A Box of Sand

by Charles Stephenson

  The objective was a small hill topped with a shrine or tomb (marabutto) marking the eastern extremity of the Zanzur Oasis. This high ground was considered to be the key to the whole position, and it was defended by a considerable Ottoman force that was well protected in narrow and deep trenches that sheltered them from rifle fire and all but direct hits from artillery. Against the nearly invisible enemy manning these defences the 2nd Brigade could not at first prevail, despite an outflanking move along the shore by a battalion of the 40th Regiment and heavy support from the mountain artillery and the 152 mm guns of the armoured cruiser Carlo Alberto stationed offshore. However the weight of fire eventually told and the infantry were able to advance over the open ground and into the trenches where some hand-to-hand fighting took place. Numbers prevailed and the clearance of the trenches meant that that the Ottoman forces as a whole were obliged to fall back into the Oasis of Zanzur and the position was taken. Having taken the hill the Italians now set out to fortify it against any counter-attack, and the 44 lorries conveyed the engineering equipment the circa 15 kilometres to the requisite positions. Having been unloaded the three columns returned to Gargaresh, where two of them were redeployed as ambulances whilst one was employed in conveying rations and equipment to the 6th and 40th Regiments atop their recently conquered position.

  ‘After the battle of Zanzur: General Frugoni with other senior officers visited the conquered enemy trenches filled with the dead.’ The small village of Zanzur lay about eight kilometres beyond the Italian occupied zone around Tripoli City and was remarkable only because it was one of the few decent anchorages between there and the Tunisian frontier. The Italians believed that it was a nodal point for the ‘contraband’ that succoured the Ottoman-led forces in the interior, but left it until 8 June 1912 before despatching an overwhelmingly strong force to occupy it. This ponderous manoeuvre was successful, though the great number of enemy dead depicted was more the result of artistic licence rather than an accurate rendition. From La Domenica del Corriere 23-30 June 1912. (Author’s Collection).

  Frugoni’s report on the battle stated that out of the total manpower deployed the losses had amounted to one officer and 38 troops (including ten ascari) killed and 13 officers and 278 troops (including 75 ascari) wounded. Of these categories, 70 wounded Italian soldiers were carried to forward hospitals by the ambulances, whilst the dead were conveyed to the cemetery.64 In these matters, and in carrying the engineering materials to the object of the attack which would otherwise have had to be moved using horses or mules, the lorries had proven useful if not decisive. It was, though, a pointer of things to come, and the writer Horace Wyatt quoted an Italian newspaper in this regard:

  The motor lorry was ubiquitous; it transported ammunition or succoured the wounded, fetched fodder for the horses and other animals, or money for the troops and for the Arabs; it brought new boots for the soldiers or delivered urgent messages, as well as being used for the transport of troops from the various bases right up to the first fighting line in battle. Only the advent of the autocar rendered possible many of the daring moves of this war, as it solved the difficulties of desert transport.65

  This perhaps overstates the case somewhat, but nevertheless there can be no doubt that the Italians had at least begun the process of solving the difficulties of desert mobility by demonstrating that light lorries and similar vehicles could, in the main, handle the terrain and climatic conditions.

  Mobility and the resultant ability to project power was assisted by the redeployment of airships to the theatre. This occurred at the end of February as, according to an eyewitness account, one of the dirigibles was test-flown about a week before first operational usage, the wind direction and speed at various heights being ascertained by sending up tethered kites. The observer was the British artist and experienced war correspondent, Henry Charles Seppings Wright, who recounted the sighting in his 1913 book:

  One peaceful morning about eight o’clock a strange phenomenon presented itself in the sky. Over Tripoli was hovering what appeared to be an indistinct moon. The sky was heavy, and a purple haze obscured the horizon. We were not left long in doubt as to what this strange new object was, for gradually it turned and presented the long ovoid body of an airship, a new terror for frightening these unconquerable desert men. I had seen it before manoeuvring above the lagoons at Venice earlier in the year. We all watched its motions with intense interest; the Turks showed little concern, and the Arabs seemed to think that the Italians were providing a new target for them to practise at. Rifles were immediately discharged, in their usually excited and erratic manner, although the ship was a good fifteen miles away. This first ascent was evidently only a trial trip, or perhaps the kites had shown that the wind was set in a wrong direction, for she continued to hover over Tripoli. Probably, too, they were testing the engines.66

