Garibaldi

by Lucy Riall

  There was, and remains, something remarkable about the defeat of a well-equipped regular army by a mixed group of ill-armed enthusiasts and untrained peasants: ‘20,000 men capitulating to a handful of ill-armed adventurers, that's an astonishing thing!’ the French dramatist Prosper Mérimée exclaimed on hearing the news.18 ‘Garibaldi has achieved wonderful results’, the philanthropist Lord Shaftesbury wrote in his diary: ‘It seems to me that God's protecting and accompanying power has repeated for him the miracle of Gideon and his three hundred.’19 Luck played an obvious role in explaining their success, especially in the landing at Marsala. Just as important was the major crisis in Bourbon government. This crisis was partly financial, as the Bourbon state had a huge public debt by 1860; it was also partly diplomatic, reflecting an increasing international isolation which had been accentuated by the defeat of its only ally, Austria, in 1859 (whereas the nationalists were helped by the recent election of a British government more favourably disposed to Italy).20 Also in 1859, the death of Ferdinando II and the accession to the throne of the Two Sicilies of his timid twenty-three-year-old son, Francesco, added a more general problem of legitimacy and political authority; while in April 1860 the insurrection in Palermo had expanded into the countryside, causing widespread revolt, the spread of criminal activity and the breakdown of local government.21 Put simply, by the time Garibaldi arrived in Sicily, and although the original insurrection had been put down, the government was weak, isolated and unpopular: ‘On the one hand was the dissolution of government; on the other there was a spreading lack of confidence in the capacity of the Bourbons to keep law and order’.22

  This already critical situation worsened with Garibaldi's landing at Marsala. Conditions in Palermo itself rapidly became so threatening that the government was obliged to bring its troops into the city to protect itself; and this action left the provinces dangerously unprotected. Where there were no soldiers, revolts erupted. There were peasant uprisings in the provinces of Girgenti (Agrigento), Messina and Catania, as well as in the areas nearer Garibaldi's forces, and the numbers of criminal gangs – always a problem in the Sicilian interior – increased rapidly. As Garibaldi advanced on Palermo, the more liberal cities of Messina and Catania rose in revolt.23 Everywhere public officials fled their posts, the police forces gave up their jobs, telegraphic and mail communications were cut, and there was a run on the banks.24 In effect, the state collapsed in Sicily in the spring of 1860, and Garibaldi and his volunteers were able to step into this vacuum of power.

  The role of good luck and good timing does not mean, however, that no merit should go to Garibaldi and his colleagues for the conquest of Sicily. Although I have emphasised the unpreparedness of Garibaldi's expedition as it left Quarto, some aspects of a military strategy were in place before they arrived. The most important of these, or the one that played the most significant role in the immediate success of the Thousand, was the alliance formed by Sicilian revolutionaries, and notably by Giuseppe La Masa, Rosolino Pilo and Giovanni Corrao, with the rural squadre. The squadre acted as a kind of guerrilla force, disrupting and cutting Bourbon supplies and causing diversions, and they were undoubtedly of crucial help in the taking of Palermo. Equally, the leadership showed real expertise in evading capture in the mountains above Palermo. Here too, the local knowledge of Sicilian revolutionaries, especially Crispi, who persuaded Garibaldi not to go further into the interior but to stay hidden in the mountains and join up with La Masa's squadre, was vital.25

