Doctor Goebbels: His Life & Death
Page 95
27 Unpubl. diary, Sep 4, 1939.
28 Ibid., Sep 5, 87; JG assured Alfieri late on Sep 4, 1939 that since there were no U-boats
nearby, Mr Churchill must have ordered the Athenia, with its many American passengers,
sunk to propel the USA into the war (loc. cit, 6577)
29 Unpubl. diary, Sep 5, 1939.
30 Ibid. Sep 6, 1939.
31 Note for Alfieri, Sep 9, 8:30 P.M. (pp.6577ff).
32 Unpubl. diary, Sep 6, 1939.
33 Führer decree of Sep 8, 1939 on Foreign Propaganda, ND: NG.3259 and ADAP(D),
vol.viii, No.31; and see foreign ministry (Habicht) to Keitel, Nov 29, 1939 (OKW files, NA
film T77, roll 64, 7860f).
34 Unpubl. diary, Sep 9, 1939.
35 E.g., Ibid., Sep 14, 15, 1939.
36 Ibid., Sep 10, 1939.
37 Note for Italian minister of popular culture on phone call to JG, Sep 10 (pp.6583ff);
Unpubl. diary, Sep 11, 1939. ‘Then I brief the Führer and Ribbentrop on our conversation.
They want to wait and see. Question what Russia’s up to now.’
38 Unpubl. diary, Sep 17, 1939: ‘The justification is very original,’ commented JG.
39 Ibid., Sep 13, 1939.
40 Note for Italian minister of popular culture on phone call to JG, Sep 16, 8 P.M. (pp.6586f).
578 GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH
41 JG propaganda directive, Oct 2, 1939, in OKW secret propaganda files (NA film T77,
roll 964, 7332).
42 Unpubl. diary, Sep 27, 1939.
43 Diary, Oct 11, 13, 1939.
44 Ibid., Dec 12, 1939.
45 Ibid., Oct 18, 1939.
46 Ibid., Oct 14, 17, 1939.
47 Ibid. Oct 15, 18, 1939.
48 Ibid., Oct 20, 1939.
49 Ibid., Oct 23; VB, Oct 21, 1939.
50 Ibid., Oct 28, 1939.
51 On this routine see the interrogations of inter alia Helmuth Sündermann, Oct 15; Werner
Stephan, Oct 29; Fritzsche, Oct 7, Dietrich, Oct 14 and 17, and Gutterer, Dec 18, 1947
(NA RG.260, list 53-3/7, box 15).
52 Kreis-, Gau-, Stoßtrupp- and Reichsredner. See the RPL report, ‘Die Propagandaarbeit
der Partei im Kriege,’ winter 1940–41 (NSDAP archives, NA film T581, roll 16).
53 Diary, Nov 5, 1937.
54 Ibid. Oct 17, 24, Nov 2, 3, 9, 11, 12, 18, 19, 28, Dec 18, 1939.
55 Veit Harlan, Im Schatten meiner Filme. Eine Selbstbiographie (Gütersloh, 1966), 111f.
56 Ibid., Dec 15, 30, 1939.
57 H Parlo et al., Jud Süß. Historisches und juristisches Material zum Fall Veit Harlan (Hamburg,
1949).
58 Sunday Express, Sep 3, 1939, p.1.
59 Diary, Oct 31, 1939.
60 Daily Sketch, London, Nov 9; diary, Nov 17, 19. Ministerkonferenz, Nov 19, 1939. (The
transcripts of these ministerial conferences, now on the original microfiches in Moscow
archives, were also held on microfilm in ZStA Potsdam; Willi Boelcke, a former ZStA official,
fled to West Germany taking microfilms with him, and published them as Kriegspropaganda
1939–1941. Geheime Ministerkonferenzen im Reichspropagandaministerium (Stuttgart, 1966), and
Wollt Ihr den totalen Krieg? Die geheimen Goebbels-Konferenzen 1939–1943 (Stuttgart 1967).
Whether from Boelcke or the original files I cite them hereafter as ‘MinConf.’— See too
Karl-Dietrich Abel, Presselenkung im NS-Staat (Berlin, 1968), and Fritz Sänger, Politik der
Täuschungen. Mißbrauch der Presse im Dritten Reich., Weisungen, Informationen, Notizen (Vienna,
1975).
61 Diary, Nov 2; and see Westdeutscher Beobachter, Nov 1, DAZ, Nov 2, NYT, Nov 3; and
picture in Illustrierte Beobachter, Nov 9, 1939.
62 Diary, Nov 3, 1939.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid., Dec 5, 1939.
65 Rosenberg diary, Nov 11, Dec 3, 1939; for JG’s speech see DAZ, and Berliner Börsenzeitung,
Oct 23, 1939.
66 Diary, Nov 2; RMVP (Hippler) to Schaub, Nov 1, and reply (BA file MS.10/46); cf.
Rosenberg diary, Dec 8, 1939.
67 Rosenberg diary, Dec 11; JG diary, Dec 12, 1939.
GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH 579
68 See the architect’s file, Oct 1939, in ZStA Potsdam, Rep.50.01, RMVP, vol.1032; and
diary, Oct 15, 21, 22, 28, 1939.
