by Benny Morris
it, the Nationalist movement was “fundamentally defined by [its Muslim]
religion . . . [and] character.” 45
Kemal may have occasionally entertained wide territorial ambitions. But his
pragmatism won out. He understood that expansion beyond Asia Minor
would lead to war with Britain over Mosul, with France over Aleppo, and with
Rus sia over the Caucasus. Still, he was not, in princi ple, opposed to expan-
sionism, instead leaving decision on such matters to evolving conditions on
the ground. Hence the National Pact of 1920, the Nationalist movement’s
“constitution,” announced, “We shall establish the borders [of the Turkish
Republic] according to the degree of our power and our strength.” 46
When Kemal arrived in Samsun, hundreds of officers gathered around him.
Within months, regular army units rallied to his cause. Almost from the first,
he dominated the movement, as he was to dominate Turkey for the next two
de cades. An American intelligence officer in summer 1921 described him,
after a meeting, as “a clever, ugly customer” who looked like “a very superior
waiter.” 47
In late July 1919, Kemal summoned some 200 nationalists to the aban-
doned Armenian Sanasarian High School in Erzurum. At that point the pan-
Turanian dream was still very much alive: in addition to the Anatolians there
were also a few delegates from Af ghan i stan, Turkestan, Daghestan, Mesopo-
tamia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Yet the attendees mostly hailed from the
eastern and southern provinces claimed by the Armenians for future Armenian
Historical Background, 1918–1924
sovereignty.
These areas
were flooded with muhacirs from Russian-
occupied territory and with recently demobilized or still- serving Turkish
troops who found available housing and uncultivated lands, formerly owned
by Christians. The Turks living in these regions were not only “instinctively
anti- Armenian,” according to British Col o nel Alfred Rawlinson, but they also
had a vested interest in blocking Christian repatriation. They constituted man-
power at the ready for refashioned Turkish army units and brigand bands.48
The stated aim of the Erzurum gathering was to unite Nationalist forces
and or ga nize the defense of the fatherland against the invaders, though there
were some, outside the gathering, who charged that the movement’s aim was
“to arm the people for a massacre of the subjugated races and make a clean
job of what was started in 1915.” 49
The Erzurum Congress was informed with jihadi rhe toric. A few days be-
fore Erzurum, Kemal had resigned from the army, saying that the affiliation
would hamper “the national holy war now commencing to save our sacred
race and fatherland from the danger of dismemberment.” Now he was a simple
“crusader (mudjahid) fighting for the glory of his race.” Others at the gathering echoed him. Former Constantinople minister Rauf Bey proclaimed,
“I have joined in the sacred war” for “the in de pen dence and liberation of our
land and race.”50
On August 7, the congress issued a manifesto. It avoided the word “jihad”
but declared that “the sacred fatherland” was threatened with partition and
dissolution thanks to the Allied occupation, which was charged with the
“stamping out of Islam.” The manifesto also claimed that the Turks were being
massacred by Greeks and Armenians and declared the congress’s opposition
to the formation of Greek Pontine and Armenian states. “All Moslem ele-
ments” in eastern Anatolia would fight for the “integrity of Turkey . . .
and . . . the Sultanate and Caliphate.” The manifesto pointed out that in the
eastern vilayets, as throughout Turkey, there was an overwhelming “Moslem
majority,” precluding severance of the vilayets from the Turkish body politic.
Still undecided about the mea sure of commitment the new organ ization
should exhibit to the sultan’s government in Constantinople, the manifesto
settled for a vague title. It declared the establishment, on the basis of the local defense committees, of The League of Eastern Anatolia for the Defense of
Our Rights. Fi nally, the manifesto warned against “the grant of a new series
Mustafa Kemal and the Nationalists
of privileges to the Christian ele ments” while vaguely averring “re spect” for
the “acquired rights” of non- Muslims.51
The Erzurum congress was followed, on September 4, by a second
gathering, in Sivas, of representatives of the movement’s branches in
western Anatolia and Western Thrace (Rumelia). At the conference they
united as The League for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Ru-
melia. At Sivas Kemal advanced the narrative at the heart of the Nationalist
strug gle: “The non- Moslem ele ments with which we have led a joint exis-
tence ab antique, encouraged by the favor shown them by the Entente
