Gods and Monsters: The Scientific Method Applied to the Human Condition - Book II
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Chapter 29:
Historiography and analysis of the history of structural reality historic
The same historians “idealists” acknowledge the substantial estrangement of the individual from the causes which determine his actions, actions which, therefore, they are accomplished in contrast to its own essence (1) or nature. This is valid, also, for the action of politicians and statesmen. The human condition, in structural reality statual, can be likened to a group of passengers who are on a train, traveling without driver and without that passengers are aware of traveling on a circular track closed, making laps on laps, apparently indefinitely, or better, in without limits way. The capitalist systems constitute an extension of the circle formed by the track on which the train is moving (with respect to the slavers systems), which, however, does not lose its characteristic of a closed circle. You must make the passengers aware of their condition, so that they may seek to stop the unnecessary travel of the train or prepare to get off before the train derailing.
John BrianTaylor spoke of mythology, indifferently for the statual “Age” as for the “Ages” pre-statual. In reality: if in the universes pre-statual are created myths, with purpose of the religious mold, in the structural universe statual you create mythologies that, as well as carrying out a function cultural-religious, constitute the surrogate of knowledge of history, in coherence with the essence of the feudal phases.
Federico Chabod stated that, with what we call the feudal phase, the story is transformed in mythology, connected to reasons theological and of political (2). He stated that in the “modern age”, the history tends to become the queen of sciences (structural). This would have the possibility to occur, if the metaphysical prejudice fades, with proper historical analysis (3). By analysing the evolution of historical studies, in history, Chabod had referred to the fact that the historical methodology can go ahead with the gradual acquisition of the criticism of the sources and with the passage from political history the “history of civilization” (4), passage, this, that is happened, according to him, with the consolidation and the generalization, of the social system that we call the bourgeois system, namely in the XVI and XVII centuries.
William James criticized what he called the “vicious intellectualism”, founded by Socrates and Plato, according to which the real essence of one thing: it is given by its definition (5). He affirmed, rightly, that this “methodology intellectualistic” is the bearer of ideologization of the structural sciences (6). James stated that originality must, necessarily, be accompanied by the lucidity and by the “mastery of all, the classic, stylistic apparatus” (7). He had quoted Henri-Louis Bergson: as an example to follow. He had distinguished, anyway, between “theoretical knowledge or scientifical” and knowledge “speculative and philosophical, as a fundamental distinction (8). He thought that the most important thing for the human being is the investigation of human nature and of structural reality historic, although he had recognized that the latter had not yet on a scientific level. James defined: ideas true, those whose consequent action is consistent with its effects expected, namely, with the stated purposes of the theory (9). James defined as a criterion of truth, the moral satisfaction or utility, by proposing, in an indirect way, the overcoming the structural logic, when defined as useful: what exalts the human intellect (10). He recognized the relationship of perception with the formation of Thought (11), according to which the greater the perception, greater is the Thought product and vice versa. The character of the “jamesian psychology” consists in considering the psychological phenomenas: “intermediate between the impressions received from the environment and the adaptations of organisms to the same environment” (12). The empiricism of James constituted a sufficient adaptation “of the organism to the many needs of the situation in which he finds himself to live” (13), as well as being a means of knowledge to discover the real essence of every faith or ideology (14), although he considered, rightly, all this: insufficient to “remedying to the conflict between the doctrine of the nature and our individual destiny” (15). To rectify this conflict there is the need: of theories adapted to analyze thoroughly the structural reality historical and its influence on human nature, as well as the existence of the potentiality of the same human nature, sufficient to realize concretely the emancipation from this reality. Even Carl Gustav Hempel stated that we must arrive to achieve the science of history, capable of explaining the historical events, with the ability to make forecasting of the same, in relation to the conditions antecedents or concurrent (16).
The historic Ewart Oakeshott stated that if the historical research it was on their way to becoming truly scientific, you would have the generation of the “complete destruction of history” (17). He, for destruction of history, was intended to, evidently, the destruction of the structural reality, and in particular of the universe structural statual, which is the object of historiography.
