by Benny Morris
prob ably exterminate them if they cannot find another means.”74 The Armenian
Patriarchate shared this assessment. The Kemalists, the patriarchate observed,
followed the CUP policy of solving “the Armenian question by exterminating
the nation. The only deviation from this common policy . . . lay in the methods
Historical Background, 1918–1924
of promoting it. So, the Kemalists did not resort to massacre or looting [in]
those places where their influence is absolute.” In these locations, “the Ar-
menians . . . are condemned to annihilation . . . by starvation and poverty. . . .
In the Armenian vilayets . . . the Kemalists have absolutely and irrevocably
forbidden the Armenians to make a residence there. Their return to these
vilayets has not been allowed.” In places where the Nationalists faced re sis-
tance or did not wield exclusive control, they were more aggressive. In the
few spots where Muslims resisted Ankara’s takeover, the Kemalists found
pretexts to massacre Christians. There were also anti- Christian massacres in
places “in the direct path of the advance of the Greek” Army. And in regions
“ under foreign administration as in Cilicia, the Kemalists never restrained
themselves from massacring.”75
While the Nationalists were growing in strength and fighting the foreign
occupiers, the government in Constantinople made a show of conciliation,
kowtowing to the Allies in the hope of extracting favorable peace terms. But
the Allies came to understand they had no real partner in the increasingly
irrelevant Porte. With a pos si ble Nationalist takeover in Constantinople
looming, the British, on March 16, 1920, sent in troops to occupy impor tant
areas of the city. They took over key buildings and cracked down on the local
Nationalists. One hundred and fifty were arrested, including members of par-
liament.76 There was almost no Turkish re sis tance. The French were careful
not to take part in the operation; their high commissioner, Albert Defrance,
left town the day before. Kemal denounced the occupation of the “seat of the
caliphate” as a “new crusade” against “the whole Mohammedan world.”77
In occupying the city, the British were partly driven by a desire to force the
Turkish government into at last signing a war- ending treaty. The tussle con-
tinued through spring and early summer, as the remains of the Constantinople
government, under pressure from the Nationalists and the occupiers, dragged
their feet and eked out a few more Allied concessions. The treaty would
fi nally be signed at Sèvres, in the suburbs of Paris, on August 10. The
agreement— between the Allies and representatives from Constantinople, but
not Ankara— provided for severing extensive areas from the prewar empire.
Alexandretta (the Hatay) and an east- west strip of northern Aleppo vilayet in-
cluding Urfa, Mardin, and Cezire were consigned to French rule. In the
south, portions of Mosul, Mesopotamia, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine were
Mustafa Kemal and the Nationalists
to become either British or French mandates. Most of the Arabian Peninsula
became sovereign Arab territory. Eastern Thrace, including Edirne, was
slated for Greek sovereignty. The bulk of Trabzon, Erzurum, Van, and Bitlis
vilayets were to be added to the Republic of Armenia. A chunk of eastern Ana-
tolia south of the Armenian areas, including Harput and Diyarbekir, was to
become an autonomous Kurdish area, which could apply to the League of
Nations for in de pen dence. Smyrna and the surrounding district were to re-
main under Greek control, the area’s fate eventually to be deci ded by pleb-
iscite. France and Italy were to enjoy spheres of influence in Cilicia and
southwestern Anatolia respectively. Constantinople was to remain sovereign
Turkish territory and the capital of Turkey. But the Straits Zone, the shore-
line north and south of the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmara, would be
under international control.
Sèvres also imposed substantial constraints on key Turkish institutions.
With re spect to the military, Sèvres echoed the severe limits Versailles had
placed on Germany. Turkey’s armed forces, including gendarmerie, would
have to be cut to 50,700 men, and the country was prohibited from main-
taining an air force. Its navy was reduced to a handful of small vessels. In
addition Turkey’s economy and finances were placed under Allied supervi-
sion and, to a degree, regulation. Fi nally, Turkey was enjoined to ensure Chris-
tians equal rights, facilitate the return of deportees to their homes, and work
to restore plundered Christian property. All conversions to Islam since No-
vember 1, 1914, were to be annulled.78
Aware of the treaty’s extreme unpopularity at home, Constantinople refused
to ratify. Even se nior Allied officials had “grave misgivings.” Bristol, naturally, thought the terms “absolutely unjust.”79 De Robeck, then the British high
commissioner, wrote that he had no prob lem with Allies financial controls and
the internationalization of the Straits, but the forced cession to Greece of
Eastern Thrace and Smyrna were in “flagrant violation of the princi ple of self-
determination.” Their transfer would, he predicted, lead to endless warfare
and expulsions. “I am amazed at the lightheartedness with which the [Allied]
Supreme Council seem to contemplate another war,” he wrote. The Turkish
public would reject the treaty, he wrote.80 Others forecast that Sèvres would
lead to a surge in vio lence against the Christian minorities.81
Historical Background, 1918–1924
The Ankara government denounced the terms as harsh and humiliating.