  The airships P 2 and P 3 in their hangar at Tripoli. The P Type (modello piccolo) semi-rigid airship consisted of a gas-filled envelope 63 metres in length and 11.6 metres in diameter containing 4400 cubic metres of hydrogen. From the internal hinged keel was slung a boat-shaped car or gondola, with two 75 hp Fiat engines, one on either side, equipped with reversible propeller blades. The aircraft were fitted with dual controls and had a four or five man crew, which, despite the airships being army machines, consisted of both naval and military officers. The petrol for the engines was carried in the car as was the water ballast, whilst additional sand ballast was contained in bags and a number of bombs could also be carried. The first operational usage of the two airships occurred during the attack on Zanzur on 5 March 1912. Seppings Wright related how the two ‘ballons,’ as the Ottomans called them, ‘proceeded slowly and gracefully to Zanzur, manoeuvring like a couple of battleships.’ (Author’s Collection).

  This vessel was either the P 2 or P 3. The P Type (modello piccolo) semi-rigid airship consisted of a gas filled envelope 63 metres in length and 11.6 metres in diameter containing 4400 cubic metres of hydrogen. From the internal hinged keel was slung a boat-shaped car or gondola, with two 75hp Fiat engines, one on either side, equipped with reversible propeller blades. The aircraft were fitted with dual controls and had a four or five man crew, which, despite the airships being army machines, consisted of both naval and military officers. The petrol for the engines was carried in the car as was the water ballast, whilst additional sand ballast was contained in bags and, although this was not apparent at the time, a number of bombs could also be carried.67 The aviators who manned these craft included several who went on to higher things. Perhaps most notable were Salvatore Denti di Piraino, who became an admiral and commander in chief of the Italian Navy and Giulio Valli, who as a rear admiral was to argue for the construction of Italian aircraft carriers to provide organic air power for the Italian fleet.

  The first operational usage of the two airships (a third slightly smaller P Type – 60 metres in length and 11.6 metres in diameter containing 4200 cubic metres of hydrogen – P 1, was deployed at Benghazi from 11 May 1912) occurred in an attack on Zanzur on 5 March 1912. Seppings Wright related how the two ‘ballons,’ as the Ottomans called them, ‘proceeded slowly and gracefully to Zanzur, manoeuvring like a couple of battleships.’68 Though obviously useful for reconnaissance the dirigibles also had an embryonic strike capability. According to Abbott, who was in the vicinity, they aimed six bombs at ‘a hillock between Girgaresh and Zanzur, where a body of fifteen Arab horsemen were gathered at the time.’ Only one of these devices exploded whilst the rest embedded themselves in soft sand, allowing the Ottoman forces to recover them. Abbott described one he saw thus:

  They consist of an outer iron cylinder, about nine inches long and four inches in diameter, and a narrower concentric cylinder inside. The latter is charged with dynamite, the former with about three hundred shrapnel bullets embedded in brittle resin. On the top of the cylinder is a wooden cap; through its centre passes a tube about two feet six inches long. The upper and longer portion of this tube serves to suspend an
d direct the bomb. The portion that goes through the bomb contains a detonator. From below projects a needle resting on a spring. When the lower end of the tube, which for equipoise is armed with a small linen parachute, has struck a hard substance, the needle gets loose, shoots upward, and hits the detonator, thus bringing about the explosion.69

  According to reports issued from Rome shortly after the event these bombs had ‘terrific effect.’70 Later reports, having digested the operations in Tripoli as a whole, gave a different view; ‘The dropping of bombs, while they did no material damage, had a wonderful moral effect.’71

