Analysis of India's Ability to Fight a 2-front War 2018
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1963 or so
121st (I) Brigade
Scouts battalions
1971
121st (I) Brigade
Scouts battalions
1984
28th Mountain Division
Two brigades
1986-1987
3rd, 4th, 6th Divisions for OP Trident
Reinforces with 3 brigades
1999/January
121st Brigade
Three brigades
1999/December
8th Mtn + HQ 3rd Div (with 70th Bde)
Four brigades + 7th Division
2018
8th Mountain Division
4 brigades; may be 5
East Ladakh
Year
India
1962/Sept
114th (I) Brigade
1962/Dec
3rd Inf Division w. 70, 114, 163 Bdes
1971/Dec
3rd Division w. 70, 114 Bdes
1985
3rd Division (70, 114 Bdes); 102 (I) Bde
1999
114 Bde; 102 (I) Bde
2013/2014
3rd Division (114 Bde); 102 (I) Bde; 39th Division as wartime reserve
2018
3rd Division (3 bdes); SSN (1 bde + 102 Bde); 1 Armd Bde; 39 Div war reserve
Clearly, India had by end 1999 demilitarized East Ladakh. Did this make China happy? Did it seize on this opportunity to discuss a permanent reduction of troops in Ladakh? No. China opportunistically chose to pressure India, which led us to jump from two brigades to nine in wartime. If necessary, India can add 72nd Mountain Division from Pathankot, part of XVII Corps. Hope China is happy now.
While East Ladakh is in reasonable shape, there has been a cost in that 39th Division is needed to reinforce XVI Corps during wartime. Ignoring that, the problem is that if Pakistan moves XI Corps from Peshawar to the Northern Areas, we’re going to be looking at 10 brigades for our four. In 1999 it moved 7th Division from the Peshawar Corps in case India decided to launch a counteroffensive against the Northern Areas. Now, when the Kargil War was not getting resolved due to the difficulty of assaulting very high-altitude positions held by tenacious defenders, India prepared to move 6th Mountain Division into Ladakh and was prepared to bring in 27th Mountain Division from Eastern Command. But: under the scenario postulated here, we are engaged in a live confrontation with China not amounting to outright war. If we protect East Ladakh, North Ladakh becomes vulnerable, and vice versa.
Now, look, people. If I was sitting in the Army’s place, I would be asking the GOI: Why are you forcing me to make these compromises? Moreover, are we not supposed to be able to defeat both adversary armies, and by having this capability deter them from attacking in the first place? I’ve already calculated we need 54 divisions for a strong defense; and informed the reader that my calculations done elsewhere for a 2-front victory suggest 72-divisions. For this situation, XIV Corps needs a division in reserve, not a brigade, and XV, XVI, and IX Corps also need to be three divisions each instead of two. And we need a strike corps to lead an offensive, not one lonely division belonging rightly to the Eastern Command’s strike corps. And we need a corps in Army reserves for the Northwest theatre, plus plug the gaps discussed in the Cold Start chapter. We’ve already discussed the need – previously accepted by the GOI, for a division in Himachal and a second one in Uttarakhand. Not to forget all the other stuff need against Nepal, to strengthen Bhutan defenses, and trouble on the Bangladesh and Burma fronts. We’ve argued earlier that of the GOI wants to defend every meter of Indian territory, it needs a big jump in strength. If it can bring itself to maintain a proper offensive doctrine, perhaps 54 divisions will do the job, and territory can be protected using one of the several variations of a People’s Army that we discussed. What is unacceptable under any conditions is this Nothing Strategy, where we don’t have enough to fight on 2-fronts offensively and defensively. And we have also already shown that the Indian strategy for a 2-front war, i.e., defeating Pakistan and then shifting to China won’t work. Because we cannot defeat Pakistan with the force we we have.
Incidentally, I am aware that the Pakistanis have taken the Northern Areas out of Pakistan Kashmir and now directly rule what is called Gilgit-Baltistan. It’s easier to refer to the region by its old name. The Pakistanis have given India the clue that we should take Ladakh and Jammu out of Kashmir, reducing the argument to the ten districts of the Valley; but of course, asking the GOI to do any original thinking is like asking a dead tree to come up with a Unified Field Theory.
