Early Buddhist Meditation
Page 23
4 See, for example,, Gunaratana 1999, 79.
5 E.g., MN II.28.
6 See, for example, AN V.3, which will discuss later on in this chapter.
7 E.g., Vism XVIII.3. Note that the Nikāyas do not ever express the view that for integrating insight practice with the jhānas, one has to emerge from a jhāna attainment for contemplating (discursively) the jhāna factors.
8 SN V.332: samādhisambojjhaṅgo tasmiṃ samaye bhikkhuno bhāvanāpāripūriṃ gacchati. So tathā samāhitaṃ cittaṃ sādhukaṃ ajjhupekkhitā hoti. yasmiṃ samaye ānanda, bhikkhu tathā samāhitaṃ cittaṃ sādhukaṃ ajjhupekkhitā hoti, upekhāsambojjhaṅgo tasmiṃ samaye bhikkhuno āraddho hoti. Upekhāsambojjhaṅgaṃ tasmiṃ samaye bhikkhu bhāveti. Upekhāsambojjhaṅgo tasmiṃ samaye bhikkhuno bhāvanāpāripūriṃ gacchati.
9 SN V.332.
10 MN I.59.
11 See SN V.181, which explains that sampajāna is the ability to know the arising, presence and passing away of feeling (vedanā), thoughts (vitakka) and apperception (saññā). Since this quality manifests fully in the third jhāna, it demonstrates that the third jhāna is the actualization of understanding conditionality and impermanence. See also AN II.45, which calls this type of observation samādhi-bhāvanā bhāvitā bahulīkatā satisampajaññāya saṃvattati.
12 Note the statement in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta that one ‘abides observing mind as mind’ (citte cittānupassī viharati) (MN I.59).
13 Gethin 2001, 159.
14 Gethin 2001, 159.
15 Note that according to SN III.131, when one has seen the rise and fall of the five aggregates, which are the Buddhist analysis of subjective conditioned experience, it is only then that one can eradicate the conceit, intention and underlying tendency ‘I’ am with regard to the five aggregates. Note that SN V.180–1 points out the establishment of sati means that one sees form, feeling, citta and dhamma as they are, without clinging or aversion; at the same time, the establishment of sampajāna means that one knows the impermanent and insubstantial nature of feeling, perception and thoughts. This is a slightly different formulation than the five aggregates, but it refers to the same experiential aspect of human beings.
16 Ibid.
17 AN V.3: Samāhitassa bhikkhave na cetanāya karaṇīyaṃ’yathābhūtaṃ taṃ jānāmi passāmī’ti. Dhammatā esā bhikkhave yaṃ samāhito yathābhūtaṃ jānāti passati. Yathābhūtaṃ bhikkhave jānato passato na cetanāya karaṇīyaṃ, nibbindāmi, virajjāmī’ti. Dhammatā esā bhikkhave yaṃ yathābhūtaṃ jānaṃ passaṃ nibbindati virajjati.
18 MN I.303–4.
19 E.g., MN I.174: yaṃ taṃ ariyā ācikkhanti ‘upekkhāko satimā sukhavihārī’ti tatiyaṃ jhānam upasampajja viharati.
20 AN III.279: idha bhikkhave bhikkhu cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā neva sumano hoti na dummano. Upekkhako viharati sato sampajāno. Sotena saddaṃ sutvā neva sumano hoti na dummano. Upekkhako viharati sato sampajāno. Ghānena gandhaṃ ghāyitvā neva sumano hoti na dummano. Upekkhako viharati sato sampajāno. Jivhāya rasaṃ sāyitvā neva sumano hoti na dummano. Upekkhako viharati sato sampajāno. Kāyena phoṭṭhabbaṃ phusitvā neva sumano hoti na dummano. Upekkhako viharati sato sampajāno. Manasā dhammaṃ viññāya neva sumano hoti na dummano. Upekkhako viharati sato sampajāno. Imehi kho bhikkhave chahi dhammehi samannāgato bhikkhu āhuneyyo hoti pāhuneyyo dakkhiṇeyyo añjalikaraṇīyo anuttaraṃ puññakkhettaṃ lokassāti. See also DN III.250.
21 E.g., bhikkhu pītiyā ca virāgā upekkhāko ca viharati, sato ca sampajāna…
22 See also DN III.113, which states that ariya supernormal power (iddhi) is the abiding in equanimity, mindfulness and full knowing. This is the noble supernormal power that is free from the āsavas and free from clinging.
