Analysis of India's Ability to Fight a 2-front War 2018

by Ravi Rikhye

  In 1951, chasing the North Koreans out of South Korea, the US kept advancing toward the Yalu River, which forms the North Korea – China border. How was the mighty US to imagine that a country of extreme poverty, just emerged from twenty years of war with Japan and within itself, would decide to fight the US? Using N-weapons, the US could have destroyed China. But when push-came-to-shove, the US, already in extreme moral ambivalence over its creation/use of N-weapons, found itself unable to unleash the destruction of China. Today, the US is looking at China overtaking it in GDP by 2030 (though not in per capita, which seems improbable).

  In 1952, Ho Chi Minh had liberal beliefs and greatly admired the US as the nation that had brought revolutionary democracy to the world. He asked the US at least seven times to help him against the French, sensibly, as the US was pushing the Europeans to divest themselves of colonies. Too late: US hatred of communism and the need to destroy it converted the US into the world’s greatest counter-revolutionary power, with the Soviets running a close second. What happened next needs no retelling. The US did likely save Ho’s life. A covert intelligence team was in contact with him during the latter part of World War 2. Ho fell very ill; the team managed to get the needed medicine to him.

  In 2003, in the name of bringing stability to Iraq, the US began a process of destabilizing the Mideast, North Africa, and East Africa. The situation in 2018 shows the Law of Unintended Consequences in spades.

  Since the Law says consequences cannot be foreseen, it is impossible to calculate the probability that taking Action X will lead to result Y.

  In India’s case, the most famous example of the law since 1947 is that Nehru’s instinct for peace has let the Kashmir dispute fester for 70-years with no end in sight, keeping India weak, and laying the ground for the 1965, 1971, 1999, and 1987-ongoing wars. The consequences of our failure to adequately prepare before trying conclusions with China needs no reiteration.

  4.5 Chinese military threat as assessed by India

  This is Saurav Jha’s[79] assessment quoting Indian military sources: China can send 30 divisions to Tibet. Quite incidentally, that was my estimate made in 1968, though the move would have required several months. My thought is that the Indians have not done any real estimate, and this one is impressionistic. Jha correctly asks if China would want that many troops in Tibet; if it does, however, he is correct to suggest they can now be maintained for long periods.

  He also notes the buildup of supply storage centers, as also the provision of hyperbaric chambers. These are necessary for emergency treatment of Acute Mountain Sickness [80] (Table 3 shows results of a study in the Alps, 53% of people get sick at 4559-meters.) While medication can ameliorate the symptoms, and pulmonary vasodilators can increase oxygen uptake, and while hyperbaric chambers can provide emergency life support by decreasing chamber altitude by 1500-meters, AMS requires descent to low altitudes, if necessary below 1500-meters. There is no substitute for proper acclimatization. For a young, fit soldier coming from below 1,000-meters, to become accustomed to working at high altitude (up to 5,500-meters) or above requires fourteen days of conditioning at increasingly higher altitudes. Camps constructed have permanent power and water supplies through the civilian network.

  A reminder: though the Chinese Army has shifted to brigades, I’m still using three brigades to a division for easy comparison with the Indian Army. Our divisions have the usual standard three brigades, but many have four and some even five. Taking that into account, however, makes the analysis needlessly complex.

  China’s ability to reinforce Tibet using Jha’s assumption of 30 divisions

  Mobilization (days)

  Troops inducted

  Cumulative divisions

  M + 2

  Rapid Deployment Division

  1

  M +30

  Add 7 divisions from 76th and 77th Army

  8 divisions

  M + 60

  Add 12 more divisions including 4 from Sinkiang

  20 divisions

  M + 90

  Add 12 more divisions

  32 divisions

  China can now not only mobilize such forces against India in a relatively short period of time but can also sustain them for relatively long periods of time. The significant number of camps that have come up in TAR simply plug into existing civilian water and power utility infrastructure. Apart from specialized storages (many underground), massive dual-use logistic centers, such as the one at Nagqu, have been constructed which also host command and control facilities.