W. H. Dray had stated that, where the historiography adopts a scientific method, the object of this science, being different from the nature, you can not to apply to it the same method that it uses to study the human nature or the nature in general (18). He, however, stated that: the laws of historical explanation, as occurs for the natural sciences, they should be derived from the same historical science, and from the social sciences (19). However, the claim of the “functionalism” of codnsider the historiographical methodology as a fact at itself, is illogical, since the same conception “functionalist” (20) does not differ from the good methodology suitable for each science, be it natural that structural (21). It should search, in any case, the general laws valid for the structural reality, in order to be able to consider the history in the same way as any object of science, where the individual events are not sought for other purposes than for the examples of laws and theories, rather than as phenomena unique and unrepeatable, as they do, instead currently, the generality of historians, including the “positivists” (22), the which latter, simply consider as examples, the general appearance of certain phenomena or morphological elements (such as: the revolutions and wars, executions and so forth).
Robert Nisbet, as already Comte (23), had connect the systematic exposition of the ideas-base, or basic categories (24), at to the historic exposure (25), placing the ideas-base in their historical context. Nisbet recognized the possibility to divide the ideal systems in their ideas-base, or “fundamental categories” (26). Nisbet had identified, especially, in these latter the validity of the system concept. The inferential methodology Galileian-newtonian was considered valid by Popper, and consists in “give a causal explanation by deducting an assertion that describes it, using as a basis of the deduction, one or more laws universal, together with certain assertions singular said initial conditions” (27). On the basis of Popper, Antiseri had stated that the proof of the hypotheses takes place through the “forgery”, or experimentation, designed to refute hypotheses. The result of this process it will be possible to classify the theory as scientific law, in case of not confirmation of the falsehood of the hypothesis, taken as proof of its validity, at least provisional (28). In the absence of the possibility to adopt the principle of falsifying, for a given theory, this is certainly by consider non-scientific (29). Antiseri had defined: sciences “historical, in general, those whose interest is focused on specific facts and their explanation” (30). He proposed the use of the scientific method also for history. However, with Popper, he stated that we must still find a scientific methodology adequate for the Sciences “historical-social” (31). The debate between “secessionists” and not (of the historical methodology, from the sciences “theoretical”) leads to the conclusion that for the Sciences “social”, and for the history, in particular, there is no need for a methodology “sui generis”, since it is only a specific definition of the essence of the object of science, in relation both to the human being, and at the level of its evolution bio-psychic (32). The particular characteristic of the historical evolution does not lessen the possibility o
f his scientific analysis, through scientific laws (33) or extensible to all the field of the Social reality historical (whose extension must be scientifically determined) (34).
Antiseri stated that both in natural field, as in the structural field, you have cases of novelties “extrinsics” (namely, newness of combinations or provisions) (35), while you do not have, if not marginally, news “intrinsics” (with the uniqueness, in itself, of the phenomenon). He had noted as the unique character of a phenomenon is connected with the conditions contingents, that occur inevitably in every phenomenon, whether it be natural or structural (36).
If for the natural sciences you have managed to translate, almost all, the qualities in quantities, not so it happened in the social sciences, although here we make use of the statistic (something very different from the transformation of the qualities in quantities) (37). The lack of an appropriate method to transform the qualities in quantities demonstrates the failure to achieve of the scientificity of structural sciences.
Popper had recognized as the limit of the “social sciences” “must be exceeded” (38).
