Every Man a Tiger: The Gulf War Air Campaign
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Salman Pak Biological Warfare Center
Samdan, Abdullah Al-
SAMs (surface-to-air missiles)
Wild Weasels and
SANG (Saudi Arabian National Guard)
Santos, José
SAR (search-and-rescue)
RSAF headquarters cell
SAS (Special Air Service, British), operations in Iraq
Satellites
Saudi Arabia
Iraqi threat
defense against
military leaders
Scud attacks
and servicewomen
troops killed by friendly fire
See also Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF)
Saudi National Guard
Saudi pilots
Sawyer, Dave
Schmidt, Eric
Schriever, Bernard A.
Schulte, Dave
Schwartz, Paul
Schwarzkopf, H. Norman
and air campaign
and battlefield interdiction
and biological warfare
and bridge destruction
briefings
daily
and civilian casualties
command center
and DCINC
and Dugan
ground campaign
start of
Schwarzkopf, H. Norman (cont.)
Horner and
insecurity, psychological, of
and INSTANT THUNDER plan
and integration of forces
meeting with King Fahd
and oil spills
and psychological warfare
and Push CAS
and rotation policy
and safety of troops
and search-and-rescue missions
and target selection
troop deployments in Saudi Arabia
and war planning
Scowcroft, Brent
Scud missiles
defense against
SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defense)
Seara, Oscar
Search-and-rescue. See SAR
Security, for battle plan
Self-confidence of fighter pilots
Senegal, infantry
Sepkas
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks
7th MEB (Marine Expeditionary Brigade)
Seymour Johnson AFB
Shaikh, Abdullah al-
Shamrani (Saudi Captain)
Sharp, Grant
Sharpe, Sandy
Shaw AFB, Reconnaissance Center
Shaw, Bernard
Sheehy (Air Force captain)
Sheikh Isa Air Base, Bahrain
“Shock and Awe,”
Shrike radar homing missile
Simms (U.S. Captain)
Simon, Bob
SIOP (Single Integrated Operations Plan)
Situational awareness
Solnet, Claude
Soviet training of Iraqi pilots
SPACECOM (Space Command)
Space forces
Space people
Space Warfare Center
Sparks, Billy
SPEAR (Navy team)
Special Operations, British, and Scud launchers
Special Operations Forces (SOF)
Schwarzkopf and
Special Tactics Personnel (STPs)
Speed of action
in future wars
Spiritual leader, Horner as
Squadrons
Staff officer, Horner as
Stan Eval (standardization and evaluation) pilots
Stanfill, Ronnie
Starling, Dane
Statistics from Gulf War
Status of forces
Stealth aircraft
See also F-117 aircraft
Stillwell, Joe
Storage area, destroyed by A-10s
Strafe patterns
STRATCOM
Strategic air campaign
Schwarzkopf and
Strategic Air Command. See SAC
Strategic air power
Strategies
Successes, of Gulf War
Sudairy, Ahmed
Sultan, Prince of Saudi Arabia
Sultan, Sultan Adi al-Mutairi
Battle of Khafji
Summers, George
Sununu, John
Super Saber aircraft (F-100D)
Supercruise
Superpower, U.S. as
Support elements
Surface-to-air missiles. See SAMs
Surge rates of sorties
Surprise, military doctrine of
Surrender by Iraqis
Suter, Moody
Swain (Air Force captain)
Sweeney, Walter
Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR)
Systems of systems
T-33 (T Bird) aircraft
TAC (Tactical Air Command)
counterproductive policies
TACC (Tactical Air Control Center)
and ATOs
layout of
start of Desert Storm
Tactical Air Control Parties (TACPs)
Tactical air power
Tactical mobility
Tactics
ineffective, in Vietnam
Taif Air Base
Ta Khli, Thailand
Talil (Saudi Admiral)
Tankers (aircraft)
Tanks, Iraqi
destruction of
Tapline Road
Targets for air strikes. See Air strike targets
Target trackers
Task Force NORMANDY
Tastett, Bobby
Taylor, Zack
Team effort, international
Technology, new
Tel Aviv, Scud attacks
Television:
coverage of Gulf War
interviews
and psychological warfare
sets for Desert Shield troops
Temper tents
Tenoso, Ed
Ten Percent War
Terror, weapons of
Test programs, Nellis AFB
Thailand, U.S. military in
Than Hoa Bridge
Thatcher, Margaret
Theories of war
Third Army, U.S.