  A major tactical problem is knowing how many troops to commit to a task. Too few, and you risk losing. Too many, and you are wasting resources. The mountains impose a constraint: the valleys run north-south, and with few exceptions are narrow. Putting more than 1-2 divisions in a cramped sector will see the Chinese falling over their own feet. Realistically, there is no reason for them to use more than – say – 15 divisions in Tibet unless we climb to the plateau and launch an offensive with several divisions. This will not happen because we lack the logistical capability. Having more divisions serves a useful purpose in a longer war: used up or exhausted divisions can be rotated out and replaced with fresh troops, keeping up the offensive pressure. Yet, China plans only for short wars on the sound political assumption that the longer a war continues, the less control of events it has. They have been enchanted with firepower and high-technology warfare and decided reliance on numbers is too third-world. Somewhere between 10 and 15 divisions is likely a practical maximum.

  §Note: Boring data ahead A casual understanding of the India versus China situation is possible without reading the below. For anything else, especially when talking about reinforcing the Northern border which, is, from the Chinese point-of-view the Southern border, readers must try and retain a general understanding of the Indian Army’s 3-stage acclimatization schedule. The same will apply to the Chinese. The stages are: 2700m - 3600m; 3600 m - 4500 m; and > 4500m.

  The three-stage acclimatization schedules for soldiers extend up to 14 days for Stage III to reach altitudes of > 4500m. Stage I acclimatization lasts for 6 days for altitudes range of 2700m to 3600m. To achieve Stage II additional 4 days are required, which is considered appropriate for altitudes 3600m to 4500m. For re-entry to high altitude, after 10 -30 days of break at lowland, 4 days at each stage need to be spent. After break of > 30 days, full acclimatization schedule as fresh inductees needs to be followed.[81]

  The thing to remember is that infantry combat is possibly the physically hardest activity humans will engage in. A fascinating and easily available book, Black Hawk Down, tells the story of USA Army Rangers’ epic 1993 fight at Mogadishu, Somalia in their failed attempt to capture two key aides of the Somali rebel leader Mohammed Farah Aided. This gives a good idea of the exertion of battle. The 1-hour mission extended to 14-hours of combat which is not particularly long. As a point of history, the fiasco happened because of lack of accurate intelligence, a feeling of contempt toward the “skinnies”, and a belief M-1 tanks and AC-130 gunships were not required. It is true the skinnies were thin to the point of emaciation, clad in shirts, shorts, and rubber sandals, but there were 3000 or more of them, outnumbering the Americans 10-1, and drugged to their eyebrows. It didn’t matter how many the US defenders killed, more appeared. This is also a useful little battle to study for all us civilians who think special forces operations are as easy as depicted in movies. Even more compelling is Moore and Galloway’s 1992 book We were soldiers once and young. In a calm, understated way it details the brutalities of an extended close-quarter battle, with lives snuffed out in seconds, men who refused to quit despite multiple wounds, the always-present shortage of drinking water, the casualties from friendly fire inherent when artillery was called at 30-meters from the forward line, and airstrikes called at 100-meter distances, the cowardice of medevac pilots who refused to fly while under heavy enemy fire, the bravery of other pilots who made 10, 20, 30 sorties in a day to get reinforcements and supplies
in and wounded out, the extreme care with which unit commanders accounted for every man KIA and to make sure no one was left behind, the indifferent manner in which both sides simply executed the enemy wounded, the calm demeanor of the one- and two-war veterans, the rapidity with which green troops became veterans in hours, the noise, the confusion, the fear everyone had pulled back and left you alone, and – to me – the worst of all, the inevitable casualties as patrols returned to base and were shot at by defending troops who thought they were the enemy. It also shows how the North Vietnamese soldiers just kept coming and being killed hours at a time, refusing to give up, and how the remnants, suffering from shell shock, threw down their weapons and broke when one last B-52 run was made against them.

