The Breach

by Peter Baker

  Bryant was exhausted. He had just returned from a whirlwind eighteen-hour trip back home to his Tennessee district to view tornado damage. As the Senate was completing its question-and-answer period the day before, Bryant had gotten a call warning him that a home-state newspaper was preparing a scathing editorial accusing him of being more concerned with the impeachment trial than a natural disaster that had ravaged the lives of his constituents, so after the floor session he flew home to tour the wreckage and rushed right back to Washington. Now back at the Capitol, he conferred with his fellow managers. McCollum wanted to take the lead in meeting with Lewinsky, and given his seniority, neither Bryant nor Hutchinson could object. Bryant would go next and handle the bulk of the questioning, to be followed by Hutchinson, but the main purpose of the encounter was to establish a human connection with their star witness and gauge how she would come across if she were to testify before the Senate. They were a little nervous. After all this time, she was less witness than celebrity. What would she be like in person? Was she the starstruck and vulnerable young intern still harboring an impossible love for Bill Clinton? Was she the sexually seasoned woman who had eagerly pursued an affair with a married man and then relentlessly pressed him for a job in return for accepting their breakup?

  They arrived at the Mayflower shortly before 3 P.M. and waded into a chaotic scene, with dozens of cameras mixed in with assorted protesters and bystanders. For all of the attention they had been getting at the Capitol, the managers had never encountered anything like this. Escorted through the crowd by the police, the managers were taken to the room chosen for the sessionthe Presidential Suite, complete with a backlit presidential seal etched in aqua glass inset in the floor and normally $5,000 a night. Representing Lewinsky were her lawyers, Plato Cacheris, Preston Burton, and Sydney Jean Hoffmann, and representing Starr were deputy independent counsel Bob Bittman, associate independent counsel Michael W. Emmick, and FBI special agent Patrick Fallon. Hutchinson and the other managers were not happy to see Starrs lieutenants there. After the storm generated by Starrs involvement in court over the weekend, the last thing they wanted was for him to hover over this event as well.

  Before inviting Lewinsky into the room, Cacheris tried to set ground rules, employing what Hoffmann liked to call his confrontational alpha male routine. With an amiable toughness born out of years in Washingtons high-octane legal world, Cacheris had played a role in some of the capitals most celebrated cases, representing John Mitchell during Watergate, secretary Fawn Hall during Iran-contra, CIA employee Aldrich Ames during his spy case, and members of Congress during the ABSCAM and BCCI investigations. Along with Jacob Stein, Cacheris had rescued Lewinsky last summer after her first attorney, William H. Ginsburg, had bungled the case. To the lawmakers on hand today, Cacheris made clear she had no desire to appear before the Senate and demanded a letter confirming that her statements to the managers would be covered by her immunity agreement.

  McCollum assured him that the conversation would be covered by immunity and that they had no desire to ask about her sexual encounters with Clinton. But when Cacheris told them he wanted the questioning to be conducted by Starrs lawyers to make sure she would retain her immunity, the managers protested. Cacheris eventually gave in after assurances that Lewinsky would be protected, that the questioning would only last a couple of hours, and that there would be no written report about it. The two sides agreed that the managers could conduct the questioning themselves and that Bittman and Fallon would leave, while Emmick would remain to observe.

  The deal struck, Cacheris offered Hutchinson and the others advice on how to handle his much questioned client: Look, you dont need to schmooze her up or soft-soap her. Shes here. Shell answer your questions. Youre better off going straight to that. You dont need to chat her up. Just go to the questioning.

  Lewinsky was then brought into the room. In her presence, Cacheris repeated the terms of the deal, and Bittman stipulated that she had her immunity. Now it was finally time for the Starr men to leave.

  Beat it, Bittman, Cacheris said with a roguish smile.

  As they began the questioning, McCollum and Bryant immediately ignored Cacheriss caveat against trying to warm up to her. After all, that was why they had come. McCollum asked her if they had been representing her story accurately on the Senate floor: Have we been screwing it up? Bryant asked her where she had been spending her time lately and how she was handling her newfound fame and the possible security risks. He could imagine what she was going through in terms of the celebrity, he said, recalling the media mob in front of the hotel that afternoon. Having just been through that, I cant imagine going through that the way you have, he said.

  Bryant led her through some of the facts of the case, how she got her job at the White House, the first time she ever saw the president, whether she had had any contact with anyone at the White House since the story broke (only her friend Ashley Raines, another young, low-level employee, she told them). When Bryant asked if she had voted for Clinton, her lawyers jumped in and said she was not going to answer that.

  How did she think the trial should end? Bryant asked.

  I think he should be censured but not removed, she said evenly. Hes been elected twice by the people of this country. Still, she added, as a citizen, I feel he misled the public about the nature of our relationship.

  They talked about the infamous stained dress (she did not keep it as a souvenir, she insisted, but had not bothered to clean it because Linda Tripp told her she looked too fat to wear it). They talked about her subpoena in the Paula Jones case and her conversations with the president about it (she thought maybe the Jones people found her by tapping her phone). Bryant asked her if it would be hard for her if Clinton came to watch the trial while she testifieda far-fetched scenario that confused others in the room since it hardly seemed likely.

