The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha

by Bhikkhu Nanamoli

  Contrary to certain popular notions, the Buddha did not explicitly repudiate the class divisions of Indian society or appeal for the abolition of this social system. Within the Sangha, however, all caste distinctions were abrogated from the moment of ordination. Thus people from any of the four castes who went forth under the Buddha renounced their class titles and prerogatives and instead became known simply as disciples of the Sakyan son (see Ud 5:5/55). Whenever the Buddha or his disciples were confronted with the brahmins’ claim to superiority, they argued vigorously against them, maintaining that all such claims were groundless. Purification, they contended, was the result of conduct, not of birth, and was thus accessible to those of all four castes (MN 40.13–14, MN 84, MN 90.12, MN 93). The Buddha even stripped the term “brahmin” of its hereditary accretions, and hearkening back to its original connotation of holy man, he defined the true brahmin as the arahant (MN 98). Those among the brahmins who were not yet hampered by class prejudice responded appreciatively to the Buddha’s teaching. Some of the most eminent brahmins of the time, in whom there still burned the ancient Vedic yearning for light, knowledge, and truth, recognised in the Buddha the All-Enlightened One for whom they longed and declared themselves his disciples (see especially MN 91.34). Several even renounced their class privileges and with their retinues entered the Sangha (MN 7.22, MN 92.15–24).

  The samaṇas were a much more diversified group which, lacking a common scriptural authority, promulgated a plethora of philosophical doctrines ranging from the diabolical to the superdivine. The Pali Canon frequently mentions six teachers in particular as contemporaries of the Buddha, and as they are each described as “the head of an order…regarded by many as a saint” (MN 77.5), they must have been quite influential at the time. The Majjhima Nikāya mentions both the set of six and, separately, states their individual doctrines; it does not, however, correlate the names with the doctrines. The connections between names and doctrines are made in the Sāmaññaphala Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya.

  Pūraṇa Kassapa, who is always mentioned first in the list, taught a doctrine of inaction (akiriyavāda) that denied the validity of moral distinctions (MN 60.13, MN 76.10). Makkhali Gosāla was the leader of the sect known as the Ājīvakas (or Ājīvikas), which survived in India down into the medieval period. He taught a doctrine of fatalism that denied causality (ahetukavāda) and claimed that the entire cosmic process is rigidly controlled by a principle called fate or destiny (niyati); beings have no volitional control over their actions but move helplessly caught in the grip of fate (MN 60.21, MN 76.13). Ajita Kesakambalin was a moral nihilist (natthikavāda) who propounded a materialist philosophy that rejected the existence of an afterlife and kammic retribution (MN 60.5, MN 76.7); his doctrine is always cited by the Buddha as the paradigmatic instance of wrong view among the unwholesome courses of action. Pakudha Kaccāyana advocated an atomism on the basis of which he repudiated the basic tenets of morality (MN 76.16). Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta, a sceptic, refused to take a stand on the crucial moral and philosophical issues of the day, probably claiming that such knowledge was beyond our capacity for verification (MN 76.30). The sixth teacher, the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, is identified with Mahāvīra, the historical progenitor of Jainism. He taught that there exists a plurality of monadic souls entrapped in matter by the bonds of past kamma and that the soul is to be liberated by exhausting its kammic bonds through the practice of severe self-mortification.

  Whereas the Pali suttas are generally cordial but critical towards the brahmins, they are trenchant in their rejection of the rival doctrines of the samaṇas. In one sutta (MN 60) the Buddha contends that the firm adoption of any of the first three doctrines (and by implication the fourth) entails a chain of unwholesome states generating evil kamma strong enough to bring a descent into the lower realms. Similarly the venerable Ānanda describes these views as four “negations of the holy life” (MN 76). The scepticism of Sañjaya, while not regarded as so pernicious, is taken as an indication of its proponent’s dullness and confusion; it is described as “eel-wriggling” (amarāvikkhepa) because of its evasiveness and classified among the types of holy life that are without consolation (MN 76.30–31). The Jain doctrine, though sharing certain similarities with the Buddha’s teaching, was held to be sufficiently mistaken in basic assumptions as to call for refutation, which the Buddha undertook on several occasions (MN 14, MN 56, MN 101). The repudiation of these erroneous views was seen, from the Buddhist perspective, to be a necessary measure not only to sound a clear warning against tenets that were spiritually detrimental, but also to cut away the obstacles against the acceptance of right view, which as the forerunner of the Buddha’s path (MN 117.4) was a prerequisite to progress along the road to final deliverance.

  TECHNICAL NOTES

  There remain to be discussed only a few technical points concerning this translation: first a general problem inevitably facing any translator from the Pali Canon, then certain changes that have been made in Ven. Ñāṇamoli’s renderings of important doctrinal terms.

  THE REPETITIONS

  Readers of Pali suttas, particularly in the original language, will immediately be struck by the frequency and length of the repetitive passages. The repetitions, if examined, will be found to be of different kinds and thus probably stem from different sources. We may consider three main types.