Powers, broke into open attacks on the dignity and rights of the Nation
and State.” He accused the Greek army and Ottoman Greeks of a “general
massacre of the Moslem population” and charged the Armenian Republic
at Yerevan with carry ing out a “policy of extermination” against that re-
gion’s Muslims.52 On September 11 the Sivas meeting declared that no
Armenian or Greek sovereignty would be countenanced in the territory of
Turkey.53
Three months later, after moving his headquarters to Ankara, Kemal made
his clearest statement regarding the war time massacres and deportations. He
blamed the Armenians and Greeks for what had happened, while never actu-
ally defining what had happened: “What ever has befallen the non- Muslim ele-
ments living in our country is the result of the policies of separatism they
pursued in a savage manner, when they allowed themselves to be made tools
of foreign intrigues and abused their privileges.”54
At the end of 1919 the Nationalists won a majority in the Ottoman parlia-
ment. Thereafter, in January 1920, they promulgated the National Pact, which
stated that the territories inhabited by a Muslim Turkish majority were an in-
divisible whole. The vilayets to the south, with a largely Arab population,
would be allowed to determine their own future— whether to remain part of
Turkey, achieve in de pen dence, or follow some middle course. The same right
was granted the inhabitants of the three eastern sanjaks occupied by the
Russians— Batumi, Kars and Ardahan— and of Western Thrace, occupied by
Greece. The rights of Turkey’s Christian minorities would, it stated, be de-
termined in conformity with past Ottoman- European treaties.55
Assessing the National Pact, Rumbold saw the Nationalists as duplici-
tous: they actually aimed at the “complete subordination, if not extinction,
Historical Background, 1918–1924
of non- Moslem communities.”56 In time he grew increasingly anti- Turk. In
1923 he wrote, they are “so shameless. . . . I have never met such people
and . . . I never wish to see any of them again. I am convinced that they are
heading straight for ruin and the sooner they get there, the better I shall be
pleased.”57
The Nationalist gov
ernment controlling Anatolia in 1920 had in effect
supplanted Constantinople’s rule in Asia Minor the previous autumn. The
October 3 takeover of Bursa, one of the Constantinople government’s last
footholds, sealed the Nationalists’ victory over its domestic rivals and the
movement of the seat of real power from Constantinople to Ankara. The gov-
ernment of Sultan Mehmet VI Vahdettin, the last of the Ottoman monarchs,
nominally remained in existence until 1923, when the Nationalists dissolved
it. But while the Sultanate spent the transitional years officially opposing the
Nationalists, Constantinople’s War Ministry secretly funneled supplies, man-
power, and intelligence to Nationalist military campaigns.58
In Britain, the leading Western power in the Middle East, councils were
divided on what to do about a resurgent Turkey. The dominant view was that
Britain should hold on in Turkey until a peace treaty ended World War I in
the Middle East. More vaguely, policymakers sought to contain the National-
ists. But there was also dissent. The secretary of state for war, Winston
Churchill, favored avoiding a clash with Kemal. The failure at Gallipoli—
Kemal’s triumphal moment— hung over Churchill’s head. And Churchill
was more interested in cutting military expenditure and containing or de-
feating Soviet Rus sia, his biggest bugbear. He hoped that the Turks, tradi-
tional enemies of Rus sia, could yet be harnessed for this purpose.59 And there
were other considerations:
The [Nationalist] movement grows daily in strength, and if we show our-
selves as definitely opposed to [its ends, “to prevent the partition of
Turkish territory amongst the Greeks, Italians and Armenians”], we must
be prepared for the following consequences: (a) A spread of Pan- Islamic
feeling allied, perhaps, to Bolshevism, to Trans- Caspia, Persia, Af ghan-
i stan and India. (b) Fresh disturbances in Egypt. . . . (c) Increased un-
rest amongst the Arabs. (d) A greater likelihood of a massacre of the
Armenians.
Mustafa Kemal and the Nationalists
Churchill therefore advised revising
our pres ent attitude. . . . If we reinforce our troops on the Anatolian
Railway, we must be prepared to find ourselves committed to operations
on an indefinite scale against the Turkish Nationalists . . . solely for the
benefit of alien and predatory races [i.e., the Greeks and Italians]. . . .
The possibility of [saving money by] reducing our garrisons in Egypt,
Palestine and Mesopotamia turns directly on [this].60
Of course, Churchill and likeminded officials were keenly aware of the
damage Britain’s standing would suffer should it withdraw hastily from Turkey.
