The Camel Merchant of Philadelphia

by Sarbpreet Singh

  Kharak Singh’s character and personality must have been a cause of hope for Sada Kaur. In The Punjab Chiefs, Lepel Griffin describes Kharak Singh ‘as a man of strong passions and weak intellect’ and as ‘addicted to many degrading vices, besides being unforgiving and vindictive’. William Osborne, who visited Ranjit Singh and later wrote a book entitled The Court and Camp of Runjeet Singh calls Kharak Singh ‘the worst looking of the Sikhs I have yet seen’ and says he was ‘little liked or respected in Punjab’.

  Kharak Singh, despite this harsh assessment by multiple British observers, was clearly and unequivocally the heir to the throne and enjoyed his father’s favour. Sada Kaur’s enmity towards him was transparent and surely noted by Ranjit Singh.

  The rise of Ranjit Singh had of course not escaped the attention of the British, who, by 1807, were the only power of consequence left in the Indian subcontinent and ruled all of it with the exception of Punjab and Sind. The Afghans, on Punjab’s northwestern frontier, were in disarray, locked in internecine battles and the powerful factions of Ranjit Singh’s youth such as the Marathas, the Gurkhas and the Irish adventurer George Thomas, who had carved out a state in Hansi, were no longer a threat. The British had been content to mark the Yamuna River as the western boundary of their territories and Ranjit Singh unequivocally was the master of Punjab north of the Sutlej, having subjugated the Pathans of Kasur, the chiefs of Multan and most of the Sikh Misls. The six Misls that occupied the territories between the Sutlej and the Yamuna rivers and constituted the quasi-independent Malwa states were the last remaining part of Punjab that were not directly under Ranjit Singh’s control.

  In 1807, Ranjit Singh took over the territories of Tara Singh Gheba, a Malwai chief who had passed away and one of his ablest generals, Diwan Mohkam Chand crossed the Sutlej and took control of several villages, much to the consternation of the Malwai Sardars. To the Malwai Sardars, this was a clear expression of Ranjit Singh’s intent to annex their territories.

  By early 1808 various places in northern and western Punjab were taken from their independent Sikh overlords and brought under the direct management of the new kingdom of Lahore. At the same time, Diwan Mohkam Chand was consolidating Ranjit Singh’s conquests on the left bank of the Sutlej. But Ranjit Singh’s vaunting ambition was becoming a huge cause of concern to the Sikh Chiefs of Malwa. The Sardars of Jind and Kaithal, and the Diwan, or minister, of Patiala, rushed to Delhi in March 1808, to ask for British protection. The British authorities at Delhi did not provide unequivocal support but gave the vague assurances that if the need arose for protection, they would not be deserted. The wily Ranjit Singh, aware of their efforts to seek British support had sent messengers to reassure them of his friendly intentions and to urge them to join hands with him. The disappointed Sardars left and resolved to negotiate directly with the Marahaja to ensure the future of their kingdoms.63

  Lord Cornwallis the British Governor-General in 1805 had declared the Yamuna river to be the western boundary of the British territory in India and would have almost certainly rebuffed the Malwai Sardars. The situation in 1808, however, was different for unexpected reasons. Lord Minto was Governor General at that time and his response was prompted by a belief in the British camp that the French, the Turkish, and Persian emperors had designs on the British territories in India. In Lord Minto’s mind it had become important to seek new alliances, not only beyond the Yamuna, but also beyond the Indus. The purported ambitions of Napoleon Bonaparte in the east made it imperative to ally with both Afghans and with the Sikhs as they could provide strong buffers if there was an invasion by land from the northwest. Two very able British civil servants were tasked with securing these alliances. Monstuart Elphinstone was sent to the court of Shah Shuja, the Afghan King and in September 1808, Charles Metcalfe was deputed to Ranjit Singh’s court. The chiefs of Patiala, Jind, and Kaithal were also given verbal assurances that they would be considered dependent princes of the British Government as Lord Minto felt that creating an additional buffer between Ranjit Singh’s empire and the British would be prudent.

  It was truly ironic that the British, who really had no desire to meddle in the affairs of Punjab, were motivated by the fear of an alliance between France, Turkey, Iran (and Russia) which might have threatened their Indian empire! The sudden focus on Punjab was to have significant consequences for Ranjit Singh and his empire. Protracted negotiations ensued over the next couple of months, with Ranjit Singh keen on learning of the real intent of the British while taking several actions designed to show Metcalfe that he was the de facto ruler of the Malwa territories as well.

