Day of the Rangers: The Battle of Mogadishu 25 Years On

by Leigh Neville

Eventually the ropes get thrown and the pilot says, “I’m putting you in here, but you’re about three blocks short of your insertion point so when you get on the ground, go three blocks in the direction of flight and you’ll be in the right spot. There was some discussion about “Can we continue to move even with the ropes physically outside the aircraft?” which clearly is a safety hazard. I think it was just bad luck.

  The pilot’s focused on avoiding the brownout, the crew chiefs are looking for an enemy threat, the Rangers are looking at the crew chiefs, and it’s, “The ropes are tossed and now we’re stuck where we are.” My assumption would be that the crew chief told us to do it [throw the ropes] but I don’t remember. I didn’t think it was a bad deal. On the first mission on helicopters, we were inserted in the wrong spot [too] and my chalk went into the wrong spot. It’s combat, it happens.

  Warned to expect a long fast-rope of some 40 feet, the reality was even worse. “We knew it was going to be about a 40-foot fast rope, after the fact I was told it was closer to 60 feet. That’s a long way down,” said Eversmann.

  The enemy gunfire was already increasing as the assault helicopters lifted out. Co-pilot Captain Jim Yacone in Super 62 said: “We started receiving enemy fire almost immediately after the insertion. We had no idea we would receive that volume of fire.”16 “The Somalis came to the sound of the gunfire. They kind of got used to our tactics so they knew to just wait until the helicopters leave and then they can converge on whoever they dropped in,” agreed Maier.

  After depositing their Rangers, the Black Hawks flew to the north of the city to establish a holding pattern. Gerry Izzo explained the plan:

  There was a road called 21 October Road, south of that was the city and north of that was desert. We were in a racetrack pattern north of the city and it was wide open country so nobody was going to sneak up on us. We were holding there, out of the gunships’ way, out of the P-3’s way, we were keeping ourselves deconflicted, a mile, maybe a mile and a half away. We were a backup contingency, maybe if a truck gets ambushed on the way back and shot up, maybe we can land at an intersection and pick guys up, that kind of thing. Plan was to stay flexible and be ready for anything.

  The MH-6s flew instead directly to Sword Base where they waited, rotors spinning, should an emergency extraction or MEDEVAC be required.

  On the ground at the objective, Delta already had their prisoners secured. “We started clearing and it was over with within a minute,” said Norm Hooten. In fact the Delta assaulters had captured 24 Somalis including their two primary targets from Aideed’s clan, Omar Salad and Abdi Hasan Awale. The Ground Force Commander, Captain Scott Miller, radioed Gary Harrell in the C2 Black Hawk: “Hey, boss, I think we’ve got the guys you sent us in for.” Hooten’s F-Team then moved to the rooftop to join E-Team in providing overwatch security for the loading of the prisoners.

  1550 HOURS: SUPER 61 REPORTS FRIENDLIES ON ROOF OF TARGET BUILDING.

  Paul H, the E-Team leader, had led his men straight up to the roof only to be fired upon by at least one AK47-armed Somali gunman from an adjacent rooftop. As two of his operators returned fire, the team leader warned his men to avoid exposing their profile to other rooftops and potentially other enemy. Unfortunately a Ranger M60 gun team, most likely from Chalk 2, mistook them for hostiles and opened fire.

  “When F-Team made it to the rooftop, the members of E-Team were already there. They were taking cover behind the raised wall on the roof in an effort to protect themselves from fires from one of the Ranger blocking positions,” said Kurt Smith. Paul H contacted the Assault Force Commander and requested Miller to contact Captain Steele and order all Ranger callsigns to cease fire on the target building. “That happened before I got to the roof but I remember [one of the operators] telling me to keep my head down as one of the blocking positions was firing up at the roof,” recalled Norm Hooten with F-Team.

  Staff Sergeant Jeff Bray, the only one of the Combat Controllers directly attached to the Delta assault element, provided security outside the objective whilst the operators “policed up” (a term meaning to secure and organize) their prisoners. As the amount of incoming fire increased, Bray, using his callsign Kilo 64 Charlie, called in an AH-6 to provide overhead cover at the target house. He was also one of the first to fire his weapon when a Somali charged at him, firing his AK47 from the hip. Bray swiftly shot and killed the man.

