A Box of Sand

by Charles Stephenson

  Russia and Britain, though at odds in apportioning blame for the closure of the Dardanelles still had a shared interest in getting them reopened. The cargo aboard the stranded vessels consisted largely of Russian grain, which was essentially a perishable commodity. On 30 April with the strait still closed Grey telegraphed to Lowther instructing him to urge the Ottoman Government to open the Straits temporarily so that the detained ships could recommence their voyages.39 In order to support this initiative, Grey tasked Rodd with putting the point to San Guiliano that the reopening of the Dardanelles would be facilitated if the Italian Government would agree that the British could say to the Ottomans that there would be no further attacks there ‘for a reasonable period.’40 Giuliano was, as might have been expected, somewhat evasive. According to Rodd’s reply on 1 May, he had been told that because Russia had protested to the Ottomans about the closure, any such promise from Italy would have the effect of weakening the effect of those protests. Guiliani further argued that because Russia had shown ‘goodwill’ to Italy, it would be difficult for Italy to take any step until it was certain that the Russian protest had failed.41 This Russian ‘goodwill’ was further demonstrated when Sazanov refused entreaties to become involved in Grey’s ‘friendly representations’ to Rome; when Buchanan approached him on the matter he ‘absolutely declined’ to become involved. Upon being asked by the British Ambassador ‘what he hoped to gain by so assiduously courting Italy[?]’ Sazanov replied that he didn’t want ‘Italy to send, as she had undertaken to do, [an] Army Corps into Galicia, in the event of a Russo-German war.’ Buchanan added that ‘after a moment’s pause’ he then added that ‘she won’t do this now.’42

  These exchanges illustrate a growing difference in political strategy between Britain and Russia. Grey wished above all to maintain the delicately poised equilibrium of Europe, more or less divided between the Alliance and Entente blocs. Hence he deprecated any attempts to detach Italy from its Alliance partners lest it disturb this equilibrium and precipitate a European conflict. Sazanov, given his policy of ‘assiduously courting’ Italy, was of a different opinion, and his remark to Buchanan indicates why. Which of the two views was the more accurate was not put to the test as it happened, for on 1 May the Ottoman Government indicated that the straits would indeed be reopened as soon as the mines were cleared. As long as the conflict lasted though, and because it had the potential to destabilise European politics, Grey considered it to be dangerous in the wider context.43

  Italy for her part seemed ready to steer between the two blocs, and to push to the limit the constraints of Article VII of the treaty with Austria-Hungary. The decision to extend the war into the Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean required some careful consideration. As had become obvious, action at the Dardanelles caused international diplomatic ructions and any actions on the Anatolian mainland or in the Balkans were militarily and politically problematical to say the least. The Southern Sporades were then, almost by default, the only option and had been recognised and suggested as a suitable place for operations as far back as the 19 October 1911. On that occasion the army Chief of Staff, General Alberto Pollio, had raised the issue with his naval opposite number, Admiral Carlo Rocca Rey via a letter. They met on 9 November and agreed that if the navy intervened in the area, the army would also be required to participate although at that time no plans had been prepared. The chiefs agreed that the best way to proceed would be for the two services to reach agreement on the feasibility of occupying the islands and, if this were settled, only then would the proposal be put forward for political consideration. There could be no question of taking action unilaterally without careful deliberation of the political ramifications as Article VII of the Triple Alliance specified Austro-Italian pledges to maintain the status quo regarding Ottoman possessions in the Adriatic and Aegean Seas. Any modification was dependent upon previously agreed mutual consent, and promises of compensation between Austria-Hungary and Italy.44