  The kind of warfare which Garibaldi had learnt in South America and had always excelled in – travelling light and fast, using surprise to frighten the enemy, relying on the skill and reckless courage of his officers – was particularly suited to conditions in the empty Sicilian countryside, and to conflict with an enemy which, however well armed, had already been discouraged and dispersed by peasant resistance. Moreover, as Garibaldi had long realised, motivated volunteers had a huge advantage over more self-interested mercenaries and conscripts in close-combat situations where the main weapon was the bayonet. Before the descent into Palermo, Garibaldi was overheard telling the squadre chiefs ‘for the hundredth time’, after they expressed concern about their lack of artillery, ‘that it was not long shots which imposed on the wellarmed Neapolitans, but a determined rush in advance’.26 The taking of Palermo was, in its way, an equal triumph of military strategy and local knowledge. Apart from the crucial element of surprise, the leadership was careful to choose one of the city's least defended points, leading into a market area known for its revolutionary sympathies, from where the volunteers could lose themselves in the city, if necessary, or arrive very quickly at the seat of municipal government in Piazza Pretorio, if they were more lucky. Finally, great use was made of Garibaldi's leadership and reputation (and even his Piedmontese uniform) further to demoralise the enemy. When the situation demanded it, Garibaldi showed great skill in producing displays of prodigious courage (exposing himself and his officers to enemy fire at Calatafimi), indifference to danger (sitting in the open during the bombardment of Palermo), and grim determination (threatening to break off negotiations for the truce). These tactics were successful not just in purely military terms but also in helping to intimidate the Bourbon leadership and its soldiers into surrender.

  Problems of government

  There was evidence of strategy and forward planning in the organisation of the new government and its policies. Here the presence of Francesco Crispi was central. Immediately after the victory at Calatafimi, Garibaldi appointed Crispi as Secretary of State. Crispi went on to introduce a series of measures designed both to reestablish administrative authority in the island and to gain popular support for the regime. First, on 17 May, he announced the appointment of governors in the twenty-four districts of Sicily and he abolished the tax on milling grain (the grist tax or macinato); the next day, he set up military courts to try civilian and military crimes, and this was followed ten days later by a decree which established the death penalty for theft, looting and murder. Finally, on 2 June, after the armistice with the Bourbons, he declared that common land should be divided among the peasants, with special privileges given to those who volunteered to fight with Garibaldi. These measures were followed up by other popular reforms, such as the abolition of the title of Eccellenza and of the baciamano (‘hand-kissing’ as a sign of social respect). Also on 2 June, the setting up of a civilian government was announced. It was to consist of six ministries: War and Navy; Interior and Finance; Justice; Education and Culture; Foreign Affairs and Commerce; and Public Works.27 There were also decrees aimed more specifically at the liberal middle class. These included a programme of public works (especially railway construction); the abolition of restrictions on the labour market; investment in education (notably in the universities); and the expulsion of the Jesuits from Sicily along with the confiscation of their wealth and property.28

  Crispi's aim, as he later explained, was ‘to disrupt the enemy's economic resources and win over the masses in any way we could … all the decrees of [this] period bear this stamp’.29 He and the other Sicilians in government remembered only too well the political fallout caused by social disorder during the 1848–9 revolutions.30 Accordingly, they sought to organise and control the peasantry, to liberate the government from its dependence on the armed irregulars or squadre (this by the decree of mass conscription announced before Calatafimi), and to reassure the propertied class on the question of law and order and the protection of its economic interests. There was a widespread recognition of the social hardship and economic problems caused by the prevailing system of land tenure in Sicily and of the pressing need for land reform.31

  Yet how successful Crispi was in attaining his objectives remains an open question. The decree of land reform – the partition of common land among the peasantry – remained unenacted in many areas, and the disappointment this provoked produced a wave of land occupations and peasant unrest across much of Sicily. Peasant protest was paralleled by a
sharp increase in urban crime and rural violence: Alcamo in the province of Trapani was said to be experiencing ‘kidnapping, destruction, arson, looting, robbery and homicide’ on a daily basis,32 while in Corleone in the Palermo uplands a bandit named Santo Meli conducted a reign of terror from June onwards. Conscription – through the creation of a national guard as well as an army – was meant to combat the problem of banditry, but even where national guards were set up they were often infiltrated by the bandits themselves. Just as serious were the difficulties in organising provincial and local government. Efforts to set up functioning administrations were persistently undermined by local officials; they were motivated either by old loyalties to the Bourbon regime or more simply by the pursuit of private interests, rivalries and material gain. Increasingly the government was obliged to rely on military force and simple repression to maintain control in the countryside.33

