Analysis of India's Ability to Fight a 2-front War 2018

by Ravi Rikhye

  (a) Afghanistan permitted Osama Bin Ladin to take shelter. Within one month of 9/11, the US invaded Afghanistan, overthrew the Taliban, and occupied the country for now going on 17-years, with no end in sight. The US claimed Article 51 right of defense. This, however, created many problems. First, the US gave the Taliban an ultimatum of two weeks to turn over Osama, without establishing that he was responsible for the attack on New York, and without any claim by him or Al Qaeda of responsibility. Second, the US did not establish that the Taliban government, whose writ like all Afghan governments ran weaker in direct proportion to the distance from Kabul, had control of Osama to the point they could simply hand him over. Considering it took the US, with its immense resources, fourteen years to find the man, it is probable that the US made no good faith effort to negotiate. Third, the response, under international law, was clearly disproportional. The Taliban did not attack the US and never has outside of Afghanistan, which is permitted to a resistance movement. Last, the US issued no two-week ultimatums to Pakistan to hand over OBL. Legally the US had a weak case for invading/occupying Afghanistan.

  (b) Whereas the US had full international legal sanction to invade Iraq in 1991, please to note that that the US did not continue the war a day longer than necessary, did not seek to destroy the Iraqi Army, did not seek to depose Saddam, and did not seek to take over the country. This was in perfect adherence to international law, and the US is to be congratulated.

  (c) The 2003 invasion, however, was based on the weakest of legal grounds. The US sought to justify itself under previous UN resolutions requiring Iraq to verifiably destroy its WMDs. It does not follow from there that an expulsion of UN inspectors, that too after Iraq had complied with UN demands, obviated the need for fresh UN authorization. Further, those earlier resolutions say nothing about taking over the country, arresting and executing the ruler, installing a new government, and ruling for eight years. Worse, the US itself has admitted it had no proof of WMDs, meaning it engaged in willful aggression. Serious questions can be asked, also, about the UN authorized embargo 1991-2003. For example, graphite pencils for school children were prohibited. Why? The US said lead could have a military use. How? One use the US might have been thinking of is that graphite is a fission moderator. Except Osirak, also called Tammuz 1, had been destroyed in 1981, and was in any case, a light-water moderated reactor. Tammuz 2 was a small 500-KW research pool reactor, i.e. the moderator was water. When non-stop smuggling was going on, might it not be simpler for Iraq to bring in a few tons of graphite than to sit there stripping a few million school pencils of their wood casing?

  § In 1991, 56 F-16s attacked Osirak on Day 3 of the air campaign. Then F-117s were sent to follow on Day 6. Then 48 F-117s attacked the reactor seven more times over 32 days. On Day 19, 17 F-111s hit Osirak. By Day 42, the US DIA declared itself satisfied that the reactor had been “severely degraded.” The F-16s and F-117s would have carried a war load of 2-tons, and the F-111 presumably 4-tons. In addition to the attack sorties, there would have been escort, tanker, EW, reconnaissance, and suppression of enemy air defense sorties. Either the DIA are blithering idiots, or airpower is not particularly effective against fixed concrete targets, or the USAF had a lot of idle time on its hands. This operation approaches the level of farce. Especially since Israel had already destroyed the reactor. Agreed, Iraq could have theoretically rebuilt the reactor with smuggled components. Equally, however, US NORAD could mistake Santa Claus for an attacking Chinese or Russian bomber and shoot down the jolly fellow. How likely is this to occur? Very unlikely, right? Ditto Osirak.