A symptom of a lack of scientificity, according to some epistemologists, is the methodology, used mainly in the “social sciences”, which is defined, method essentialist: direct survey of the cause for which happens a fact and which is its essence, in comparison to the method of the analysis of as it happens the action, also said the method nominalist (namely, at maximum, the research of the as) (39). The epistemologists ignore, however, the actual difference between the methodology essentialist and the analysis of as it happens the action (proposing the achievement of the knowledge of the essence, through the knowledge of the way of the occurrence of the phenomena). Also the “positivists”, as Popper, they argue that the social sciences use, in reality, nominalists models, although abstract (also, given the abstractiveness of the structural reality) (40). Dario Antiseri had defined historicism, as: a concept, according to which it is possible to identify the laws of historical evolution, in order to predict the subsequent developments. He despised the “holism”, namely, the claim to know totally a given event or historical fact (41). Antiseri had defined the inductive method as the method, according to which, you is legitimated at to go from specific observations of phenomena limited to general theories (42). Karl Popper, even if he had opposed at the inductive method, used by the “social scientists”, he had accepted its the “method eliminatory” (even describing it in another way) and refused the “induction for enumeration or repetitive”, even if (Antiseri stated), in reality, it was use, speaking however, of verification or falsification of principle (43). Popper, like other epistemologists, stressed that the principle of verification, as was formulated by the Vienna Circle, was nonscientific, since science progresses, even without verification (species when eliminatory, momentarily, there can be no verification) (44). Antiseri stated that Popper refused the inductive method, as well as used by “social scientists”, since does not provides a “criterion of demarcation”, appropriate, between metaphysics and empirical science (45). In fact, stated Antiseri, such demarcation is not supplied by the induction, in so far as, if the demarcation is there, is not empirical character, as instead say the “positivists” and the “neo-positivists” (46), which had based their scientific conception on empirical verification (namely, with a method, defined unscientific). Popper had adopted, essentially, the deductive method, the which last, derives the “universal assertions” (namely, the scientific theories, falsifiable, however, on the basis of observations singular) from the laws of nature (or axioms, but also from theories, from conception or from intuitions) (47). The deductive method is valid, but can and must, be used in conjunction with the inductive method (48). Popper had stated that in the human being there are innate needs and that from these, and not from the observation of reality, is appropriate to take start, for the human sciences (49). This is the base of the deductive method of Popper. Antiseri, while recognizing the value of such a method, had recognized the its dangers, being possible to fall in the nativism. Antiseri stated that the conjectures on human nature and the observations of reality have (among them) a ratio very precise, but remain two distinct fields and should adopt different methodologies. Furthermore, the analysis on human nature and on structural reality, proceed from intuitions or “hypothesis”, but these are not born from nothing, but only by a cognitive basis (50) already existing. Therefore, the inductive method and the one deductive: are interconnected and inseparable. Popper stated that the most important aspect of scientific theories consists in the denial of certain capability through the creation of the theoretical of the absurd (51) and through the absurd, for opposition, you create the plausible theories. Antiseri criticized the of Popper, conception according to which science cannot investigate the absolute (52), because we should not seek the essence last of things (53). Antiseri stated that this position (namely, the search of the essence ultimate of things) is unscientific, with the following excuse: no subject is outside the scope of science, for the definition of science itself, although science is always evolving and perfectible (54) (It must, however, consider that the last essence of things can not be refractory to the application of the scientific method, for the own analysis). Popper had stated that to the concept of certainty, in the scientific field, should be replaced that of progress (55), and the evidence should only be considered as “corroborations” (56) (and the corroborations, considered only as miss of falsifications). The scientific methodology, advocated by Popper, was to proceed by trial and error, researching the falsification, as pursuit of the strengthening, or corroboration, of the hypothesis not falsified (57). There was the fear of Popper that ideologies philosophical are able to block scientific progress, while he had hoped that the philosophy of science, or the epistemology, reaches the level of science. Popper had defined the revolutionary concepts such as “holistic” (58). The conceptions “holistic”, are able to distinguish between aspects, or attributes, of a part of reality (in particular relations existing between the various parts) and the aspects that confer to the whole: the typology of organised structure (59). The “holism” proposes the use of the historical method to treat the (60), namely proposes the study, for example, of the various social systems, having in mind the unitary structural essence of the universe structural statual. Popper warned the need to free themselves from the ideological impediments, to achieve genuine social sciences, where he claimed the need of the autonomy of the survey method, from the essence of the object analyzed (61).
Popper accused the sociologists of consider as dynamic: only those systems that, in their opinion, have changes in the structure, noting how in physics and astronomy you consider a system as dynamic, where it has a cyclic mutation, but devoid of structural change (62). The sociologists consider, instead, even, a structural mutation: what we consider the cyclical evolution, own of the universe structural statual, (which is certainly a dynamic system) which alternates two different phases (namely changes some of its characteristics, also relevant) while remaining structurally unique. Popper stated that the scientific laws, to be such, must have universal validity (63).
