Public Sector Transformation Through E-Government

by Christopher G Reddick

  and their perceptions in relation to the adoption of interoperable identity

  management systems (IdMS) (Backhouse & Halperin, 2009). The notion

  of citizen-centric e-government (Reddick, 2010) however draws attention

  to this aspect of the emerging systems, an aspect that may vitally affect

  whether or not such systems win public acceptance.

  2 RESEARCHING THE PERCEPTIONS

  OF CITIZENS TOWARDS EID

  The study reported in this chapter addressed the gap in EU research on

  eID perceptions (Lusoli & Miltgen, 2009; Seltsikas & O’Keefe, 2010). It

  was designed to generate and analyse qualitative data so as to achieve a

  deeper understanding of citizens’ perceptions on eID, and to reveal the rea-

  soning underlying the prevailing views. The methodology adopted in this

  study drew on grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) because it off

  ffers

  Identifying Online Citizens 109

  a research method that seeks to develop accounts grounded in the data and

  uses the analytical technique of open coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).

  Data were collected using a web survey to explore the perspectives

  of European citizens toward the new interoperable systems planned by

  the European Union. A brief description was provided of the proposed

  EU scheme and of the introduction of a Europe-wide eID card, which

  would allow shared use for all governmental services across all Euro-

  pean countries.

  In order to generate qualitative data, the survey contained an open-ended

  question inviting respondents to comment freely on any aspect of eIDs. This

  method generated data in the form of free text. Although responses came

  back from several EU countries, the national representation of the data

  used in the present study was restricted to just two countries, Germany (N

  = 360) and the United Kingdom (N = 377), a high response rate that lent

  itself to rigorous content analysis.

  Citizens were also asked to respond to demographic questions. The

  results indicated that the survey respondents is dominated by a relatively

  young population, with a mean of 34 years of age, a minimum age of 15

  and maximum age of 77. In terms of gender, male respondents are heavily

  over-represented in the survey (female 17 percent, male 83 percent). Finally,

  on the question of political views, results indicated a mean of 4.53 on a 10

  number scale with 1 indicating farthest left and 10 farthest right.

  We recognize the limitation of web surveys as self-selected samples, but

  interviews would not have provided the rich, diverse and anonymous responses

  obtained through the web survey. We emphasise that our fi

  findings do not seek

  to represent the U.K. and German populations in a statistical sense. Instead,

  the validity of qualitative research stems from the plausibility and the cogency

  of the logical reasoning used in describing the results from the cases, and in

  drawing conclusions from them (Agerfalk, 2004). This study lays claim to

  analytical generalizability (Yin, 1984), in particular to the common type of

  generalizing from data to descriptions (Lee & Baskerville, 2003).

  We used content analysis where the data are read and categorized into

  concepts that are suggested by the data themselves rather than imposed

  from outside (Agar, 1980). Units for analysis defi

  fine units of meaning

  (Henri, 1992) whereby each response is partitioned into text segments

  representing ideas in the text. This method of open coding relies on an

  analytical technique of identifying possible categories, their properties

  and dimensions (Kelle, 2007).

  Systematic content analysis of the dataset revealed trust as a major issue: Governments cannot be trusted to

  d

  maintain identity information

  on the citizen’s behalf.

  The main problem is not the data that is stored on the ID-card, but

  the lack of trust i

  t n the authorities that handle the data.

  110 Ruth Halperin and James Backhouse

  The salience of similar statements and, as we shall show later on,

  the logic of justification associated with them, led us to focus on trust-

  related beliefs.

  3 ANALYZING

  TRUST-RELATED PERCEPTIONS

  In this chapter we present the fi

  findings that emerged from the analysis

  focusing on trust-related perceptions. We illustrate them using the data

  that created trust perception categories, and further consult the literature

  to reconceptualise the data-driven categories, drawing from trust models

  and trust taxonomies.

  3.1 The Distinctive Themes: Competence and Integrity

  I believe the authorities will attempt to be honest and secure but ulti-

  mately will be unsuccessful in maintaining the confi

  fidentiality of my

  data. (United Kingdom)

  This quote from a U.K. respondent is chosen to illustrate a fundamental

  distinction arising from the analysis concerned with issues of trust and

  public authorities. The focus on honesty in the fi

  first part of the state-

  ment implies an assessment of the integrity of government . The second part of the statement however addresses the ability of the government to

  deliver a proper system, questioning its competence. These twin themes

  of competence and integrity emerged from the analysis as distinctive

  and independent categories. In the statement above, integrity of pub-

  lic authorities is assessed positively while the judgment for competence

  is negative.