23 See the threefold classification into dibbo vihāra, Brahmā-vihāra and Ariyo-vihāro in DN III.220. I suggest that the last one refers specifically to the jhānas, while the first kind refers to ‘divine pleasures’ (dibba-sukha) attained in heavenly worlds of the kāmadhātu and the the rūpa-dhātu and the arūpa-dhātu. The Brahmā-vihāra refers to the attainment of specifically the Brahmā world.
24 MN I.303–4.
25 Klein 1992, 295.
6
The Fourth Jhāna
Non-reactive and lucid awareness of the phenomenal field
With the abandoning of pleasure and pain and with the previous disappearance of gladness and discontent, a bhikkhu enters upon and abides in the fourth jhāna, which is neither-painful-nor-pleasurable and has complete purity of mindfulness and equanimity.1
Throughout the previous chapters, I state that what I seek to demonstrate in my analysis of the jhānas is that this model of four successive states exemplifies a gradual development of an awakened awareness of experience. I suggest that the jhānas designate a gradual spiritual ascent in which each step signifies a more clarified perception of experience. This position contrasts with the traditional Buddhist conception that views the jhānas as altered states of consciousness disconnected from sense experience and therefore not relevant for seeing reality clearly. Relatedly, following Rupert Gethin, I suggest that by progressing from one jhāna to the next, the mind gradually develops the seven factors of awakening until they are fulfilled as ‘awakening factors’ (bojjhaṅgas). Put simply, I argue that the jhānas actualize the aim of Buddhist meditation: they purify the mind from that which obstructs clear seeing and fulfil those qualities that can awaken the mind. My suggestion was that through the attainment of the jhānas, one can experience intimately a different mode of being; this mode is very different from ordinary cognition, in which the mind constantly reacts, interprets, rejects and desires. By progressing through the jhānas one gradually de-conditions the tendency to prefer, compare, interpret and react. Although the process of de-conditioning culminates in the attainment of nibbāna, it deepens when one attains the four jhānas.
In this chapter, I wish to continue this argument by further demonstrating that the process of purifying the mind’s perception of experience arrives at an important moment when one enters into the fourth and final jhāna. In the previous chapter, I suggest that in the third jhāna, a specialized form of awareness is beginning to be established. In this chapter, I attempt to show that this specialized form of awareness becomes fully grounded in the fourth and final jhāna. I will argue that the fourth jhāna, although conditioned and impermanent (as all experiences and insights are), is nonetheless further rectifying the connection between the conditioned and unconditioned by familiarizing the practitioner with an awakened awareness of phenomena. In other words, the fourth jhāna is an attainment, dare we say, that resembles or anticipates an awakened mind.
I The entrance into the fourth jhāna
Let us begin our exploration of the fourth jhāna by analyzing the opening statement of the formulaic description of the fourth jhāna:
With the abandoning of pleasure (sukha) and pain (dukkha) and with the previous disappearance of gladness (somanassa) and discontent (domanassa), a bhikkhu enters upon and abides in the fourth jhāna.2
Before looking at the oddity of this statement and trying to shed some light on it, I would like to make two preliminary remarks. First, it is important to note that when dukkha and sukha are coupled with somanassa and domanassa, they refer specifically to bodily pleasure and bodily pain; at the same time, somanassa and domanassa designate gladness and discontent, respectively.3 Second, this description is interesting since it seems to indicate that the fourth jhāna is the moment where the movement between two extremes ceases: the movement between mental and physical pleasure on the one end and mental and physical pain at the other end – that is, as I shall demonstrate, between desire and aversion. It seems that the entrance into the fourth jhāna marks a point in the spiritual path were one embodies equilibrium in both body and mind.
The opening statement of the formulaic description of the fourth jhāna is odd first and foremost because we already know that bodily pain ceases to arise when one att
ains the first jhāna.4 We know that the first, second and third jhānas are characterized specifically as physically pleasurable. What is more peculiar is the statement that for entering into the fourth jhāna, one ‘abandons’ (pahānā) [bodily] pleasure (sukha) and [bodily] pain (dukkha): how can one ‘abandon’ bodily pleasure and bodily pain when these bodily-sensations (kāyika-vedanā) can only cease (nirodha) or disappear (atthagama) due to various causes and conditions?5 Finally, why the sudden reference to gladness (somanassa) and discontent (domanassa), when these two mental factors are not mentioned in any of the descriptions of the previous three jhānas? When, then, did they disappear? How did their disappearance come to be? Why does their disappearance condition the attainment of the fourth jhāna? In other words, what is the spiritual and emotional process this statement is trying to convey?