Pakistan on its side has four or five brigades: Gilgit, Astor, Skardu, Dansam for the Siachin, and a brigade forward of Skardu. My Force Command Northern Areas orbat is in a bit of a mess because of being away from the region so long; no one seems particularly interested in tracking it. This fifth brigade might be 170th if it exists. Pakistan should simply give FCNA a division number. Prior to 1971 there were no brigades at all, and it was manned by Scouts, so a division number was not appropriate. After 1972 Pakistan raised two new brigades, later added a third and then a fourth. There are several Scouts battalions also, another long story. First, there were the Gilgit Scouts (1889); after Independence came the Karakorum (1949) and the Northern Area (1965). In 1974 all three were amalgamated into the Northern Light Infantry. That left the problem of policing the India-Pakistan border in the north, so the Northern Area Scouts were reraised, and then became the Gilgit-Baltistan Scouts with three wings of battalion size, 112th, 113rd, and 114th. The permanent garrisons are at Gilgit, Skardu, and Piun. India’s 1971 offensive by a ragtag Ladakh Scouts force supplemented by volunteers given 15-days training was forced to stop at Piun for lack of supplies. Since India knew from May 1971 that war was coming, we could have prepared better and perhaps even made it to the outskirts of Skardu; but this completely obscure corner of Kashmir was of no interest to Army HQ, particularly given the extreme terrain and the winter weather. Still, there was no one better suited for the job than the indominable Major K. Rimchin, a Ladakhi who had won his first MVC at age 17 in the 1947 War and added a well-deserved bar for his effort 25-years later.
In closing it is necessary to emphasize: ultimately, we are in this super mess where we are surrounded by actual or potential powers not because our diplomacy has failed, but because our economic growth has failed, and we have not even provided for a military force that we can afford – 4% of GDP. Had we kept modest pace with China, we would have a GDP of perhaps $6-8 trillion, and it would be us investing in the peripheries and overawing them by our force, instead of China doing this against us. We have hunkered down like turtles on Pakistan and on China, not looking one day ahead leave alone 10, 20, 50 years. China is neither playing games nor playing the fool. It is single-mindedly bent on first supremacy in South and East Asia and the Western Pacific, and then the world. If we are failing, it is solely because of us and no one else’s fault. 99% of our energy is going in our internal security, economic, and cultural wars. Please do not misunderstand me: India will survive in one form or the other. But if we cannot provide for the prosperity and internal/external security of our people, they’re going to start thinking: is it such a good idea to tie our future to Delhi’s empire?
An astute analysis of another Chinese option in the north by Surauv Jha.
I found Saurav Jha’s article while wrapping up this analysis. This may be the first time I’ve ever quoted someone on a scenario rather than present mine, but honestly, the thought of a Chinese smash-and-grab operation had never occurred to me. Saurav Jha’s “China’s creeping invasion of India”[439] lays out this possibility. We’re all familiar with China’s “sneak-and-grab” because China has been doing it for decades. What Jha suggests is a no-warning limited grab by China without more than a modest reinforcement of Tibet. Right now, there are four regular and one reservist brigades, plus several border regiments that in time will become brigades as is the case everywhere else except Tibet and Xinjiang. There is also a special f
orce brigade, and a helicopter brigade can be quickly sent in. Zero warning is impossible when we’re talking divisions and corps. But a couple of brigades can do a zero-warning. Particularly as we have very limited intelligence on Chinese movements and because the border is 4057-km long. If China grabs a couple of hundred square-kilometers in a swoop and that sits down, we’ll be faced with an unpalatable situation where we accept the grab or bear the onus of attacking. To quote Jha:
Indeed, rather than opt for a major campaign that isn’t going to end quickly, given that there would be no element of surprise, the PLAGF could use its ability to mobilize modest-sized forces much more quickly to make a grab at tactical features and a pass or two at certain places along the LAC where such opportunities exist. In the process, the PLAGF could create more encroachment possibilities for itself while possibly foreclosing axes that might be used by counter-attacking Indian forces. China would try to gain the initiative by striking first, very much in consonance with its philosophy of “active defense,” and then offer a negotiated settlement to India.