  In many cases, however, the responses refl

  flected negative perceptions of

  trust in both the competence and integrity of public authorities:

  Governments cannot be trusted to maintain identity information on

  the citizen’s behalf, and once such information is under the control of

  governments, its abuse will necessarily follow—either by government

  itself, or by criminals who infi

  filtrate government systems. (Germany)

  In this example the suggestion is that the abuse of personal data under

  public custodianship is inevitable —“either by government itself, ” thus implying lack of integrity on the part of the government, “or by criminals

  who infi

  filtrate government systems” — suggesting the inability of the gov-

  ernment to secure the data from criminal attack.

  The distinction between competence and integrity was therefore apparent

  in the grounded analysis process. We explore further these two themes.

  Identifying Online Citizens 111

  I am not against ID cards in principle, but have grave doubts about

  the competence of those running the system. Human error is probably

  a bigger risk than IT. (U.K.)

  The theme of competence was raised repeatedly with statements address-

  ing the ability of the U.K. state to secure and manage personal data. Neg-

  ative judgments of the technical profi

  ficiency of public authority was also

  found in the German responses:

  Theoretically the electronic identity card is a smasher; unfortunately pol-

  iticians tend to be technically insuffi

  fficient at implementation causing sig-

  nifi
>
  ficantly more harm than potential benefits to the citizens. (Germany)

  It is implied that, given the sensitivity of the data, the lack of technical

  competence required for operating an interoperable IdMS could lead to

  harmful outcomes.

  In the literature on trust relations, we discovered constructs similar to that

  of competence in our grounded analysis. In their integrated model of organi-

  zational trust, Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) propose the notion of

  ability (i.e., the ability of the trustee to do what the truster needs). Renn sug-

  gests that perceived competence is a component of institutional trust, defined

  as the degree of technical expertise in meeting an institutional mandate

  (Renn, 2008, p. 223). Clustering types of trusting beliefs, McKnight, Choud-

  hury, and Kacmar (2002) identify in the literature a total of fi

  fifteen constructs.

  Among them are constructs related to competence, which include expertise,

  dynamism, ability, capability and good judgment. Studying trust relationship

  in the context of Business to Consumer (B2C) ecommerce, the McKnight et

  al. model confi g

  fi ures competence as an attribute of trustworthiness.

  Trust is often studied in the arena of ecommerce (cf. Gefen, Benbasat,

  & Pavlou, 2008; Sen, 2010), such as when a consumer is inclined to trust a

  vendor not previously known to him— initial trust (

  t McKnight et al., 2008).

  By contrast, the public sector context represents a situation in which the

  service provider, the government, is already known to its “clients,” the

  citizens. Indeed, the familiarity of citizens with governmental authorities

  found clear and frequent expression in our data:

  We also already have all the evidence we need to know that massive

  governmental IT projects are massive disasters, since every single one

  in the past twenty years has been. (United Kingdom)

  Evident in the data was the connection made to past experiences as a

  way of justifying the perception of incompetence:

  Unfortunately the authorities have shown in the past their incompe-

  tence in realizing IT-projects. (Germany)

  112 Ruth Halperin and James Backhouse

  To summarize, our fi

  findings point to negative perceptions regarding

  the ability of government to operate a secure, interoperable IdMS. The

  responses testify to the low level of trust in public authorities, and the

  concern of citizens that governments will ultimately prove incompetent

  and therefore “fail to deliver a working system.” A pattern was further

  identified in the justifi

  fication logic of the respondents, relying on past

  experience: the perceived inability of the government to manage large-

  scale IT projects rests on a reputation for failure.

  Our analysis found judgments concerned with government ethics

  ranging from moderate to extreme statements, such as viewing all pub-

  lic authority as corrupt. The notion of integrity, as well as similar con-

  cepts such as fairness, is found in research on trust-related perceptions

  (cf. Renn, 2008). Going beyond general judgments of integrity how-

  ever, further analysis revealed that the major issue of integrity revolved

  around handling of personal data. More specifi

  fically, a key concern

  for the eID context was the potential for opportunistic behavior by pub-

  lic institutions:

  I don’t have the confi

  fidence that authorities can resist the temptation

  to use all available information to solve their acute problems e.g. “ter-

  rorism” or crime. (Germany)

  States cannot be trusted to restrict their use of citizenship data to what

  they promised in different circumstances. (United Kingdom)

  What emerge from the responses are scenarios often referred to as mission

  creep, where information collected for one limited purpose is eventually

  used for other purposes for which the data subjects have not approved.

