Early Buddhist Meditation

by Keren Arbel

  113 I wish to make clear that translating the term yathābhūtaṃ as ‘things as they are’, does not refer to knowledge about the ontology of reality, or reality in the scientific sense, but to knowledge about how dukkha arises and ceases; knowledge about the nature of experience which can liberate the mind from clinging.

  114 SN II.117: aññatreva āvuso nārada, saddhāya aññatra ruciyā aññatra anussavā aññatra ākāraparivitakkā aññatra diṭṭhinijjhānakkhantiyā atthāyasmato nāradassa paccattameva ñāṇaṃ.

  115 SN II.118. The same question was put to the venerable Musīla, and he gave the same answers as Nārada. However, contrary to Nārada who claimed he is not an Arahant, Musīla kept silent when Saviṭṭha said that he must be an arahants [SN II.117].

  116 SN V.229–30: idha bhikkhave, sekho bhikkhu idaṃ dukkhanti yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti. Ayaṃ dukkhasamudayoti yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti, ayaṃ dukkhanirodhoti yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti, ayaṃ dukkhanirodhagāminīpaṭipadāti yathabhūtaṃ pajānāti… sekho bhikkhu pañcindriyāni pajānāti: saddhindriyaṃ viriyindriyaṃ satindriyaṃ samādhindriyaṃ paññindriyaṃ, yaṃgatikāni yaṃparamāni yaṃbalāni yaṃpariyosānāni, naheva kho kāyena phusitvā viharati, paññāya ca ativijjha passati. Ayampi kho bhikkhave: pariyāyo: yaṃ pariyāyaṃ āgamma sekho bhikkhu sekhabhūmiyaṃ ṭhito sekhosmī’ti pajānāti.

  117 The Kosambī Sutta was interpreted in different ways. La Vallée Poussin, for example, has argued that Musīla represents those who know and thereby reach the goal (he identifies Musīla as a Sāṃkhya), while Nārada, strives to reach the goal through direct experience (and therefore he is a yogin, as defined in the Bhagavad Gīta). La Vallée Poussin has also contended that insight without meditation is possible and accessible to more than just a few. See Bronkhorst summary of La Vallée Poussin’s argument in Bronkhorst 1993, 101–2. Gombrich has suggested, that Nārada interprets paññā in the narrow sense of intellection without a deeper realization (Gombrich 2002, 129). In a more recent article Bhikkhu Bodhi has demonstrated that the Kosambī Sutta does not present a tension between two competing visions – the cognitivists and pro-meditatie view of the path – but between a sekha and the arahant. Bodhi points out that ‘by denying that he is an arahant [i.e., Nārada], he is insinuating that an arahant has not only directly cognized nibbāna but is capable of experiencing it in a meditative state so powerful that one seems to be making bodily contact with it’ (Bhikkhu Bodhi 2003, 62).

  118 Note that in MN II.15–6 and DN I.73–6, the Buddha describes the four jhānas elaborately and explains that the various jhāna factors should be experienced in such a way that they pervade the whole body. With reference to the first jhāna, the Buddha says that ‘there is no part of the whole body, un-pervaded by the joy and pleasure born of discernment’ (nāssa kiñci sabbāvato kāyassa vivekajena pītisukhena apphuṭaṃ hoti).

  119 MN I.504: vigatapipāso ajjhattam vūpasantacitto vihareyya.

  120 MN I.504–5: so aparena samayena kāmānaṃyeva samudayañca atthaṃgamañca assādañca ādīnavañca nissaraṇañca yathābhūtaṃ viditvā kāmataṇhaṃ pahāya kāmapariḷāhaṃ paṭivinodetvā vigatapipāso ajjhattaṃ vūpasantacitto viharāmi. So aññe satte passāmi kāmesu avītarāge kāmataṇhāhi khajjamāne kāmapariḷāhena pariḍayhamāne kāme paṭisevante. So tesaṃ na pihemi. Na tattha abhiramāmi. Taṃ kissa hetu: yā hayaṃ māgandiya ratī aññatreva kāmehi aññatra akusalehi dhammehi api dibbaṃ sukhaṃ samadhigayha tiṭṭhati, tāya ratiyā ramamāno hīnassa na pihemi, na tattha abhiramāmi.

