A Box of Sand

by Charles Stephenson

  The costs incurred by Italy during the war are not easy to reckon. The casualty figures for the Italian Army vary dependant on source and the way they are calculated, but generally a figure of about 10,000 killed and wounded is usually accepted. It is probably about right, though almost certainly on the low side. The reports of the General Staff produced more or less contemporaneously give the figure for September 1911-January 1912 as 1,432 killed and 4,220 wounded in combat operations, plus 1,948 that died of disease. From January-October 1912 a total of 4,292 dead and wounded were recorded. These total to 11,892 for all casualties from all causes, but do not seem to include prisoners. Taking everything into account, it is likely that about 4,000 Italians died during the period of the conflict and about 8,000 were wounded.22 Such low casualty figures for just over a year of war demonstrate what had become apparent as the conflict went on; the Italian Army had not engaged in heavy fighting. Conversely, if the price of victory had been relatively cheap in terms of blood then the same could not be said of treasure. It was calculated in January 1914 that the total cost of the acquisition of the former vilayet amounted to 957,000,000 francs, or £38,260,000. The army accounted for the greater portion of this, £31,440,000, whilst naval costs amounted to a figure of £4,840,000 at the time.23 Indeed, as has already been pointed out, in the financial year 1912-13 the adventure was reckoned to have absorbed nearly 47 per cent of total state expenditure.24 This precipitated an economic crisis which sent the cost of foodstuffs, unemployment, and poverty levels, rocketing. There was a political uproar when the costs of the war thus far were revealed in November 1913 by Finance Minister Luigi Facta; parliament had been kept in the dark by Gioitti’s government concerning the enormous financial costs.25 Indeed, it had not proved cheap, in any sense of the word, for Giolitti and San Giuliano to extricate their donkey from the tip of the Tripoli minaret.

  The terms of the Treaty of Ouchy were by no means welcomed by those peoples who found themselves involuntarily bound up with them. Without a doubt the inhabitants of the Aegean Islands occupied by Italy, or the ‘Autonomous state of the Dodecanese’ as they had proclaimed themselves, were in a somewhat invidious situation. Dr. Skevos Zervos put the matter succinctly:

  Italy […] undertook in a special article to restore the Twelve Islands to the Ottoman tyranny. Stirred by the report of this unholy compact, the Dodecanesians held mass meetings and national congresses, and, by universal resolutions addressed to the European Governments, reasserted their immemorial desire, their single and unalterable determination [for union with the Greek State].26

  To add to their discomfiture, upon the outbreak of the Balkan War in October 1912 the Greek navy had almost immediately taken possession of many of the other Aegean islands:

  Thus the Balkan Wars […] found the Dodecanese diplomatically a Turkish province, but de facto under the power of Italy, who continued to hold it provisionally until the execution of the terms of the treaty by the Porte. For this reason the Hellenic Fleet, which within a few hours of the commencement of the Helleno-Turkish hostilities had freed all the great sister islands and close neighbours of the Dodecanese […] was unable to act as the liberator of the Dodecanesians because they were still in Italian hands.27

  The frustration felt by the Dodecanesians, who had welcomed the Italians as liberators, must have been excruciating. Had the Italians not invaded in May then Greece undoubtedly would have in October, and their ‘immemorial desire’ would have been satisfied. In order to try to influence the Italians and other Great Powers, plebiscites were held between December 1912 and February 1913 on all of the islands occupied by Italy. The results of these were sent to the Italian, Greek and British governments, together with pleas for assistance. One of the shorter addresses, from the inhabitants of Kalymnos, may serve to give the flavour of these resolutions:

  The people of the Island of Calymnos […] are in great anxiety because – owing to the temporary Italian occupation of their island – they cannot participate in the struggle [against the Ottoman Empire] in this island, held a mass meeting this Sunday, February 3rd, 1913, in the premises of the Holy Church of Christ, and have decided the following:

  1. They proclaim the union of their most Greek island with the motherland Greece.

  2. They declare their unswerving decision that they will not accept any other settlement of the fate of the island. They are ready in the contrary case to follow the brilliant example of their sister island Crete.