Since they are related, let us begin with the first and second issues. According to Buddhist theory, it would be incorrect to say that one ‘abandons’ (pahāna) bodily pleasure or bodily pain. As noted earlier, these sensations arise and cease due to certain causes and conditions (we can say that they are ‘old kamma’, vipāka). Therefore, to state that one ‘abandons’ them seems inconsistent with the Buddhist view. What is more, the verb pajahati, in its various forms and inflections in the Nikāyas, usually appears in contexts where the abandonment of unwholesome states is described;6 it refers to the letting go of akusala dhammas (which sukha-vedanā and dukkha-vedanā are not), an abandonment brought about by insight into the nature of phenomena. Thus, all this seems to suggest is that the use of the term pahāna here implies that what one actually abandons, before entering into the fourth jhāna, is unwholesome reactions to pleasant and painful feelings. That is, one does not abandon the sensations themselves but the desire for pleasant feelings (vedanā) and aversion to painful ones. Following this, I will contend that abandoning these unwholesome habitual reaction-patterns to pleasant and painful sense experiences is the proximate cause for entering into the fourth and final jhāna.
This interpretation finds support in the Cūḷavedalla Sutta, which indicates that, when one attains the first three jhānas, not only aversion and desire but also the latent tendencies (anusaya) to aversion and desire are abandoned.7 The sutta then associates the abandonment of ignorance (avijjā) with the attainment of the fourth jhāna. It heralds that by abiding in the fourth jhāna ‘one abandons ignorance, and the underlying tendency to ignorance does not underlie that’.8 This makes it very clear that ignorance, the wrong perception of experience – wrong perception that gives rise to desire for impermanent and unreliable things, and aversion to unpleasant and painful ones – is not present in any level in the attainment of the fourth jhāna. Since desire and aversion, as the active aspects of ignorance, are abandoned when one enters the fourth jhāna – by developing insight into the nature of experience – one finally breaks free of ignorance by experiencing a different mode of being in the world of phenomena. This mode of being is untainted by emotional reactions and cognitive overlays based on a wrong perception of the nature of experience.
This last point is also demonstrated implicitly in verses 1106–7 from the Sutta Nipāta. Even though these verses do not mention the fourth jhāna explicitly, it seems obvious that they do refer to the jhānas, and more specifically, to the fourth jhāna. I suggest that the reason the fourth jhāna is not specifically mentioned in this context is due to the simple fact that the Sutta Nipāta is less systematic in its teachings than are the four primary Nikāyas. In other words, what received a systematic presentation in the four primary Nikāyas is still in a seed-form in the Sutta Nipāta. However, it is clear from Sutta Nipāta 1105, which opens this sutta, that the verses that follow describe the jhānic process.
In this discourse, Udaya questions the Buddha about the nature of liberation. He specifically asks the Buddha to explain ‘the breaking of ignorance’ for ‘one who attained jhāna, seated, free from defilements’ (jhāyiṃ virajaṃ āsinaṃ). As a response to Udaya’s question, the Buddha states that
[T]he abandonment of both the desire for sensual pleasures, said the Blessed One to Udaya, and discontent, and the dispelling of sloth and the hindrance of worry,
I tell [you], that liberation by perfect knowledge, the breaking of ignorance, is pure mindfulness and equanimity, preceded by examination of phenomena.9
Though this description is not identical to the formulaic description of the fourfold jhāna model (or to the fourth jhāna specifically) it seems clear that these verses make reference to the attainment of the jhānas – especially in light of Udaya’s question. These verses seem to illustrate, albeit in a different formulation, the beginning and ending of the jhānic process (from the abandoning of the nīvaraṇas,
the examination of dhammas up to the fulfilment of upekkhā and sati in the fourth jhāna). What is particularly interesting in this account is the Buddha’s statement that ‘pure mindfulness and equanimity’ (upekkhāsatisaṃsuddhaṃ), which quite evidently refers to the attainment of the fourth jhāna, 10 is ‘where’ the breaking of ignorance (avijjāya pabhedanaṃ), ‘liberation by perfect knowledge’ (aññāvimokkhaṃ), happens. In other words, the sutta propounds that this jhānic attainment is the point where the breaking of ignorance can happen; when the active aspects of ignorance are abandoned, one actualizes and embodies wisdom (paññā). Furthermore, when one embodies wisdom, the underlying tendency to ignorance does not underlie this mode of being.
Considering all the preceding, I propose to read the formulaic description of the fourth jhāna in this way:
With the abandonment of [the desire] for pleasure and [aversion] to pain, and with the previous disappearance of [the inner movement between] gladness and discontent, a bhikkhu enters upon and abides in the fourth jhāna.