  Again, Lewinsky kept her cool: I think its not my preference. But she added, Look, I would do the right thing. I would tell the truth to keep my immunity.

  McCollum exclaimed, Politics be damned!

  Bryant moved into the job search and the hidden gifts. Echoing a line used by the White House lawyers, he told her, Youve given about ten different versions of the gift exchange.

  Lewinsky bristled. I dont think Ive given ten different versions.

  Well, he said, Currie had testified that Lewinsky called her, not the other way around. Cell phone records showed a call from Currie to Lewinsky at 3:32 P.M. on the day in question, even though Lewinsky had said Currie had come to collect the gifts at 2 P.M.

  How do you reconcile this with that? Bryant asked.

  Its not my job to reconcile, Lewinsky said sharply. She did not know why Currie said what she said. Im just telling you what I remember.

  Bryant liked those answers. Lewinsky showed spirit in denying that she had given multiple accounts; that would look good in testimony, he thought. And she stuck by her story on the gifts without vacillating, even though it contradicted the president. Overall, Bryant came away pleased with the session. He had walked in afraid she would be hostile, still in love with Clinton and reluctant to say anything that might harm him. To his surprise, Lewinsky appeared relaxed and not especially unfriendly to the managers. She did not trash the president but seemed reasonably open about what he had done. And she was playful at times. When McCollum asked about her relationship with the president, Lewinsky quipped, I dont want to put a wrinkle in your shirt. She even joked with the Starr prosecutor who in her mind had tormented her when she was first confronted at the Ritz Carlton near the Pentagon a year earlier, telling Emmick that we should stop meeting in hotel rooms like this. Bryant felt he had built a rapport.

  He could not have been more wrong. What he missed were the rolling eyes. Lewinsky did not bond with him. She and her lawyers were contemptuous. To them, he seemed to stumble through the give-and-take. They could not believe that he would compare his moment in the public eye downstairs to the klieg-light experience she had endured for t
he last twelve months. He did not seem to notice the derision when she told him near the end of their session, Lets keep this thing moving. Ask me what youve got to ask me. Im paying these lawyers umpteen thousand dollars an hour. Its coming out of my pocket. So lets get this over with. Even Hutchinson privately thought Bryant focused too much on essentially irrelevant how-did-that-make-you-feel questions rather than on a precise interrogation that would be useful to the prosecution.

  As the managers prepared to depart the Mayflower, they huddled briefly to figure out what to tell the press. McCollum suggested they should say it was a good meeting and that Lewinsky was intelligent and, quite frankly, attractive. The rest of the group was aghast and immediately vetoed that description. The safest course, they decided, was to say as little as possible lest they further inflame the senators already smoldering about the interview in the first place. They got another nudge toward brevity when they reached the elevator to go downstairs and the Capitol Police officers who had accompanied them stopped to give a warning. The officers were nervous because of the size of the crowd and told the House group they could not guarantee someone with a gun was not out there. If all of a sudden the officers had to push the managers into a car to speed away from a threat, they should not be surprised.

  The only shot they took came from Plato Cacheris, who had already beaten them to the cameras and pronounced the session old news. Nothing new had been said, he told reporters, and therefore there was no need to call witnesses. That was the opposite message the House team wanted to send. After departing, the managers caucused back at their House offices. Hutchinson jotted down his assessment of the witness: Shes impressive, confident. Great witness, intelligentknows the record. But later that night, he got a telephone call from Lindsey Graham. They had lost ground on the fight for witnesses, Graham believed. The Monica Media Frenzy had turned off the moderate Republicans who wanted to avoid exactly that sort of circus in the halls of the Senate. They were going backward, not forward.

  ***

  Troubled by the television images from the Mayflower, both Senate Republicans and Democrats met separately the next morning, Monday, January 25, to try to figure out where to go from here. The senators were weary and pessimistic. None of the options looked good.

  At the Democratic caucus meeting, the senators were presented for the first time with the text of Byrds proposed motion to dismiss. Eyes widened and heads shook as Byrd read his hastily prepared draft. His preamble included several paragraphs that condemned Clintons behavior so harshly that by the time he moved on to the resolved clause, it seemed more like a motion to convict the president. The only real rationale he gave in the proposed motion for dismissing the case was the recognition that there would not be sixty-seven votes for conviction. Byrds wording seemed to parallel the articles of impeachment themselves, the language so damning that his fellow Democrats immediately protested.

  A lot of us cant go along with this because we dont agree with this, Tom Harkin told him. Many of the things Byrd considered established fact had not been proven, Harkin argued.

  How can you vote for that and then vote to acquit? asked Senator Pat Leahy. With all due respect, Bob, I know youre our historian, but Ive done as much work as anybody and more than most, and theres no way Im going to say hes guilty and then vote to dismiss. Im not going to explain that to the Senate, and Im not going to explain that to the people of Vermont.

  Im not comfortable with saying were dismissing because there arent enough votes, said Senator Chris Dodd.