In reality, the scientific laws may have a general validity, which it is to be understood as internal validity to the specific field of investigation.
The historians turn up their nose with respect to the method of Arnold Joseph Toynbee of “impose” some models (64) for the comparative analysis of the various societies, feeling (they) that the various societies are incomparable. Toynbee justified its “deviations” from the commonly accepted method, saying that such “deviations” descend, also, from scientific concepts currents. This has meant that his method has been accepted, albeit partially and with reserve. Historians, analyzing the Toynbee method: namely, of demonstrate that the development of every “civilization” (unless of special circumstances) you comply with its generalizations or laws, for what was considered in itself irreproachable, is sharply criticized for each historical particular
, inaccurate reported by the same Toynbee (65). It is appreciated the modesty inherent in the declaration of Toynbee of: “attempt a scientific approach to human facts” (66), attempt appreciated, perhaps especially, because of the intrinsic contrast with its declared position anti deterministic, denier of every law historic (67).
Some historians criticize the scientific method to Henri Pirenne, believing that it is not totally scientific, since it fails to take account of the scientific need to base the theoretical systems or the thesis on a number of examples, exhaustively studied (68). The theses of Pirenne, extraneous to the historical customary accademic, have a certain credit at official historians, who recognize to it the mrit of reflecting on the future of the human species. The theses of Pirenne, substantially correct, have not sufficiently been rehearsed and conducted to their logical consequences. Official historians love to cling to this inadequacy for deny any its validity (69). Many historians use a “typological method” (70), namely that escapes at each system which “generalizes”, or “conceptualism” (71), emerging from the intuition and merely suggest hypothesis circumscribed and provisional, or “working”. This latter method is extraneous at Pirenne, which for this reason is attacked by the “academic culture”. Federico Chabod had stated, for example, that the “historical method” (namely: the general methodology of the historical research, adopted by the academic world) is not, in itself, objective, but need to adapt it according to the situations (72). He had the merit, however, of recognize that the history, like every other branch of human knowledge, will begin to become scientific, when will become autonomous (73), and is not subject to external purposes.
The “historicism” does not distinguish between scientific laws (of general validity) and the “general assertions o increasing sophistication” (74) or restricted generalizations, namely: applicable to certain situations or conditions provisional.
Dray stated that historians are not “objectives”, because the historical research involves “value judgments” (75). He wanted a situation in which the scale of the values of the historical is not involved “logically” (76), namely as the basis of evaluation and addictive the “meaning of his statements” (77). The realisation of a scientific methodology valid for the story, so indisputable or empirically verified, could eliminate the influence of value judgments or, anyway, their impact on the historical objectivity (78): the assessment of values in act in the object of the research should be guided by criteria unrelated to the values own of the structural reality underway (whether they are of a statual phase or of the other (79). Michael Fisch stated that the maximum of objectivity obtainable by the historians is a criticism, that is not in conflict with the evidence of the facts and is open to any further criticism (80).
The methodology of history, proposal from the “functionalism”, instead of researching the causes of events, search for the purpose of the actions and the functions that they play within the social system in act (defined: “Everything” or “integral system of culture”) (81). Antiseri noted as between the “teleology functionalist” and the causal research, there is anything else that a mere linguistic difference (82).
Antiseri divided the hierarchisation of causes in: fundamentals and derived (or primaries and secondary) (83).
The “historians official” attempt to analyze the way in which, who has lived the events: as they have imagined it to be their essence and their epilogue, namely, as they have perceived them. The theory of the “empathy” (or identification in the thought of others) (84) can, marginally, be useful to better analyze thoroughly the real essence of specific cultures, although it is unnecessary for understand the actual human condition and the actual evolution of historical reality.