  Rocca Rey was to have doubts concerning the wisdom of carrying out any such operation, believing that the results would not be commensurate with the effort required and that it would likely cause an intervention by the Great Powers. Pollio, on the other hand, argued that taking the islands from the Ottoman Empire would be an effective military operation. Pollio’s superior, the Minister of War Paulo Spingardi, was also cautious arguing in a letter of 12 January 1912 that any action would require very careful consideration due to the possible political repercussions.45 In the immediate term, and in respect of Austria-Hungary, Italy had received a grudging acquiescence towards occupying the islands of Rhodes, Karpathos and Stampalia on a temporary basis. What prompted this concession was German pressure. San Giuliano’s constant theme in this context was based around how difficult it would be for Italy to remain a friend and ally of Austria-Hungary if it were perceived that the latter state was not acting in a friendly way. Rather, by attempting to prevent Italy from bringing the conflict with the Ottoman Empire to a close, Austria-Hungary was breaching the duties of neutrality in favour of Italy’s enemy. If it became known to public opinion in Italy that operations against the Ottomans were being hampered by Austria-Hungary, then the future of their alliance would be at stake.46 Since the maintenance and renewal of the Triple Alliance was a prime German foreign policy objective, Italy was able to continue to use the influence of the senior member as leverage. Accordingly, the German government brought strong pressure to bear to make the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister agree to Italian wishes, pointing out that any refusal ‘not merely complicated the renewal of the Triple Alliance (as Kiderlen said on 31 March 1912) but even risked its breaking up.’47 This ploy was successful.

  Where such action might lead though was obviously unknowable, but given the failure of all previously attempted efforts, whether military, naval, or political, to force the Ottoman Empire to come to terms the politicians, when the option was put to them, decided that on balance the risk was worth taking. Rocca Rey remained unconvinced however, sending two ‘confidential and personal’ memoranda to Spingardi on 16 and 18 April 1912 in which he set out his doubts. The admiral pointed out that Rhodes, the main island of the archipelago, was only around 17 kilometres from the southern coast of Anatolia (Asia Minor), whilst the nearest Italian naval base was at Tobruk, over 1000 kilometres distant. He also cautioned that the Ottomans had a ‘fleet in being’ in the Dardanelles, near to their supply base and to dockyards (though also around a 1000 kilometres away). These vessels, should they be put into good order, could sortie and attack southward through the Aegean, necessitating the Italians keeping a squadron at least as strong permanently on station to repel any possible attack. This squadron would have to be constantly cruising in order to be effective, and would risk becoming worn out. Therefore it would have to be relieved regularly, and the deployment would then tie up two naval squadrons, a total of ten ships and forty torpedo boats. Furthermore, whilst the Ottoman vessels remained a threat Italian shipping to and from the area would have to be convoyed and escorted. Rocca Rey also argued that since Rhodes had no military or economic value, it was unlikely that the loss of it would force the enemy to make peace. Additionally, the Ottoman government would undoubtedly believe that Italian occupation could only be temporary, and that the island would return to being a possession of the Sultan in any event. The enterprise would therefore wear out the Italian fleet, be expensive, and only provide a diversion from the main theatre where all efforts should be concentrated.48 His protests fell on deaf ears; Giolitti and San Giuliano had decided ‘resolutely’ to go ahead, and on 23 April the Italian navy ‘occupied the island of Stampalia (Astipalea), set up our own naval base, and took prisoner the Turkish garrison.’49

  Apart from extending the conflict into totally new areas, the Italian navy also had a significant part to play in the maintenance and extension of the occupation of Tripoli. Chief among these was the interdiction of the coastal route from Tunisia via which it was believed the Ottoman forces were receiving l
arge amounts of supplies. This route began at Ben-Gardane on the Tunisian side of the frontier and then along the road to Zuwarah in Tripoli. Zuwarah is situated around 110 kilometres to the west of Tripoli City and about 60 kilometres from the border, and from there the supplies went on to Azizia. Zuwarah was also provided with an anchorage suitable for coastal shipping at least, and mahones, such as the Camouna and Gaulois involved in the incident of 25 January 1912, and other vessels were able to moor there and discharge their cargoes.

