The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha

by Bhikkhu Nanamoli

  676 This type is distinguished from the previous type only by his sluggishness in arousing mindfulness to abandon arisen defilements.

  677 This is the arahant, who alone has eradicated all the fetters.

  678 Here I have departed from Ñm in rendering sukha as “bliss” rather than “pleasure” in order to avoid the awkward-sounding phrases that would result from strict consistency. MA explains the jhānas as nekkhammasukha because they yield the bliss of renouncing sensual pleasures; as pavivekasukha because they yield the bliss of being secluded from the crowd and from defilements; as upasamasukha because their bliss is for the purpose of quieting down the defilements; and as sambodhasukha because their bliss is for the purpose of attaining enlightenment. The jhānas themselves, of course, are not states of enlightenment.

  679 All states of mind below the fourth jhāna are classified as “the perturbable” (iñjita). The fourth jhāna and all higher states are called “the imperturbable” (aniñjita). See n.1000.

  680 MA: It is not fitting to become attached to it with craving, and one should not come to a standstill at this point.

  681 The cessation of perception and feeling is not simply one more higher attainment along the scale of concentration, but here implies the full development of insight brought to its climax in arahantship.

  SUTTA 67

  682 Kevaṭṭā maññe macchavilope. MA gives two explanations: one favours this rendering, the other suggests “fisherman hauling in fish.”

  683 It was the Brahmā Sahampati who entreated the newly enlightened Buddha to teach the Dhamma to the world. See MN 26.20.

  684 MA: In this case Ven. Sāriputta erred in not recognising his responsibility, for the Sangha is the responsibility of the two great elders. Thus the Buddha rebuked him but commended Ven. Moggall̄na, who recognised his responsibility.

  685 MA: The Buddha undertook this teaching to show that there are four fears (or dangers, bhaya) in his Dispensation. Those who can overcome these four fears will become established in the Dispensation, the others will not become established.

  686 Pali uses two distinct words signifying different types of food: khādaniya, “food to be consumed,” includes all varieties of vegetables, nuts, fruits, yams, etc.; bhojanı̄ya, “food to be eaten,” includes food made of grain, meat, and fish. Things to be tasted (ssāyitabba) would include light refreshments.

  687 The proper time is from dawn to noon, beyond which only liquids may be drunk.

  SUTTA 68

  688 The “rapture and pleasure secluded from sensual pleasures” signifies the first and second jhānas, “something more peaceful than that” the higher jhānas and the four paths.

  689 See MN 2.4. These are practices undertaken by one in training to prevent the arising of latent taints that have not yet been abandoned.

  690 This refers to the Buddha’s ability to discover by clairvoyance the states in which his disciples have taken rebirth.

  691 Aññā: the knowledge attained by the arahant. It should be noted that whereas the declarations of attainment made by monks and nuns begin with arahantship, those for men and women lay followers begin with non-returning (in §18, §21). Though early Buddhism recognises the possibility of lay persons attaining arahantship, in all such cases attested to in the Nikāyas, they do so either when on the verge of death or just before requesting admission into the Sangha.

  SUTTA 69

  692 This is prohibited by Pāc 46 (Vin iv.98–101). A bhikkhu may visit families at these times only if he has informed another bhikkhu in the monastery of his intentions, except during the season for making and giving robes.

  693 Abhidhamma abhivinaya. MA says that he should apply himself to learning the text and commentary to the Abhidhamma Piṭaka and the Vinaya Piṭaka. This is clearly anachronistic. On Abhidhamma in the context of the suttas, see n.362. Although there is no corresponding body of literature called “Abhivinaya,” it seems probable the word refers to a systematic and analytical approach to the study of the Vinaya, perhaps that embedded in the Suttavibhanga of the Vinaya Piṭaka.

  694 MA: This refers to the eight meditative attainments. As a minimum he should become proficient in the preliminary work of one meditation subject, such as a kasi˚a.

  695 MA: This refers to all the supramundane states. As a minimum he should become proficient in one approach to developing insight up to arahantship.