The philosophers of history of the trend “positivist” say that the experiments in the field of social reality should be carried out with appropriate criteria, but also affirm the scientific nature of the possible experiments in this field, as far as the results should be evaluated in relation at the specific essence of social reality (85). In the field of social reality of structural type, the experiments are resolved in forcing the normal structural evolution. In the field of a possible social reality post-structural, the experimentation is equivalent, vice versa, at to the attempts to overcome the reality structural of history.
Popper stated that the experiments holistic, proposed by those which he had defined as Utopians, are only improperly experiments, namely only in the sense of “action whose outcome is uncertain” (86) since they do not give the possibility to compare the results achieved (this mainly because he recognized the nature of “reinforced dogmatism” [87] of the ideology that is at origin of the experiment that, for this, the experiment itself may not have characteristics of scientificity, in relation to the declared aims and at the authentic human needs).
With the “history pre-literal” the “historians official” they intend, the history, of which, there is not a knowledge, through story written. This highlights how the distinction is typical of an erroneous methodology, as completely alien to any subdivision in periods with specific structural characteristics, as our subdivision into structural universes (88).
Durkheim himself recognized as it was not scientifically correct to use the terms in current use, according to the meanings that they acquire with the use (89), for the lack of systematic and consistency of these attributions (90). Even Bloch had recognized as the terminology, currently in use, it is often misleading and erroneous, in that: offers analogies where there are no and vice versa (91). Boutruche had recognized, moreover, as: in addition to the knowledge gaps, the historians are located in front of in terminological confusion (92). He, had avoided, however, of examine at the bottom, the causes of all this.
Some historians recognize the absolute arbitrariness and conventionality of the term “Middle Ages” (93), which is, generally, temporally localized between the half of the V century and the end of XV.
Robert Boutruche, while recognizing explicitly as in the XI century was reborn the market (94), stated that the “feudalism” (namely, that which we call the feudal phase decentralized) has spread in the West, especially from the XI century (95). Boutruche he thought it was deplorable that in the Studies “on the Middle Ages” there is a distinction between common language and technical terms (96). This shows as historical studies are subject to criteria unscientific as well as submissive to the ideologies, at the prejudices and at the support of the needs of the structural reality. These are the reasons for the poor scientificity of analyzes and investigations of the professional historians, since they confuse the current terminology with the real structural reality and its essential modifications, resulting from the structural evolution, of which, however, they ignore the essence and logic.
Boutruche had recognized as the reality of the feudal societies is “victim of abstractions that place it outside of time and space” (97). Stated that historians define the character of this “lordship” with the term “feudal rule” (98), for indicate the all-encompssing power and totally inhuman, exerted on men and things, existing in the feudal phases. However, they use the same term to indicate the power exerted, in very different ways, in systems that are very different, or even to indicate any type of large landed property (99).
Heers had reported as historians fear, in choosing the terminology to be taken, of to fall victims of various ideologisms or cultural trends. This fear comes from the lack of real scientific criteria.
The “comparativism” may replace the global analysis, where allows to understand the diversities of social realities observed and analyzed, taking into account the fact that each community constitutes a model, almost complete, of a specific type of society.
Bloch proposed to compare similar facts, occurring in environments and dissimilar times (100), as methodology of comparative history. He proposed, then, the systematic comparison between two parallel societies, and nearby, geographically and temporally, and therefore that undergo an ascendancy at each other,
at least at the level possibilistic, the one to the other (101). This comparison, although limited, can allow scientific results, although it takes a vision far more high and wide of historical reality.