  3. They solicit the favour of all the great Powers for the realization of their national establishment.

  [Follow the signatures of the people.]

  The Holy Metropolis and the Town Council confirm the contents of the above resolution.28

  This was not though an age when the democratically expressed wishes of a people were reckoned of much, if any, importance, and the desires of the islanders were ignored. They did perhaps have one crumb of comfort inasmuch as it soon became apparent that the Dodecanese would not be handed back to the Ottoman Empire. That the Italians would keep them became more and more evident as the months passed; ‘within a year of their occupation […] they [the Italians] had introduced martial law, prohibited assemblies, forbidden the display of the national symbols of Greece, meddled in the affairs of the local Orthodox Church and deported some of the most vocal champions of enosis [union with Greece].’29 The Italian justification for this change of policy and apparent breach of the terms of the Treaty of Ouchy related to the precise wording and meaning of the relevant article. This had specified that the withdrawal from the Dodecanese would only take place following the removal of Ottoman personnel from North Africa, and, the Italians argued, this had not taken place. It must be conceded that, in this at least, they had a point.

  It was of course the peoples of the former Tripoli vilayet that had the most to lose, or gain, from the settlement. The reactions of these peoples, as well as the Ottoman officers and regular forces that led their resistance, differed somewhat between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. In the former area reports that the Italians and the Ottomans had come to terms at Ouchy arrived, in Angelo del Boca’s words ‘like a bolt out of the blue.’ He quotes one of the tribal leaders as stating that the news caused ‘alarm and confusion among the rank and file of the mujahedeen formations’ and further split the already fragile unity of the resistance.30 Upon learning of the peace treaty, Nesat Bey withdrew the Ottoman regulars, estimated to number some 2,600, southwards away from the Italian lines, and the Arab and Berber irregulars felt they were being more or less left to fend for themselves. They had not been totally abandoned however. Before he left with his command on 8 December 1912, aboard ships provided by Italy, the Ottoman commander addressed them and, according to an Italian source, informed them that:

  A peace treaty has been signed: the Turkish government can no longer provide any official aid to you for your continuation of the war, but there is someone who can: the Committee for Union and Progress. I can make available to you the victuals that have already been ordered and 20,000 Turkish liras; other sums will be sent to you from the committees of Tunis and Egypt. I cannot give you munitions, but I can let you take them, likewise with rifles, and I will report that you simply carried them off.31

  In order to decide what their course of action might be, the tribal leaders met at Kasr Azizia. There is no doubt that the withdrawal of the Ottoman commander and his troops, and the removal of the administrative and logistical structure they had created and fostered, inflicted a devastating blow to the Arab resistance movement, and they could not reach agreement on what to do and split along tribal and regional lines. According to the memoirs of Mohamed Fekini, who was later to become the most notable and effective leader of the resistance to Italian occupation in Tripolitania, the chiefs from the coastal region and its hinterland were in favour of coming to terms with the Italians. On the other hand, those from further inland were more inclined to continue the struggle using Kasr Azizia as their base of operations. The Ottoman deputy,
or former deputy as he now was, Sulyman al-Baruni (Sulaiman al-Barouni) was one of the most fervent supporters of continuing to resist the Italians. He argued that the Ottoman government was almost bound to continue sustaining them in one way or another and that they would have the support of the Islamic world. He also advocated continuing the fight for its moral effects, and, more prosaically, because they might then get more concessions from Italy were they forced to come to terms. His motives were not purely derived from hatred of the Italians or solidarity with his fellow resistance fighters. Sulyman al-Baruni was a Berber, and his political goal was to set up a Berber territory within the framework of Tripolitania. This had been resisted by Ottoman governments over the years, particularly since the advent of the CUP who sought to suppress such ideas and followed a policy of amalgamation. With their departure from Tripolitania he saw an opportunity with the potential at least to realise his ambition.32