  Metcalfe was received cordially by Ranjit Singh and the Maharaja patiently listened to British concerns about the French and the potential danger they represented to his kingdom as well. However, Ranjit Singh, intent on consolidating the Malwa territories as well into his empire started an elaborate effort to show Metcalfe the extent of his power across the Sutlej. Ranjit Singh received Metcalfe at the newly conquered town of Kasur and made the point that his control over Lahore, which had always been the capital of the entire Punjab also give him suzerainty over Malwa. Quite unconvinced about the seriousness of the French threat, Ranjit Singh felt that the British represented a much larger one and had already sensed that they were scheming to box him in on his eastern front and extend their control beyond the Yamuna to the Sutlej.

  Ranjit Singh abruptly broke off negotiations, and crossed the Sutlej to enter Malwa. He captured Faridkot and Ambala, levied tribute on the states of Malerkotla and Thanesar, and entered into an alliance with the Raja of Patiala. Metcalfe protested vigorously against these acts, calling them hostile as the Malwai chiefs were nominally British vassals and remained on the banks of the Sutlej until Ranjit Singh recrossed the river to return to his own territories. Metcalfe sent urgent communications back to Lord Minto apprising him of the situation.

  Lord Minto asked Metcalfe to play for time while a British detachment under General Ochterlony advanced towards Punjab. Ranjit Singh by then had developed what he considered a warm and cordial relationship with Metcalfe and was fully convinced that the negotiations were in good faith. He was completely unprepared for the stab in the back that Metcalfe delivered. Lord Minto’s letter was delivered by Metcalfe to Ranjit Singh in November, during the revelry of Diwali, which the court was observing in Amritsar with much carousing and boisterousness. The letter essentially stated that Ranjit Singh had in the past had indicated to the British general Lake that he would accept the Sutlej as his southern boundary and that the British were the protectors of the Malwai Sardars. A second letter contained a clear demand that all new territory that Ranjit Singh had acquired south of the Sutlej be restored.

  Ranjit Singh left Amritsar for Lahore but Metcalfe stayed a little longer, visiting the Golden Temple and making an offering of two thousand rupees, a princely sum in those times! After word of British designs on Punjab got around, the offering was thrown away! Metcalfe also engaged in intelligence gathering and sent a list of Sikh Chiefs to his superiors, who he felt might be willing to betray Ranjit Singh and collaborate with the British under the right circumstances.

  Included in that list was Sada Kaur’s name!

  At this point it is useful to examine the deepening rift between Ranjit Singh and Sada Kaur.

  Several years earlier, Ranjit Singh had fallen in love with and married the Muslim courtesan Bibi Moran (see The Dancing Girl of Lahore). His infatuation had been the cause of great consternation to both his wives, Mehtab Kaur and Raj Kaur. While Raj Kaur had her son, Kharak Singh, Ranjit Singh’s heir to dote on, Mehtab Kaur was left with nothing but bitterness. The man whose father had killed hers, was a neglectful husband, he had despoiled her mother of many of the traditional territories held by her family, the Kanhayas, and she had no children of her own. The marriage to the Muslim courtesan felt like insult heaped upon a mountain of injury.

  Six years had passed after Ranjit Singh’s scandalous marriage to Moran but his passion f
or her was still unabated. The proud Mehtab Kaur, the Maharaj’s first wife writhed in agony as she was superseded by a mere courtesan. There were even rumors that coins had been minted in her name! Mehtab Kaur felt slighted and resolved that it was time to get rid of the courtesan and she constantly nagged Ranjit Singh to send her away. Her mother of course, supported her and openly scolded the Maharaja. After months of domestic strife and being insulted by his mother-in-law, Ranjit Singh lashed out and to punish her seized a large portion of her personal estates. Sada Kaur was left with Batala, Mukerian and Atalgarh fort. In 1807 Mehtab Kaur was exiled to Batala with the threat that the king would disown Sher Singh and Tara Singh. For Sada Kaur, this was the last straw. Furious, she began to undermine Ranjit Singh’s influence and authority with the Sikh chiefs and the army. Ranjit Singh became aware of her efforts and knowing her to be a master at intrigue, decided to placate her. He started to visit Sada Kaur at Batala frequently, called her mother, touched her feet and vowed that he would get rid of Moran and restore Mehtab Kaur to her rightful position. According to Metcalfe, who was negotiating with Ranjit Singh at the time, the Maharaja resumed marital relations with his wife. On the surface, there had been a rapprochement between Ranjit Singh and Sada Kaur, but they remained deeply suspicious of one another.