  The political situation became extremely complex and beset by bitter internal wranglings, particularly when it came to the question of union between Sicily and Piedmont. There were huge issues about Cavour's attitude to the new situation in Sicily. He had done little to help the expedition of the Thousand; indeed his chief contribution may have been ‘in not absolutely vetoing the expedition’.34 Thereafter, Cavour became concerned about the influence of Mazzinians like Crispi in the Sicilian government and by the threat of Garibaldi uniting Italy from the South, which would jeopardise both Piedmont's alliance with France and the moderate liberals' overall direction of Italian politics. Increasingly, therefore, he concentrated on annexing Sicily so as better to control Garibaldi's and the Mazzinian activities there. Cavour's main agent in Sicily was another Sicilian, Giuseppe La Farina of the National Society. However, La Farina rapidly fell out of favour in Palermo's political circles by pursuing an openly pro-Cavourian, pro-annexation programme, and he quarrelled especially badly with Crispi. But Crispi, in turn, made himself equally unpopular in Palermo by his contempt for Sicilian separatism and by his generally abrasive attitude. At the end of June he was forced to resign from the government and, in early July, Garibaldi, who was furious at the treatment of Crispi, expelled La Farina from the island.35

  This political disarray – which both La Farina and Crispi contributed to, and to which they both fell victim – reflected, and was accentuated by, the political divisions within Sicily itself. The three main Sicilian political groupings – democrats, moderate liberals and autonomists – had long disagreed amongst themselves. In 1860, they could not agree on a clear policy on the question of annexation by or autonomy from Piedmont, or about precisely how, under what conditions and when Sicily should unite with Piedmont. Even within these three groups there was great disagreement on the question of annexation (as well as other issues: for instance, the democrats were divided between Mazzinians and a smaller socialist party). Moreover, regional splits (most obviously, democrats in Catania; autonomists in Palermo) and rivalry (general resentment of Palermo's dominance within Sicily) added significantly to the factionalism of Sicilian politics.36

  From Palermo to Naples

  What was never in any doubt was Garibaldi and Crispi's intention to continue the struggle against the Bourbons in Sicily, and to use Sicily as a springboard for the war on the mainland. After the departure of Garibaldi and his volunteers for Sicily in early May, a series of organisations in northern Italy – the National Society, the Million Rifles Fund and Bertani's Central Committee in Aid of Garibaldi – continued the work of organising volunteers and raising money for the campaign (and at first for the parallel campaign in the Papal States). It seems that Cavour also sent significant aid, either directly through the National Society or by covering its and/or the Rifles Fund's deficits, presumably in an attempt to influence the conduct of the war in Piedmont's favour.37 The first small ship carrying guns, ammunition and a few men left Genoa in late May; this was followed some two weeks later by a much larger expedition led by Giacomo Medici consisting of two ships and some 2,500 men and 800 firearms, and in early July by another large expedition under Enrico Cosenz of 2,000 men. An expedition of 800 men was also sent from Livorno, and throughout July smaller expeditions continued to leave Genoa for the campaign in Sicily; in all, an estimated 21,000 men joined Garibaldi between late May and early September.38

  After Palermo, Garibaldi's attention was fixed on capturing the Bourbon bridgehead at Messina. Accordingly, the new arrivals were sent out of Palermo into the country in three groups (under Medici, Bixio and Türr) with orders to repress Bourbon resistance and then to converge on Messina. Türr's men went across the interior, and had by all accounts the most ‘picturesque’ experience,39 while Bixio and his men proceeded along the south coast and then east towards Catania. At Catania, Bixio's forces became embroiled in peasant land occupations and violence (what the Englishman, Forbes, called ‘a small dash of communism’)40 in the area around Bronte, on Mount Etna. Apparently to reassure Sicilian landowners that Garibaldi's revolution did not represent a threat to their property and that he knew how to impose law and order, Bixio brutally crushed the revolt in Bronte and executed the leaders, in a wave of repressive violence.41 Finally, Medici's column of 2,000 men – which was moving along the north coast between Palermo and Messina – met with a much larger Bourbon force under General Bosco at Milazzo. Although Medici managed to trap the Bourbons temporarily into and around the fortress on the promontory of Milazzo, he called for reinforcements from Palermo in order to prevent Bosco from breaking out and defeating his smaller army. Helped by the arrival not just of fresh troops but also of Garibaldi himself, the next great battle of the 1860 campaign began: the battle of Milazzo of 20 July. Once again, it was an unplanned battle and, once again, Garibaldi's forces won the day against all the odds.

