Analysis of India's Ability to Fight a 2-front War 2018

by Ravi Rikhye

  The simple solution is to create additional division sets of equipment at – say – Srinagar, Pathankot, Bhatinda, and Jodhpur. Flying in personnel and having them pick up equipment, allowing for two days departure, one-day troop transit, two days arrival, and two days to forward assembly area, i.e., seven days, is reasonable. The US, at the height of the Cold War, planned to double the size of its 7th Army in Germany from five to ten divisions in 10-days. Of course, none of this helps if we are in a 2-front war situation because we will be unable to shift formations from east to west. To that extent, this section is only a theoretical construct.

  9.5 Tactical Style Fazilka and Poonch 1971

  In this section, we’ll examine two 1971 actions to show how India and Pakistan perform on the battlefield in a general war: Indian’s Fazilka and Poonch.

  Mountain warfare

  A brief look at the original 1965 Haji Pir action is useful. The Army almost flawlessly executed the operation. 68th Infantry Brigade with five battalions attacked from the north and 93rd Brigade launched a subsidiary attack with three of its seven battalions from the south. The bulge was taken in the remarkably short period of four days. Aside from the skill and initiative showed by the Army, it was aided by surprise and a 2-1 superiority, as Pakistan had 3 ½ battalions defending. 19th and 25th Divisions covered the Kashmir front with 40 battalions, opposed by Pakistan 12th Division with 25 battalions in four brigades, which it called sectors”. Five additional Indian battalions were part of a Srinagar based task force allowing the two divisions at the front to focus on the external threat.

  A replay would be much harder because Pakistan today has three divisions covering the same area, of which 12th and 23rd Divisions together have eleven brigades, and 19th is a reserve with three brigades. Pakistani brigades can be large because of the attachment of Mujahid battalions, which are now part of a regular Mujahid Regiment. In addition, Pakistan can also call on 7th and 9th Divisions with six brigades, as also four independent brigades from Swat, Malakand, Kharian, and Rawalpindi, for a total of 24 brigades. On India’s side, we have 19th, 28th, 25th, and 10th Divisions with 20 brigades including corps reserves. China will certainly posture in Ladakh and perhaps even launch a few local attacks. 39th Division is assigned to reinforce Ladakh, but 72nd Mountain Divisions can reinforce the Kashmir front. This gives about 23 brigades for Kashmir. For internal security, we will have 60 regular army battalions of the Rashtriya Rifles and 60 BSF/ITBP, CRPF and other battalions. Twenty-two brigades on our side give us near parity with Pakistan, not the 40 battalions to 25 advantage we enjoyed in 1965.

  This will likely lead to a stalemate if India wants only a short war. If a Kashmir war breaks out today, quite likely in less than 10-days we will start running of vital spares and ammunition. In 10-days we can achieve little other than a stalemate. Because fortified mountain positions are very difficult to assault, as was seen in 1999 Kargil, rapid movement is impossible to undertake. Is there no way to win, then? There is, and for that we have to return to 1917 Northeastern Italy, and examine the Battle of Caporetto, also called 12th Izonzo.

  That title alone should alert the reader that the campaign was a very long one, 29-months. Austria-Hungary, braced by just six German divisions, deployed ~400,000 men and the Italians ~800,000. The attackers lost 70,000 KIA/WIA/MIA, the Italian defenders lost 300,000, including 265,000 prisoners. The attackers were outnumbered 1:3 in artillery.

  The Germans rapidly broke an entire Italian army using gas and infiltration tactics, both infantry and artillery, and the defenders fell apart. Nonetheless, the Italians did recover and forced Austria-Hungary/Germany to a halt. The Italians had attacked in the previous 11 battles, advancing just 12-km, but forcing AH ready to leave the war. On the attackers’ side, the German 14th Army had 6 German and 11 Austro-Hungarian divisions. It pushed the Italians back 150-kilometers in 19 days, an average of 7-km/day, most of which was in the plains, not the mountains. On the first day, German 14th Army advanced 25-km. In this twelfth battle, 33 of Italy’s total army of 65 division were destroyed. The Italians did reconstitute themselves but for the rest of the war stayed on the defensive. Their 2nd Army had only the equivalent of nine divisions,[215] deployed for the next offensive instead of the defense as they should have been.

  At Kargil, we learned that heavy fire support reduces our own casualties and increases the enemy’s. Though Pakistan was defending, it lost at least 800 men to our 450.