  SUTTA 70

  696 See n.671. In agreement with MN 66.6, MA explains that the Buddha had first prohibited the afternoon meal and then at a later time prohibited the night meal. He did this out of concern for the delicate bhikkhus in the Order, since they might have become fatigued too quickly if both late meals were prohibited simultaneously.

  697 In the Vinaya Piṭaka, the bhikkhus led by Assaji and Punabbasuka are described as “unscrupulous and depraved” monks and are shown indulging in various kinds of bad conduct that corrupt the laity. At Kı̣̄̄giri an act of banishment was pronounced against them, and their refusal to obey led to the promulgation of Sanghādisesa 13 (Vin iii.179–84).

  698 MA: This statement is made with pointed reference to pleasure experienced in eating a night meal, which does not conduce to the practice of a monk’s duties.

  699 MA: The former type of pleasant feeling is the joy based on the household life, the latter the joy based on renunciation. Similarly, the next two sentences refer to the grief and equanimity based, respectively, on the household life and on renunciation. See MN 137.9–15.

  700 §§8–10 serve to provide, by appeal to the Buddha’s perfect understanding, the grounds for his injunction to abandon all feelings based on the household life and to develop the feelings based on renunciation.

  701 Here follows a sevenfold classification of noble individuals which categorises them not merely on the basis of their path and fruit attainment—as the more familiar eightfold scheme does—but according to their dominant faculty. Alternative definitions of these seven are offered by Pug 1:30–36/14–15.

  702 Ubhatobhāgavimutta. MA: He is “liberated-in-both-ways” because he is liberated from the physical body by the immaterial attainments and from the mental body by the path (of arahantship). The Pug definition reads: “He contacts with the body and abides in the eight liberations, and his taints are destroyed by his seeing with wisdom.” MA says that the ubhatobhāgavimutta includes those who attain arahantship after emerging from one or another of the four immaterial attainments and the one who attains it after emerging from the attainment of cessation.

  703 Paññāvimutta. MA: This includes those who attain arahantship either as dry-insight meditators (sukkha-vipassaka) or after emerging from one or another of the four jhānas. The Pug definition merely substitutes the eight liberations for “those liberations…transcending forms.”

  704 Kāyasakkhin. MA: This type includes the six individuals—from the one established in the fruit of stream-entry up to the one on the path of arahantship—who first contact the (immaterial) jhānas and subsequently realise Nibbāna. Ṃ stresses that one or another of the immaterial attainments including cessation is needed to qualify as kāyasakkhin. The Pug definition merely substitutes the eight liberations.

  705 ̣Diṭṭhipatta. MA says that this type includes the same six individuals included under kāyasakkhin—from the stream-enterer to the one on the path of arahantship—but without possession of the Pug defines him as one who has understood the Four Noble Truths and who has reviewed and examined with wisdom the teachings proclaimed by the Tathāgata.

  706 Saddhāvimutta. MA says that this type too includes the same six. Pug defines him in the same way as it defines the diṭṭhipatta, but adds that he has not reviewed and examined the teachings with wisdom to the same extent that the diṭṭhipatta has.

  707 MA says that this type, the dhammānusārin, and the next, the saddhānusārin, are individuals on the path of stream-entry, the former with predominance of wisdom, the latter with predominance of faith. For more on th
ese two types, see n.273.

  708 MA: With the mental body he realises Nibbāna, the ultimate truth, and he penetrates it with the wisdom pertaining to the supramundane path.

  709 That is, these bhikkhus have not had the faith required to undertake the training laid down for them by the Buddha.

  710 MA says that the “four-phrased statement” (catuppadaṁ veyyākaraṇaṁ) is the teaching of the Four Noble Truths. However, no mention is made here of the four truths. Possibly, the four-phrased statement is the resolution on effort just below, with each clause counting as a phrase (the conditional clause being taken as two phrases).

