Atomic Thunder

by Elizabeth Tynan

  In June 1956, plans were in hand to test for fallout throughout the Maralinga lands. The AWTSC, headed at that time by Professor Martin, recommended that fallout monitoring kits, essentially comprising sticky paper to catch any swirling particles, be set up around the areas known to be inhabited by Aboriginal people. As the fallout from the Maralinga tests was likely to be to the northeast of the site, the AWTSC recommended that the sticky papers be placed at Ingomar Homestead, Mabel Creek Homestead, a shed halfway between Mabel Creek and Mt Willoughby, Mt Willoughby itself, Welbourne Hills, Granite Downs, Echo Hill and Ernabella. The sticky papers were to be changed daily during each test period, plus a few days before and after.

  As the date for the opening of the new Maralinga range approached, MacDougall was busier than ever. In mid-1956, he undertook a patrol of a large area that encompassed not just the weapons range but also a new area set aside for the South West Mining Company. In his report, he mused about what was going on:

  They, still in the Stone Age – hunters and gatherers with a code of laws and social customs effective only whilst they are segregated, and with harsh penalties applied – cannot continue to exist unchanged within our civilisation with its amazingly rapid scientific development, but they are human beings and must be considered as such.

  MacDougall set out his estimate of how many Aboriginal people lived in the area affected by the tests. As at November 1955, there were 1000 people and their numbers were increasing. Research-based calculations suggested, he said, that the numbers were expected to double in 20 years. He broke these numbers down into various areas, thus: Everard Park 200, Musgrave Ranges 350, Warburton Ranges 350 and Rawlinson Ranges 100.

  The detrimental effect of the opening up of this area depends upon the policy decided upon and the extent to which the policy is effectively policed. The policy of controlled contacts as provided for at present has been hopelessly broken down. Segregation is now impossible.

  MacDougall made the point that while around 1000 Aboriginal people lived in the area, only 50 per cent of them lived off the land: ‘One thousand natives will be more or less affected by the establishment of the Range in this area. None of these were completely uninfluenced by contacts that have been made, although some have never seen white men’. He was greatly opposed to giving Aborigines handouts and scathing of Europeans who thought otherwise.

  Because of the complete inability of many of the personnel to understand the different way of life of the aborigines, it makes it difficult for them to understand that their normal notions and reactions are detrimental to the welfare of the aborigines; e.g. ‘I know that that man is hungry because I have seen him sit there all day and he has had nothing to eat. I cannot harm him by giving him something to eat’. To explain that the man would not be sitting down all day looking hungry unless he knew that he would be freely given better food and water than he or his ancestors ever had before, makes no impression.

  In this letter, MacDougall recommended that the problem of the Aborigines in the area ‘be treated as one of great national importance’. He also advocated for a move that took more than a decade to eventuate: ‘that steps be taken to unify [Indigenous] policies, laws and regulations throughout the Commonwealth’.

  Beale took a sanguine approach to the Indigenous issue when planning for the British atomic weapons testing project to descend on the Australian desert. The government was perfectly happy with William Penney’s advice that X300, now named Maralinga, was the place to establish a permanent test site. In a top-secret Cabinet briefing document, Beale falsely claimed that if Maralinga was chosen they could revoke the existing Aboriginal reserve at Ooldea without difficulty as Aborigines had not used the area for some years.

  Robert Macaulay, MacDougall’s colleague, was only 23 and fresh out of the University of Sydney when he was appointed as the second native patrol officer. He had no experience in the out-back and in fact had rarely been outside Sydney. Initially based at Giles, his job was to ward off Aboriginal people and report on their whereabouts to the test authorities. He was woefully ill equipped, not only in life experience but also in gear – he had no car or radio when he started. He eventually borrowed a car and made his first trip south to the Ernabella Mission on 12 September 1956, two days after the first Buffalo shot was scheduled. He did not have a radio, though, so he was largely out of contact with his masters.