  Some responses drew attention to particular third parties gaining access

  to identity information:

  I am afraid that personal biometric data are combined with different

  databases and will be used for other purposes than the one originally

  determined. These “other” uses are for example—criminal prosecu-

  tion, marketing, health insurance. (Germany)

  Here, this respondent proposes a number of potential “other uses”

  of personal data, including law enforcement — personal data shared

  between diff

  fferent public sector authorities, and marketing and insur-

  ance — personal data is passed on from government to private sector

  organisations.

  Having once identifi

  fied the centrality of the integrity issue, specifi call

  fi

  y

  with regard to information passing to third party, we devised a coding

  scheme to provide a more detailed picture of citizens’ perception in this

  regard. The results of the analysis are summarised in Table 9.1.

  Identifying Online Citizens 113

  Table 9.1 Mission Creep Categories in Rank Order

  Proportion of statements

  Rank

  Mission creep categories

  referring to each category (%)

  1

  Criminal persecution

  70

  2

  General

  50

  3

  Commercial

  20

  Table 9.1 shows the percentage of statements made by respondents regarding general fear of mission creep as well as to specific kinds of mission

  creep. The concern most frequently addressed was the use of personally

  identifi

  fiable information for criminal persecution purposes, for example:

  if a technology is once introduced, it will one day be used for criminal

  prosecution and the like by the authorities, even if that was excluded

  at the time of introduction. (Germany).

  Less frequently discussed but still important was the issue of sharing

  personal information with commercial organizations: “I have a severe lack

  of faith in the ability and willingness of the authorities to protect personal

  data from being passed on to businesses” (United Kingdom). Whereas citi-

  zens fear the possibility of ID data sharing between government and busi-

  ness, they are less concerned about the potential abuse of their information

  by the private sector than by the public sector: “The abuse done by cor-

  porations is less problematic than the one by governments” (United King-

  dom). Private sector motives may usually be seen simply in terms of profi

  fit

  maximization, whereas public sector agendas may be less clear.

  An often-cited example was the transfer of EU citizens’ passenger data

  to the U.S. government:

  EU authorities, inter alia, with the transmission of fl igh

  fl

  t passenger

  data to the US already shown clearly that data protection doesn’t play

  an important role. Why should I now rely on the same institutions?

  (United Kingdom)

  4. BENEVOLENCE

  It’s not about easy access for citizens to authorities. The reason for ID

  syste
ms is to establish surveillance measures. And this is communi-

  cated to me as an advantage for the citizen?? (Germany)

  This statement encapsulates the third grounded theme that emerged and

  questions the motives behind government eID initiatives. Comments such

  114 Ruth

  Halperin and James Backhouse

  as electronic ID-cards are targeted specifi

  fically to record and analyze

  individuals and all their actions, or the recurring use of the metaphors

  “1984” (mostly by British respondents) and “Glassy Citizens” (mostly by German respondents) were all taken to represent a negative perception

  of intrusive governmental surveillance. Attempting to conceptualize this

  emerging category within a trust relationship context, we explored the

  congruence between this data-driven theme and the theoretical concept

  of benevolence (Mayer et al., 1995). Benevolence refers to the expectation

  of goodwill and benign intent from a trusted party (Yamagishi & Yam-

  agishi, 1994). It is a construct found in a number of trust models, often

  seen as a trustworthiness attribute, a trusting belief, or a type of trust

  perception (McKnight et. al., 2002). The concept of benevolence is akin

  to that of integrity in that both concepts refl

  flect ethical traits, making

  them appear less distinct and independent of each other (compared to the

  trustworthiness attribute of competence). Mayer et al. (1995) have sug-

  gested, however, that benevolence refers to trustee motives and is based

  on altruism, whereas integrity refers to keeping commitments and not

  telling lies, traits that may be manifested for pragmatic rather than altru-

  istic reasons.

  As before, respondents justify their beliefs by reference to the past:

  Such systems/approaches have been implemented in Germany

  between 1933 and 1945 with deadly outcome for some of the citizens.

  (Germany)

  ID systems are for Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia and other Police

  States and Dictatorships. They are completely incompatible with a

  free, democratic society. (United Kingdom)

  Evident in these quotes is the strong historical reference to totalitarian

  regimes. Respondents are suggesting that since governments have abused

  data in the past they are capable of doing so in the future.

  The fi

  findings point to three discrete dimensions of trust beliefs about

  public sector institutions responsible for IdMS: trust in the competence of