  (d) On what legal basis did US support European intervention in Libya? Understandably, some Americans were exercised about the lack of approval from Congress. That, however, is an internal matter of the Americans. What about international authorization? Zero. The US justified its intervention on the ground of danger to civilians. Oh dear. Civilians are starving in Venezuela. No intervention. Civilians are starving in Zimbabwe. No intervention. Civilians have been targeted in the Congo for twenty years. No intervention. There has been repeated starvation of DPRK civilians, not to mention the gulags. Don’t see any intervention. The west had no right to take sides in a Libyan civil war. This was aggression, pure and simple, without even a rational excuse. The US was initially, rightly, very reluctant to join in. The Europeans told the US: we stood with you after 2001, now it’s your turn to stand by us. In 2001, however, the US was attacked by a non-state terrorist conspiracy, possibly encouraged by the US’s ostensible ally, Saudi Arabia. Who was Gadaffi hurting? Instead, he made retribution for Lockerbie and was negotiating to normalize relations with the US and restart oil exploration/production.

  (e) Under what authorization is the US in Syria? None. The Syrian Government invited Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah to help. Who invited the US? Noone. This is an outright invasion. By the way, is the US intervening in Yemen to stop the Saudi blockade which is starving civilians and creating disease epidemics? Aside from a few sharp words to Riyadh by a very upset US President Trump, and a vague Saudi promise to allow humanitarian assistance, nothing else happened.

  (f) India’s intervention in Sri Lanka and the Maldives was legal because the respective governments requested help. But India’s intervention to help East Pakistani rebels and the invasion of East Pakistan was not accepted under international law. India attempted to come up with several new interpretations, but it was not until 20-years later that UN intervention under Chapter VII became acceptable. And that was UN intervention, not unilateral. India’s advance to Dacca was not legal, and we were condemned 104-14 at the UN, the largest margin ever witnessed.

  When China attacked India in the Aksai Chin, no one intervened for us. It was clearly an internal matter between two neighbors. If we attack Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, aside from China, who is going to intervene against us? Our strategists blithely assume the US will stop the fighting. How? What if India says it is reclaiming its own territory, and any spill over to Pakistan proper is purely temporary and regretted and so on and so forth. Aside from China and Pakistan, we have no enemies. No one will intervene. The US intervened in 1999 and 2001-02 with our tacit permission, because we accepted that as an alternative to fighting Pakistan.

  Is it possible to recover Kashmir without crossing the international border of Kashmir, Punjab, and Sindh? Let’s keep this simple. No. One of the most lunatic things India has ever done is to order our troops and aircraft not to cross even the Kashmir Line of Actual Control in 1999. This meant that we ccould not enter our own territory! Did anyone in India question this? No, because Indians are used to any amount of craziness. If now we cross into Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, the Pakistan Air Force at the very least will enter battle. We then have no choice but to suppress Pakistani main and secondary airbases within range of Kashmir. What happens then is anyone’s guess but let us understand that POK is not one day going to vote for union with India. Nor are the Chinese going to sob in their silk hankies at the unfairness of the argument so far: international law on unilateral intervening in another country is clear, but the superpowers have exempted themselves from the rules. Even India in 1971, though neither a great or superpower, violated international law, because we could.

  Another clear and simple paper discussing the right of preemption is by Sanjay Gupta.[394] It is particularly useful because he brings India into the analysis, noting that when in 2003 India claimed the right of preemption against a Pakistan terror attack, citing the US attack on Iraq, US warned India against retaliation. In particular – and you have to love this – “But the Indian government’s claim was promptly dismissed by the USA, citing Iraq as an exceptional case and warning India not to follow the US precedent in its dealings with Pakistan.” (p. 190). The hypocrisy is breathtaking. Incidentally, Gupta is concerned that India might use US doctrine against Pakistan. He should not worry. India is not just a paper elephant, it is an elephant made from smoke.

  16.2 The international community and the US will
not help us

  Reviewing the idea of a nation’s core interest, visualize a series of concentric circles. The outermost circle has the largest area and represents those interests on which we can comfortably negotiate and compromise on. The innermost circle has the smallest area, representing those interests on which we cannot negotiate or compromise at any cost. The innermost circle is our existential red line; compromise in the inner circle as consequences so dire, war is the rational answer. Take China as an example. Why China and not India? Because Indians are willing to compromise infinitely. India is more an idea than a physical entity, to borrow from Sunil Khilnani; [395] no matter what we are forced to surrender, we know the idea that is India can never be extinguished, and when circumstances permit, we will take back our losses.