  Kargil 1999 should have disabused GOI and our strategists of the idea of short wars. Kargil took 74-days, in which we recovered just a handful of strong points, with a 2-1 manpower superiority, 3-1 artillery superiority, and airpower. Pakistan could not deploy its air force because only its F-16s had the range to reach the area, and PAF was very short of spares. If the US had not sat on Pakistan to withdraw, it’s possible we’d have had to spend 150 days, with triple the forces because Pakistan would have reinforced its Northern Areas’ positions. 7th Division had already moved to the front, 9th would have followed, and 19th too. It’s also possible a replay of 1947-48 would have occurred. After 15-months of fighting, we took back some of our lost territory in the Naoshera-Poonch-Uri areas, against which we lost the Northern Areas. Had GOI been resolved to retake Kashmir, we should have

  Caporetto/12th Isonzo[216]

  re-raised two more divisions in 1948 for a May 1949 offensive, as well as commit 4th Division to the theatre. Of course, nothing of the sort happened. Nehru was more interested that the world should see him as man of peace than taking back the 1/3rd of Kashmir lost to Pakistan.

  The mechanics of recovering the Haji Pir bulge would be of great interest, but for space reasons we will look at Poonch 1971 to make our point. The important issue is that both India and Pakistan attack with meager forces which are easily thrown back, and there is nothing in reserve for a second or a third wave, or for exploitation.

  Fazilka 1971: Indian failure

  Indian 67th Brigade at Fazilka opposed by Pakistan 105th Brigade. We had 3 Assam, 4 Jat, and 15 Rajput; one T-54 squadron of 8th Cavalry, and 4th Independent Squadron formed from school Shermans; 22 and 28 BSF;[217] and three field, one medium, and 2 heavy mortar batteries, to Pakistan’s three field and one heavy mortar battery. Later we brought in two more battalions, on December 7th, 3/11 GR and 115th TA Battalion arrived. The problem was 67th Brigade was deployed on about a 40-km front, which is a division front, not a brigade one. Why did this happen? Because Foxtrot Sector, an ad hoc division, had about a 140-km sector to cover. Of its brigades (67th, 51st Para, and 163rd; total 8 battalions), 67th held the line Fazilka to Abohar, about 50-km. Facing it were Pakistan 105th Brigade at Suliemanke,[218] and and Pakistan 25th Brigade at Bhawalnagar at its southern end. If 25th Brigade had attacked eastward, it could have enveloped our 67th Brigade by turning north or turned south to outflank 51st Para Brigade.

  Pakistan 105th Brigade Suliemanke, Dec. 3, 1971

  2nd Ind. Armored Squadron (Shermans)

  76th Field Regiment

  237th Heavy Mortar Battery

  92nd Independent Fielded Engineer Company

  6th Frontier Force (Infantry)

  7th Punjab (Infantry)

  18th Baloch (Infantry)

  20th Sind Rangers (Paramilitary)

  33rd Pakpattan Mujahids (Militia)

  It appears that Pakistan’s plan was for these two brigades to punch holes in the Indian defense, allowing Pakistan II Corps with 1st Armored, 7th Infantry, and the new 33rd Division to pass through, turn north behind India’s Punjab defenses, and win

  Fazilka, 1971[219]

  a big victory. On the Indian side, 14th Division was paired with 1st Armored Division, but 14th had to give up two of its three brigades to reinforce other sectors, eliminating the possibility of India starting with an offensive. It can, of course, be argued that this is irrelevant because India would never have seized the initiative, preferring to wait until Pakistan II Corps showed its hand first, Pakistan II Corps could have ripped apart Indi
an defenses, but fortunately timidity also overcame the Pakistanis. By the time Pakistan was ready on December 14th, Pakistan 33rd Division had been withdrawn to help defend other sectors, Indian 9th Division and HQ II Corps was moving into the Punjab right after the fall of Jessore. One brigade of 14th Division was returned, and two additional brigades arrived from other areas.