Summing Up
So, we’ve taken a bit of a stroll to answer the sole question posed: Does India have the capability of fighting a 2-front war? The sole answer is “no”, and you don’t really need to read the intervening 180,000 words. I’ve taken the liberty of meandering around to show you how in defense analysis everything is related to everything. Indra’s net as told by Vedic philosophers. In every tiny part you can see the whole, or the universe in a grain of sand (John Dunne). Nothing is irrelevant to the study of national security even if you do not immediately see its relevance. Store up everything, and as you go along, data begins to throw out tendrils to link to other relevant data. Every new datum requires rearrangement of your data set. After a point it is no longer a conscious process: the rearrangement takes place by itself. Though we’re talking national security here, this is true of any form of knowledge. If national security forms a universe, other fields form parts of an interconnected multiverse. As far as we know to this point, there is no practical way to travel to other universes, but intellectually it’s very easy. Many scholars reject reading stuff that appears irrelevant to their field. This is wrong. Everything is relevant to your field. I’ve indicated there is no short-cut to achieving “expert” status. I always put “expert” in Austin Powers air quotes because an expert soon realizes that the more knowledge s/he acquires, the more s/he becomes aware of one’s ignorance. If you are not aware of something, if you do not even suspect it exists, then there’s no problem. But once you turn on a light in a hallway, you immediately see that myriad hallways connect to the one in which you stand. A myriad is a thousand. So, you learn one new datum, and it shows you there a thousand new data of which previously you were unaware. So, you enter one of the ten new hallways of which you have become aware. You enter one, switch on the light, to learn there are ten more. Each fact you learn leads you to appreciate there are 9 more you don’t know. 9 multiplied by 9 say 10 times gets you to a big number. And even that is an impossibly small fraction of what is left to learn. So: Ravi Rikhye Law: knowledge grows in a linear fashion; knowledge of your ignorance grows exponentially. Doubtless a thousand people have said that before.
So, you’re thinking with quantum computing you can get a grip on things. Sorry, you cannot. The quantum computer may analyze data at one google flops someday, but then there’s the googleplex which is infinitely small compared to what’s possible. Is there no solution to this conundrum? Sure. It’s very simple. Convert yourself to a 4-dimensional being. That’s easy; you ask incredulously? Hey, people, all I said is the solution is simple. I did not say anything about easy. These are metaphysical questions. So why bring them up? Just to keep yourself humble in case you are tempted to call yourself an “expert.” In an old Glenn Ford movie, “The fastest gun alive,” the denouement is “no matter how fast you are, there’s somewhere faster.”
The key to humility is to understand that everyone has something to teach you. So instead of grandstanding give the other person space to talk. Avoid talking unless it’s to ask questions or for clarifications.
Where does this analysis lead us? In my twenties, I realized that the great men and women who brought us freedom had no practical idea of how to govern and lead us. It seemed obvious that the damage eight centuries of colonization had done to the Indian psyche could not be overcome by just one generation which had come of age at a time we were intellectually colonized, not just physically. It followed that Midnight’s Children must take over and make the needed changes. But Midnight’s Children, as epitomized by Rajiv Gandhi, who held the biggest majority of any Indian prime minister and could have changed India turned out to be as incompetent as their fathers. Worse, they turned out to be morally corrupt. In view of this experience, I hesitate to say: Well, Midnight’s Grandchildren will make the big change. It seems hubristic to put any time on this. It takes a lot more to overcome the inertia of eight centuries. Remember, inertia is a vector; it does not necessarily mean standing still but proceeding on a certain path. The more well-worn the path, the deeper it becomes, and the more the energy needed to shift to a new vector. For some years, I’ve thought: okay, when we become the world’s largest economy, we’ll gain the self-confidence to bring real change. In 2018, watching the unbelievable nonsense that passes for a national security policy, and the convoluted mess that is our defense procurement and military organization, I have become pessimistic. I doubt we will change even when we pass China in GDP. But look: India has become the world’s sixth largest economy despite our determined effort to cripple ourselves by shooting ourselves in one foot, then the other, followed by one hand, then the other hand, and finally in the head. We’ve sort of tumbled into the sixth position and heading for third. For some reason, we India don’t do things; we allow things to do us. We will achieve greatness not consciously, but unconsciously. The world, 30-50 years from now will be tripolar: China, India, and the West, or perhaps just the US if Europe becomes neutral. A friendly partnership with the US based on shared values will suffice to keep us safe. Still, as a British sports commentator once said over 50-years ago about a hockey match against Pakistan we were winning, India is fantastic at snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. It will be unwise for us to assume greatness is ineviatble.