  § India is called a soft state because we go on compromising forever and adapting ourselves to our changed circumstances forever. Due to my American background, I am a hard stater, appalled and revolted at the way Indians are ready to compromise rather than fight and to accept the consequences of victory or defeat. While I remain a hard state person, with advancing age has come a realization that India’s strategy of compromise is well-adapted for our core interest, which is surviving as an idea. An idea can never be extinguished; the corporate memory of India cannot be erased no matter how many of us die, and we can remain confident India will return. India is like a giant, multi-brained organism that when punched resiles, absorbing the hit, but immediately probing for any space, no matter how small, to push back. Thus, the Muslim invaders could not conquer India; India absorbed them and made them Indian and survived. American consumerism took over the world; India changed it around as it wanted. Now India has even changed English, making it into a new lingua franca that permits people from all over India to communicate. My personal preference is an India sufficiently hard to build bulwarks along our borders so that no outsider can harm us, allowing 1000 states to flourish as their people see best – in conformity with basic human rights, of course.

  China’s core interest is to become the new Middle Kingdom. The Chinese thought they lived in a Middle Kingdom because they isolated themselves, with limited knowledge of the rest of the world. To be today’s Middle Kingdom, China is not staying at home, but aiming to become the world’s sole superpower, replacing the Americans. That, of course, is a long-term plan, though China already has made it to first place in trade, and second place in economic and military terms. Its core national security interest is to push America out of East Asia and to the east of the First Island Chain. To bet against Chinese success will be foolish, though the full process may not be achieved until 2030. China will not, under any circumstances, tolerate any power, adverse or not, on its land periphery. It is closing the South China Sea with the East China Sea to follow. And it will not tolerate any new power embracing Taiwan, which according to China’s manipulated and twisted historical argument, is and always has been part of China. Is not China tolerating the US in Taiwan? Yes, and it is working assiduously toward reunification. That is why I said no “new power”. However barbarous China may seem to us, the simple reality is they have a plan that they are steadily implementing toward their goal of becoming the leading world power. Indians have an amorphous belief that they should at least assume their place as one of the world’s four natural powers, which Panniker defined as America, the Soviet Union, China, and India. The Chinese are playing in another league from us: great power status is of no interest, they want to be King of the Hill. Their reaction to our pretensions ranges from outright anger to amused indifference.

  This may not be immediately obvious, but the US is resigned to sell Taiwan down the river. Not today, but when the realities cannot be denied that the US cannot defend Taiwan without severe costs. The US already refuses to sell weapons of importance. As of today, China cannot cross the Straits without incurring a tremendous loss of men and material. But Beijing has been single-mindedly focused on “recovery” of Taiwan for decades. In 2018 it is much closer to its objective than ever before. My informed guess is that China requires another seven years to invade with acceptable losses. Meanwhile, China is doing everything possible to raise costs to US Navy carrier groups, which are key to defending Taiwan. Soon the US will decide the costs of defending Taiwan are not worth the risks. In any case, the US has long accepted Taiwan as part of China. Say around 2024, Taiwan will be unable to defend itself, and the US will be unwilling to protect it. At which point the Chinese will make their move. Another possibility is that Taiwan will realize it cannot count on the US and will make its peace with Beijing.

  After this lengthy exposition, it is at last possible to tie in DPRK, after which I will tie in India. Let’s pretend this is 1998, and DPRK is firing off missiles, staging alleged N-explosions, threatening to launch ICBMs at the US homeland and so. Would US be sitting around bleating that DPRK had better watch what it says? More likely the US would have reduced much of DPRK industrial and its N-capability to ruins. What’s changed is China. In 1998 the Chinese had no military capability to stop the US. Truthfully, despite the worst-case scenarios being tossed out by Washington, it still cannot. But the risk it might react if the US crossed the 38th Parallel has substantially increased. To what extent cannot be quantified, and if someone does present neat percentages, disregard them. This is not a mathematical problem. In 1998 the Chinese military was equipped with the largest arms junkyard in the world. It had little reconnaissance capability, no networking capability, and no way to protect itself against US sea- and airpower. Today is different. But in 2028 Chinese risk margin will go down and the US’s go up to the point a US attack on DPRK will not be rational. Like it or not, neither North Korea and Taiwan are core US interests in an environment where China can hit back and cause unacceptable loss.