  Combat at high altitude makes everything much more exhausting. China reinforcements may well arrive at the rapid pace noted above. But except for the troops permanently stationed on the plateau and some units coming from Chengdu, anything short of 21-28 days acclimation will be a bad idea. Conversely, however, since we are frightened of the Chinese, we will not attack first. This allows the Chinese all the time they need for acclimatization. We would be unwise to count this a constraint.

  The Indian estimate, I feel, needs analysis because it does not account for the difficulties of mobilization. China cannot simply get a couple of paratroop battalions into aircraft and then to Lhasa and claim its Rapid Deployment Force has moved in 24-36 hours. Even two battalions means the parent unit must be on high alert. This process can take 15-60 days. You must get your personnel strength up to 110% as a minimum, which means recalling men on leave, officers on training courses, and replacing men who may be unfit for war. You must perform maintenance on your vehicles and equipment. You must make up shortages, which afflict every army in peacetime. Refresher training must be done. The air force must organize itself for lift, and arrangements must be made to get heavy equipment into Lhasa by rail and road. Take the example of the US’s 82nd Airborne Division. [82] Its alert brigade must be ready for global deployment in 96-hours, staging an opposed entry if needed. A zero-warning exercise for a jump about 2000-km from Ft. Bragg required 96-hours to go “wheels up”[83] The difference in the two cases may lie in that personnel with the alert brigade are on 2-hours recall, their personal gear and equipment is packed and can be on pallets in one hour for loading onto aircraft, the aircraft is sitting also parked ready to go. This battalion was not exercising an opposed jump, but a simulated civilian evacuation.

  Given Chinese airlift is limited, and readiness, in general, is low for the Chinese Army, it is probably reasonable to assume that 15-30 days are required to bring one division to war readiness, and four to arrive in Lhasa. At which point the men must be acclimatized, 21-days, and moved to the front, another 5-7 day. 24-36 hours is out of the question.

  The flaw in my argument is that China will have the initiative and not India. We are not about to attack China; it will attack us when it decides. So, it can take all preparatory steps at leisure. Can we not get early warning of their mobilization? Yes, of course, providing we have built up an appropriate on-the-ground intelligence capability in and about Chinese cantonments, if we have enough signals intercept capability, and if we are able to shift our reconnaissance satellites at short notice. But you know what? Even this might not help. Because we don’t want to provoke the Chinese or fight them, our intel assessments will be biased toward finding reasons why information gathered does not necessarily mean China will attack. On our side, except that our war readiness is so low we will find it difficult to fight our way out of a paper bag, we can deploy to war stations in 7-days. Of course, units will be understrength, and much equipment will not be ready, but this matters less if you are defending.

  Still, returning to Jha’s estimate of 30+ divisions, a more realistic estimate might be 15 divisions in 8-10 weeks, or half the new Chinese Army, and that too after a tremendous effort. It’s worth remembering what happens when going unready for war: 1962. Men in summer uniforms in November in the mountains, vomiting blood because they were not acclimatized, wearing hob-nailed boots that leached the little warmth their feet had and slipped on ice causing the men to break limbs, one blanket, no gloves designed for use with weapons, minimal hard rations, no entrenching tools or axes to construct bunkers…But why continue. This is now an old story. Most Chinese troops are unacclimated; the process requires 3-4 weeks.

  The Chinese will place great reliance on their air force. Nonetheless, maintaining more than 4-6 fighter brigades (200-300 aircraft) in combat may prove to be difficult. This will change as China continues its air force infrastructure post-Doklam 2017. Currently, they can support perhaps 75 fighters plus AWACS, UAVs, transports, and helicopters. This is triple pre-Doklam 2017. If we can put up 15-squadrons, about 270 aircraft, we should be able to neutralize the Chinese. In a two-front war, unless we have the mandated 42-squadrons, this will be difficult. Some reduction in squadrons is possible if 5th Generation aircraft are inducted