  121 The Tevijja Sutta of the DN seems to contradict my argument, since the Buddha describes in this sutta how to achieve union with Brahmā by the attainment of the first jhāna as the basis (DN I.250). However, although the first jhāna seems to be a prerequisite for this union, the actual practice for being reborn in the presence of Brahmā is the practice of the four Brahmā-vihāras (DN I.251–2). Note also, that in the Nikāyas, to the best of my knowledge, there is only one occurrence where the jhānas are identified with the attainment of certain heavenly realms. I will discuss this issue later on.

  122 MN I.506.

  123 The Buddha further elucidates this abandoning process by a comparing it to the story a leper who habitually eases his wounds by cauterizing his sores on a charcoal pit as a medical intervention. After this leper has been cured of leprosy, he does not envy another leper who is easing his disease in the same way as he had previously. The cured leper has the capacity to abandon a lesser craving, easing bodily suffering on a charcoal pit, since he is now cured. MN I.506: roge hi, bho Gotama, sati bhesajjena karaṇīyaṃ hoti, roge asati na bhesajjena karaṇīyaṃ hoti.

  124 There are three cosmological realms that are inhabited by different ranks of devas: the kāma-dhātu and rūpa-dhātu and the arūpa -dhātu. See the chart of the cosmological plains in Akira 1997, 58–9.

  125 It is interesting to note that DN III.220 enumerates three abidings: deva-abiding, Brahmā abiding and Ariya-abidinig (tayo-vihārā: dibbo-vihāro, buhmā-vihāro, ariyovihāro). This classification of ‘abidings’ (vihāra) is interesting. According to this classification there is a deva abidings that refers to heavenly worlds of the kāma-dhātu (‘the realm of divine sensual pleasures’). The Brahmā abiding seems to be a generic term for both rūpa-dhātu and the arūpa-dhātu. The Ariya-abiding (ariyo-vihāro), however, refers to the abidings of Noble Persons (ariya). I would propound that the jhānas are the ariyo-vihāro, mainly because what the Buddha states in the Māgandiya Sutta (that he surpasses ‘divine pleasures’ in the first jhāna), and because the third jhāna is described as an attainment in which one experiences pleasure (sukha) with the body, ‘on account of which, the Noble Ones announce: He has a pleasant abiding’. E.g., MN I.159: sukhañca kāyena paṭisaṃvedeti.Yantaṃ ariyā ācikkhanti’ upekkhako satimā sukhavihārī’ti tatiyaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharati.

  126 Taishō, 54, 55 (26?).

  127 DDB “intelligent”.

  128 MN I.91.

  129 Cousins 1994–6, 50. The Paṭisambhidāmagga was dated by A.K. Warder to be a composition from the third century and the early second century BCE (Ibid., 51).

  130 Cousins 1994–6, 50.

  131 Bhikṣu Thich Minh Chau 1991, 250.

  132 In his article ‘Thinking about Cessation’, Daniel Stuart makes preliminary observations about the jhānas and the ‘attainment of cessation’ from studying the Pṛṣṭhapālasūtra of the (Mūla-) Sarvāstivādin Dīrghāgama. In this text, the attainment of cessation is attained immediately after the practice of the four dhyānas. Stuart suggests that later on the jhānas and the attainment of cessation were separated. He states that ‘the practice of the four dhyānas was one of the fundamental practices of the early tradition. Thus, the idea that liberation was attained directly from the fourth dhyāna is probably as old as the tradition itself.’ He further posited that entering the attainment of cessation after the practice of the four dhyānas, was quite possibly one of the earliest Buddhist models of liberation (Stuart 2008, 24–5). In a more recent book he has stated that ‘the idea that liberation was attained directly from the fouth dhyāna is probably as old as the tradition itself’ (Stuart 2013, 44).