69 Diary, Oct 18–26, 1939.
70 Ibid., Nov 10, 1939.
71 Ibid., Oct 27, 30, 1939.
72 Ibid., Nov 5, 1939.
73 Ibid., Nov 8, 1939.
74 Ibid., Dec 4, 1939; and letter from her secretary to ration card office, Jan 9, 1940 (ZStA
Potsdam, Rep.90, Go 2, vol.2).
75 Diary, Dec 6, 9, 1939.
76 See Himmler files, NA film T175, roll 473, 4786; and BA file NS.10/126.
77 Diary, Nov 9, 1939.
78 Press circular, Nov 9, 1939 (Hoover Libr: Fritzsche papers, box 4); on Nov 10, the
circular directed journalists to blame ‘world Jews and not the Jewish community in Germany.’
79 Diary, Nov 10, 11; press circular, Nov 22, 1939.
80 Borresholm, 146ff.
81 Diary, Nov 11, 12, 1939.
82 MinConf., Nov 10, 1939.
83 Diary, Nov 13, 14, 15; MinConf., Nov 11, 13; press circular, Nov 11; cf. NYT, Nov 13,
1939. The murderer Georg Elser, 36, a Swabian watch-maker, had been caught a few hours
after the bomb blast: see BA files NS.20/65, and R.22/3100; he appeared to have acted
alone.
84 Press circular, Nov 21; news of the capture had been embargoed on the tenth (ibid.)
85 MinConf., Nov 2, 22, 25, 1939; Boelcke, 229.
86 MinConf., Nov 11, 13, 1939.
87 Borresholm, 146ff.
88 Karl Loog, Die Weissagungen des Nostradamus. Erstmalige Auffindung des Chiffreschlüssels und
Enthüllung der Prophezeihungen über Europas Zukunft und Frankreichs Glück und Niedergang 1555–
2200 (Pfullingen, 1940). And Bruno Winkler, Englands Aufstieg und Niedergang nach den
Prophezeiungen des großen französischen Sehers der Jahre 1555 und 1558 (Leipzig, 1940).— Diary,
Dec 5, 14; MinConf., Dec 5, 1939. He sent a copy of the Nostradamus brochure to Hitler’s
adjutant Albert Bormann on Sep 10, 1940 (Princeton Univ. Libr: Hitler collection).
89 MinConf., Dec 11, 12, 1939.
90 Diary, Dec 13, 14, 17; MinConf., Oct 28, 1939, Feb 27, 1940.
91 Diary, Dec 17, 1939.
92 Press circular, Dec 11, 1939 (Hoover Libr.: Fritzsche papers, box 4). For a further
collection of RAP Berlin special press circulars Oct 1939–Jul 1940 see ZStA Potsdam,
Rep.50.01, RMVP, vol.1041.
93 Diary, Dec 20, 1939.
94 MinConf., Oct 28; MinConf., Apr 20, 24, 1940.
95 Diary, Nov 3; MinConf., Nov 2, 3, 11, 1939.
96 Diary, Nov 3; press circular, Nov 18, 1939.
97 MinConf., Nov 3, 16, 17; press circular, Nov 20; VB, Nov 21, 1939.
580 GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH
98 MinConf., Nov 17, 18, Dec 19, 20, 1939; Jan 11, 1940. Diary, Dec 14, 17, 19; Dec 15,
1939; diary, Jan 9, 10,. He directed Fritzsche to publish fresh sentences every two or three
weeks as a deterrent (MinConf., Apr 19, 1940.)
99 For the first WB see the SD morale reports called Meldungen aus dem Reich, Nov 22
(NA film T175, roll 258, 0299f and 0317) (cited hereafter as ‘Meldungen’); and OKW
propaganda files, Dec 2, 1939, NA film T77, roll 964, 7987ff. For the second, third, and
fourth WB and other leaflets including Fliegende Blätter Nr.1 and Englands Kriegsziel–Englands
Friedensziel see Meldungen, Dec 6, 29, 1939 and Jan 12, 1940 (pp.0396f, 0535f, 058f).
101 Diary, Dec 5, 1939.
102 Press circulars, Dec 23, 26, 1939; Meldungen, Jan 5; MinConf., Jan 9, 1940.
103 Press circular, Nov 17, 18, 1939.
104 Ibid., Nov 21, 23, Dec 18, 1939.—In Mar 1942 he informed the magazine Kirchenmusik
that even reviewers of church singing had to sign their full names. (Yivo, file G-17).
105 Press circular, Dec 16, 28, 1939 (Fritzsche papers).
GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH 581
Goebbels
37: Propaganda Means Repetition
THE winter of 1939–40 wrote its name in the history of Europe with weeks of
barbaric blizzards. The canals froze over; deprived of coal, the arms factories
slowed down, and power stations dimmed.1 The radiators in Goebbels’ ministerial
palace were stone cold. Playhouses and movie theatres closed.2 He discussed with
Albert Speer putting even stronger security fencing around Lanke, and gave orders
for a two month renovation of Schwanenwerder as well.3 The forests around Lanke
were blanketed in snow. He took Magda and the children out on sleigh rides until the
snow lost its magic for him. Judging from his diary the chattering children were his
only joy. ‘Children are at least quite honest,’ he wrote. ‘They say what they mean.