  First are the narrative repetitions within a single sutta as well as the repetition of statements in ordinary conversation. These doubtlessly originate from the method of oral transmission by which the suttas were preserved for the first four centuries of their existence, such repetition serving as a useful mnemonic device to ensure that details would not be lost. In this translation these repetitions have usually been bridged over with ellipsis points and occasionally the liberty was taken of contracting them.

  A second type of repetition stems from the use of stock formulas to describe fixed sets of doctrinal categories or aspects of the training. A common example of this is the formulas for the four jhānas and the three true knowledges. These formulas were almost certainly part of the Buddha’s repertory of instructions, employed by him in the countless discourses he gave during his forty-five years’ ministry in order to preserve the unity and consistency of his teaching. Here the shorter stereotyped formulas have generally been allowed to stand except when they play a subordinate role to a larger theme, in which case only the main clauses have been retained; an example is the treatment of the jhāna formula at MN 53.18. The longer formulas that appear very often have been abridged, with references usually given to the passages where they appear in full; examples are the treatment of the first two true knowledges at MN 27.23–24 and of the gradual training at MN 38.31–38.

  A third type of repetition stems from the Buddha’s application of an identical method of exposition to a series of doctrinal terms belonging to a fixed set. Examples are the formula for insight that is attached to each of the exercises in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta (MN 10.5), and the exposition on the three characteristics applied to each of the five aggregates (MN 22.26). These repetitions, contrary to modernistic suppositions, were very likely integral to the Buddha’s own pedagogical method and served to drive home the points he wanted to convey. We can well imagine that such repetitions, delivered by a fully enlightened teacher to those earnestly striving for awakening, must have sunk down deep into the minds of those who heard them and in many cases triggered off a glimpse of the truth. In the translation this type of repetition has usually been handled by repeating the method of exposition only for the first and last terms in the set—as is often done in the Pali editions of the texts—except when the method of exposition is especially long (as at MN 118.37–39), in which case it is shown in full only for the first term and in much abbreviated form for the rest. Those who read the suttas as an exercise in contemplation, and not merely for information, may try mentally filling in the entire sequence and exploring its range of implications.

  DHAMMA


  In his later translations Ven. Ñāṇamoli appears to have set himself two goals: to render virtually every Pali word into English (arahant and bodhisatta are rare exceptions); and to do so in obedience to a very rigorous standard of consistency. In effect the principle that guided his work was: one Pali word, one corresponding English word. This principle he also applied to his treatment of the multiplex word dhamma, of which he wrote elsewhere that “the need for unity in the rendering is so great as to be almost desperate” (Minor Readings and Illustrator, p. 331). He chose as his root rendering the word “idea,” which he attempted to deploy for the Pali word in all its diverse occurrences. Even when dhamma is used in the suttas to signify the Buddha’s teaching, he still remained faithful to his choice by translating it “the True Idea.”

  Needless to say, this experiment was not successful. Recognising this, Ven. Khantipālo, in his edition of the ninety suttas, opted instead to retain the Pali word in most of its occurrences. This decision, however, seems to have been unnecessary when the relinquishment of the demand for strict consistency allows for smooth and reliable translation without loss of meaning. While the many different uses of the Pali word dhamma may originally have had some underlying connection of meaning, by the time of the Pali Canon such connection had already receded so far into the background as to be virtually irrelevant to the understanding of the texts. The commentaries ascribe at least ten different contextual meanings to the word as it occurs in the Canon and they do not try to read any philosophical significance into this variability of application. The goal of lucid translation therefore seems to require that the word be rendered differently according to its context, which generally makes the intended meaning clear.

  In revising Ven. Ñāṇamoli’s translation I have retained the Pali word Dhamma only when it refers to the Buddha’s teaching, or in several cases to a rival teaching with which the Buddha’s is contrasted (as at MN 11.13 and MN 104.2). In its other uses the context has been allowed to decide the rendering. Thus when dhamma occurs in the plural as a general ontological reference term it has been rendered “things” (as at MN 1.2 and MN 2.5). When it acquires a more technical nuance, in the sense either of the phenomena of existence or of mental constituents, it has been rendered “states” (as at MN 64.9 and MN 111.4). This term, however, must be divested of its overtone of staticity, dhammas being events within a dynamic process, and it must also not be taken to refer to some persisting entity that undergoes the states, entities themselves being nothing but connected series of dhammas. The last two meanings of dhamma are not always separable in the texts and sometimes naturalness of English diction had to be used as the factor for deciding which should be selected.

  As the fourth foundation of mindfulness and as the sixth external sense base (āyatana), dhamma has been rendered “mind-objects” (even here “ideas” is too narrow). In still other contexts it has been rendered as qualities (MN 15.3, MN 48.6) and teachings (MN 46.2, MN 47.3). When used as a suffix it acquires the idiomatic sense of “to be subject to” and so it has been translated, e.g., vipariṇāmadhamma as “subject to change.”

