announced it had won and reinforcements were withdrawn. Much self-adulation followed.

  Anyone familiar with the Chinese should have understood this was not the end of the matter. On or about October 8, 2017 Global Times, which speaks for China’s communist party, said China had stopped construction because of weather[33], and would resume anytime it wanted. It called India ‘eccentric’ and ‘arrogant’. The Chinese proceeded to reinforce positions in the Doklam plateau to 1800 soldiers, which indicates a border regiment, began work on another road 10-km distant from the summer confrontation, now approaching the Ridge from the East instead of the West, and started improving the road to Yatung (Yadong) in the Chumbi Valley. There have been reports the Chinese are improving the Shigatse-Yadong road, Highway S204. To which India had no objection as that lay in Chinese territory. The new road is in the Bhutan-China disputed India and away from the Indian Sikkim border. In other words, they backed down temporarily because they had a limited presence on our northern border, and presumably at the appropriate time will resume their road building at Doklam. The Chinese also undertook a major expansion of the previously very limited air capability in Tibet, a subject we will discuss in some detail later.

  And, of course, as usual India has missed the point of the Doklam incident. The point has many strands. One is to tell the Bhutanese that India cannot protect their country and they had best come over to the Chinese camp.

  An example of how China’s claim lines in Ladakh kept changing is given in the map below. The map is from Claude Arpi’s compilation of maps of the India-China border dispute. It is only one example of how Chinese claim lines keep changing. The eastern boundary is what the Chinese claimed in 1959. But the western boundary is what they claimed in September 1962.

  3. Why China pushes India

  3.1 Rising China makes for an impatient China

  3.2 The Sundarji Plan

  3.3 India reduces China front forces

  3.4 Why a diplomatic compromise with China is impossible

  3.5 India begins a new buildup

  3.6 How MEA and Min Finance sank the Army’s expansion

  3.7 Foreign and defense policy are the different sides of the same coin

  3.8 A strong defense requires a strong economy

  3.1 Rising China makes for an impatient China

  First, we know from the geopolitical aspect, that China has been pushing India along the northern border since around 2005. My suspicion is that after 2004 and the fifth round of border talks, China realized that India, despite all its polite words, which cost nothing, was not going to budge on the border issue. China, with its steadily growing economy and greater confidence, decided to up the pressure on India for a settlement. We already know the result, because, after 12-years of accelerated pressure, India has still not budged a centimeter. It is unclear if China understands the only way it can win here is by a full-scale war that results in our complete defeat. Idiots, morons, and poltroons we may be, but we are not going to permit any amount of pressure/provocation to change our position: all Ladakh and all Arunachal is Indian territory.

  By the way, here’s a Sun Tzu quotation from Chang Yu. “Attack is the secret of defense; defense is the planning of an attack.” The interpretation is “To avoid losing, you must be able to defend. Knowing this, you can spend too much on building a strong defense. To win, however, you must be able to attack. And so you must also plan and prepare for winning attacks.”[34]

  Second, China is getting impatient with us and becoming even more aggressive. They should remember their own Zen percepts, that allowing emotions to control your actions is probably not a good idea. I believe that by pushing too hard they’re making the same mistake in the China Seas, though they’re likely to get away with it because if the US’s precipitous decline in relative economic and military strength. Since China is not prepared to go to war with us, Doklam is simply arm-twisting, bullying, intimidation. To shut bullies up, you must stand up to them. GOI made a terrible mistake in prematurely ending the overall Northern border buildup authorized around 2008, and we’ll discuss that later. At present, however, China is in no position to get its way, so it has continued to provoke, and this includes constantly pushing us to see if we back down. Consider this. Doklam was an obscure corner of the border and India was unbothered by Chinese encroachments against Bhutan. India reacted only when it seemed that the Chinese were preparing to outflank our south Sikkim defenses and get closer to the Siliguri Corridor. Not not only have the Chinese reinforced their part of the border, they went ahead and built their road anyway. It is on the eastern side and does not pass near us. It’s still in Bhutan territory, but the Bhutanese have told us not to make on their behalf. So a wedge has been driven between India and Bhutan, which some years from now will declare neutrality because it knows we can no longer protect it against China.