  At Milazzo, Garibaldi was as enthusiastic a leader of his men as he had been at Calatafimi. By all accounts, he led and encouraged them from within the thick of the fighting, and sought to inspire them with examples of fearless courage. In one celebrated incident, he found himself standing alone on a road with his aide, Missori, facing a cavalry charge; and, instead of retreating, he stood his ground facing the galloping horses. As they came close, Missori shot the horse from under one officer, while Garibaldi leapt up to cut the same man's throat with his sabre. Missori then continued to shoot at the horses, and Garibaldi went on attacking their riders with his sabre, so terrifying the soldiers that those who were still unharmed fled back to the safety of the fortress. In the afternoon, with his forces established on the bridge to the town, Garibaldi took to a ship and bombarded Milazzo from the sea. By the end of the day, after eight hours of bitter fighting under the Sicilian sun, he had taken possession of the town.42

  Five days later, General Bosco surrendered the last of the Bourbon forces at Milazzo fortress and, on 28 July, Medici led the volunteers into Messina, riding Bosco's horse. Although Clary, the Bourbon general in charge of Messina, had 15,000 men and an ‘impregnable fortress’ at his disposal, he had preferred to sign a treaty whereby Messina would be held by the garibaldini and the fortress by the Bourbons, and all hostilities between them were declared at an end. This meant that Garibaldi's ships could cross the straits of Messina ‘under the muzzles of the king's cannon to invade his Calabrian provinces’ without the Bourbons firing a single shot. Shortly afterwards, most of the soldiers in the Messina fortress were withdrawn to the mainland.43

  After the defeat at Milazzo, the Bourbons seem to have decided to abandon Sicily in order more effectively to stop Garibaldi on arrival on the mainland. Perhaps aware of this, Garibaldi hesitated for some three weeks before crossing the Straits of Messina into Calabria. On 8 August, he sent a small exploratory force under the Calabrian revolutionary, Musolino, and a trusted officer, Alberto Mario, across to capture the fort at Scilla on the Calabrian side. They failed, and were forced to flee into the Aspromonte mountains. As a result, Garibaldi tried a different tactic, and on 18 August, along with Bixio and a force of some 3,500 men, he crossed the sea to
Melito in southern Calabria from a secret embarkation point on the beach below Taormina. They immediately marched inland, away from danger. On 22 August, after some fierce fighting, the combined forces of Garibaldi's and Cosenz's men took Reggio Calabria, and on 26 August met up with Medici's men at Nicotera. Also on the 26th, the town of Catanzaro declared itself for Garibaldi. As Trevelyan comments, ‘[t]he race to Naples had now fairly begun’.44 From Nicotera, Garibaldi's army marched north to Monteleone, which the Bourbon garrison of 10,000 men under General Ghio had already abandoned.

  By now Garibaldi and his General Staff were on horseback and moving so fast that they ‘were acting militarily as their own scouts, politically as their own heralds’.45 Much of Garibaldi's army was left behind, and the journalists following him were unable to keep up: Charles Arrivabene of the London Daily News and Frank Vizitelly, the artist for The Illustrated London News, were obliged to cross much of Calabria on foot because Garibaldi and his men had taken all the donkeys and carriages in the area.46 On 29 August Garibaldi caught General Ghio's men in the high mountains, where they had been blocked by armed bands holding the pass at Agrifoglio, and captured all their weapons and cannons. Garibaldi kept on moving, by carriage and on horseback; he entered the provincial capital of Cosenza on 31 August, and from there descended to the coast and took a boat to Sapri. From Sapri he crossed the mountains of the Cilento, and in Casalnuovo he and his staff got into open carriages and drove into Salerno, just a short train ride away from Naples, on 6 September.