  In March of 1808, Ranjit Singh was expected to visit Hardwar to attend the famous fair and festival on the occasion of the Kumbh Mela. The British Government decided to send Metcalfe to meet him there to test the waters for a potential alliance. However, Ranjit Singh, fearing a trap chose not to go. Mehtab Kaur offered to go in his place with a secret agenda that the monarch was completely unaware of. The British, whose interest in Punjab had been renewed, were not solely focused on Metcalfe’s diplomatic mission, which hadn’t quite been put in motion yet. They decided to send a spy to Punjab to make contact with Sada Kaur, whose falling out with her son-in-law the British were already aware of. Mehtab Kaur’s real objective in going to Hardwar, which was in British territory was to escort the spy to Batala to meet with her mother!

  The spy was Captain Arnold Nesbitt Mathews, a Deputy Commissioner of Ordnance posted at Fatehpur on the Ganga under the British Adjutant General. Mathews was chartered with studying the political situation in Punjab; he was given six months leave and provided with elephants, horses, gifts for Ranjit Singh and in the company of a munshi and a secretary/translator dispatched to Punjab as a private individual. A presumably bowdlerised account of his travels was published in the 1809 edition of the Asiatic Review under the somewhat weighty title: From the manuscript notes of an officer of the Bengal army, made from actual observation, during a late tour through the Punjab to Lahore; and affording, among much valuable matter, some illustrations of the character and manners of the Sikhs.

  Mehtab Kaur met Captain Mathews in Hardwar and arranged a special permit for him to travel to Ranjit Singh’s kingdom, which was out of bounds for all foreigners. Gupta’s account of the conversation between Mehtab Kaur and Captain Matthews, drawn from Foreign Department Secret Consultations, 13 May, 1808, is startling and provides great insight into the seriousness of the rift between Ranjit Singh and Sada Kaur.

  Mathews wrote to his chief that Mehtab Kaur’s mother, Rani Sada Kaur wished ‘to enter into an immediate combination with our Government to dispossess the Rajah Runjeet Sing of his present authority in the Punjab’. If the proposal was accepted she would get ‘the country transferred to the English’. To achieve this objective she only required ‘a small auxiliary force of two Regiments of Infantry and one of Cavalry to assemble either on the Borders of our own country’ or at Buria. She believed that this would give stability and confidence to the chiefs and people and that there was no possibility of failure. Sada Kaur also wished to meet an authoritative person with all her confederates. She was prepared to leave her daughter, Mehtab Kaur, with the English as a surety. In return for her doings, she only required her present possessions of Batala and its dependencies yielding a revenue of nine or ten lakhs of rupees annually, to be guaranteed to her in jagir, and she would pay the company 37.5 per cent of the revenues. Mehtab Kaur further told Mathews that she had two sons by Ranjit Singh, but he was now ignoring her completely and was living with concubines, particularly with Moran ‘who influences all his councils and so enamoured is he of this lady that he secludes himself with her for several days together’.

  She added that Ranjit Singh’s army was secretly on the side of Rani Sada Kaur. Only 1,000 to 1,500 soldiers were attached to him. The rest would desert him on receiving a green signal from her. Raja Sahib Singh of Patiala would join her with 5,000 horses and foot-soldiers. Bhai Lai Singh of Kaithal would also bring the same number of troops. Bhagwan Singh of Buria would participate with 2,000 troops. Other Cis-Sutlej sardars were with Rani Sada Kaur. Bhag Singh of Jind was a doubtful case due to his family connections with Ranjit Singh. She said that the army of Ranjit Singh was disaffected due to general ill-treatment. He paid no respect to rank and used the grossest expressions of abuse and that the cavalry was undisciplined.

  Mathews commented that both the Ranis, mother and daughter, were determined on his total ruin and that ‘they were so firmly resolved upon it’ that in case of their failure with the English, they would try other means, ‘at the risk of their fortunes, their lives and everything they consider to be their nearest and dearest interests’.