  To understand how much stronger the Chinese position in Tibet is compared to 2005, consider this. Having extended the Lhasa railroad to Shigatze, China is now working on a further expansion to Yadong which should be complete by 2018. A broad-gauge line suffices to support a corps in wartime. Simultaneously, China is building another line from Shigatze west to to Kerong (also called Jilong), which is 84-km north of Kathmandu. Topographical surveys have been done to extend the line to Kathmandu-Pokhara-Lumbini. Cost factors are under study. If this
were insufficient, a third line is under construction from Shigatze, east to Nyangtri, running just north of the Indian border; completion date is uncertain, but planned for 2021. This will connect with the Chengdu rail system to the east. Simultaneously, construction has begun the other way, from Chengdu-Kangdang (already complete) to Nyangtri. A date of 2025 for full connectivity is mentioned, five years earlier than planned This 200-kmph line will be the most difficult railroad China has ever built. It will allow journey from Chengdu to Lhasa in 15-hours, versus the current 45-hours via Xining at the foot of the Tibetan plateau. The complete project will cost $32-billion, or – for the Chinese, a staggering $20-million/km. Some China analysts waste time by noting the Chengdu-Lhasa line cannot possibly be profitable.[35] First, the primary intention is not commercial, but strategic. Lhasa will now become 48-hours from Beijing, so militarily, administratively, and psychologically, Tibet will no longer be remote. Second, the line will permit Han immigration that is already swamping the idea of Tibet as separate from China. The Han are also expanding in force into Sinkiang; soon, the notion of Sinkiang as another country will cease to exist. This is all a long-range plan to make all China Han, ending the separatism of West China. Which happens to be near 60% of China. Last, the army gives budgetary support for strategic military railroads, so that commercial viability is not an issue. A fascinating aspect of the 1629-km line half will run through tunnels or over bridges. A line from Kashgar to Hotan, 488-km, was completed in 2010. Providing a road connecting Hotan to highway G219 (Aksai Chin Road) is constructed, this will ease China’s logistic problems in the Xinjiang part of Tibet.

  Tibet rail under construction/planned[36]

  Shigatze-Yadong: complete 2018

  Shigatze-Gyriong (Jilong): complete 2020

  Shigatze-Burang: planned, 2030 complete.

  3.2 The Sundarji plan to meet rising China

  In the 1980s, then Lt.-General K. Sundarji presciently predicted that in time China would become India’s major threat, not Pakistan. He proposed that India build up from 34 divisions to 40, as follows:

  2 airmobile divisions

  4 tank divisions

  8 mechanized divisions

  7 RAPIDs (infantry divisions with an integral armored brigade)

  19 mountain divisions

  According to my notes, in end-1984 the Indian Army had an authorized strength of 977,000. This was to be raised by 211,000. I do not know if the total included 28th and 29th Divisions, which were raised around 1984. One source told me that the 1986-91 plan was for 2 tank, 3 mechanized, and 5 mountain divisions. In the case of the armor forces, at least the mechanized divisions would be conversions from infantry. Another source said for the 7th Plan (1985-90) 1 armored, 1 mechanized, and 3 mountain divisions were authorized. In the event, after 28th and 29th Divisions, India refused to add any new divisions until around 2007, when two batches of two divisions each were authorized.

  Since I did not have the opportunity to speak with Sundarji, below is a speculative laydown of his force, by division, based on what is known about his ideas.

  AHQR

  2 airmobile

  Ladakh

  2 mountain (1 north, 1 east)

  Kashmir/West Jammu

  5 mountain (including 1 Northern Command Reserve)

  Jammu-Pathankot

  2 RAPID

  North Punjab

  3 RAPID

  1 tank

  2 mechanized

  South Punjab/North Rajasthan

  2 RAPID

  1 tank

  2 mechanized

  Desert

  2 tank

  4 mechanized

  Middle Sector

  1 mountain

  Eastern

  11 mountain

  3.3. India reduces China-front forces

  Militarily, the Chinese are pushing us because they can. Since China never suffers any consequences for its salami tactics, it continues a course where, in its view, it is succeeding.