  Given his later status it is perhaps ironic to note that it was Mohamed Fekini who was amongst the most vociferous in arguing against the general thrust of Sulyman’s position. He made the point that the vast majority of the inhabitants of Tripolitania were living a hand-to-mouth existence, were largely without weapons, and could not hope to defeat Italy given that the Ottoman Empire, with all its resources, had failed to do so. This analysis was also in accord with the viewpoint expressed by al-Baruni’s fellow former Ottoman parliamentarian, Farhat al-Zawi.33 These arguments were rejected or ignored by el-Baruni, who also managed to take possession of the munitions, food, and money left behind by Nesat Bey and withdrew southwards to the mountains. He claimed that he was in possession of a secret order from the Ottoman Sultan appointing him the leader of the forces charged with continuing the jihad against the invaders. He issued proclamations to this effect in the expectation that the tribes would follow him in to the renewed conflict. This response was, in the opinion of Mohamed Fekini and others, premature. He issued an appeal urging caution, arguing that it would be sensible to discover what the Italians intended before coming to any final decisions. Fekini believed at this point that there was a chance of some autonomy for the Tripolitanian peoples similar to that which he believed pertained in Tunisia and Egypt. Even given that the ‘autonomy’ that France and Britain accorded to Tunisia and Egypt had far more form than substance, it is clear that Fekini was somewhat over optimistic in this regard. Having said that, both of the countries he looked to as potential models were, albeit, nominally still under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Sultan. As has been repeatedly noted, Italy had continually and specifically rejected any settlement of the conflict on anything even approaching similar terms, though had eventually accepted a settlement that could be interpreted as so doing. It depended of course on whose interpretation could be made to stick.

  On the other hand, if Mohamed Fekini was responsible for over-optimism, or in retrospect even naivety, then the same charge may certainly be made in respect of Sulyman al-Baruni. Described even by Fekini as standing head and shoulders above all the other chiefs, he took the autonomy granted by the Sultan at face value. He proclaimed an independent mini-state in the mountains of the Gharyan region, a predominantly Berber populated area, around 100 kilometres to the south of Tripoli. His words on the matter are quoted by Del Boca:

  His Majesty the Sultan granted to the inhabitants of Tripolitania complete and entire self-government, we have decided to maintain that autonomy in accord with the inhabitants, who have invited me to accept the presidency of the government. Many requests in writing and signed by the people were presented to me for that purpose, and I accepted, and hastened to telegraph the news to the Great Powers and the most respected newspapers. […] I formed a regiment of soldiers, consisting of infantry and cavalry on horseback and camels, uniformed in the European style. I organized a mail system over the entire territory. Telegraph and telephone offices were instituted that extended to the border of Tunisia. I established a war zone in front of the Italian forces.34

  Such developments were of course deeply unwelcome to the occupiers. This was particularly so given their long standing belief that it was only the presence of Ottoman forces and their logistical arrangements that had prevented the tribes conceding Italian dominance. The Italian strategy of coming to terms with the Ottoman Empire in order to remove its forces from the theatre had developed from this, and it appeared, on the face of it, to be working. Following the withdrawal from combat and eventual departure of the Ottoman forces under Nesat Bey, General Ottavio Ragni had begun successfully extending the area of occupation. The three former Ottoman strongholds of Suani Ben Adem, el-Azizia, and Funduq Ben Ghashir were occupied without major effort. For the majority of the Tripolitanian tribes the motivation for fighting had been to preserve their way of life, on which the Ottomans had hardly impinged; they were at that time ‘unencumbered by any sense of nationhood.’35

