No Silent Night

by Leo Barron

  31 “For the CP group in the little wood… 4 dead and five wounded” (C. S. Marshall, 1948, 6).

  32 “We had a close call in a wooded area when a flame thrower came in…. My buddy’s helmet got smashed” (Koskimaki, 2009, 267).

  33 Shell Report for the 463rd Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, 25 December 1944.

  34 “I was on the edge of an evergreen patch just east of Hemroulle…. I reached over and found that he was dead” (Hesler, World War II Historical Summary of the 463rd Parachute Field Artillery, 2009); “During the early morning a strong enemy attack developed along line CHAMPS-FLAMIZOULLE… tanks were moving in the direction of the firing batteries’ positions” (C. T. Moran, 1944).

  35 “Among the 463rd artillerymen killed in an infantry mode that morning were Howard Hickenlooper and John T. Hall, both of Battery C. Hickenlooper was struck in the neck by a burst of 9mm rounds from a MP40, while Hall caught a burst of MG42 fire through the chest” (Bando, 101st Airborne: The Screaming Eagles in World War II, 2009, 185).

  36 “…and it was in this group that most of the night’s casualties occurred—4 dead and five wounded” (C. S. Marshall, 1948, 6); “Four Screaming Eagles of A Company in the path of the juggernaut were killed and five wounded” (MacKenzie, 1968, 221).

  37 See map in C. S. Marshall, 1948, 6.

  38 “Attack after attack was repulsed by a small group of men under 1st Lt. (now Capt.) John Adams of A Company…. The three men who were left joined our company” (R. J. MacDonald, Another Von Rundstedt Blunder—Bastogne, 1948, 21); “The German infantry was walking five or six abreast in a column… and we would have been quickly wiped out” (D. R. Martin, 2009, 56).

  39 “I called Lt. Colonel Allen and told him the battalion had been penetrated… as he could not reach him with his SCR 300” (R. J. MacDonald, Another Von Rundstedt Blunder—Bastogne, 1948, 22–23).

  40 “We could hold the infantry, but not the tanks, so I told the platoon leaders to let the tanks through and they would get ’em in the rear but to knock every Jerry on foot” (Ryan, 2009).

  41 “We had two .50 caliber machine guns we had got from our scouting mission to where the field hospital had been attacked…. Anyway, those .50 calibers came in handy during that battle [25 December]” (C. Gisi, Interview with PFC Carmen Gisi, 2009).

  42 “When the enemy attacks of the morning trundled over ‘A’ company… preventing him from turning northward and rolling up the flank of ‘B’ company” (O’Halloran, 1948, 8–9).

  43 “As the German tanks slowly rolled past them… The German tanks slowly rumbled toward Company C” (D. R. Martin, 2009, 57).

  44 “13 enemy tanks and an unknown number of infantrymen attacked…. All 7 tanks stopped east of the woods” (R. B. Miller, 1945); “There was a little patch of woods where they put our reconnaissance…. I couldn’t turn the gun for the trees” (Lamke, n.d., 974).

  45 “Our guards told us the Germans had bombed Bastogne at midnight…. By now Jerry had broken through on the east side of them in the area of our 2nd Battalion” (Black, The Last First Sergeant, 1998, 242).

  46 “We got ready in a hurry with few words…. What upset me the most was that Jerry wasn’t going to take Christmas off!” (Black, The Last First Sergeant, 1998, 242).

  47 “Our ‘C’ Company moved about halfway up the road. My 2nd Platoon… Start a fire!” (Black, The Last First Sergeant, 1998, 242–43); “That was Christmas morning… when we were coming down a road, single file on each side…” (Elson, 1998).

  48 “It was early, 6 o’clock in the morning, just getting light, it really didn’t get too light until about 8 o’clock or so, till the fog cleared” (Elson, 1998, 3).

  49 “It was cold, and everything was covered in snow. We were jumpy…. Somebody started to heat up coffee” (Black, The Last First Sergeant, 1998, 243).

  50 “I took my time setting up my squad’s machine gun at the corner of the courtyard gate…. They had to burn maps and papers” (Black, The Last First Sergeant, 1998, 243).

  51 “They put us in a condominium up towards Foy…. He never got credit for it” (O’Mara, 2011).

  52 “We were in reserve…. Captain Towns told me ‘Bob, pass the word out—not any soldier is to take a shot’” (Lott, 2009); “He [LTC Allen] ordered me to call Captain Preston E. Towns and to tell him to counterattack in that sector as he could not reach with his SCR 300. Towns ‘rogered’ my instructions…” (R. J. MacDonald, Another Von Rundstedt Blunder—Bastogne, 1948, 21–23).