Lellia Cracco Ruggini, on the basis of the analysis of some historians (102), had equated society “Western” of the IV century CE to the “socialism real” of the XX century CE Lellia Cracco Ruggini (103). This, is able to demonstrate how many historians “moderns” they understand perfectly the real essence of the historical evolution, although they prefer to abstain from the analyze the same in a systematic way. Ruggini, however, identified some discrepancies between the “socialism of State” and the situation of the “Roman Empire of the West”, in the IV century. These discrepancies are in the decentralized nature of western society of the IV century and by the fact that you was in the presence of a society in transition to phase feudal and, in particular, the system feudal-bureaucratic, while in the twentieth century we are in the presence of systems feudal-bureaucratic centralized consolidated. The historians “academics”, in fact, they saw the presence of certain sectors of, they continue to exist in the IV century (104). Historians have noted a mixing of social stratification in western society of the IV century which, however, they neglect to investigate the cause. di cui, tuttavia, essi trascurano Bruno Rizzi had contended, with historians “official”, which do not have considered the system slaver-bureaucratic as part of that that we have defined the feudal phase, because it has no characteristics distinctly military. Rizzi, on the contrary, claimed the thesis according to which it would be produced what we called the feudal phase, although the “Patrons” have possessed some militia “privates”. In reality cannot be considered there was already a feudal phase consolidated, since there was still, the market, although limited, and therefore the materials ratios were not still predominantly of feudal type and, also, the priority value was not yet of type military, although the same characteristics of the hierarchical type-military were gradually incremented.
The proponents of the “Renaissance”, not have resurrected the idea of progress, since they have taken over the culture “ancient”, as a model and as a guide, since the ideal was identified in the restoration of the society “ancient”, considered the mirror of the true nature of the human being (105), in an optimism certainly excessive, but significant, of how they have understood correctly the historical moment that you were experiencing. Marx himself, had identified the term “feudalism” with that which we call the feudal phase, of which acknowledged there are “aspects different in relation with the circumstances of their historical development” (106). If the “historians classical” have illustrated, mainly, the regime, and identify the latter with the term “feudalism”, Marx had highlighted above all the material base. Many historians have used the term “feudalism” to indicate what we have defined the feudal phase, as: with the term “capitalism” have identified the mercantile phase (107) (at least that which it was emancipated from the slavers systems).
Historians recognize, generally, as the “manorial system” has been caused by that which they define: “commercial atony” of the "High Middle Age” (108). Also Comte had considered the feudalism a “transitional evolution”, namely an interlude between the mercantile phase “ancient”, that is, between the “evolution ancient and modern evolution”. He was, therefore, aware of the fact that the mercantile phase “ancient” was analogous to the statual phase who was contemporary to him, while what is called the “medieval feudalism” represented a rupture element, or alternative, between a given statual phase and the other of the same type, but of statual.
Durkheim had distinguished, speaking of “socialism”, among many “socialist systems” and the “socialism” as such, speaking, for the latter, of “system in general” and of specific types of systems: “socialist” (109), for the firsts. He identified the variant between the different “socialist systems”, inside the degree of centralization, from decentralisation to the complete centralization (110).
Pero Ostellino had reported as the concept according to which, with the so-called “Revolution of October”, in reality, it occurred a historical retrogression, there was widespread among the Russian intellectuals anti-conformists of the seventies of the twentieth century (111). This fact shows how the exact understanding of the structural reality, and of its real historical dynamic, is not far, and is only prevented from mental slavery imposed by the dominant ideologies, especially if of type dogmatic.
Some historians recognize as the current historiography is not scientific. They recognize how it can become scientifically valid, by applying to it the scientific method, basing the his analyzes on criteria and concepts: falsifiable. The purpose of the search historiographical will be considered compliant to science, if it meets criteria or scientific methods, consistent with the purpose of human progress (112). Witold Kula had quoted Ossowski, to which last, noted as “the schematics of the dichotomous class structure lend themselves in a more usefully to serve as ideological weapon in the fight against the existing structure, while the hierarchical patterns or functional are most useful for his defense" (113). It should be noted how the fight against structural reality existing in a given historical moment (social systems or phases statual in act) may be aimed at the creation of articulations of the structures statual, not less hierarchical and dichotomous and, therefore, as had noted Kula, the searches on “Social Structure” represent a field “where the ideological passions you ... [concretized] more vividly" (114). A scientific analysis of the “social structure”, without having to choose between the “dichotomous scheme” and what of type “hierarchical”, you can easily see the impossibility of denying and the constant presence of the stratification hierarchical (in the two types of phases statual) and organic, and the consequent breakdown of the “social body” in two sections complementary organically: the section of the dominators and that of dominated.
Part VII:
Knowledge and conscience