  The post-1962 War plan saw India with 2nd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, 17th, 20th, 23rd, 27th, 57th Mountain and 3rd Infantry Divisions on the northern front. 2nd, 3rd, and 8th were raised during the war, 6th afterward. 5th, 17th, and 27th were converted from infantry and replaced by new infantry divisions; if I recall correctly, these were 7th, 15th, and 14th. 39th and 57th were raised as cadre mountain divisions, as were 36th and 54th cadre infantry divisions. The exigencies of the situation after the 1965 War saw the planned changed, making them into full divisions. The real historian for Indian Army orbats is Mandeep Singh Bajwa. Unfortunately, I was unable to obtain his cooperation for this book. The primary difference between mountain and infantry configuration is that the former has fewer vehicles, lighter artillery (now to become all 155mm), and battalions have only a nominal anti-tank capability. Also, unfortunately, I had to leave the Table of Equipment for the Indian Army behind in India when I left, though of course it pertained to an early 1970s TOE. India is not in the habit of sharing its TOEs, unlike the US and other countries

  With the easing of tensions with China, the 4th and 23rd Divisions were reconverted to infantry, 9th Infantry Division sent from Eastern Command to Western, and 21st Division, given variously as infantry or mountain, was raised to replace 23rd, even though the latter remained in Eastern Command. The 8th Division went to Kashmir to stay there; 57th also went for about 20-years. This a temporary deployment in the Indian conception of time. At one point, we were down to seven divisions against China, as only one brigade of 3rd Division was left in Eastern Ladakh. So, the Sundarji plan would have required seven more divisions to replace. Of course, we raised none because in the 1990s India and China had a peace romance, which basically meant India was to withdraw troops while the Chinese continued their incursions. Was this a foolish romance? Yes, but never underestimate GOI’s ability to seize the thinnest straw of hope that the China confrontation can be toned down.

  With India already doing a unilateral reduction of forces, the Chinese could have worked with India. With some compromise on their part, in time, with sincere negotiations, Confidence Building Measures, and verification, they could have persuaded India to further thin out some of the remaining divisions. This would have increased China’s security in Tibet, and relieved India of the decades old responsibility and expense of protecting the high mountain frontier. But no. The Chinese, born under a malign star, could not bring themselves to compromise with India. That would have meant treating India as an equal. This the Chinese cannot do until the wheel of history turns and again reduces them to an ordinary Asian power. The Chinese insist on making India understand we are subordinate to the Emperor, and this means forcing their terms on us. And even the next time around, they will plot and plan their return to global dominance, at least until individual nations remain.

  3.4 Why a peaceful compromise with China is impossible

  Everyone aspiring to be a serious analyst must, from time to time, reexamine her/his assumptions. I do that by flipping a problem around by 180-degrees. In this case, what precisely is wrong with accepting China’s offer to settle? We acknowledge China Occupied Ladakh is theirs, they acknowledge that Arunachal is ours. The insurmountable problem is that we occupy Arunachal, not China. Basing its claim on the now exhausted, pale, limp, and weak formula “since time immemorial” follows no logic. First, the phrase is an oxymoron. If the period is beyond memory, then no one has any idea what happened. We can talk of “since time memorial”, but not time immemorial. Next, claiming today something is yours because you once had some remote association with it defies sense. On that basis India could claim 7-million-km2 of land, as well as South East Asia and Indonesia. The Cholas used to trade all the way upto Kamchatka. Does that make the China and Japan Seas ours? Obviously not. The second problem is that for China the land is not the real issue. The real issue is that we must acknowledge its sovereignty. How precisely do the Chinese figure, in the year of our Lord 2018, that we’re going to accept that? For starters, we’re soon going t
o have a bigger population than them. And next, they will at some point, perhaps 50-years from now, reach their maximum growth and become slow-growing like Japan and the US. Then we will overtake them before reaching our own plateau. Will the Chinese agree to become our vassals? Obviously not. There is also no sense in assuming the Chinese will become different from other great/super powers. This is a fantasy promoted by the US to justify its “greatness” as America starts to fall behind China. Graham Allison fully punctures this assumption in his brilliant The Thucydides Trap.[37] My only question for Professor Allison is, why did it take 20-years to state the obvious? Perhaps it is intuitively easier for a 3rd Worlder whose nation probably has a longer history than China and was also humiliated by the West to understand China than for an America used to ruling the world.

  My suggestion to India, and particularly its ruling elite, is to face the reality of rising China and prepare for the worst. Ofcourse we won’t because we’ll merely “adjust”.