  That there was much traffic through Zuwarah is beyond dispute, though whether it was all ‘contraband of war’ as the Italians claimed is uncertain. Ernest Bennett related how whilst crossing the border from east to west over the new-year period of 1911-12, he caught sight of an immense caravan of 1,240 camels laden with around 150 tonnes of flour travelling in the other direction. This caravan had been delayed at Ben-Gardane by the French authorities for 15 days before being allowed to proceed. The French, he argues, had for some time been acting ‘in a curiously erratic fashion as regards the passage over the frontier of food and necessaries.’50 Supplies such as he describes were not of course necessarily contraband of war unless they were destined for those engaged in fighting, and of course a large portion of the population of Tripoli could not be described thus. The Italians however made no distinction, and determined to at least gain control of the route, which the Ottomans, indicating that it was of considerable importance to them, made great efforts to prevent.

  Previous attempts at interdiction had mainly been restricted to the naval bombardment of Zuwarah and surrounding areas, and a decision to attempt a landing there with a brigade of infantry in late December 1911 had to be abandoned due to the poor weather and the ‘energetic’ defence put up by the Ottoman defenders, as already related.51 By April 1912 the weather had settled enough for another attempt to be made, this time in much greater strength. The naval component comprised the ‘Training Division’ under Rear-Admiral Borea Ricci, with the obsolete, though still adequate for the task, battleships Re Umberto, Sicilia (flag) and Sardegna forming its core. The landing force consisted of the 5th Special Division under Lieutenant-General Vincenzo Garioni. One brigade, commanded by Major-General Clemente Lequio, was drawn from forces based in Tripoli City, the 11th Regiment of Bersaglieri plus an extra battalion (the 28th), two battalions of Grenadiers, and the 6th and 7th Eritrean Battalions. The other was under Major-General Alberto Cavaciocchi and mainly comprised the 60th Infantry Regiment, which sailed directly from Italy. There were also three batteries of artillery and a company of engineers.

  The plan was much more sophisticated this time, demonstrating the respect that the Italians had for the Ottoman forces and the learning process attendant on the difficulties of amphibious warfare at that time. The Training Division, including the three battleships and the armoured cruisers Carlo Alberto and Marco Polo left the port of Tripoli with three transport ships on 8 April 1912. The three transports and the two armoured cruisers arrived off Zuwarah on 9 April and anchored some two kilometres offshore. The warships began a desultory bombardment of the town until nightfall, resuming with a much fiercer barrage the next morning. The resumption of the fire from the cruisers coincided with the approach of some twenty boats from the transports towards the landing beach. This was however all a feint to fix the attention of the Ottomans whilst the real landing took place some 40 kilometres to the west on the El Faru (Farwa, Farwah, Ra’s al Makhbaz, Macabez) peninsula. Running more or less parallel to the coast some three kilometres to the south, this small uninhabited spit of land is about twelve kilometres in length and about 1 kilometre at its broadest. During the night of 9-10 April seven transports, escorted by those warships not engaged at Zuwarah, with the vast majority of the 5th Division aboard (about 10,000 men) appeared off this peninsula and began landing advance parties of troops at around 03:00 hours. There was no sign of any opposition and so the the Italians secured the landing ground without difficulty. At daybreak the main body began to disembark and some four hours later, at about 12:00 hours, it was also safely ashore despite choppy conditions on the water.

  Landings on the mainland opposite El Faru were undertaken on the morning of 11 April by a mixed force of marines and army troops. This operation was unopposed and by 12:00 hours large contingents had moved inland and the whole area had been secured with the occupation of Abu Kammash (Bu Kamez, Bu Kamech), a small Berber village on the shore just west of where the peninsula joins the mainland. The village featured a small and obsolete ‘Turkish Fort’ and this was occupied by a detachment of marines and Eritrean ascari. The first Ottoman forces did not appear on the scene until later in the day to find the Italians well dug in and covered by the guns of the fleet. By 12 April Garioni estimated that there were around 1,000 men in the dunes around Abu Kammash who kept up a constant sniping at the Italian positions and at the various boats working in the bay between the peninsula and mainland. The Ottoman positions were cleared by a flank attack carried out by Eritrean troops who moved off the peninsula during a sandstorm on the morning of 13 April and thus had the element of surprise. Once the dunes overlooking the bay had been cleared of the enemy they were incorporated into the Italian defences, which, given their great strength backed by the guns of the Training Division, made the whole area secure.