  711 MA: By this the Buddha shows that the ideal disciple practises by arousing his energy and resolving: “I shall not rise up so long as I have not attained arahantship.”

  SUTTA 71

  712 This sutta and the following two seem to present a chronological account of Vacchagotta’s spiritual evolution. The Saṁyutta Nikāya contains a whole section of short discussions between the Buddha and Vacchagotta, SN 33/iii.257–62. See also SN 44:7–11/iv.391–402.

  713 This is the type of omniscience that the Jain teacher the Niga˚ṭha Nātaputta claims at MN 14.17.

  714 MA explains that even though part of the statement is valid, the Buddha rejects the entire statement because of the portion that is invalid. The part of the statement that is valid is the assertion that the Buddha is omniscient and all-seeing; the part that is excessive is the assertion that knowledge and vision are continuously present to him. According to the Theravāda exegetical tradition the Buddha is omniscient in the sense that all knowable things are potentially accessible to him. He cannot, however, know everything simultaneously and must advert to whatever he wishes to know. At MN 90.8 the Buddha says that it is possible to know and see all, though not simultaneously, and at AN 4:24/ii.24 he claims to know all that can be seen, heard, sensed, and cognized. This is understood by the Theravāda commentators as an assertion of omniscience in the qualified sense. See too in this connection Miln 102–7.

  715 MA explains “the fetter of householdership” (gihisȧyojana ) as attachment to the requisites of a householder, which Ṃ details as land, ornaments, wealth, grain, etc. MA says that even though the texts mention some individuals who attained arahantship as laymen, by the path of arahantship they destroyed all attachment to worldly things and thus either went forth as monks or passed away immediately after their attainment. The question of lay arahants is discussed at Miln 264.

  716 On the Ājı̄vakas see n.73.

  717 Since this Ājı̄vaka believed in the moral efficacy of action, he could not have subscribed to the orthodox philosophical fatalism of the Ājı̄vakas, which denied the effective role of kamma and volitional deeds in modifying human destiny. MA identifies this Ājı̄vaka with the Bodhisatta in a previous birth.

  SUTTA 72

  718 The view that the soul (jı̄va) and the body are the same is materialism, which reduces the soul to the body. The following view that the soul and the body are different is an eternalist view, which regards the soul as a persisting spiritual principle that can exist independently of the body.

  719 The view that a Tathāgata exists after death is a form of eternalism that regards the Tathāgata, or spiritually perfect individual, as possessing a self that attains eternal deliverance after the death of the body. The view that a Tathāgata does not exist after death also identifies the Tathāgata as self, but holds that this self is annihilated upon the death of the body. The third view attempts a synthesis of these two, which the Buddha rejects because both components involve a wrong view. The fourth view seems to be a sceptical attempt to reject both alternatives or to avoid taking a definite stand.

  720 In the Pali a word play is involved between diṭṭ̣higata, “speculative view,” which the Tathāgata has put away, and diṭṭ̣ha, what has been “seen” by the Tathāgata with direct vision, namely, the rise and fall of the five aggregates.

  721 MA says that “does not reappear” actually does apply, in the sense that the arahant does not undergo a new existence. But if Vacchagotta were to hear this he would misapprehend it as annihilationism, and thus the Buddha denies that it applies in the sense that annihilation is not a tenable position.

  722 MA says this is the material form by which one would describe the Tathāgata as a being (or self) possessing material form. MṬ adds that the material form has been abandoned by the abandonment of the fetters connected with it, and it has thus become incapable of arising again in the future.