  53 “We were holding our fire to let them pass through our position and then we would trap them…. It was definitely a miracle on Christmas Day” (Lott, 2009).

  54 “I think what helped us was that the Germans split up…. We wondered why the Germans went in opposite directions…” (Lott, 2009).

  55 “Around 0700 hours the II./115 reached the heights west of Hemroulle… required authentication” (Maucke, Report Over the 15th Panzer-Grenadier-Division during the Ardennes Offensive from 16 December 1944 to 2 February 1945: MS P-032c, 1949).

  56 “The 15th panzer Grenadier Division… Initial objective: country road Hemroulle–Isle-la-Hesse” (G. H. Kokott, Ardennes Offensive—Battle of Bastogne, MS #B-040, 1950, 122–23).

  57 “Yes, my CP was beside the road leading from Champs to Hemroulle…. No, I was busy, it was foggy and the tanks were coming up behind the CP” (D. R. Martin, 2009, 58); “Allen had previously got a telephone call from Capt. Preston E. Towns of Company ‘C’… Towns replied, ‘If you look out your window you will be looking down the muzzle of an 88’” (Harper, 327th Regiment at Bastogne, 1945, 21).

  58 “I looked out the back window… He ordered me to get out and get out fast” (D. R. Martin, 2009, 58); “At 0715 Col Allen, Comdg 3rd Bn, called Harper…. ‘My units are still in position but I’ve got to run.’” (Harper, 327th Regiment at Bastogne, 1945, 21).

  59 “Captain James Pounders and Joseph S. Brewster had refused to leave me…. He said: ‘No. You were definitely leading it’” (D. R. Martin, 2009, 58).

  60 “At the command post of the 327th Glider Regiment’s 3rd Battalion… I called out the order. ‘Get the hell out of here! Head for the trees!’ (Black, The Last First Sergeant, 1998, 243–44).

  61 “…and we were going along this road when something started shooting…. And the idea is so you’re not silhouetted against the snow completely” (Elson, 1998).

  62 “C Company was broadside to this mess and we were ordered to fall back to the woods on the east side of the road… as my trusty M1 was frozen due to my dunking, I couldn’t do much more than act as a cheerleader” (J. Flanagan, n.d.); “Before breakfast, German panzers began pushing through our lines… they would have had to be very fast” (Sutton, 2009).

  63 “This farm was a split-level with the house over the horse and cow stables…. I could see German tracer bullets over his head” (Black, The Last First Sergeant, 1998, 244).

  64 “He ran through the woods with two members of his staff… and he got out of it with none of his party being hurt” (Harper, 327th Regiment at Bastogne, 1945, 22).

  65 “You know something? For a moment there, he looked a lot like Jesus Christ to me” (Koskimaki, 2009, 273).

  66 “Captain Cody came back after seeing tanks to find one platoon already engaged in a firefight…. This squad was captured along with everything left by 3d Battalion CP when they evacuated” (Phillips, 1948, 24).

  67 “The Colonel’s run was at least two hundred yards to the 1st cover of any kind…. They were scattered, too, but in good shape” (Black, The Last First Sergeant, 1998, 244–45).

  68 “Lt. Colonel Hanlon was ordered by the Regimental Commander…reached an area 500 yards behind the Regimental CP” (S. A. Chappuis, Historical Narrative of the 502nd PIR, 1–31 December 1944, 1945, 4); “While Swanson was becoming engaged [in Champs]… if it pushed on into town and the Germans came around it” (Cassidy, 1945, 8); “This Regiment [77th Volksgrenadier Regiment] in its role of the left attacking force will be on al
ert at 0215… 2nd Bn, 77th Regt in the Rau-Bachgrund 500 meters east of Rouette” (Schriefer, Order for the Attack by this Regiment (77th) on 25.12.44 on Town of Bastogne, 24 December 1944).

  69 “The section left CHAMPS at 0900 [probably a lot earlier] and proceeded down the road toward HEMROULLE…. Williams decided that his TDs would be better off covering the cross road (527613) south of ROLLE” (Long, 1945, 3); See map from D’Angelo interview (A. D’Angelo, Interview with Tony D’Angelo, 2009).

  70 “By this time all of the Regimental CP men were out on out-post duty around Rolle…. He had first sighted them at 523-603” (Cassidy, 1945, 8).

  71 PFC Amos Almeida wrote, “On the way over [to Champs], we were shelled…. There was no time for us to position ourselves before we were attacked” (Koskimaki, 2009, 291).