  In the event, Buffalo was delayed until 27 September, but even so preparing the local Aborigines for the first Maralinga major trial was impossible due to the short time and huge distances. On the day of that test, Macaulay sent a cable from Giles to Woomera, saying:

  Unable to satisfy myself no natives south of mentioned line. Have not been there. Unable to penetrate without own vehicle and radio. Hear none Mt. Harriot area. Regret unable to signal daily. Unaware I could use the flying doctor system. Shall remain Giles until vehicle and instructions arrive.

  Even though there were now two men, MacDougall and Macaulay, the task was getting more difficult. As doctor and activist Charles Duguid said in a 1957 speech, ‘It is an utter impossibility for two men efficiently to patrol such an area, particularly as tribal aborigines are always on the move and can keep out of sight if they wish’. And so it proved to be – the territory they were expected to cover was so vast that it was not humanly possible. They did what they could, but it was not enough. Duguid’s warnings were stern:

  The British Government, the Federal Government of Australia, and the Governments of South Australia and Western Australia must all join to ensure the future development of the people of the Central Reserve whose territory they have invaded. But they must act quickly or it will be too late to redeem a situation fraught with tragedy for the natives and shame to ourselves.

  MacDougall was an opinionated individual and a vocal critic of many decisions made on behalf of the Indigenous inhabitants of the Maralinga lands. He opposed the policy of keeping tribal Aborigines segregated from white people, ‘since it is obviously impossible to keep tribal Aborigines segregated for ever’. However, when the policy changed in 1956, he expressed his anger forcefully:

  I understand that the policy has now been changed though oddly enough I, as Dept. of Supply Native Patrol Officer, was not informed nor has it been promulgated in any way. The new policy appears to be a third and disastrous alternative whereby contacts are made by completely unqualified persons and no provision is made to train the Aboriginals to fit into the twentieth century. The result is certain to be a degeneration from self-respecting tribal communities to pathetic and useless parasites – it has happened so often before that surely we Australians must have learnt our lesson.

  For all his paternalism, MacDougall knew what was at stake: ‘The country under discussion belongs to the tribe and is recognised as such by other tribes. However, we propose to take it away from them and give nothing in return – we might as well declare war on them and make a job of it’.

  After the 1956 Buffalo tests, the West Australian newspaper ran several stories about the effects on Indigenous people. The deputy leader of the Opposition Arthur Calwell wrote to Beale asking if press reports about Aboriginal children being separated from their parents were true. HJ Brown, the Weapons Research Establishment controller at Woomera, sent a cable briefing the department so that they could reply to Calwell:

  There was no separation of Aboriginal parents and children anywhere in Australia as a result of the atomic trials. The only arrangements made respecting Aborigines was to keep track of their movements and to maintain information on their whereabouts. If necessary their movements were controlled to ensure that they did not enter danger areas but this was hardly necessary as they appear to be aware of the necessity for keeping away from the areas involved.

  The message said that the issue of the atomic trials was probably being conflated with the practice of the Warburton Mission ‘to take children from the Aborigines and endeavour to keep them at the Mission station for training. This is a policy of the
Mission which is creating some criticism but has nothing to do with atomic tests and has been in operation for some time’.

  The native patrol officers did not necessarily interact happily with that other great bushman of the region, Len Beadell. On a patrol in March 1957, Macaulay encountered Beadell driving his Land Rover, with an Aboriginal man as his passenger, looking for a landmark of Giles the explorer. Macaulay was furious. ‘Beadell thought his own need justified the breach of regulations. I did not.’ Macaulay notified TR Nossiter at Woomera. ‘I consider that not only was Beadell’s action a definite breach of the Controller’s instructions, but that it was detrimental to the native way of life, and more important, detrimental to the contact situation which I am attempting to control.’

  The AWTSC meeting of 19 July 1957 in Melbourne, chaired by Ernest Titterton, reviewed plans for the final major trials series at Maralinga and responded to a letter from the secretary of the Aborigines Board in Adelaide. ‘Similar facilities for moving aborigines are required for the Antler tests as were available during the Buffalo tests’, the minutes laconically related, as though making arrangements for the movement of cattle.