  Abu Kammash. The Italians decided to occupy the small village of Abu Kammash in order to interdict the coastal route from Tunisia via which it was believed the Ottoman forces were receiving large amounts of supplies. This route began at Ben-Gardane on the Tunisian side of the frontier and then along the road to Zuwarah, which is situated around 110 kilometres to the west of Tripoli City and about 60 kilometres from the border. From there the supplies went on to Azizia. With total command of the sea, and having acquired expertise in the techniques of amphibious warfare, the landing was a sophisticated affair. With the defenders lured away via a ruse, landings on the mainland opposite the El Faru Peninsula were undertaken on the morning of 11 April 1912 by a mixed force of marines and army troops. This operation was unopposed and by 12:00 hours large contingents had moved inland and the whole area had been secured. The Ottoman forces could then only try and contain the invaders, and a good deal of the supplies were forced to take a less convenient route some 150 kilometres inland. (© Charles Blackwood).

  Once again Italian naval supremacy had allowed Italian forces to descend upon the coast at a time and place of their own choosing in overwhelming force. The landing at El Faru and the occupation of Abu Kammash had an effect on the Ottoman supply situation. Because the road between Ben-Gardane and Zuwarah was now vulnerable, though not yet completely cut, a good deal of the contraband trade was forced to take a less convenient route some 150 kilometres inland. Further, with torpedo-boats able to use Abu Kammash as a temporary base – the bay was found to be deep enough for torpedo-boats to shelter in, and was utilised as their anchorage – the passage of contraband by sea to Zuwarah was also threatened, though not entirely stopped.

  CHAPTER TWELVE

  The Southern Sporades, the Dardanelles, and the Limits of Navalism

  ‘A cardinal factor [of British Mediterranean policy] has naturally been that no strong Naval Power should be in effective permanent occupation of any territory or harbour East of Malta.’

  Rear-Admiral ECT Troubridge in a Memorandum of 29 June 19121

  ‘The water boiled around the torpedo boats from stem to stern, and jets of water flew high as shells fell with horrible thuds, as if volcanic eruptions were flashing inexhaustibly beneath the water […] The air was full of flashes, of flames, explosions, and splinters. Convulsive, foaming, full of glare and reflections, the sea seemed to become a huge fiery furnace. But at the zenith shone always the star of Italy.’

  Giuseppe Bevione in La Stampa, 25 July 19122

  AS originally conceived, the military component of the expedition to Rhodes was to be some 3,000 strong taken from the units around Tobruk, together with 350 horses and mules. This special detachment
was to carry with it four weeks’ worth of rations and supplies, plus enough water to last two weeks, and 600 rounds of ammunition per rifle. Subsequently however it was greatly strengthened, which necessitated the use of units from Italy. The force thus created was to be termed the 6th Aegean Special Division (6° Divisione Speciale dell’Egeo) with Giovanni Ameglio, who had recently been promoted to Lieutenant General, in command. The concentration points for the division were Tobruk and Benghazi, where seven steamships (Sannio, Europa, Verona, Toscana, Bulgaria, Cavour and Valparaiso) to transport it were despatched. Protection for the convoy was provided by the heavy units of the 2nd Division of the 1st Squadron and torpedo boats, which would operate close by the troop carriers during the landing.3

  The military contingent sent from Italy consisted of ten battalions of infantry, organised as the 34th and 57th Infantry Regiments, with two batteries of field artillery, eight machine gun sections, plus engineering and support troops. Also included were a group of Carabinieri and the 4th Regiment of Bersaglieri. The force drawn from the North African theatre consisted of the Fenestrelle Battalion of Alpini with its machine gun section and four-gun mountain battery, together with support. Also sent were two wireless telegraphy sections and two field hospitals. The 57th Infantry and 4th Bersaglieri were sent to Benghazi whilst the 34th Infantry concentrated at Tobruk. The total strength of the 6th Special Division amounted to between 8,494-9,282 officers and men, and 1,186-1,309 transport animals, dependent upon source. Also loaded aboard the ships were a number of civilians whose task would be to oversee civil administration.4