Here is the thought I want to leave you with. The idea of the dharmic ruler seems to have been extant for all our recorded history. The Americans have a slogan “You are the change you seek.” You are the person who will change India. It you wait for Kalki, as I did for 20-years, sorry about that but Kalki does not function in human time. A few millions of years this way or that mean nothing to him. If you want change, you must do the job. Start with something simple. Plant a tree and keep the sidewalk outside your house free of trash. Others will join you. That is how revolutions start. Gandhi knew that, and he was right.
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[1] Ellis, N. (2017, December 23, 2017). The Great Indian Tamasha. Facebook.com
[2] Knoma. (2018). “GDP by country: Statistics from the World Bank. https://knoema.com/mhrzolg/gdp-by-country-statistics-from-the-world-bank-1960-2016?country=Pakistan
[3] International Monetary Fund (2017, October). “World Economic Outlook Database, October 2017”. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=49&pr.y=14&sy=2018&ey=2022&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=564%2C924%2C534&s=NGDPD&grp=0&a=
[4] Press Trust of India. (2017, September 17). “HSBC sees India as a $7 trillion economy by 2028, overtaking Germany, Japan”. Livemint.com. https://www.livemint.com/Politics/0IMc34nX7x8aJFOSuUatnL/HSBC-sees-India-as-a-7-trillion-economy-by-2028-overtaking.htm l
[5] At least one report, based on what Indian Army sources told the UK Daily Mail, says Indian border police pushed the Chinese 10-km back towards the LAC before the Chinese refused to budge further. If true, this implies the original intrusion was 29-km. Mail Today Bureau. (2013, April 29). “Army fumes as Chinese troops erect fifth
tent and deploy dogs in Ladakh”. Daily Mail (UK). www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-2316738/Army-fumes-Chinese-troops-erect-fifth-tent-deploy-dogs-Ladakh.html http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-2316738/Army-fumes-Chinese-troops-erect-fifth-tent-deploy-dogs-Ladakh.html
.
[6] Tibet Review. (2014, May 20). “India denies China occupying territory in Ladakh”. www.tibetanreview.net/india-denies-china-occupying-territory-in-ladakh/
[7] Chin, J. (2017, January 6). “‘Yeti’ Prints Suggest Humans Settled in Tibet More Than 7,000 Years Ago”. Wall Street Journal. https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2017/01/06/yeti-prints-suggest-humans-settled-in-tibet-more-than-7000-years-ago/
[8] Smithsonian Institute (2018, June 15). Earliest humans in China. Smithsonian Museum of Nattural History. http://humanorigins.si.edu/research/asian-research-projects/earliest-humans-china
[9] Arpi, C. (2013, Setpember 12). “India is soft on Chinese intrusions. Claude Arpi Blog http://claudearpi.blogspot.com/2013/09/india-is-soft-on-chinese-intrusions.html
[10] Pandit, R. (2014, September 26). “India, China set to end 16-day Chumar stand-off by Saturday”. Times of India. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-China-set-to-end-16-day-Chumar-stand-off-by-Saturday/articleshow/43467644.cms
[11] Times News Network. (2013, May 27). “Chinese troops intercept Army patrol in Ladakh”. Times of India. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Chinese-troops-intercept-Army-patrol-in-Ladakh/articleshow/20284571.cms