  72 “In the morning we started down the road [from Champs to Rolle] to our usual position by the trees and a German burp gun opened up on me…. He started swearing, calling me every name in the book” (A. D’Angelo, Interview with Tony D’Angelo, 2009); “As these two TDs moved across country… but Williams decided that he best get out of the line of fire of the tank and then flush it” (Long, 1945, 2).

  73 “I remember the Lieutenant who threatened to court martial us. I said [if he had sent us straight at the German tanks] there, five men killed! You happy?” (Stoling, 2009).

  74 “Look, Lieutenant, I told him we’ll fight our way, the way we are trained. We go around behind, back in the woods, and come out on them” (A. D’Angelo, Interview with Tony D’Angelo, 2009). It is possible the unidentified officer who argued with D’Angelo was Lieutenant Nickels.

  75 “Colonel Chappuis agreed this was a sound decision and gave instructions…. Lieutenant Nickels, S-2 of the 1st Battalion, came running into the CP with one excited sentence, ‘Seven tanks and infantry coming from the left’” (Phillips, 1948, 23–24).

  76 “Cooks, clerks, chaplains, and radio men were gathered up under Capt James C Stone, the Hq Comdt, and rushed west to the next hill. They saw the German tanks coming on straight toward the CP” (Cassidy, 1945, 8); “Before further details were known… rushed forward to command the scratch force composed of cooks, radio operators, wiremen, demolition troops, and staff personnel” (Phillips, 1948, 24).

  77 “I [Barnes] dozed sitting on a parachute in a candle-lit barn while talking to the wounded…. We heard there were seven tanks outside with about a company of infantry” (Koskimaki, 2009, 293).

  78 “Left in the CP were only Chappuis, Cassidy and one radio operator…. By this time, however, the tanks were coming on over the hill and every gun was blazing into Company ‘C’” (Cassidy, 1945, 8–9); “While this action was going on… and take the tanks under fire” (Phillips, 1948, 25).

  Chapter Ten

  1 Aron, 2010, 196.

  2 “As soon as the last tank rolled through 2nd Platoon’s position… and in front of the approaching infantry” (D. R. Martin, 2010, 56); “Now to get back to Second Platoon… following along behind the tanks, had mistaken the meaning of their easy passage” (C. S. Marshall, 1948, 7).

  3 “Harper realizing that control of the Bn was jeopardized by these rapid developments sent his own S-3, Maj Jones…. ‘Hold tight to your positions and fight back at them.’” (Harper, 327th Regiment at Bastogne, 1945, 22); “How the Command Post group got out of that house alive is a story in itself… and a good vantage point for the duration of the battle. (R. J. MacDonald, Another Von Rundstedt Blunder—Bastogne, 1948, 23).

  4 “Speck, this is the time for a counterattack…. We can take them right where they are” (MacKenzie, 1968, 228).

  5 “They were still marching in formation in the field below the ridge… and the infantry still didn’t know where we were dug in” (D. R. Martin, 2010, 57).

  6 “Bowles’ one mortar (the other had been overrun by the armor) found this body immediately… the few survivors of the anti-climatic action came in with their hands up” (C. S. Marshall, 1948, 7).

  7 “It was a hell of a fight. The Germans we didn’t kill, we captured” (C. Gisi, Interview with PFC Carmen Gisi, 2010); “No, I don’t seem to remember that. I just remember it was pure hell. A real fight on Christmas Day” (C. Gisi, 2010).

  8 “You were shooting in almost every direction, it seemed” (C. Gisi, Interview with PFC Carmen Gisi, 2010).

  9 “We just piled the Jerry dead up and they did a good job on us too, but we got the most in the long run” (Ryan, 2010).

  10 “In effect, we had bottled up the krauts… and we were pouring in plenty of lead from the [right] flank” (R. J. MacDonald, Another Von Rundstedt Blunder—Bastogne, 1948, 23).

  11 Finally, as dawn broke the enemy panicked and attempted to cross the 300 yards of open ground to our front…. The riflemen were standing out of their holes bracing their rifles against the fir trees for better aim” (R. J. MacDonald, Another Von Rundstedt Blunder—Bastogne, 1948, 24).

  12 “Company ‘A’ captured 92 of the upcoming infantry” (Harper, 327th Regiment at Bastogne, 1945, 23).

  13 “Early morning of the 24th they would break through then with their tanks and infantry and get behind them and… They would take care of them” (Walsh, Francis Walsh Collection (AFC/2010/010/64192), Veterans History Project, American Folklife Center, Library of Congress, 2010); Walsh confuses the dates. There was no attack on December 24, but his description easily matches the attack on the twenty-fifth, even though he said that was a second attack.