II Wholesome gladness (somanassa) and discontent (domanassa)
As already observed, there is no apparent explanation why gladness (somanassa) and discontent (domanassa) are suddenly mentioned in the formulaic description of the fourth jhāna, especially since the descriptions of the other three jhānas do not. SN V.213– 14 makes things even more complicated when it states that the pain faculty (dukkhaindriya), the discontent faculty (domanassa-indriya), the pleasure faculty (sukha-indriya) and the gladness faculty (somanassa-indriya)11 cease without a remainder (aparisesaṃ nirujjhati) when one enters into the first, second, third and fourth jhānas, respectively.12
The difficulty with this account is the statement that sukha-indriya ceases (not abandoned) when one enters into the third jhāna, while gladness (somanassa) ceases when one enters into the fourth jhāna. This is problematic for two reasons: first, it contradicts the opening statement of the fourth jhāna, which states plainly that somanassa (together with domanassa) disappears prior to the attainment of the fourth jhāna and not when one enters into the fourth jhāna. Second, as we already know, sukha is very much present in the third jhāna. Sukha does not cease when one enters into the third jhāna, as stated in SN V.213–14, but only when one enters into the fourth and final jhāna.
Looking at this discrepancy, there is no plausible way to reconcile SN V.213–14 and the formulaic description, except from concluding that one of them is faulty. Based on Tse-Fu Kuan’s observation, in his article ‘Clarification on Feelings in Buddhist Dhyāna/Jhāna Meditation’, I believe we can safely conclude that SN V.213–14 is not a reliable account. Tse-Fu Kuan has pointed out that according to the Aviparītaka Sūtra (and other later texts translated into Chinese), sukhi-indriya is that which ceases at the fourth jhāna and not somanassa.13 This means that the Chinese accounts complement the formulaic description of the third and fourth jhānas (in both the Pāli and Chinese versions), while SN V.213–14 does not. Given that, it seems reasonable to contend that the Chinese sources preserved the correct version of this process. Accepting the Chinese version also clarifies the statement that both domanassa and somanassa disappear prior to entering into the fourth jhāna; that is, they disappear when one enters i
nto the second and third jhānas, respectively, while sukha is that which ceases (nirujjhati) (though not abandoned) when one enters into the fourth and final jhāna.
Having said that, how are we to understand the disappearance of domanassa and somanassa in a way that will clarify our understanding of the jhānic process, the nature of the fourth jhāna and the way by which one progresses into this attainment? Although this statement seems out of place at first sight, in point of fact, it gives us additional information on the process of insight, the very insight that arises prior to the attainment of the fourth jhāna and by which one attains this state. The Saḷāyatanavibhanga Sutta14 is a helpful discourse in understanding this spiritual-psychological process. It clarifies the nature of jhānic domanassa, somanassa and upekkhā as wholesome mental factors that arise from insight into the nature of experience. It also explains the connection between the disappearance of domanassa and somanassa and the fulfilment of upekkhā.
The Saḷāyatanavibhanga Sutta classifies gladness (somanassa), discontent (domanassa) and equanimity (upekkhā) into two types. The aim of this classification is to discern between the wholesome and the unwholesome as a guide for the practitioner. The sutta directs the practitioner to explore gladness, discontent and equanimity by seeing clearly when these mental factors arise from ignorance or when they arise from insight. The sutta then depicts a gradual process of cultivation in which wholesome gladness, discontent and equanimity are developed by the abandoning and surmounting unwholesome gladness, discontent and equanimity. That is, by the abandonment of the unwholesome, the wholesome can unfold and be revealed.
The Saḷāyatanavibhanga Sutta defines two types of gladness, discontent and equanimity: (1) those based on ‘worldly life’ (gehasitāni), and (2) those based on renunciation (nekkhammasitā). In this context, the classification between ‘worldly life’ and ‘renunciation’ should not be understood to refer to the external conditions of life, meaning whether a person has a family and lives at home or if one wears robes and lives as a monk or a nun. It refers to a mental attitude: whether the Dhamma was actually internalized or not.15 Wearing robes does not transform a person into a liberated person (although it is a beneficial and helpful condition to do so), only the abandonment of unwholesome states transforms one into a real renunciant. This point is exemplified by the way the Saḷāyatanavibhanga Sutta characterizes gladness, discontent and equanimity based on worldly life and gladness, discontent and equanimity based on renunciation. The former are mental states that are rooted in ignorance, arising from not seeing experience as it is; in contrast, the latter are mental states that arise from insight into the nature of sense experience.16