The treaty boosted their motivation to drive out the foreigners and immedi-
ately triggered an increase in anti- French and anti- Greek vio lence around
Anatolia. Following Sèvres and the British occupation of Constantinople,
the new po liti cal landscape solidified. The Allies governed Constantinople
and the parts of Cilicia and Ionia under their direct control, while the rest of
Turkey was governed by the Nationalists, who had further consolidated
power after the occupation of the capital. Many deputies moved to Ankara
and, in April, reconstituted themselves, with additional activists, in a new
parliament: the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. The rift between the
two Turkish regimes was thus complete. The old government condemned
Kemal to death in absentia, and the Şeyhülislam issued a fatwa designating the
Nationalists “rebels” whom believers were authorized to kill. The Sultanate
even tried— briefly and ineffectually—to challenge the Nationalists in skir-
mishes in Izmit, Balikesir, and several other towns.
On June 14 and 15, the Nationalists attacked British troops for the first
time, in Izmit. The Allies immediately lifted their ban on an eastward Greek
advance from Smyrna, believing it would improve their own threatened posi-
tions in Izmit. The Greeks made their move on the 22nd, occupying Bursa and
Panderma (Bandırma). In July they occupied Edirne and in August the heights
of Uşak on the Anatolian plateau. The Nationalists, meanwhile, gained the
upper hand in Turkey’s easte
rn marches, decisively beating the ragtag Ar-
menian republican forces in November– December. In March 1921, after the
Bolshevik takeover of Yerevan, the Turks and Soviets signed a treaty of friend-
ship. The Turks ceded Nakhichivan and Batumi, and the Soviets began to arm
the Nationalists. With the eastern frontier out of the picture, Nationalist troops were free to turn and face their other enemies, the Greeks and the French.82
At this point the French tried to reach an accommodation with the Na-
tionalists. In March 1921 they signed an accord with Kemal, agreeing to
withdraw from Cilicia in exchange for a handful of largely symbolic con-
cessions. But Ankara scrapped the pact, confident that they would achieve
better terms after further fighting.83 That improved deal came in October.
Represented by the right- wing parliamentarian Henry Franklin- Bouillon—
whom Rumbold described as “a perfect curse”— the French reached an accord
Mustafa Kemal and the Nationalists
with the Nationalists “ behind the back” of the other Allies. Rumbold thought
the Allies’ position “gravely compromised.” 84 The French withdrew com-
pletely from Cilicia and northern Aleppo vilayet. No provision was made to
protect the Christian minorities left behind, the French being “quite indif-
ferent to their fate.” 85
The Greeks were more committed. But the Nationalists blocked their last
offensive fifty miles short of Ankara. The Greek leadership— including Veni-
zelos, who was ousted from the premiership in the general elections of
November 1920, and the reinstalled sovereign, King Constantine— then
sought a dignified way out of the quagmire. “Something must be done quickly
to remove us from the nightmare of Asia Minor,” Prince Andrew, a Greek
commander, wrote.86
The British gradually abandoned the Greek military effort, reducing and
eventually cutting off loans and arms. But Britain continued to supply diplo-
matic support. In March 1922, with the Greeks flailing, the British proposed
the complete evacuation of the Greek Army from Anatolia, but with certain safe-
guards relating to the evacuation and Ottoman Greek civilians.87 The National-
ists rejected the terms.88 Athens contemplated seizing Constantinople but was
warned off by united Allied opposition.89 The British representative in Smyrna
predicted that the demoralized Greek Army would “crumple up and run for
their ships. . . . There is going to be the father and the mother of a mess!”90
At the last minute, in spring 1922, the Greeks turned to a new commander:
General George Hatzianestis, “a well- trimmed and well- dressed Don Quixote,”
according to Lloyd George, as well as a “ mental case.”91 It was of no avail. By
summer the Greek army “was like an apple eaten out inside by insects or
disease, superficially whole and apparently firm, but ready to disintegrate at
the first sharp blow.”92 It fell on August 26, in the form of a surprise Nationalist offensive. After months of preparation, the Nationalists took only hours to
breach the Greek lines. Defeat turned to rout. In their daily communiqués to
the press, the Turkish high command downplayed their success for tactical
reasons, but the victory was decisive.93 The Greek Army fled to the coast
and took ship for the mainland. Smyrna and the rest of the Ionian coast fell.
Within days thousands of Greek and Armenian civilians were massacred,
much of Smyrna was in ashes, and more than a quarter of a million Ottoman
Greeks fled Anatolia.
Historical Background, 1918–1924
The ejection of the Greek Army and a further Nationalist advance north-
ward brought the Kemalists and the British troops into direct contact along
the Neutral Zone on the southern shore of the Straits. Kemal demanded right
of passage to cross to Eu rope. Rumbold’s fears were coming true. He had pre-
dicted back in March that “if the Greeks crack we may expect to have to eat
dirt to an unlimited extent and this is not a form of diet that has ever agreed
with me”— though the French and Italian high commissioners “Pelle and
Carroni may flourish on it.”94 The French and Italians folded, withdrawing
their troops from the Straits and southwestern Turkey. But the British, too,
ultimately were forced to beat a humiliating strategic retreat.