  Though it has been customary to blame the OC 67th Brigade for the fiasco that happened at Fazilka, later analysis by Sukhwant Singh, ordered by the Army Chief to find out what went wrong, says the corps commander, and the GOC Foxtrot Sector were equally responsible. Sukhwant Singh out of respect does not mention the role of the Army Chief in the idiotic Western Front plan. The idea that every meter of the Western front was to be protected came from the Chief of Army Staff. Though the COAS was under orders from the Prime Minister, it was his duty to educate her that “nothing ventured, nothing gained”, and that wars are not won by the defensive. 67th Brigade was given three contradictory orders: defend Fazilka, bottle up Pakistan forces at Suliemanke, and block a potential attack from the vulnerable southern flank by Pakistan 25th Brigade. OC 67th Brigade was required to keep 6 of his 12 infantry companies (3 battalions) in Fazilka. The town was too far from the border for 3 Assam (on the border) to work with 15 Rajput (in the town) because of a 10-km distance between them. The southern positions were 20-km from Fazilka. All-in-all, the brigade ended up spread out over 40-km. Two Border Security Force battalions held border outposts, and though they did their best, there was no way their companies and platoons could support each other because of the distances over which they were spread. A brigade in the defense should not cover more than 20-25 km, and a division no more than 40-50. Instead Foxtrot Sector, akin to a division, was covering almost 200-km, with just six tank squadrons and no armored personal carriers. Most amazing, Suratgarh, at the south end of Foxtrot Sector’s responsibility, was held by three engineer regiments! The Indian Army was very short of engineers, without whom offensive action becomes very difficult. Since it was decided in advance we would not attack in Foxtrot Sector, it was thought acceptable to use this valuable and expensively equipped resource as infantry. It is true OC 67th Brigade made many mistakes. But when the entire front was organized in a way that suggests a bad joke, it is not right to blame just one officer. Incidentally, on the opposing side there were just two infantry brigades, while we were defending with the equivalent of four. Right there we handed victory to Pakistan without a shot fired.

  Keeping two companies of 4 Jat as a counterattack reserve, the brigade commander deployed 3 Assam on the border. Here is what happened. The minute the starter’s gun went off, a small Pakistani force attacked a company of 3 Assam at the front. Not only did this company fall back, and another outflank and then surrender in toto, the entire battalion retreated, and then all 22 bridges on the canal the battalion was using as its line of defense were blown for fear the Pakistan would take the bridges. In a typical Indian master-move, we now were protecting the Pakistanis from our attack, because there was no way to get across the canal! Moreover, the Pakistani attack was no surprise. The Indian front was 1500-meters from Pakistan’s critical Suliemanke Headworks, key to its canal defenses. Everyone on the Indian side was acutely aware that as war began, Pakistan would attack to push India back. Instead of using the brigade to attack, all but two companies were committed to the defense. So basically, strategically the war in this sector was over within hours of the start of war.

  Here is a small example of how difficult it is for Indians to be serious. General K.P. Candeth, GOC Western Command in the war, relates how an anti-tank missile squadron from the just formed 70th Armored Regiment, was at Fazilka.[220] One crew saw and killed a Pakistani tank with an SS-11B. It fired 2 SS-11B rounds at another and missed. General Candeth says the Army did not know the minimum arming range of the SS-11 missile was 1300-meters, and that for close-in work it had to be paired with the ENTAC or anti-gun guns, presumably 106mm RCLs. Excuse me, please, but shouldn’t this have been taught to the crews on Day 1 of their training? The second Pakistan tank fired back, killing the missile crew, and wounding the regimental CO and his adjutant who had gone forward to congratulate the crew. The CO died of wounds. Candeth said that we had to learn the hard way about the arming range; implying that had the crew known, it probably would not have exposed itself to fire more rounds. Okay, this is now 47-years ago and presumably, we’ve learned to be more careful, but this was horrible negligence.

  On the night of December 3-4, D/4 Jat and about 8 Sherman tanks launched a counterattack. At Sukhwant Singh explains, this tiny force had no idea where the Pakistanis were located, and the counterattack was easily defeated. You are asking yourself, one rifle company and 8 tanks were sent to counterattack a Pakistani brigade? Well, you see, this is India. No point in asking for explanations, you just accept this is the way we are. The Army would say we were trying only to recover our forward posts lost by 3 Assam. If you want to fight a war where companies and single battalions are sent into the attack, do not be surprised when nothing us achieved.

  Fazilka counterattacks December 1971

  Dec

  Units

  Results

  3 /4

  3 Assam routed by Pakistan attack

  Battalion falls back in confusion

  3 /4

  D/4 Jat, 8 tanks from 4th Ind Sqdn

  Failed, at least 3 tanks lost

  4/5

  2 companies 4 Jat; Sqdn/8 Cav with 8 tanks

  Failed, down to 3 tanks

  5/ 6

  4 Jat; 3/11 GR, 115 TA + new sqdn 8 Cav arrive

  Fails

  8/9

  15 Rajput (3/11 GR takes over in Fazilka)

  Fails after initial success; Bde OC fired

  13/14

  4 Jat, begs for a chance to redeem honor

  Fails

  14

  15 Rajput (in a different part of sector)

  Initial success, then disintegrates

  In all cases, artillery and carefully situated battalion weapons inflicted such severe casualties on the attackers that except for 4 Jat, the other battalions lost heart. As Sukhwant Singh[221] has explained, 67th Brigade insisted on frontal attacks on the same axis, the ground funneled the attackers, and the Pakistanis knew the Indian tactics so well, they foiled every attack. They also had carefully built their defenses with fortifications and minefields. India had too, but 3 Assam, as an example, was overwhelmed with firepower and simply fell apart. The same thing happened to 15 Rajput on December 14, even though they met light defenses which they overran. The new brigade commander ordered the Rajputs to attack in a different part of the brigade sector, which was lightly screened by the Pakistanis. The battalion overran a platoon post, got hit by artillery, and just ran for it. The brigade OC went forward to rally the men and assure himself there was no opposition and failed. The OC had to give up and returned, managing to rescue a mounted RCL 106mm which the battalion had abandoned. The final Indian toll was 189 killed, 425 wounded, 196 missing (POW).