3rd Infantry Division
335th Tactical Fighter Squadron
363d Tactical Fighter Wing
“Thuds.” See F-105 aircraft
Thumrait Air Base, Oman
Timeline, Desert Shield/Storm
Timely action
TISEO (TV telescope)
Tolin, Tony
Tonoso, Ed
Tornado aircraft, losses
TOT (Time on or over Target)
Totalitarian systems
Towner, John
Training:
of Coalition forces
for nuclear delivery
of transport pilots for combat
for weaseling
Transformation
Transportation system, Iraqi
Troop transport aircraft, Gulf War
Trust, among commanders
Truth, Creech and
Tullo, Frank
Turk, John
Turki (Saudi general)
Turki bin Bandar “Little Turki” (Saudi major)
Turki bin Nassar, Prince
24th Mechanized Infantry Division
2v2 ACT (air combat tactics) mission
Tyndall AFB, Florida, Horner at
U-2 aircraft
Unified commands
United Arab Emirates
United Arab Republic, infantry
United Nations Inspections Teams
United States military, reorganization of
Unmanned drone aircraft
Unmanned systems in future
USMTM (U.S. Military Training Mission) compound
Vandenburg AFB, California
Van Huss, Pete
Van Meter, Bill
Vehicles, Iraqi, destruction of
Vice wing commanders
Vietnam War
failures of
fighter pilots
Horner’s views
ineffective tactics
inefficient policies
VIIth Corps
battlefield preparation
and close air support
ground war
target list
Voice Product Network
Volant Solo aircraft
Volmer, Al, daily routine
Vulnerability of computer systems
Waller, Cal
War
goals of
Horner’s views of
television and
Warden, John
Warriors, fighter pilots as
“Warthogs.” See A-10 aircraft
Wartime, flying in
Washington administration, and Vietnam War
Washington Post
Watkins, Jack
Weapon system operators (WSOs)
and low-level tactics
Weapons and Tactics
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs)
Weapons Tactics Team
Weaseling
Weather:
and Desert Storm
information about
Webster, William
Welch, Bill
Welch, Larry
West, “Tiny,” 470
Wheelus, Libya
“Whiplash Bango Alert,”
Wide-area munitions
Widows of fighter pilots
Wild Weasels
in Gulf War
Willard, Gary
Williams, Clint
Williams AFB, Arizona
Will of enemy, destruction of
Wing commanders
Wingmen
Wings (Air Force units), rating of
Wing/Squadron Command Posts
Wing Tactical Operations Center, Thailand
Witt, Randy
Wives, of military personnel
of Air Force pilots
WMDs (Weapons of Mass Destruction)
Wolfowitz, Paul
Women:
Arab men and
in Gulf War
World War II
Wratten, William
XVIIIth Airborne Corps
ground war
Yeosock, Betta
Yeosock, John
daily routine
Horner and
and psychological warfare
and Push CAS
as Third Army commander
Yugoslavia, military operations in
Zayed, Sheikh (UAE)
1 Later F-15 models could be used in other roles, as well.
2 Born Margaret, but called Pud from childhood. Ellen and Mary Lou were the other sisters. Chuck was the only son.
3 After he finished gunnery school, Horner intended to apply for a regular commission, the type academy graduates got; but before he could get his paperwork together, the Air Force changed the procedure. In the new dispensation, a board selected the ones they wanted instead of letting people apply directly. Later, while he was stationed at Lakenheath in England, Horner was called into his squadron commander’s office one day and asked if he would accept a regular commission, since a board had selected him for one. “Sure,” he answered. And so he was resworn into the Air Force in 1962.
4 In World War I, World War II, and Korea—even though some fighters carried bombs—the fighter’s primary weapon was its gun, and most fighter actions were gunnery actions: air-to-air and strafe of ground targets. Hence, when a young pilot went to school to learn how to be a fighter pilot, he went to gunnery school. There he would also learn to drop bombs, even nuclear bombs, and shoot missiles.
5 The mechanics had installed one of the pulley reels upside down, so both ailerons moved in the same direction. This made them flaps and not roll controls. And this made the rudder the only roll control the pilot had. His aircraft was going too slow, however, for it to generate the control moment he needed to use the rudder to keep the wings level.
6 An Immelmann is half a loop with a roll on the top. The roll allows you to return to level flight after you’ve reversed your direction. If you want to make the loop smaller, you pull more Gs in the climb, but that means your airspeed at the top is slower.
7 When Horner entered the Air Force, there were about 900,000 people on active duty, of which about 130,000 were officers, and about 70 percent of those were rated. Today there are about 350,000 in the Air Force, with about 70,000 officers, of whom about 20 percent are rated.
8 FACs work on the ground with Army units as liaison with close air support fighter-bombers.
9 The NG stands for “new guys.”
10 If MiGs got into a bomber fight, the bombers would jettison their bombs and fight them. Even if the MiGs didn’t shoot anyone down, the bombers still jettisoned the bombs . . . which meant they were ineffective. In order to counter this air-to-air fighter threat, the practice was to dedicate a few fighters to patrolling the area, so for insurance a few fighters were designated MiG CAP (Combat Air Patrol).
11 That is, he set himself up with relation to the flight leader’s plane so that the leader’s wingtip light was on the star painted on the side of his jet. This means Horner was flying in the right position fore and aft and up and down. Then all you had to do to make sure the flight stayed in close formation was to hold this position and keep the same distance out, usually so his wings didn’t overlap.