  1545 HOURS: GROUND REACTION FORCE AT PREPLANNED HOLD POINT.

  Whilst Delta secured the objective, Colonel McKnight’s GRF was waiting around the corner in an alleyway just south of the Olympic Hotel. It had taken less than 10 minutes to drive from the hangar to the Olympic. “I roll in as the operation initiates and I lead the Humvees into the target building. I make a turn one block too early, everybody else peeled off and goes straight to the target building and it takes me about 30 seconds to catch up,” recalled Jeff Struecker in the lead Humvee.

  The GRF had experienced light small-arms fire and already taken a casualty as they headed northeast toward the K-4 Traffic Circle. Delta operator “Griz” Martin administered first aid to SEAL Chief John G, known as “Little Big Man” to the SEALs, who had suffered a minor but painful wound when an AK round shattered the Randall combat knife he carried at his waist. The SEAL hoped that the manufacturer would be keen on a product endorsement upon his return to the States, but reportedly Randall showed no interest.17

  1553 HOURS: RPG/SMALL-ARMS FIRES REPORTED 1 BLOCK EAST NEXT TO GREEN WATER TANK; GROUND REACTION FORCE MOVES TO EFFECT LINK-UP.

  Once they arrived in the area of the objective, the convoy pulled up to await the order to drive forward and load the prisoners from the target building. Struecker reported: “We staged about a block away from the target building waiting for the all clear to roll up and put the bad guys on [the trucks].” Unbeknown to the assaulters and the waiting GRF, the Rangers had suffered their first casualty.

  “Everything changed for Chalk 4 after take-off. We were short of our location by at least 100 meters. We had to insert there due to the brownout conditions, the resulting concern regarding collisions with other aircraft, and incoming enemy fire. The pilot told me and I acknowledged it. It had happened before and we had a contingency worked for it,” said Matt Eversmann.

  The young sergeant had been the last out of the helicopter because of his position in the aircraft: “There’s the pilot and co-pilot up front and then the two crew chiefs who are also the doorgunners behind them and then there’s a seat in between and that’s where the chalk leader sat.” After his last man grabbed the rope and disappeared into the dust, Eversmann took his turn. When he landed on the ground, he was confronted by his worst fear:

  I got to the bottom of the rope and I saw this body of a Ranger lying on the ground and Rangers administering aid. By the time I got to the bottom [of the rope], I just assumed, “Holy Mackerel, this guy’s been shot,” and we’re in a firefight and I’m in charge and I haven’t even gotten here yet! I don’t believe we were taking fire right then but I do recall thinking he’d been shot because he was bleeding all over the place. I asked one of the guys working on him where he got shot and the answer was, “He didn’t get shot, he fell.” Like, how do you process that one? It’s the last thing that you would think from a casualty perspective. Someone’s just fallen 60-plus feet from an aircraft, but there we are.

  Each Ranger chalk carried a collapsible litter (stretcher) to enable them to move seriously wounded casualties. Unlike what may be portrayed in Hollywood, moving a critically wounded soldier typically requires four men and is exhausting over anything further than short distances. It is obviously exponentially more difficult under enemy fire.

  Marc Good, Chalk 4’s medic, was working to stabilize the injured soldier, Private First Class Todd Blackburn. “One of the Delta teams [likely E-Team] that preceded us onto the target had been inserted in the wrong spot so the initial aid administered to Todd Blackburn was Marcus Good and one of the Delta guys who were on their way to the target
,” said Eversmann.

  Each Delta troop had an assigned Direct Support Special Forces Medic along with the medics within each team. The Special Forces Medics were trained to an exceptionally high level, completing a minimum of 12 months of advanced medical training. Exceeding the capabilities of a civilian paramedic, the Special Forces Medics were even capable of conducting field surgery if required. Each carried a distinctive pack of medical supplies along with their weapons and other battlefield equipment.