True, they blocked Kemal from crossing to Thrace, primarily to maintain
their temporary hold on the Straits and Constantinople. Kemal tried brink-
manship, inching his cavalry into the Neutral Zone on September 23. The
British feared that Kemal would march on Constantinople.95 Rumbold quoted
Franklin- Bouillon to the effect that there were “150,000 Turkish troops who
wanted to advance” and “no victorious army had ever stopped and waited be-
fore its own capital.”96
But this one did. Though effectively alone, the British stood firm. Honor
was at stake: Lloyd George argued that abandoning Chanak (Canakkale), the
town on the Anatolian side of the Dardanelles where Allied troops were cen-
tered, would lead to “the greatest loss of prestige.”97 The Cabinet authorized
General Charles Harington, the British officer in command in Constanti-
nople, to issue an ultimatum demanding the Nationalists withdraw. He was
ordered to fight if necessary.98 But Kemal then halted his cavalry’s advance and
agreed to talks.99 Negotiations began on October 2, at Mudanya. The British
hoped to achieve an armistice between the Greeks and Turks, fix the Thra-
cian line to which the Greeks would withdraw, and calm the Straits.
At the Mudanya talks, the French and Italians were ready to bow to Turkish
demands, including an immediate Greek handover of Eastern Thrace.
Rumbold characterized the French position as “a treacherous surrender.”100
In Constantinople, it was reported, the Christians were “gibbering with
terror”— and some were already fleeing the city.101 Residents understood
that the days of Allied occupation were numbered. Most observers expected
all the city’s Christians—400,000 Greeks and 130,000 Armenians—to leave,
as the Armenians fled Cilicia when the French withdrew (see below).102
Mustafa Kemal and the Nationalists
In the midst of the talks, Britain substantially reinforced its troops along
the Straits, and the Turks did not renew their probes into the Neutral Zone.
But this was a minor victory. In the larger scheme of things, the Turks had
won. In the Mudanya Armistice signed on October 11, Britain conceded even-
tual Greek and Allied withdrawal from Eastern Thrace and Constantinople.103
The city and the Neutral Zone remained temporarily under British control,
but the Greek military would have to begin retreating from Eastern Thrace
on the fifteenth. The territory they left would be occupied by Allied contin-
gents for up to thirty days. Turkish gendarmes would then move in.104
Within a fortnight, the Christians of Eastern Thrace, numbering between
300,000 and 400,000, had trekked westward out of the country under
Allied supervision. The Turks subsequently charged that “the Hellenic au-
thorities” had provoked and encouraged the migration.105 Venizelos worried
that the Turki
sh gendarmes moving into Eastern Thrace would harass the
evacuees, but almost no incidents were reported.106 The last to leave were the
remaining Christian villa gers of Gallipoli.107
For Rumbold, it was all very humiliating. The Nationalists had “secured
Eastern Thrace without striking a blow” and had made no real concessions.108
When it came time for a peace conference, slated for Lausanne in late
November, the Turks would arrive “with the National Pact in one hand and
a drawn sabre in the other.”109 Admittedly “gloomy,” Rumbold feared for the
Christians still left in Anatolia, Western Thrace, and Mosul vilayet.110
Between Kemal’s conquest of Smyrna and the Lausanne talks, Turkish pol-
itics underwent an earthquake. In November 1922, the Grand National As-
sembly dissolved the Sultanate and declared the establishment of the Turkish
Republic. Ahmet Tevfik Pasha, the last Ottoman grand vizier, handed over
his seal of office to the Nationalists, and on the 17th Sultan Mehmed VI fled
to Malta on a British warship.111 (The Grand National Assembly then elected
the crown prince, Abdülmecid, caliph, a religious figurehead. But the caliphate
would also be abolished the following year.)
On November 20 the Nationalists and the Allies convened in Lausanne to
hammer out the postwar settlement that would replace Sèvres. An American
del e ga tion also attended, mainly to look out for U.S. commercial interests. It
did not participate in the formal negotiations, but on one issue appear to have
made a real effort: promoting the establishment of an Armenian “national
Historical Background, 1918–1924
home” in the eastern vilayets. (The term may have been borrowed from the
Balfour Declaration, Britain’s 1917 promise to support a Jewish “national
home” in Palestine.) The Americans saw the minuscule postwar state that had
emerged around Yerevan, ultimately to fall under Soviet rule, as insufficient.
The Armenians did not disagree: at the Paris Peace Conference back in
February 1919, the Armenian del e ga tion had called for a “greater” Armenia,
consisting of the Yerevan republic, the “six vilayets,” Alexandretta, Adana,
Trabzon, Kars, and Alexandropol.112 During the war Western statesmen had at