  133 DN III.288: Katame nava dhammā bahukārā? Nava yonisomanasikāramūlakā dhammā: yoniso manasikaroto pāmojjaṃ jāyati, pamuditassa pīti jāyati, pītimanassa kāyo passambhati, passaddhakāyo sukhaṃ vedeti, sukhino cittaṃ samādhiyati, samāhite citte yathābhūtaṃ jānāti. Yathābhūtaṃ jānaṃ passaṃ nibbindati, nibbindaṃ virajjati, virāgā vimuccati. Ime nava dhammā bahukārā. See also SN II.30.

  134 The reason I refer to these moments as ‘similar’ to jhānic pīti and sukha is because jhānic pīti and sukha are part of a particular body-mind experience that includes specific mental factors and the absence of others. Only this unique configuration of factors can be characterized as jhāna. However, this does not mean that one cannot o
therwise experience pleasure and happiness that are not connected to sense gratification. Yet, in the absence of the other jhāna factors, these pīti and sukha are perhaps similar to the jhānic one, but not identical.

  135 See also AN III.207.

  136 See DN I.73.

  137 SN IV.209: tassa kāmasukhaṃ nābhinandato yo sukhāya vedanāya rāgānusayo so nānuseti. This transformative process, in which the mind is independent from pleasant sense experiences, is depicted in the Salla Sutta: ‘Being contacted by a painful feeling, a noble disciple does not seek delight in the pleasures of the senses. For what reason? It is because the instructed noble disciple knows of an escape from painful feeling other than sensual pleasures. Since he does not seek delight in the pleasures of the senses, the underlying tendency to lust for pleasant feeling does not lie behind this. He understands as it really is the origin and the passing away, the gratification, the danger, and the escape in the case of these feelings’ (SN IV.209).

  138 MN I.303–4.

  139 See, for example, Griffiths 1983, 59.

  140 For a detail study of these terms in the Abhidhamma and later Pāli texts, see Cousins 1992, 137–47. Cousins has summarized the Abhidhamma understanding of vitakka and maintained that vitakka is a faculty which in its weakest form is a tendency to speculate and fix upon ideas, and when it is strongly developed it is the ability to apply the mind and fix it on an object. Vicāra in its weakest form is the tendency of the mind to wander, but when it is developed, it is the ability to explore and examine the object (Cousins 1992, 153). See also Vism IV.88–91 and VI.67.

  141 E.g., MN I.9; MN I.114–5; MN III.114; SN V.417–8.

  142 E.g., Dvedhāvitakka Sutta and Vitakkasaṇṭhāna Sutta of MN.

  143 E.g., SN IV.293.

  144 MN I.301; SN IV.293.

  145 MN I.301: vitakketvā vicāretvā pacchā vācaṃ bhindati, tasmā vitakkvicārā vacīsaṅkhāro.

  146 DN II.277.

  147 papañcasaññāsaṅkhāya sati vitakka hoti, papañcasaññāsaṅkhāya asati vitakka na hoti. See also MN I.112–3.

  148 See Ñānananda 1971, 25.

  149 E.g., SN V.417–8.

  150 See, for example, MN I.111–12: ‘Dependent on the eye and forms, eye consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is contact. With contact as a condition there is feeling. What one feels, that one perceives. What one perceives, that one thinks about. What one thinks about, that one mentally proliferates. With what one mentally proliferates as the source, perceptions and notions tinged by mental proliferation beset a man with respect to past, future, and present forms cognizable through the eye.’