  In his account, Mathews confirms that he did indeed leave Hardwar with Mehtab Kaur and visited Sada Kaur in Batala. He travelled to Amritsar and Lahore and met with Ranjit Singh but his spying mission was largely unsuccessful. He was recalled to Saharanpur, an important cantonment in British India after a couple of months in Punjab and the British focus shifted to Metcalfe’s mission.

  Metcalfe proceeded to Lahore and negotiations resumed. Ranjit Singh’s courtiers Fakir Azizuddin and Prabh Dial presented a strong case for Ranjit Singh’s rights over the Malwa territories, noting historical British reluctance to get involved in the affairs of the Malwai Sardars, which had placed the burden of dealing with disputes on the Lahore court. They also pointed to the two occasions when Ranjit Singh’s armies had crossed to Sutlej and made annexations, without any response whatsoever from the British. Privately, Metcalfe completely subscribed to this position and had in fact made these very same arguments to his superiors as he had tried to make the case for Ranjit Singh’s overlordship of the Malwa! However, the situation had changed and Metcalfe had clear orders to stoutly deny all of Ranjit Singh’s claims to the territories between the Sutlej and the Yamuna.

  Ranjit Singh stayed calm outwardly, but was much chagrined. Metcalfe in his correspondence mentions that Ranjit Singh expressed great disappointment and remonstrated that it would be unfortunate if their personal friendship were to turn into enmity. In the meantime, Ochterlony was getting closer and on 22 December, 1808 Metcalfe was forced to reveal to Ranjit Singh that a large British detachment was advancing towards Punjab. The decision was made with a lot of trepidation, which is evident from Metcalfe’s letter to General George Hewitt, the British Commander-in-chief.64

  In the letter, Metcalfe opined that the only way to motivate Ranjit Singh to negotiate in good faith was to somehow convince him that the British could deny him control over the Malwa territories as acquiring them was an obsession for him. He was however not quite sure how Ranjit Singh would respond to a show of belligerence by the British. On the one hand, Metcalfe felt that Ranjit Singh, being a judicious man, would be loath to take on the might of the British Empire. However, there was a chance that he might feel honour-bound to resist militarily. There was also a possibility that Ranjit Singh might view British designs on Malwa as a precursor to further westward expansion into his territories. That fear might also induce him to challenge the British immediately to pre-empt a future threat. Metcalfe was fearful that word of Octerlony’s advance might result in open hostilities between the British and the Sikhs, but felt that the only way to know for sure was to put his cards on the table and let Ra
njit Singh know that the British would not let him take Malwa.

  Metcalfe was not far off the mark in his assessment. His announcement of Octerlony’s impending march aroused the passions of the hawks in the court. Foremost among them was Diwan Mohkam Chand, Ranjit Singh’s ablest and most successful general at the time, who declared that it would be more honourable to die fighting than to capitulate without firing a shot! On his command word was sent to all the Sikh chiefs to ready their forces to meet the British at the Sutlej and several forts were repaired and stocked for long sieges. In a few days the force had swelled to a hundred thousand men, ready to fight. The stage was set for a dangerous confrontation with the British army, which was larger, better-trained and better-equipped. It was the most perilous moment that the fledgling empire had encountered.

  Even though Sada Kaur had been at odds with Ranjit Singh, she swung into action and played a large role behind the scenes and helped her son-in-law avert a major disaster. After all, a confrontation with the greatest power on the Indian subcontinent could only result in disaster, not just for Ranjit Singh but for all his vassals and chiefs as well. She worked in partnership with Fakir Azizuddin, Ranjit Singh’s chief diplomat, who also believed that a confrontation with the British would be unwise. According to a spy that Ochterlony had in Ranjit Singh’s court, Sada Kaur had ‘… urged Ranjit Singh in the most earnest manner to avoid hostilities with the British power, which as coming from one who has so much cause for complaint and dissatisfaction will probably have greater weight at this moment than he has been accustomed to pay to her representations’.

  The consequence of the restraint advised by Sada Kaur was the Treaty of Amritsar, which constrained him on his eastern frontier and dashed his vision of a united Punjab, but earned him a powerful ally in the British and the stability he needed on his eastern front to pursue his territorial ambitions elsewhere, which he proceeded to do with great gusto. The spy’s letter is also significant in that it acknowledges the growing rift between Sada Kaur and her son-in-law.