  According to Italian sources, the dirigibles had an important effect on the advance towards Zanzur that took place on 8 June 1912. Drawn by the sounds of battle, Ottoman forces moved towards the Italian forces and hoped to surprise the 1st Brigade which was inland covering the flank of the main advance. This was spotted by the observers in the airships, who not only reported the movement but also bombed the advancing force. Though the bombing had little or no effect the warning was invaluable to Rainaldi’s brigade as it allowed it to deploy in good time and repulse the Ottoman attack.72

  Another area of novel technology that the Italians utilised was in communications. Radio, or wireless, telegraphy (radiotelegrafici) was not new to the Italian forces, and they despatched a wireless detachment to Tripoli under the command of Lieutenant Luigi Sacco on 9 October. Nor was this was the first time wireless communication had been used in land warfare as the German forces in Deutsch-Südwestafrika had employed the technique during their campaign there in 1904-7. There it was discovered that it was possible to send Morse messages successfully at distances of over 150 kilometres using the portable Telespark apparatus. However, other than installation in permanent land-based stations, the apparatus was only really suitable for use on board ships because in that application the weight and size of the apparatus could easily be accommodated; such factors meant that developing portable apparatus for military use was problematical.

  Sacco was joined at Tripoli City by none other than Guglielmo Marconi and they carried out a series of experiments on 16 December in the presence of Caneva and Frugoni at the airfield near the Jewish Cemetery. They established that with small-scale equipment using four 1.5-metre length antennae it was possible to communicate over a distance of 15-20 kilometres. The next day a further experiment was performed near the cavalry barracks. During the course of these tests Sacco and Marconi ‘accidentally made a discovery of the greatest importance.’ They discovered that they did not have to rig up an antenna on masts in order to send or receive a signal. Rather the insulating properties of the dry desert sand meant the running of a 200-metre cable on the ground allowed the apparatus to function ‘without interruption, exactly the same as if the usual system were employed.’

  Messages sent from Tripoli were received at Coltano, near Pisa, in Italy, and as Sacco put it in his report it meant ‘a simple and safe communication with Italy although in only one direction.’ In terms of military applications he noted that the removal of the need for tall masts, which Marconi reckoned to be a grave danger as they could be seen by an enemy from a long distance, would allow greater flexibility in the field. He also noted that although it would be possible to intercept enemy wireless transmissions, the same applied in reverse and that therefore it would be necessary to encrypt all transmission by radiotelegrafici. Tactically, the Italians did manage to produce wireless sets that were small enough to be carried by animal transport and which were used by gunfire direction parties to communicate with ships close offshore. The use of these sets allowed close support naval gunfire to the army.73 The utilisation of these new technologies, though they were not without interest or import and reflected the Italian search for, and deployment of, technological solutions to the difficulties of terrain they faced, did not alter the fact that at the theatre or operational level the war was stalled. It was becoming impossible to disguise the fact that at the political and strategic level, the Italian government was in difficulties.

  CHAPTER TEN

  ‘Nations have no friends, they only have interests’

  (Attributed to Lord Palmerston)

  ‘The German Powers disapproved of Italy’s adventure in Tripoli, but to check it would have been to drive her into the Triple Entente.’

  H N Brailsford, The War of Steel and Gold, 19141

  ‘If the Powers of the Triple Entente wish to secure the goodwill of Italy, they must acquiesce in her designs on Tripoli. If they do this they must presumably pro tanto alienate the sympathy of Turkey and throw her more and more into the arms of Germany.’