  Notice, please: US has taken not the slightest military action against DPRK, which threatens the US with annihilation day after day, that is, of course, when Mr. Trump and Kim Jong Il are not exchanging “Your Mama so fat…” insults. Far from disarming DPRK, US is quietly putting out it may even lose a war to DPRK. The idea is an utter farce. Yes, of course, the Pentagon is driving this to bid for more resources, but that a retired general who has served in the area is writing a warning to Congress does raise justifiable suspicion that the Pentagon, at least, if not also the White House is not displeased at the chance to deescalate.

  The statement needs closer analysis because we could easily see similar reasoning applied to us if the US wants an excuse not to defend us. The statement says (a) Unless the US stages a ground invasion, there is no surety all DPRK N-weapon facilities will be destroyed; (b) US/ROK forces will be vastly outnumbered by DPRK forces; (c) US would be caught having to evacuate 100,000 civilians in the middle of fighting; and (d) DPRK may use chemical weapons against US/ROK bases that US needs to bring in troop reinforcement and supplies, leaving the US unreinforced and under-supplied.

  By the way, am I permitted to ask if calling a document “leaked” automatically makes it more credible and authentic? Just asking,

  Point (a) has merit. Yet, any ground invasion without China’s tacit agreement creates too many uncertainties about counter-escalation by China, a ground war is ruled out unless DPRK starts it. Even then, it will be risky if the US moves to occupy North Korea with the purpose of searching out and securing all elements of the country’s N-program. Not only is this a lenghty process, there is no reason for the Chinese to acquiese.

  Point (b) is without merit. DPRK is said to have 1.2-million soldiers. After the reductions to focus resources on modernization, the ROK army will be 400,000 active and reserve troops in 38 divisions; the US has 28,000 soldiers in theatre, but just one brigade on rotation. Since when, however, has the US needed equality or superiority of manpower to defeat an enemy? The US will rely on firepower, not ground numbers. Moreover, why is it assumed the US would attack DPRK with what it has is in theatre? The US will call up reserves to replace troops shipped to South Korea, these could inclu
de eight army and two marine divisions, requiring a 6-month buildup, with corps, army, and theatre troops this will total 600,000 soldiers including tactical air, plus naval task forces.

  Point (c) is without merit. Evacuation of US civilians will be one of the least important priorities for the US military. Moreover, if the US is to attack DPRK to destroy N-capability, an extensive buildup is required, giving ample time to evacuate anyone.

  Point (d) has partial merit. Certainly, DPRK can use chemical weapons. The US and almost all countries, [396] has destroyed its chemical weapons under the United Nations International Chemical Weapons Convention treaty. Since these weapons are considered WMD, US will be free to respond to their use by using its own WMD, i.e., nuclear weapons.

  § DPRK is one of six countries that has refused to accede to the Convention, on ground it has no chemical weapons.[397] Nonetheless, South Korea estimates a DPRK stockpile of 2500-5000 tons which will be used against cities, plus 5,000-tons of biological weapons. Are these estimates based on hard intelligence data or speculations and chain-quoting? Chain-quoting is a term I use to describe the phenomenon of X making a statement, which is then quoted by Y, followed by Z, and so on, until a “fact” is created. In my experience, disproving a chain-quote may be the most difficult process encountered in war studies. A conjectural,[398] DPRK scenario can be found in the short paper “Thunder Run to Seoul”. It contains no data to back its assumptions or to clarify the argument. This is no criticism of this paper, merely an example of the content-free analysis so common in the field of conflict studies.