  14 “0735 [25 December] to Cherry. Move strongest team to pos[ition] held 24th by Ryerson. En[emy] t[an]ks in vic. When situation in hand return to town and alert. Fr[om] Rbts. [Colonel Roberts]. 0822. Alert 2nd half of Cherry to move to NW on O” (Radio Journal of the Combat Command B, 10th Armored Division, December 1944); “I continued to warn my infantry that the tanks would break through…. Well, they did break through—the chief break-through coming on Christmas morning…” (A. C. McAuliffe, 1945, 6); Team Cherry Strength reports see (S3, 3rd Tank Battalion, Combat Command B, 10th Armored Division, 25 December 1944); “…but it was known in the Operations Room there that out beyond the long sweep of plain stretching westward from General McAuliffe’s C.P. a tank force was pounding on a damaged inner door at Hemroulle…. Captain Leo H. Schweiter, the assistant G-2, passed the word to Bernay to round up any bazookas he could find” (MacKenzie, 1968, 225).

  15 “Around 0700 hours the II./115 reached the heights west of Hemroulle and encountered strong enemy resistance…. The II./115 made a futile attempt to entrench into the frozen ground” (Maucke, Report Over the 15th Panzer-Grenadier-Division during the Ardennes Offensive from 16 December 1944 to 2 February 1945: MS P-032c, 1949).

  16 “0800 Hours I and III Battalions stand 2.5 km west of Bastogne and encounter strong enemy resistance… received heavy tank and machine gun fire” (Operations Section, 1944).

  17 “Based on the situation that remained unclear… American fighter aircraft began uninterrupted attacks, which included the regimental combat command post” (Maucke, Report Over the 15th Panzer-Grenadier-Division during the Ardennes Offensive from 16 December 1944 to 2 February 1945: MS P-032c, 1949).

  18 “0858 Hours Radio communiqué from the I./115… The enemy reoccupied the road” (Operations Section, 1944).

  19 “Grenadier Regiment 77 reported: ‘Heavy fighting around Champs, to the south, penetration into the wooded sections west of Rolle… One had the impression that enemy resistance would have to break down now” (G. H. Kokott, Ardennes Offensive—Battle of Bastogne, MS #B-040, 1950, 129–30). Kokott mentioned these reports came into his command post at 1000, but that is doubtful, since Maucke had already called off the attack by 0900, which coincides with American reports. Kokott likely received these reports but at an earlier time than he mentioned.

  20 “The artillery- and mortar fire was raging furiously on both sides… same as Salle, Givroulle and Gives were exposed to incessant by the bombs and aircraft armament of the fighter-bombers” (G. H. Kokott, Ardennes Offensive—Bat
tle of Bastogne, MS #B-040, 1950, 130).

  21 “At 0800, the CO of 502-1 [Hanlon] came to Andrews and asked for AT support…. Upon returning, he told Andrews that he had seen 2 Mk IVs and 5 SP guns. This was at 0900” (Andrews, 1945, 2).

  22 “Halfway back to the farmhouse command post… They had made the mistake of not coming after us or not being ready for a counter attack” (Black, The Last First Sergeant, 1998, 245); “This had all happened within thirty minutes at the most…. We were all engaged in a deadly serious act” (Black, The Unedited Manuscript of Layton Black’s Memoirs to George Koskimaki, n.d., 344–45); “The Germans got out of their tanks and made coffee and sat around waiting for daylight… they had parked in front of the only gun that had the ammo” (Cooper, Interview with Colonel John T. Cooper, unknown). We know from the radio logs that the German units overran the 401st headquarters around 0720, and then a lull occurred in the action, and fighting did not resume until 0900, after the sun had risen. This was verified by the radio logs from the 321st FA BN, CCB 10th AR DIV, and the AARs of the 705th TD BN.

  23 “We [D’Angelo and his section of TDs] drove over to the woods near the road…. We were hidden in those woods good. That’s what helped us get the Germans” (A. D’Angelo, Interview with Tony D’Angelo, 2010); “The château was on our left…. Some of them paratroopers told me later they didn’t know we were in there” (A. D’Angelo, Interview with Tony D’Angelo, 2010); “There were a lot of paratroopers around us. I sort of remember him [Black]. Of course, ‘Moe’ Williams was there, too. I think he’d come up in a jeep about the same time we got into positions” (A. D’Angelo, Interview with Tony D’Angelo, 2010); “He [Williams] then move back to ROLLE where he was informed that German tank was in the woods covering the road… the infantry flushed it out with bazookas and small arms” (Long, 1945, 2–3).