  151 Note the well-known example of seeing a rope when it is dark and thinking it is a snake.

  152 See SN IV.202, which points out that the notion ‘I am’(asmīti), ‘I am this’ (ayamahamasmīti) and so forth are all forms of thinking (maññita) and that this type of thinking is fundamentally problematic. Wynne has pointed out that this sutta indicates that the various manifestations of the subjective aspect of self-consciousness – the ‘I’ as a quasi-independent observer of phenomena – arise in dependence on the conceptual activity of the mind. He further asserts that this implies that ‘the subject of self-consciousness does not exist beyond particular cognitive events’ (Wynne 2011, 131–2).

  153 See, for example, DN I.202.

  154 Hamilton 2000, 148.

  155 Hamilton 2000, 133.

  156 The Sangīti Sutta enumerates five results when one develops samādhi. The third result of developing and extending samādhi is mindfulness and clear awareness (satisampajaññā): when a monk knows the arising, remaining, and falling of feelings, perceptions and thoughts (vitakka) (DN III.223).

  157 Sn 7: yassa vitakkā vidhūpitā, ajjhattaṃ suvikappitā asesā.

  158 Sn 8: sabbaṃ accagamā imaṃ papañcaṃ.

  159 Note that the tern vikalpa in Mahāyāna Buddhism seems to designate the same thing: erroneous thinking that originates from delusion, ignorance and desire. This ‘thinking’ is the cause of saṃsāra: ‘the state of saṃsāra is merely the result of deluded thoughts (myi-bden-pais′ ′du-ses)’ (Gomez 1983, 89).

  160 SN I.39–40 : nandi sambandhano loko vitakkassa vicāraṇaṃ.

  161 AN II.49: gamanena na pattabbo lokassanto kudācanaṃ, na ca appatvā lokantaṃ dukkhā atthi pamocanaṃ.

  162 See the Bāhiya Sutta where the Buddha instructs Bāhiya that he must train himself in a way that in ‘the seen there will be only the seen; in the heard, only the heard; in the sensed only the sensed; in the cognized, only the cognized’ (Ud 1.10).

  163 See Sue Hamilton’s suggestion that ‘by concentrating on gaining understanding of the nature of all things at the same time as working for stilling one’s normal mental activity, one can see the way one’s affective reaction to one’s perceptions is something that arises because of not understanding that all things are similarly dependently originated and therefore impermanent and impersonal’ (Hamilton 2000, 134).

  164 E.g., DN I.186–7.

  165 DN III.253.

  166 Klein 1998, 207.

  167 MN I.116: yaññadeva bhikkhave bhikkhu bahulamanuvitakketi anuvicāreti tathā tathā nati hoti cetaso nekkhammavitakkañce bhikkhave bhikkhu bahulamanuvitakketi anuvicāreti, pahāsi kāmavitakkaṃ. Nekkhammavitakkaṃ bahulamakāsi. Tassa taṃ nekkhammavitakkāya cittaṃ namati. Abyāpāda vitakkañce bhikkhave bhikkhu bahulamanuvitakketi anuvicāreti, pahāsi byāpādavitakkaṃ. Abyāpādavitakkaṃ bahulamakāsi. Tassa taṃ abyāpādavitakkāya cittaṃ namati. Avihiṃsāvitakkañce bhikkhave bhikkhu bahulamanuvitakketi anuvicāreti pahāsi vihiṃsāvitakkaṃ. Avihiṃsāvitakkaṃ bahulamakāsi. Tassa taṃ avihiṃsāvitakkāya cittaṃ namati.

  168 MN I.116: uppanno kho me ayaṃ nekkhammavitakko. So ca kho nevattavyābādhāya saṃvattati, na paravyābādhāya saṃvattati, na ubhayavyābādhāya saṃvattati, paññāvuddhiko avighātapakkhiko nibbānasaṃvattaniko. Rattiñcepi naṃ bhikkhave anuvitakkeyyaṃ anuvicāreyyaṃ neva tatonidānaṃ bhayaṃ samanupassāmi. Divasañcepi naṃ bhikkhave anuvitakkeyyaṃ anuvicāreyyaṃ neva tatonidānaṃ bhayaṃ samanupassāmi. Rattindivañcepi naṃ bhikkhave anuvitakkeyyaṃ anuvicāreyyaṃ neva tatonidānaṃ bhayaṃ samanupassāmi. api ca kho me aticiraṃ anuvitakkayato anuvicārayato kāyo kilameyya. Kāye kilante cittaṃ ūhaññeyya. Ūhate citte ārā cittaṃ samādhimhāti. So kho ahaṃ bhikkhave ajjhattameva cittaṃ saṇṭhapemi sannisādemi ekodiṃ karomi samādahāmi. Taṃ kissa hetu: mā me cittaṃ ūhaññī ti.