12 Fortunately, Tastett bailed out and lived, then spent years in the Hanoi Hilton.
13 Roger Myhrum, we should mention, is now retired. After the war, he went on to fly with the F-5 squadron at Williams AFB training Saudis and Iranians, but after that Horner lost track of him.
14 For combat awards, the Air Medal stands below the DFC, but above the Air Force Commendation Medal, which is usually given for excellence in job performance to company-grade officers. Though it isn’t really a major award, at the time the Air Medal was highly respected. Since the last war was Korea, by 1965 very few medals had been handed out since the early 1950s.
15 This was not always the case. When he returned to Korat in 1967, Horner served under an old-time fighter commander, Colonel, later Brigadier General, Bill Chairasell. Chairasell used his most experienced squadron commanders to lead, no matter what their rank—a practice of which Chuck Horner seriously approved.
16 Horner himself stayed on at Korat beyond 100 sorties, because he enjoyed combat. Others stayed on beyond 100 sorties because they wanted to help the unit out. But by 1967, he wasn’t aware of anyone who felt they were going to win this war. When I asked him what we could possibly have done to set up an acceptable end state, this was his answer: “Our overall strategic aim, as far as I can make out, was to devastate the North so badly that they would surrender any hopes of interfering in the South. Naïve. If we had really wanted to show the North Vietnamese we were serious, we probably should have shut down Haiphong and Hanoi, invaded below Haiphong, and cut the country in half lower down. In fact (though we didn’t know it then), as it turned out, all we really had to do was befriend Ho. Seems he wasn’t part of a monolithic Communist plot, and hated the Chinese more than anyone else. Since as it turns out we really didn’t have any loyalty to the South Vietnamese people anyway, perhaps we could have brokered a deal after the French pulled out. But that is twenty-twenty hindsight on my part.”
17 The Wild Weasels amassed more medals per aircrew (pilot or his EWO) than any other unit in the war.
18 Later, White Fang was shot down over North Vietnam and stoned to death by villagers. He and his EWO, Sam Fantle, were picked up by the Army and told to run for it across a field. If they were fast enough, the Army would protect them from the villagers. Fantle was fast enough to make it across the field. But White Fang was older than the rest of the Weasels (he had been a flight officer at the end of World War II) and didn’t make it. He had a wife and son. His wife died years later from cancer.
19 Bill Kirk was a longtime fighter pilot, who is probably best known for his part in Operation Bolo: In 1967 the F-4s from Ubon tricked the North Vietnamese air force into thinking they were attacking F-105s. The F-4 wolf pack used the 105 call signs, and for the first time carried ECM pods and used radio discipline (something they were not noted for). Since the F-4s were the only friendly aircraft north of the Red River, they were allowed to use AIM-7 missiles beyond visual range, with just a radar lock on the target. As a result, they got face shots on MiG-21s out of the North Vietnamese base at Phuc Yen and shot a number of the North Vietnamese fighters before they could attack the force they thought was bomb-laden. The result was that the North Vietnamese MiG-21 force had to stand down for six months while they worked out what happened. It was a brilliantly planned event. Kirk eventually retired with four stars—after some trials and tribulations getting the first one.
20 SAC is today called STRATCOM and it remains in the ICBM missile silos and missile subs, but it has lost its onetime clout. Though there is still a CINCSTRATCOM to execute the SIOP, no one believes the Russians and Americans will destroy the world. Meanwhile, the SAC forces were merged with TAC forces into a command called Air Combat Command, or ACC. Today, the ACC headquarters is located at Langley AFB, Virginia, where the TAC headquarters was once located, and is mostly commanded by former TAC personnel. The ICBMs themselves later came under the Commander, Air Force Space Command, since ICBM technology and space launcher technology are the same, while the strategic MFP-1 forces (nuclear missiles, boomer subs, and, when on alert, bombers) are now under the operational command of CINCSTRAT. The MFP-1 air defense forces are all now in the Air National Guard and come under CINCNORAD (one of Chuck Horner’s last jobs on active duty) when on alert.
21 Suter died in 1997, but not before he was told that the Red Flag Complex at Nellis would be named in his honor.
22 Called “The Grr,” and the father of “Little Grr,” Horner’s aide in 1990 when he was himself Ninth Air Force Commander.
23 The following discussion very closely follows Bill Creech’s analysis in his excellent book, The Five Pillars of TQM: How to Make Total Quality Management Work for You, Truman Talley Books/Dutton, 1994, pp. 126-138.
24 In fact, the situation changed dramatically between the time of the briefings and when the war became a reality. The greatest benefit of the Camp David briefings was to reassure the President that his military leaders were capable of reasonable planning and thinking. As it turned out, none of what Schwarzkopf and Horner briefed at Camp David came about: the Iraqis didn’t come into Saudi Arabia in any significant way, the forces available to Schwarzkopf, both on the ground and in the air, increased significantly, and the battlefield in January and February of 1991 was far different from the battlefield they might have fought on in August 1990.