  With some misgivings, the majority of the tribal leaders from the regions in the coastal hinterland and the northern areas of the mountains to the south decided to go, or send emissaries, to Tripoli City. Some 6,000 irregulars accompanied this delegation, and somewhat unexpectedly they were welcomed and treated with honour though required to surrender their arms. A measure of the distrust felt by the tribes is perhaps indicated by the fact that only some 800 weapons were handed over, and fewer than 500 of these were modern and suitable for combat. Nevertheless, whilst undoubtedly worried by this, General Ragni expressed his friendship for the various leaders and confirmed that Italy was determined on a path of reconciliation. To this end, the Italian government was prepared to invest significant funds in the region, and was happy to answer all the questions that the tribesmen might care to put. Indeed, at this time the Italian administration appeared happy to leave the tribesmen much to their own devices, and Fekini noted that whilst the position of mutasarrjf (governor of a district) that he had held under Ottoman rule was no longer recognised, he was held to be a kaymakam (sub-governor or communal leader). By virtue of this rank he was able to appoint judges and teachers in his area of responsibility, and ensure adherence to Islamic sharia law throughout his jurisdiction.36

  From the Italian perspective then, the first few weeks following the signing of the Treaty of Ouchy boded tolerably well in Tripolitania. The Italian regime in Tripoli City and the majority of the tribal peoples within easy reach of the seat of government had reached an accommodation of sorts, albeit with a great deal of mutual suspicion. Moreover, the Ottoman forces had been removed from the theatre. This latter success formed the culminating point of Italian initial operational strategy, and led to the fracture of whatever solidarity the Tripolitanian population had previously displayed. This was of course a phenomenon that could hardly be to Italy’s disadvantage in future.

  From the initial viewpoint of the tribal peoples, the outlook also appeared reasonable. Those tribes that had decided to attempt an accommodation with the Italians had been courteously received and no particularly onerous conditions had been imposed upon them. Those that had no wish to come to terms with Italy were reasonably free from interference in the interior. Even the statelet proclaimed by Sulyman al-Baruni, which continued to not only proclaim war on the Italian invaders but also began attacking areas where the leaders were in favour of compromise with them, was ostensibly tolerated. Indeed, a two-man delegation sent to Rome by al-Baruni was cordially greeted by Pietro Bertolini, head of the newly constituted Colonial Ministry, and their requests for an autonomous relationship with Italy were seemingly well received. In reality however, the Italian military in Tripoli was merely biding its time before moving against him. Ragni informed Bertolini on 19 January 1913 that ‘al-Baruni was truly a megalomaniac, not a man of war’ and that ‘only in his imagination’ does he believe that he could be Emir of the polity he had created.37 This view was entirely in accordance with the wishes of Giolitti in Rome, who upbraided Bertolini on 23 March 1913 for giving al-Baruni’s ideas any consideration whatsoever, and arguing that only ‘vigorous action’
would convince him of the futility of his goal.38 Indeed, this vigorous action had already begun by the time Bertolini received Giolitti’s missive, for on the day that he wrote it a divisional-strength force won a substantial victory as it moved to assert Italian control.

  Consisting of the 1st Brigade under Major General Domenico Mazzoli (23rd and 82nd Regiments), the Mixed Brigade under Major General Luca Montuori (the 11th Bersaglieri, 8th Alpino, and a battalion of the 52nd Infantry), and supported by a battalion of Eritrean ascari plus camel-transported artillery, engineers and cavalry, this powerful force consisting of 259 officers and 8,014 troops, was commanded by Major-General Clemente Lequio. Since there were now no regular Ottoman forces in the theatre there was little to oppose them, and on 23 March the Battle of Assaba (Asàbaa, also Asabaa-Rabta) saw Sulyman al-Baruni’s force routed. The autonomy of his ‘tiny alpine state’ lasted a mere five months.39 Lequio’s force moved further inland and on 27 April a small detachment of about 530 colonial troops, mainly recruited from around Tripoli, under the command of Captain Alessandro Pavoni arrived at Ghadames. En route he had received a welcome from the leaders of many of the local tribes, which led the Italians to the conclusion that they had submitted their rule.40 This belief was bolstered when several of the Tuareg leaders visited him there and likewise acquiesced in accepting Italian rule.41 However, if, from the Italian point of view, the situation in Tripolitania seemed relatively favourable then the same could not be said in respect of Cyrenaica. There, the Italo-Ottoman War morphed into what came to be called the First Italo-Senussi War, and, as an appreciation by the British Foreign Office put it, ‘the peace was merely nominal.’42