  169 DN II.277: vitakke sati chande hoti, vitakke asati chando na hotī.

  170 For example, chanda appears as a wholesome factor in the ‘giving rise to the intention for the non-arising of un-arisen evil unwholesome states’. MN II.11: anuppannānaṃ pāpakānaṃ akusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ anuppādāya chandaṃ janeti. Chanda as a wholesome factor occurs also in SN I.202; AN IV.320.

  171 Chanda as an unwholesome factor, occurs in DN I.25; SN IV.195; Sn 835. According to the Sakkapañha Sutta, chanda, as an unwholesome factor, is the cause for the arising of likes and dislikes (piyāppiyaṃ), which in turn is the cause for ill will (issā) and envy/stinginess/selfishness (macchariyaṃ).

  172 ‘And where do these unwholesome intentions cease without a reminder? Their cessation is stated: quite secluded from the desire for sensual pleasures and unwholesome states, a bhikkhu enters upon and abides in the first jhāna… It is here that unwholesome intentions cease without a reminder’ (MN II.27–8).

  173 MN III.136: So ime pañca nīvaraṇe pahāya cetaso upakkilese paññāya dubbalikaraṇe kāye kāyānupassī viharati ātāpī sampajāno satimā vineyya loke abhijjhādomanassaṃ. Vedanāsu vedanānupassī… citte cittānupassī… dhammesu dhammānupassī viharati ātāpī sampajāno satimā vineyya loke abhijjhādomanassaṃ.

  174 E.g., MN III.235–6.

  3

  The Second Jhāna

  Non-discursive broad field of awareness

  Again, with the stilling of thought and reflection, a bhi
kkhu enters upon and abides in the second jhāna, which is [mental] joy and [bodily] pleasure born of samādhi, and has inner stillness and unification of mind, without thought and reflection.1

  The Buddhist path to liberation is a progression from an ordinary mind filled with many moments of unwholesome states to a purified mind wholesome and free. It is a progression from a wrong perception of reality to a clear seeing of phenomena. The jhānas, I would suggest, exemplify this progression: when one progresses from one jhāna to the next, one purifies the mind from mental obstructions and actualizes the aim of Buddhist meditation. By progressing through the jhānas, insight (vipassanā) becomes deeper and reality is perceived more clearly. This chapter will offer an analysis of the second jhāna viewed as a progression from the previous jhāna. This analysis will also serve as a foundation for exploring the third and fourth jhānas.

  Before we delve into exploring the nature and liberative value of the second jhāna, I would like to offer an observation. The second, third and fourth jhānas pose a problem if we consider Buddhist liberation as some kind of discursive wisdom. This notion of liberation has been presented, for example, by Paul Griffiths and Robert Gimello, who have argued that liberation is discursive knowledge brought about by vipassanā practice, which by itself is a conceptual reflection upon basic categories of Buddhist doctrine.2 If the practice of meditation and the notion of liberation are conceived of in this manner, how are we to understand the second, third and fourth jhānas, in which discursive thinking are absent? What is the benefit in the cessation of discursive thinking for seeing the nature of reality and for attaining awakening? Moreover, how does the stilling of discursive thinking and reflecting come about according to the Pāli Nikāyas: is it a fruit of insight or the outcome of certain concentration exercises? And last, what happens in the mind when thinking fades away?