  The senators began proposing amendmentsthey could cut this section or reword that one to say something softer or add a different phrase. Time was running short; the motion had to be submitted in writing when the trial resumed that day at 1 P.M. But Daschle sat back and listened, letting the situation play out and a consensus develop on its own.

  Finally, around 12:15 P.M., with just forty-five minutes before the senators were due back on the floor, Byrd stood up and surrendered: Lets take it all out. The motion would be stripped down to the bare essentials with no garnishing: The Senator from West Virginia, Mr. Byrd, moves that the impeachment proceedings against William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, be, and the same are, duly dismissed.

  The other senators called out their approval as applause broke out.

  Over in the Mansfield Room of the Capitol, the Republicans were struggling as well, trying to figure out where they stood on the dicey question of witnesses. Lott informed his colleagues that Daschle had offered to drop the motion to dismiss altogether if the Republicans agreed to call no witnesses. The trial would move immediately to closing arguments and final up-or-down votes on the articles of impeachment. The Republicans were torn on how to respond. It did not sound bad to some of them. But to others, it was another cop-out.

  Weve got to get this over with, said Senator Mitch McConnell.

  Senator Slade Gorton suggested trying to figure out where the conference stood on witnesses first. We have to know if people are not going to vote for witnesses. If not, we might as well take Daschles offer.

  Senator Jeff Sessions of Alabama said they should stick to procedures, call a small number of witnesses, and well have done our duty.

  The discussion turned to alternative ways of ending the trial. The findings of fact idea mentioned on the floor by manager Steve Buyer on Saturday had been floating around Senate Republican circles as well, embraced by Susan Collins and a few others, including the respected Senator Pete Domenici. The concept had some appealin effect, they could declare Clinton guilty of the allegations on a simple majority vote before the conclusion of the trial, even though presumably they would not muster the two-thirds necessary to remove him from office on the final votes on the articles of impeachment. Buyer had distributed a law professors memo explaining the concept to a dozen GOP senators. Domenici rose to tell his fellow senators about the proposal and urge them to think about it.

  The imperative of the moment was not to let Clinton portray an acquittal as vindication. We have to avoid the big Rose Garden party, said Senator Fred Thompson. Senator Orrin Hatch pitched another idea: adjourn the trial with findings of fact but without taking any final votes on guilt or innocence. We cant just acquit him, agreed Senator John Chafee of Rhode Island.

  Some of the supporters of the House team came to its defense. They were not being fair to the managers, they argued. Besides, they had their own political standing to worry about. We must have a vote on witnesses, said Phil Gramm.

  Senator Pat Roberts, the sharp-tongued Kansan, offered a colorful summary of where the fifty-five Republican senators stood. Were like fifty-five frogs in a milk can, he said, adding, I want to be able to explain to my grandchildren how we came to the vote in which we slipped into the minority.

  At 11:30 A.M., the House managers met in the Judiciary Committee conference room to haggle over the witness question again. Lindsey Graham had been one of the most interested in calling so-called pattern-and-practice witnessesthe other women who would show how Clintons actions with Lewinsky mirrored their own experiences with himbut he was beginning to retreat. Under the present circumstances, he told fellow managers, it was probably best not to call Kathleen Willey. Steve Buyer, who had invited other House members to look at the Juanita Broaddrick evidence in the secret vault during the impeachment debate in December, suggested that Willeys story could still be used by putting it into the record through other evidence, such as her FBI interviews or grand jury testimony. Bob Barr disagreed. He thought they should call Willey. She would make a powerful witness. She had shown through her 60 Minutes appearance that she presented herself well, that she came across as credible. And because of that experience, she had been through the ordeal of public discussion of her case.

  By this point, though, even some of the other hard-liners had decided against Willey, including Rogan, McCollum, and Charles Canady. But Rogan and Chris Cannon were still itching to challenge the restrictions imposed by the Senate. The managers, they
argued, should call for fourteen witnesses and exercise the prerogatives of the House. The Senate might run the trial, but they could not tell the House how to put on their case. The other managers, while sympathetic to the argument, knew by now that such a show of defiance was pointless.

  On the Senate floor, the frogs were still trying to get out of the milk can. The days session started at 1:04 P.M., but Lott immediately recessed for an hour while he tried to broker a procedural deal with Tom Daschle. When the senators returned at 2:06 P.M., confusion reigned while they searched for some order. Finally the trial resumed with arguments on Byrds motion to dismiss. To dismiss the case would be unprecedented from a historical standpoint, because it has never been done before, Hutchinson told the Senate. It would be damaging to the Constitution, because the Senate would fail to try the case. It would be harmful to the body politic, because there is no resolution of the issues of the case. But most importantly, it would show willful blindness to the evidentiary record that has thus far been presented.

  Nicole Seligman handled the White House side. She had originally thought one of the senators would present the main arguments in favor of the motion, since they were the ones introducing it, only to find out later that she would carry the entire burden. As she finished preparing her remarks shortly before four that morning, Seligman discovered she was losing her voice. Rather than go to bed and nurse her throat, however, she ran through the speech at home to make sure she would finish within the one-hour limit; she had nightmares about being cut off by Rehnquist. She started at 4:17 A.M. and finished at 5:12 A.M. Just right.