But they also worried that hanging tough with the Nationalists might trigger
rebellions in Britain’s heavi ly Muslim colonial possessions. Opinion in India,
Iraq, Egypt, and other lands had to be placated.61 Moreover, during 1919–
1921 it was not always clear to what frontiers the Kemalists aspired— Turkey
as configured then or Turkey plus Thrace, Syria, Mesopotamia, and the
Caucasus. If the Nationalists were prepared to restrict themselves to Asia
Minor, then perhaps Britain need not oppose them. Kemal kept every one on
tenterhooks in this re spect. On March 19, 1920, a year into the Nationalist
resurgence, he defined “all Mesopotamia and Syria” as part of the patrimony
that he intended to restore to “Ottoman” rule.62 And during the following
years, he tried to use proxy forces to disrupt Western rule in these lost
Ottoman territories.63 But it is unclear whether Kemal really sought to incor-
porate them in the newborn Turkey or merely brandished the threat as a
means to subvert the French in Cilicia and Western resolve generally. He re-
frained from sending Turkish troops to Syria or Mesopotamia and vaguely
endorsed a “plebiscite” to determine their future.64 Indeed, some Turks were
averse to reincorporating the Arab lands, as the Arabs were viewed as having
betrayed the empire during the world war.65
Almost from his arrival in Anatolia, Kemal was seen as a prob lem. By Jan-
uary 1921 Rumbold was writing to Foreign Secretary Lord George Curzon:
“It is useless to regard Mustapha Kemal any longer as a brigand chief. [The]
Angora Government has [a] tight grip on the whole of Asia Minor not in
effective foreign occupation. . . . Bulk of population, sheep- like as always,
recognized its authority without demur, and majority of the Moslem ele ment
Historical Background, 1918–1924
support it strongly, as standing for best interests of Turkey and individual
Turks.” 66 Already by spring 1920 a knowledgeable Italian observer thought
the Kemalists the “only party in Turkey to which any importance should be
attached.” 67
Nonetheless, during 1919–1922 the British had not yet thrown in the towel
and often displayed true grit in face of Kemalist challenges. Britain must
not “allow the Kemalists to kick us when and where they like,” as John de
Robeck, commander- in- chief of the Mediterranean Fleet, put it in November
1921.68
But, following the vast expenditure of blood and trea sure in the world war,
the British ultimately were unwilling to commit the resources necessary to de-
feat Kemal or protect Turkey’s Christian minorities. Neither was seen as a
vital national interest. As a result, sympathy for downtrodden Christians failed
to translate into concrete support. During 1920–1923 Britain walked a fine
line between confronting the Kemalists and capitulating to their demands.
France, the second impor tant Western imperial power in the Middle East,
took a clearer tack. After 1918, the French sought reconciliation with Turkey.
True, the French initially were guided by colonial hands such as François
Georges Picot, who hoped to expand and consolidate imperial holdings in
the Levant and southern Turkey. In November 1918 the French landed in the
northeastern Mediterranean and, during 1919, took over most of Cilicia from
the British in the hope of establishing long- term rule and realizing commer-
cial opportunities. But war- weary France was not inclined to battle a resolute
Nationalist movement. The French quickly lost their taste for combat and
sought to extricate themselves from Cilicia while holding on to as much as
they could of Syria and preserving as much face as pos si ble. Already in 1919
the French High Commission in Constantinople had apparently sent emis-
saries to Kemal offering him Cilicia and support in future international con-
ferences. The High Commission even proposed abandoning the alliance with
Britain.69
Something of a split developed between French officials in Constantinople
and Beirut. In Constantinople successive French high commissioners pursued
a pro- Turkish stance, to the great annoyance of the British. In Beirut, by con-
trast, military commanders were at least initially steadfast in their resolve to
hold Syria- Lebanon, including Aleppo vilayet. But, perennially short of money
Mustafa Kemal and the Nationalists
and manpower, they eventually were persuaded to abandon Cilicia and
&n
bsp; northern Aleppo vilayet, the heavi ly Armenian region where the Nationalists
fought the Allied occupation hardest.
In France the debate raged largely out of the public eye. On one side were
the anti- imperialist left and the Quai d’Orsay, which generally supported re-
duced commitments and withdrawal. On the other was the colonialist right,
which advocated retaining as much of Cilicia and northern Aleppo vilayet as
pos si ble. But the Turco- French warfare of 1919–1921 and bud getary prob-
lems gradually persuaded middle- of- the- roaders such as Clemenceau to give
up Cilicia and northern Aleppo vilayet. In June 1920 the many- time Prime
Minister Aristide Briand captured the sentiment of a nation tired of expending
itself in Turkey, describing the Kemalists in Cilicia as “patriots merely de-
fending their homeland,” even as they fought his own troops.70
The Turkish Nationalists came quickly to understand that the Allied
co ali tion was rickety. Turkey and its Christians were not a vital Western in-
terest, and the French could be pushed out. Kemal was shrewd in handling
the minorities issue, crafting diff er ent messages for his international and do-
mestic audiences. His official statements avowed Nationalist support for
equality and maintained that Ottoman rulers had always been tolerant toward
their non- Muslim subjects. But he was careful to avoid specific policy guar-
antees.71 All the while he never stopped telling Muslims that Turkey’s exis-
tence was imperiled by Christians abroad and at home, the great powers and
the domestic subversives who constantly invited their intervention. As Kemal
told the Erzurum assembly in 1920, the Greeks aimed at nothing less than
“the enslavement of the Turks.”72 He beat the same drum for years, reflecting
in 1927 that, after the Great War, Greeks and Armenians had worked “to
hasten the break- down of the state.”73
In spite of Kemal’s double- talk, the Nationalists’ take on the Christian mi-
norities was clear to most foreign observers. In June 1920 even Bristol, who
was generally pro- Turkish, or more sympathetic to the Turkish predicament,
wrote, “The Turks, undoubtedly, want to get rid of the Armenians and will