  Sukhwant Singh mentions one battalion commander, who refused to go to the front, sat in comfortable accommodations ten-kilometers back, and directed operations via radio. Coincidentally, I’ve been rereading the US 1st Cavalry Division’s first battle in Vietnam, in November 1965 near the Iadrang River. One of its battalions, 1/7th Cavalry, took the brunt of an attack by three PAVN battalions and one Viet Cong battalion. The two sides fought for 2-days separated in places by 5-25 meters. The CO 1/7th Cavalry had his command post 100-meters behind the front. Later a company of 1/5th Cavalry reinforced, its CO had his command post 40-meters behind. These commanders had no choice: the terrain was covered with elephant grass (is this what we call sarkanda?), anthills 2-meters tall, and jungle. 1/7th Cavalry and its sister battalion 2/7th took 70% casualties. When they were brought back, they were given 48-hours rest and returned to combat. Incidentally – and readers will have noticed this – the 7th Cavalry and its commander George Custer were
annihilated at the Battle of the Little Big Horn. In 2003, the 3/7th Cavalry led the 3rd Infantry Division, a mechanized formation, in its run from Kuwait to Baghdad.

  What is inexplicable about the battle for Fazilka is that the threat from Pakistan 105th Brigade was assessed at one battalion holding the defenses and two battalions attacking. Why couldn’t we have done the same thing and out two battalions into and attack? As a bye-note, it’s unclear if more than a couple of companies from Pakistan 6 FF were seriously engaged in battle. I’m trying to get a historical account from Pakistan’s side, but the Pakistanis are even worse at recording their history than we are.

  Incidentally, I don’t want to mislead readers by suggesting there were no offensive plans in the west. The Chaamb offensive which would have helped Indian I Corps’ offensive was called off at the last minute, I Corps offensive needed a month to show results, but India shut down the war in two weeks. The 1st Armored/14th Infantry Divisions offensive was never launched because we refused to take the initiative. Foxtrot Sector had a defensive mission. 12th Division had a carefully planned and bold offensive, but (a) the GOC had no intent of executing it; (b) the Pakistanis launched a preemptive attack to throw 12th Division off; ironically the attack was unauthorized and GOC Pakistan 18th Division sacked which was truly reprehensible. Pakistani sources do not agree with my interpretation, saying the GOC acted without authorization and suffered serious tank losses for lack of air cover. Perhaps they will change their mind when they realize how the attacked rendered Indian 12th Division incapable of further action; and (c) just before the war it was found the division did not have sufficient trackage to make a 1-lane duckboard road to Rahim Yar Khan. Had this gone through, most of Sind might have been lost to Pakistan. 11th Division mounted its offensive and succeeded in its first phase, taking ground up to Naya Chor, but Pakistan reinforced at the cost of weakening its potential II Corps offensive in the South Punjab, and the war ended before 11th Division could be reinforced. The Kutch offensive had very limited resources but did launch; unfortunately, its Phase II which required returning a brigade sent to East Pakistan and aimed at Badin was cancelled by the premature ceasefire. The entire blame rests with the GOI. Had it had the courage to continue for at least four more weeks, India would have scored a major strategic victory in the West. Nixon’s threat to intervene was a complete bluff; since I knew that at age 24 it seems impossible to me GOI did not know it. USSR did not want us to break up West Pakistan and joined the US in the bluff. I’ve written a book about it based on declassified US State Department telegrams and other resources; as usual I write these things and forget about them, so I have no idea what happened. GOC 12th Division from the start had no intention of executing his offensive. He openly said that when the war began, he would proceed at his own pace, and no one could do anything about it. Despite two severe rockets by the Chief of Army Staff over the phone, the GOC refused to budge. Since the Army Chief had already announced no senior officer would be punished for failure, nothing happened to the GOC. Is this the way to win wars? By contrast, there is the inescapable comparisons with generals like Manstein,[222] Guderian,[223] Balck[224], Hoth[225], and Rommel. No less than 285 German general officers died in action, of wounds, or missing.[226] An additional 145 died of war-related health problems, and 128 perished in POW camps.