  MacDougall’s report of October 1957 told of his efforts to clear the area of Indigenous people before the Antler trials the previous month. During these trials, MacDougall based himself ‘at a strategic point upon the Emu–Giles Road’. Macaulay went to the Everard Ranges – Officer Creek area to check on the whereabouts of the ‘Jankantjara’ (probably Yankunytjatjara) people who were known to be hunting dingoes in the area at the time, while at Betty’s Well in the northwest corner of the Everard Range, 150 Jankantjara people were concluding an initiation ceremony. Both MacDougall and Macaulay hired local Indigenous people to assist them. William was engaged by MacDougall on ‘a food and transport with time to hunt dingoes basis’, while Tom Dodd, ‘an old halfcaste’, was offered £2 per week to travel with Macaulay.

  MacDougall found 27 Aborigines hunting dingoes in the Mt Lindsay area. These were Ernabella Mission people from up north. They had been briefed on the forthcoming Maralinga tests and knew who to contact if they experienced any problems, according to MacDougall. On his travels from Coffin Hill to Rawlinson Range, Mt Davies and Ernabella, he encountered a small number of Indigenous people. He then joined forces with Macaulay at Shirley Well and travelled around further, again discovering few Aborigines. MacDougall wrote in his report, ‘It is comparatively easy to ensure that a definite area is free of natives and definite information can be checked and forwarded. It is unfortunate that the dingo pup season coincides with Maralinga tests but the natives are quite content to keep out of the areas when told to do so’.

  The incident that, decades later, became the most famous concerning Aboriginal people during the British nuclear tests personalised for many the folly of conducting nuclear tests on land where people lived. On 15 May 1957, the Milpuddie family – Charlie (Tjanyindi), Edie, Henry (Kantjari) and Rosie (Milpadi), noted in the report as ‘Father, Mother and two Picaninnies’, along with their four hunting dogs – were found in a very inconvenient place. They had camped overnight alongside Maralinga’s only atomic bomb crater. A party of Royal Australian Engineers led by Captain Rudi Marqueur spotted Charlie at 9.15 am, as he walked from the crater to the health physics caravan at Pom Pom. Captain Marqueur noticed that the man gave hand signals to indicate he wanted water. After having a drink, Charlie led Marqueur back to the camp where his wife, children and dogs were waiting. The family had 12 dingo pelts gathered during their journey, almost certainly collected for the bounty payable. The huge crater had been created seven months earlier at the Marcoo test site as part of Operation Buffalo, by the only atomic bomb detonated at ground level. The area had been classified on site as dirty, meaning contaminated.

  The acting security officer for Maralinga, B White, met the family at the caravan. The report from Sergeant Frank Smith noted that ‘both mother and daughter were very shy as regards any approach in the early stages’. The health physics officer on site, Harry Turner, was initially quoted as saying at the time that they were all free of contamination, although this was not true. The boy, Henry, thought to be about 11, had contamination on his hair and body, and the other family members were not thoroughly checked. Turner’s own report provided more detailed information. He said that they were ‘monitored head to foot’ and the only trace of radioactivity was found on the boy.

  The boy was then persuaded to shower in the caravan. He was thoroughly washed by Mr. D SMALL who paid particular attention to the boy’s hair. At the conclusion of the operation, the boy was a new person and was so obviously pleased at the result that it was not difficult to persuade the father to shower. The father then washed his daughter. The mother was content with just washing her hair. Altogether the process of monitoring and washing was accomplished surprisingly well, considering the circumstances.

  Turner then handed them over to security, who ‘evacuated them from the area’. The Milpuddie story came to be known as the Pom Pom incident after the location where the father had been found.