Why can’t we?’4 Visiting his mother at Rheydt he did what he could to help her to
make ends meet. ‘She brought me through the World War,’ he reasoned. ‘Now I’m
going to see her through this one.’ Still plagued with money problems, he persuaded
Magda to pass the hat round among their wealthier friends.5 As Europe froze, Hitler’s
plans congealed as well. Once, on January 8, 1940, he invited Goebbels around
for a cup of real coffee; but he made no attempt to discuss Yellow, his planned attack
on France.6
Goebbels boasted to Hitler that their propaganda broadcasts were now going out
in twenty-two foreign languages, including Gaelic, Afrikaans, Arabic, Hindustani and
a babel of Balkan tongues, compared with four languages a year before. Their English
language broadcasts targeted the working-classes, with an emphasis on the anti-plutocratic
character of the war; the News Chronicle, Goebbels told Hitler, reported that
582 GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH
fifty-four percent of the ‘little people’ in England admitted tuning in to his propaganda.
7
He was ill at ease in war. His ministerial functions largely bored him. He repeatedly
criticized the party’s newspapers like the S.S. organ Das Schwarze Korps, which
printed these words: ‘If, one way or another, a girl evades her supreme obligation to
have legitimate or illegitimate children, she is as guilty of desertion as is a conscientious
objector.’8 To the foreign journalists stationed in Berlin he offered both the
carrot and the stick. He told Karl Bömer to open up luxurious retreats for these
important gentlemen, with no expense spared to mollycoddle them; but he also
recommended arresting one from time to time and saddling him with ‘interminable
court proceedings’ as a salutary lesson.9 He also directed Bömer to ensure that Otto
Strasser’s autobiography was banned ‘in every country in which it is slated to appear’.
10 The book was not flattering about Goebbels.
SEVERAL times during those weeks he defined his basic propaganda tenets. Ordering
Fritzsche to continue plugging the Athenia mystery, Goebbels lectured him cynically:
‘Never lose sight of the fundamental principle of all propaganda, the constant
repetition of the most effective arguments.’11 A month later he reiterated, ‘Propaganda
means repetition and still more repetition!’ ‘I keep dinning it into my people
over and over: repeat it until even the densest has got it.’12 Speaking to editors on
April 5, 1940, he said much the same. In August he would call repetition the ‘linchpin
of all propaganda.’13
Almost equal in importance came accuracy and promptness. Local people had
been dismayed by the press’s furtive reporting on the Friedrichshafen rail disaster.14
Moreover, headlines had to match the story. A Berlin evening newspaper headlined
the sinking of ‘two British warships’, but they were only patrol boats.15 As the British
air raids began during May 1940 Goebbels ruled that the local press was always to
report death-rolls accurately. After casualties in one Berlin raid were first announced
as six dead, then revised to thirty-six, he ordered the press to admit their error. ‘The
people must not start doubting the credibility of German reporting,’ he explained.16
GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH 583
In overseas broadcasting he allowed greater objectivity than at home. He released
the newsreel record of the last moments of the pocket battleship Graf Spee only for
foreign consumption.17 With the increasing setbacks of 1941 Goebbels’ policy of
total truth became harder to enforce. When the navy lost its three top submarine
aces, Günter Prien, Joachim Schepke, and Otto Kretschmer, on one day he ordered
the news suppressed.18 He began to deceive his own diary more systematically, telling
it on November 19, 1941 that Ernst Udet had ‘died suddenly,’ although it is plain
from the rest of the entry that he knew that the Luftwaffe general had died by his
own hand.19
He saw little point in issuing official denials. ‘Denials alone won’t work,’ he stated
when the British started alleging Nazi atrocities in Poland. ‘You’ve got to counterattack.’
In this case he suggested producing eye-witnesses of the Polish massacre of
several thousand ethnic Germans at Bromberg.20 During one crisis in the Norwegian
campaign he recognized a need to rebut the enemy attacks immediately; but this did
not necessarily mean counter-attacking on the same theme. ‘Our principle must
always be, never hold your tongue: always say something. If need be, force our enemies
to lose themselves in denials instead of spewing out still more lies.’21 Denials,
he defined, must always be categoric.22 When an official asked in 1944 for formal
denials of Soviet allegations about Nazi atrocities in Maidanek concentration camp,
his ministry replied that none would be issued, ‘as we shall be totally on the defensive
in any discussion of this matter.’23
As for lying, Dr Goebbels laid down strict rules about when this was permissible:
it was to be used only as a defensive tactic, never to fake successes; official organs like
news agencies and radio stations were never to be used to spread lies, and their
source was to be immediately camouflaged; and Germany’s domestic radio and press
channels must never be burdened with them, they were to be propagated only by
their overseas broadcasters.24
Perhaps his most enduring method was to pick up the enemy’s most lethal propaganda