  A second Delta medic assigned to the assault force, Sergeant First Class Bart B, immediately moved to assist fellow Delta medic Kurt S and Ranger medic Good in administering an intravenous drip to the fallen Ranger. Blackburn had “a closed head injury with a Glasgow Coma Score of approximately 6 [the Glasgow Coma Score is a method of evaluating the consciousness of a casualty who has likely suffered a traumatic brain injury – 5 is classed as ‘Severe’, the most dangerous category], a skull fracture, multiple rib fractures, fractures of the femur and humerus, and he had a retroperitoneal hematoma”18 although thankfully there was no immediate evidence of internal bleeding. Bart B later wrote: “Good, the Ranger medic, was trying to start an IV when I got there. I looked at Blackburn, and he was already starting to posture. Initial survey [examination] – he had an airway and was breathing, no gross bleeding, but he was in the middle of an intersection.”19

  Blackburn, lying in the middle of the road, was at significant risk from the increasing enemy small-arms fire. Bart B recounted his actions as he arrived on the scene;

  The Somalis were starting to move in, so we moved him out of the intersection and behind a vehicle. I told Good to put a C-collar on Blackburn and put in a J-tube, while I finished the IV. We waited for a vehicle, which never came. There was no choice but to move him to the vehicles, so I grabbed his vest under the upper back and tried to support his head/neck as well as possible on my forearms while we moved him.20

  The Rangers and the two Delta medics carried him gently off the street, taking care to “keep his neck straight.”

  Medic Kurt S was clear that the casualty needed immediate evacuation. Matt Eversmann and his RTO tried to raise Captain Steele or Lieutenant DiTomasso on the radio net to inform them of the casualty but neither of their radios were working properly. Eversmann remembered checking the radios was part of their standard operating procedure;

  The last thing we did we did before getting onto the aircraft with your radioman was a radio check. We knew that it worked when we left the airfield. By the time we got on the ground, [Specialist] Jason Moore, who was my radio operator, said, “I can’t get comms” and I’m like, “Well, that sucks” … It was a combination of the buildings, the helicopters … at this particular moment it wasn’t working.

  I’ve got a backup handheld and that’s really not working [either]. I remember eventually getting in touch with [Lieutenant] Larry Perino who was a platoon leader at one of the blocking positions with Captain Steele and I remember him telling me, “Hey, calm down” and I remember thinking, “Holy shit, what do you mean calm down – I’ve got a kid who’s about to die, we’re in the wrong spot, and now we’re taking fire – you know, maybe give me a little bit of help here!”

  Eventually what does happen is that my Fire Support [Staff] Sergeant Jeff McLaughlin – he’s got his own radio – and he’s able to transmit the predicament we’re in with the commander that we’ve got an immediate litter casualty and he needs evacuation.

  Eversmann told his men to carry Blackburn toward the target building on the litter. The folding litter was deployed and Ranger Sergeants Casey Joyce and Jeff McLaughlin carried the unconscious soldier away from the intersection, heading south on Hawlwadig: “They put that kid on the litter and off they go,” remembered Eversmann. The weight of incoming fire forced the two Rangers to stop to return fire a number of times as they made their way to the objective.

  Bart B dashed over to McKnight and Combat Controller Dan Schilling who were located outside the target building and updated them on Blackburn’s status. Schilling immediately passed on the details over the radio command net to Gary Harrell, above in the C2 Black Hawk. Harrell then passed the critical information on to Doctor John “Rob” Marsh back at the airfield so that he could prepare his field trauma team for the impending arrival of the casualty. Bart B continued:

  “When we got to the vehicles, I told … McKnight the serious condition Blackburn was in, and explained that we did not have the equipment or place to deal with such a casualty. The target area was still under our control at that time, so the decision was then made to evacuate him back to the airfield.”21

  1613 HOURS: MCKNIGHT REPORTS ONE CRITICAL WIA [FRIENDLY WOUNDED IN ACTION] WILL EVACUATE BY GROUND ASAP [AS SOON AS POSSIBLE]; HELOS WILL PROVIDE GUNS AS REQUIRED. GRF #1 AT BUILDING #1 FOR EXFIL.

  McKnight later wrote: “Based on the medical recommendation, I quickly decided to conduct a casualty evacuation of Blackburn. I radioed the Operations Center to inform them of what was about to take place; the response was roger and that an AH-6 Little Bird would provide air cover during the evacuation. This had to be a vehicular evacuation as the enemy fire was far too intense to bring a helicopter down into the streets.”22 Soon Struecker’s vehicle was summoned forward: “Immediately we’ve got a casualty – Todd Blackburn – and we’re tasked to take him back to the base and drop him off.”