  SANKHĀRA

  Although this word as used in the suttas has different specific references in different contexts, unlike dhamma it retains enough unity of meaning to permit, with rare exceptions, a uniform rendering. The problem, however, is to decide which of the many proposed renderings is the most adequate, or, if none are found fitting, to coin a new one that is.

  The root idea suggested by the word sankhāra is “making together.” The Pali commentators explain that the word allows for both an active and a passive sense. Thus the sankhāras are either factors (or forces) that function together in producing an effect, or they are the things that are produced by a combination of co-operating factors. In his translation of the Visuddhimagga Ven. Ñāṇamoli had rendered sankhāras as “formations,” a rendering favoured by many other translators. In his later translation scheme he had experimented with rendering it as “determinations” and had attempted to incorporate that new choice into his manuscript of the Majjhima. In editing the manuscript Ven. Khantipālo chose to return to the translator’s earlier and better known “formations,” and in this edition I have followed suit. Though this word has the disadvantage of accentuating the passive aspect of sankhāras, it avoids the problems into which “determinations” runs and seems colourless enough to take on the meaning determined by the context.

  The word sankhāra occurs in four major contexts in the Pali suttas: (1) As the second factor in the formula of dependent origination it is used to mean volitional actions, suggesting their active role of generating results in the process of rebirth. (2) As the fourth of the five aggregates the sankhāras comprise all the mental factors not included in the other three mental aggregates; this group is probably assigned the name sankhārakkhandha after its chief member, volition (cetanā), which is responsible for forming all the other aggregates. (3) Sankhāra is also used in a very comprehensive sense to signify everything produced by conditions. In this sense it comprises all five aggregates (as at MN 35.4 and MN 115.12). Here the word bears the passive sense, being explained by the commentators as sankhatasankhārā, “formations consisting in the conditioned.” This usage comes close in meaning to the ontological use of dhamma, except that the latter is wider in range since it includes the unconditioned element Nibbāna and concepts (paññatti) , both of which are excluded from sankhāra. (4) In still another context the word sankhāra is used in relation to kāya, vacī, and citta—body, speech, and mind—to mean the bodily formation, which is in-and-out breathing; the verbal formation, which is applied thought and sustained thought; and the mental formation, which is perception and feeling. The first and third are things that are dependent respectively upon the body and the mind, the second the things that activate speech. This triad is discussed at MN 44.13–15.

  Sankhāra is also employed outside these major contexts, and in one such case Ven. Ñāṇamoli’s sense of “determination” has been retained. This is where it occurs in the compound padhānasankhāra, which has been rendered “determined striving” (as at MN 16.26). The rare and involved idiom, sankhāraṁ padahati, has similarly been rendered “he strives with determination” (MN 101.23). In another case (MN 120), following the commentarial gloss, sankhāra is rendered “aspiration.”

  NĀMARŪPA

  Ven. Ñāṇamoli had translated this compound literally as “name-and-form.” In this edition the compound has been changed back to the rendering used in his translation of the Visuddhimagga, “mentality-materiality,” though with regret that this cumbersome Latinate expression lacks the concision and punch of “name-and-form.” The word nāma originally meant “name,” but in the Pali suttas it is used in this compound as a collective term for the mental factors associated with consciousness, as will be seen in the definition at MN 9.54. The commentaries explain nāma here as deriving from the word namati, to bend, and as being applied to the mental factors because they “bend” towards the object in the act of cognizing it. Rūpa is used in two major contexts in the suttas: as the first of the five aggregates and as the specific object of eye-consciousness. The former is a broader category that includes the latter as one among many other species of rūpa. Ven. Ñāṇamoli, aiming at consistency in his manuscript translation, had used “form” for rūpa as visible object (in preference to the “visible-datum” used in his earlier translation scheme). But when rūpa is used to signify the first of the five aggregates, it has been changed to “material form.” This rendering should indicate more precisely the meaning of rūpa in that context while preserving the connection with rūpa as visible object. Occasionally in the texts the word seems to straddle both meaning without allowing an exclusive delimitation, as in the context of certain meditative attainments such as the first two liberations (MN 77.22).

  BRAHMA

  The word brahma provided Ven. Ñāṇamoli with another challenge to his endeavour to achieve complete consistency. The word its
elf, going back to the Vedic period, originally meant holy power, the sacred power that sustains the cosmos and that was contacted through the prayers and rituals of the Vedas. Though the word retained its significance of “holy” or “sacred,” by the Buddha’s time it had undergone two distinct lines of development. One culminated in the conception of Brahman (neuter) as an impersonal absolute reality hidden behind and manifesting itself through the changing phenomena of the world. This conception is the keynote of the Upanishads, but the word brahma never appears in this sense in the Pali Canon. The other line of development culminated in the conception of Brahmā (masculine singular) as an eternal personal God who creates and regulates the world. This conception was held by the brahmins as depicted in the Pali suttas. The Buddhists themselves asserted that Brahmā was not a single creator God but a collective name for several classes of high deities whose chiefs, forgetting that they are still transient beings in the grip of kamma, were prone to imagine themselves to be the omnipotent everlasting creator (see MN 49).