  723 This passage should be connected with the simile of the extinguished fire. Just as the extinguished fire cannot be described as having gone to any direction, so the Tathāgata who has attained to final Nibbāna cannot be described in terms of the four alternatives. The simile concerns solely the legitimacy of conceptual and linguistic usage and is not intended to suggest, as some scholars have held, that the Tathāgata attains to some mystical absorption in the Absolute. The words “profound, immeasurable, hard to fathom” point to the transcendental dimension of the liberation attained by the Accomplished One, its inaccessibility to discursive thought.It seems that at this point in the dialogue, the Buddha resorts to imagery to suggest what concepts cannot convey. The two images—of the extinguished fire and the deep ocean—establish between themselves a dialectical tension, and thus both must be taken into account to avoid falling into one-sided views. The image of the extinguished fire, taken alone, veers in the direction of total extinction, and thus must be balanced by the image of the ocean; the image of the ocean, taken alone, suggests some eternal mode of being, and thus must be balanced by the image of the extinguished fire. Again, the truth lies in the middle that transcends untenable extremes.

  SUTTA 73

  724 This question and the next refer to arahantship, which (according to MA) Vacchagotta thought may have been an exclusive prerogative of the Buddha.

  725 This question refers to the non-returner. Even though a non-returner may remain in the lay life, he necessarily observes celibacy because he has cut off the fetter of sensual desire.

  726 This question refers to the stream-enterer and the once-returner, who may still indulge in sensual pleasures if they remain in the lay life.

  727 MA: He had attained the fruit of the non-returner and came to ask the Buddha about the practice of insight for attaining the path of arahantship. However, the Buddha saw that he had the supporting conditions for the six direct knowledges. Thus he taught him serenity for producing the five mundane direct knowledges and insight for reaching arahantship.

  728 The suitable basis (āyatana) is the fourth jhāna for the five direct knowledges and insight for arahantship.

  729 Pariciṇṇo me Bhagavā, pariciṇṇo me Sugato. This is an indirect way of informing the Buddha of his attainment of arahantship. The bhikkhus did not understand this, and therefore the Buddha interprets its significance for them.

  SUTTA 74

  730 Dı̄ghanakha was Ven. Sāriputta’s nephew. At the time he approached the Buddha, Sāriputta had been a bhikkhu for only two weeks and was still a stream-enterer.

  731 MA holds that Dı̄ghanakha is an annihilationist (ucchedavādin ) and explains this assertion to mean: “No [mode of] rebirth is acceptable to me.” However, the text itself does not give any concrete evidence supporting this interpretation. It seems much more likely that Dı̄ghanakha’s statement, “Nothing is acceptable to me” (sabbaṁ me na khamati), is intended to apply specifically to other philosophical views, and thus shows Dı̄ghanakha to be a radical sceptic of the class satirically characterised at MN 76.30 as “eel-wrigglers”. His assertion would then be tantamount to a wholesale repudiation of all philosophical views.

  732 This exchange, as interpreted by MA and MṬ, should be understood as follows: The Buddha suggests, by his question, that Dı̄ghanakha’s assertion involves an inherent contradiction. For he cannot reject everything without also rejecting his own view, and this would entail the opp
osite position, namely, that something is acceptable to him. However, though Dı̄ghanakha recognises the implication of the Buddha’s question, he continues to insist on his view that nothing is acceptable to him.

  733 MA says that the first sentence refers to those who first take up a basic eternalist or annihilationist view and then subsequently adopt secondary variations on that view; the second sentence refers to those who abandon their basic view without adopting an alternative. But if, as seems plausible, Dı̄ghanakha was a radical sceptic, then the Buddha’s statement might be understood to point to an unsatisfactoriness inherent in the sceptic’s position: it is psychologically uncomfortable to insist on remaining in the dark. Thus most sceptics, while professing a rejection of all views, surreptitiously adopt some definite view, while a few abandon their scepticism to seek a path to personal knowledge.

  734 MA identifies the three views here as eternalism, annihilationism, and partial eternalism. The eternalist view is close to lust (sārāgāya santike), etc., because it affirms and delights in existence in however sublimated a form; annihilationism is close to non-lust, etc., because, though involving a wrong conception of self, it leads to disenchantment with existence. If the second view is understood as radical scepticism, it could also be seen as close to non-lust in that it expresses disillusionment with the attempt to buttress the attachment to existence with a theoretical foundation and thus represents a tentative, though mistaken, step in the direction of dispassion.