  Tom DiTomasso recalled learning of the casualty:

  Specialist Coleman reported to me that he heard Chalk 4, Sergeant Eversmann, report a litter urgent casualty. At the same time, I noticed that I could not see Eversmann’s team from my position. This was a standard visual link-up that all the chalk leaders conducted to ensure that we had mutually supporting blocking positions. Eversmann reported that due to obstacles he inserted 100 meters short of his planned position.

  When Blackburn fell, I moved four of my men north so we could make visual contact with Eversmann. He and I waved to each other, they were evacuating Blackburn and everything was good to go. We took a casualty – we train for that and we expect it. We’re realists and we know there is a very good chance it could happen.

  Blackburn to this day remembers very little: “Sometimes bits and pieces come through, but that’s about all.” His memories end with the Black Hawk hovering over the intersection with the dust clouds obscuring the ground. The last thing he remembers is the sound of Somali small-arms fire.23 What exactly happened to cause the fall is still unknown. “Todd doesn’t even know. A lot of people think he might have got hit right when he was about to grab that rope [and it] bounced him off, maybe the bird leveled off and he missed the rope, maybe halfway something happened,” said Private First Class Anton Berendsen, an M203 grenadier in Eversmann’s Chalk 4.24

  Super 64 pilot Mike Durant remarks in his book that he feels that the pilot of Super 67 with Chalk 4 on board may have become disoriented by the brownout, noting, “this was his first encounter with the ‘brown monster’ … The dust cloud was more than a hundred feet high, and he [the pilot of Super 67] felt his way down into it like a wader tiptoeing into cold lake water. He deployed his ropes too early …”25

  He also notes that the pilot had been flying Super 63, the C2 platform, and had only recently taken over a spot in the assault lift formation. Mike Durant confirmed his belief to the author: “I was not on the aircraft obviously, so what I think happened is second-hand information, but I do believe the crew actions led to Todd’s mishap.” Gerry Izzo recounted that even the aircrew was unsure exactly what occurred: “At the time I couldn’t even see 67 [because of the brownout]. They were a block or two short. Nearest I ever heard from the crew was that Blackburn missed the rope.”

  Matt Eversmann is in perhaps the best position to comment definitively on the incident:

  What I recall as I took off my headset to put on my goggles, the strap that holds the goggles on broke so my goggles were worthless. I’m kneeling in the belly of the aircraft and as I’m putting on my helmet, because I couldn’t we
ar my helmet flying in because I had the headset on, I remember the helicopter keeling over a couple of degrees off of its horizontal axis. Enough that I remember putting my hand down to keep me from losing my balance. Eventually I grabbed the fast rope and started to slide down.

  Piecing it together afterwards that was about the time that Blackburn lost control [of the rope] when the helicopter keeled over and then righted itself. Could I say empirically that’s what did it? Well no, but I’m guessing that’s probably right where it happened. The thought was that as soon as the Ranger that preceded you, as soon as his head got below the deck [of the helicopter], the next guy would go. The next guy saw Blackburn grab the rope and go, he grabbed the rope, the helicopter tilted and boom.

  Chief Warrant Officer Jeff Niklaus was the pilot of Super 67 nicknamed “Texas Express.” He could not be reached for an interview for this book but explained in a 2013 video testimony that, although he could not see the other aircraft around him, he “knew where I was going. A few blocks north of the Olympic Hotel there was a white, two story building … with a little patio area with an antennae sitting there. That was my target.”26 He recounts that his crew chiefs told him to stop as the fast ropes had landed on power lines – the pilot was apparently unaware that the ropes had been dropped although Niklaus is somewhat unclear on this point.

  Whatever the ultimate cause, Chalk 4 were inserted at least 100 meters short of their blocking position and they immediately suffered a non-combat-related casualty after Blackburn fell approximately 70 feet to the road below. According to a later medical report, he would have been traveling at around 50 miles per hour when he hit the ground.

  Jeff Struecker was assigned the task of leading a three-Humvee convoy back to the airfield with Blackburn. He explained:

  Colonel McKnight rode in on the Humvees with me and didn’t know exactly where Blackburn was so told me to go up to Captain Steele’s position [on foot] and get exactly where Blackburn was from Captain Steele, which I did, and then send my Humvees back to get Blackburn, put Blackburn in a cargo Humvee in the middle and then put the rest of my squad in two Humvees right behind them.