  Joseph Heller, British policy towards the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1914, 19832

  AS has already been pointed out, the last strand of Italian pre-war strategy had collapsed with the mutual alienation engendered by the Battle of Tripoli and its aftermath. Consequentially, all hopes of the conflict being a short, victorious war on the Italian side had vanished. When the in-theatre leadership decided that there could be no military resolution in the medium, or perhaps even long term, and that waiting upon events was the only option, then Italian strategy was paralysed. It could be argued that deadlock prevailed, inasmuch as the same applied to the Ottoman Empire. However time was very much on the Ottoman side. An unnamed Ottoman Senator who visited Britain in early 1912 was quoted by W T Stead as arguing:

  We cannot make peace with Italy for two very good reasons. If we made peace signing away Tripoli, we should immediately be confronted with a far more serious war, a war of the Arabs against the Power which had betrayed them to their foes. The other reason why we cannot make peace is because it costs us less to make war than it did to govern Tripoli in time of peace. The war at present costs us nothing. Tripoli in time of peace was a burden upon our finances. Tripoli carries on the war without asking from us one piastre. But an Arab war would cost us much. To ask us to make peace, therefore, is to ask us to exchange a war with Italy, which costs us nothing and cannot possibly do us any serious harm, for a war with the Arabs which will cost millions and might entail the loss of the whole of Arabia and Mesopotamia. So far as we are concerned there will be no peace until the summer comes, when the cholera and perhaps the Senoussi may clear the invaders out of Tripoli.3

  On the Italian side the conflict was becoming if not unaffordable then exorbitantly expensive; in the financial year 1912-13 it was reckoned to have absorbed nearly 47 per cent of total state expenditure.4 By March 1912 Italian strength in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica was around 100,000 strong and the campaign had seriously depleted the army’s stocks of weapons, ammunition, and equipment. The need to provide these reinforcements seriously disrupted the training and force levels of almost every unit in the army.

  ‘La fucilazione degli Arabi traditori (Shooting the treacherous Arabs).’ According to one Italian of the Bersaglieri, Lieutenant-Colonel Gherardo Pàntano: ‘Our officers demonstrate feelings of great resentment, hostility, and hatred against the Arabs, and do not know how to distinguish between friends and foes, or, rather, between those who we should fight and those we should protect […] Arabs found seriously injured are covered in gasoline and burned, or thrown into wells […] others are shot with no other reason than that of a cruel whim.’ These types of actions met with the general approval of a section of the Italian Press. Giuseppe Bevione was to put it thus following the Battle of Tripoli: ‘Executions that lasted for three days in the oasis and have sent to Allah more than a thousand faithful were indispensable. Only a generous return of killings could establish in the Arab soul a sense of justice and the certainty of our strength.’ Photograph from: Antonio de Martino, Tripoli Italiana: La Guerra Italo-Turca, Le Nostre Prime Vittorie (New York; Sociata Libraria Italiana, 1911).

  Certain reservations also began to be expressed by the Italian press, which had, with the exception of anarchist and socialist organs, been generally supportive. Senator Maggiorino Ferraris, a former government minister and proprietor and chief editor of La Nuova Antologia,
the oldest and most prestigious organ of Italy’s cultured press, ‘admitted frankly’ in the February 1912 edition of the magazine, that the Italian nation was deceived as to the probable attitude of the Arabs towards them. He noted that the resistance of the latter had introduced an entirely new element into the military situation, and argued for a policy of remaining on the coast and not venturing upon any hazardous expeditions. The conservative Rassegna Nazionale, whilst deploring the actions of the Socialist Party in opposing the campaign and the foreign press likewise, nevertheless conceded that the conquest would prove a far longer and more difficult task than the nation had imagined.

  The Socialist Party that the more conservative press excoriated had indeed been strongly opposed to the war, and was outspoken about it from the start. On 1 October the Socialist organ Avanti (Forward) published an editorial on the matter:

  Some people tell us that this will not be really a war at all, that there will be a few shots, a blockade by the fleet, the simple landing of an army corps, and that all will then be over. And perhaps this thought is behind the whole enterprise; doubtless this conviction led to the war being prepared and decided upon. By exalting the prowess of Italy’s military forces and ridiculously under-estimating the Turkish forces, our rulers have, as it were, administered morphia to a section of public opinion in this country and have rendered it insensible to the direct and indirect perils of the situation.5