  The family must have arrived at Marcoo sometime after 6 pm the night before, when the health physics caravan had closed for the day. They had approached from the northwest, walking across about a mile of land contaminated by fallout, which Turner asserted ‘would not adhere to their feet or bodies’. The campsite was also contaminated, although Turner said that a 16-hour stay at the site would expose them to

  only about 2% of the weekly dose that is permissible every week throughout a lifetime, and about 0.025% of the dose required for clinical detection. The inhalation hazard was completely negligible. The contamination on the hair of the boy was less than the accepted tolerance value … Therefore there is no possibility that any of the family could have experienced any radiation injury.

  The family were Spinifex people from the Ernabella Mission and had travelled to Ooldea to visit relatives, not knowing that it had been closed down. They were shipped to Yalata and placed into the care of Pastor Temme of the Lutheran Mission. Edie was pregnant at the time, and soon after she miscarried. They took their dogs with them, but when Howard Beale found this out he issued a direct order to the range commander that all four dogs be shot. This was done in front of the family. Over the next few years Edie suffered several more miscarriages. She was interviewed in 1985 when the Royal Commission went to the outback and sat in the dust with the Indigenous owners. She eventually revealed the sorrow of her miscarriages to Jim McClelland, and he featured the story in his report.

  On 3 December 1957, Beale was again quizzed in parliament about reports of harm to Aboriginal people from the Buffalo and Antler test series, and HJ Brown again had to come up with acceptable answers quickly. John Moroney sent an urgent cable to him at Woomera, recounting the questions:

  (1) Did a mystery disease of epidemic proportions a few months ago result in a number of deaths amongst Aboriginal children at the Ernabella Mission Station in South Australia? (2) Is it a fact that in certain quarters the deaths of these children were attributed to the effects of radioactive fallout from bomb tests? (3) If he has not already done so, will he have this report investigated immediately and make information available as soon as it comes to hand?

  Brown’s response noted that ‘a disease of epidemic proportions did occur at Ernabella during March to June 1957, resulting in the deaths of 20 children and 2 adults’. He denied it was a mystery disease, ‘although soon after its outbreak a pathological investigation carried out at Alice Springs apparently did not disclose the cause of death’. He said that ‘three children were removed from Ernabella to the Children’s Hospital Adelaide where subsequently one died and the result of post mortem indicated large fatty liver and malnutrition, and infection of both mastoids. At least one of these children was admitted with a history of measles’. Further investigation, he said, had indicated an outbreak of measles. Medical scientists had not investigated ‘the possible effect of radio active fall out’, but they had
‘since stated that there was no reason to suspect any other cause for the deaths than measles’. Brown also pointed out that an influenza outbreak at Ernabella had killed some people. He rejected speculation in the British Medical Association journal The Lancet that had drawn a connection between measles and radioactivity, piquing some interest and questions from Charles Duguid. Even if the article were true, he said, ‘Aborigines have not been subjected to radio activity’.

  As we have seen, after the major bomb trials ended with Operation Antler in 1957, the activities at Maralinga were more secret than ever. The more dangerous minor trials meant that Aboriginal people still had to be kept away, although it was harder to explain why. A patrol report by Macaulay in October 1963 mentioned ongoing issues:

  The [Maralinga] Range Commander had recently travelled over the outer perimeter roads and had met an Aboriginal family in the Prohibited Zone. This had led him to some appreciation of the problems and the delicate handling required in the early stages of contact between whites and nomadic Aborigines, especially in such a political context for Aborigines and the Maralinga Prohibited Zone.

  On 1 May 1963, Jim Cavanagh, Labor senator for South Australia (and later federal minister for Aboriginal Affairs in the Whitlam government), asked Beale’s representative in the Senate about the Aboriginal interaction with the Maralinga site. The Department of Supply prepared a briefing paper for the minister to help answer these questions. For the question ‘Have experiments with nuclear explosions been conducted at Maralinga, South Australia?’ the paper suggested that the response‘“yes”, qualified by “not since 1957”, is strictly true’. Actually, this was not strictly true as the nuclear experiments of the Vixen B series continued until April 1963.