  5. The Rise of China and India’s deteriorating geo-political environment

  5.1 China Expands around the world

  5.2 China and Pakistan

  5.3 China and Bangladesh

  5.4 China and Nepal

  5.5 China and Sri Lanka

  5.6 China and Myanmar

  5.7 China and the Western Indian Ocean and the Red Sea

  Historically, India’s security environment has seldom been satisfactory, which is probably the case with most nations with some exceptions, say Japan, Britain, and the US. Speaking of the last 2,500 years alone, the sub-continent was invaded by the Persians, Greeks, Scythians (Sakas), Hunas, Kushanas, Arabs, Turks, Afghans, Mongols, Portuguese, French, and British. The Islamic invaders stayed the longest, for ten centuries from the invasion of Sind to the fall of the last Moghul in 1857. Of course, from the viewpoint of ordinary people, it hardly mattered if they were killed by invaders or by Indian kings and, as the case everywhere, Indian kings were as bloody-minded as the Chinese, the English, French, Italians, Germans, Spanish, the Latins, the Africans and so on. It is a mystery how Indians got the reputation of being pacifists; after all, we have an entire caste whose job has been war. Doubtless, comparisons can be drawn with the European Second Estate, the barons, who lived to fight. The proper discussion is best left to learned historians.

  The ninety-year period 1858-1947 was an aberration because it was peaceful for the great majority of Indians. And compared to the Old Bad Days, the seventy years after independence have been quite peaceful. India’s wars after independence have been fought on the periphery. Agreed that for example, Kashmir in the last 30-years has been dismal, but then Kashmir has just 1% of the nation’s population. The same thought applies to parts of North East India. It is not that wars have become unfashionable, it’s that since 1947 war has usually been the last policy resort for the GOI, and once we get into a war, we speedily get out. We were in First Kashmir for 14-months; the war did not touch 99% if the Indian civilian. We spent 30-months in Sri Lanka, that was an expeditionary war and had no impact on the nation.

  When the British left, they took India’s external defense with them. The diminishing Royal Navy hung around the Indian Ocean until 1970, but on Pakistan, we were on our own. Then the US, whom we repeatedly rejected, made an alliance with Pakistan, because of its justified anti-communist crusade, and after 1954 Pakistan became a serious defense problem for us. We fooled ourselves into believing China was our friend; by 1957 the gloves came off and now we had hostile borders except in the east and the south. We sought security in the arms of the Soviets. They took us for a ride, but since even today very few Indians understand that we thought ourselves safe. By 1990 we thought ourselves to be in reasonable shape. The US downgraded Pakistan starting in 1984 when Mrs. Gandhi made a rapprochement with Reagan; the Chinese lulled us to sleep with soothing talks, and we again allowed ourselves to be fooled that all was well, to the extent we began reducing our defense budget until we reached half the former p
ercentage of GDP.

  By the 2000s we began emerging from our coma regarding China, mainly because Beijing started throwing its weight around to an extent unacceptable even to us. But since our friendship with the US steadily developed into an alliance, and because we are famous for our ability to ignore reality, and because the GOI had become used to the idea of shorting defense so more money could be wasted on vote-buying schemes, our counter buildup against China stutters along like a misfiring Chinese 50cc moped. For a variety of reasons, we convinced ourselves we were so powerful now that Pakistan was no longer a threat, and we happily wrapped ourselves in our pink blankies, put on our blue bunny slippers, popped our binkies (pacifiers) into our mouths, and slept the sleep of the just, safe, and secure.

  But:

  Rock-a-bye baby, in the treetop

  When the wind blows, the cradle will rock

  When the bough breaks, the cradle will fall

  And down will come baby, cradle and all.

  The bough has broken, the cradle is falling, but we remain sound asleep because we hate confrontation. So, while we have been busy denying reality, what have the Chinese being doing?

  5.1 China expands around the world

  1. Buying up Central and South America, Africa, and just about anywhere else they can. In 2016 alone, they invested directly $225-billion overseas and that is the official figure. The real figure is more. In 2017 they invested $271-billion, making a global total of $1775-billion 2005-2017,