Day of the Rangers: The Battle of Mogadishu 25 Years On

by Leigh Neville

  Mike Moser agreed: “We immediately saw the requirement for a rapid, armored troop ground delivery platform. Eventually we (the Unit) obtained a solution, but lining the vehicle walls with sandbags and cannibalizing the extra helo Kevlar plates was what we had at the time.”

  Hooten continued:

  We went in and started looking back and said, “We crashed birds in Iran, we crashed a bird in Grenada, we crashed a bird in Panama, we crashed birds in the Gulf War and we crashed birds in Somalia. Every time we do this we have to call someone else to get armor.” In Grenada, we had to call someone and get light-skinned vehicles to drive in and recover survivors. In Panama, we had to get Task Force Gator, which was a conventional mechanized infantry unit with M113s, to recover Delta Force operators on the ground. We didn’t have vehicles because we were just too cool for vehicles. In Somalia we called on the Malaysians and the Pakistanis. Every SWAT team in America has an armored vehicle and we’re the only guys who don’t!

  We still believed that we could fly around in a helicopter in a skateboard helmet and a black Faust vest and everybody’s going to lay down and give up because they know Delta Force is in town and that’s just not true. But there were guys in the Unit who really fought against it – “it’s too much trouble, we’re going to have to maintain these things, and they’ll take up a lot of training time.”

  There was another half of us that fought very strongly to get it [the capability]. Sanity won out and we got the Pandurs. General Shinseki, who was Chief of the Army, came to see us one day for a capabilities demonstration and he saw the vehicles and he was skeptical at first – “If you need armor, why don’t you have a Bradley?” He started to listen to why we had wheeled vehicles – they’re easier to transport by helicopter, you can put ‘em on transport planes, you can maintain them easier, you can train in them anywhere because they have rubber wheels that don’t do any damage to the roads and all the different reasons why we picked them. He put together this task force to basically develop an Army version of it and that version became the Stryker, the Stryker really originated out of Mogadishu.

  Delta did eventually decide it needed an integral light-armor capability, and a requirement for what later became known as the Armored Ground Mobility System or AGMS was issued in 1998. This resulted in the purchase two years later of a number of General Dynamics/Steyr Pandur six-wheeled armored personnel carriers. A SOCOM spokesperson was quoted at the time as saying: “Particularly, these vehicles will provide our small teams with a degree of force protection while they are operating independently from other friendly forces,”13 naturally without mentioning Delta as the receiving unit. The vehicle would be fitted with General Dynamics SURMAX flexible composite armor to protect against armor-piercing rounds.

  A number of years later, as the Iraqi insurgency was heating up, the British SAS also attempted to buy a number of Pandurs after noting Delta’s positive experience, but allegedly the manufacturer could not supply within the Regiment’s timelines, and instead a number of Australian Bushmasters were purchased and customized for their mission. Delta’s Pandur remains in service to this day and has been seen in action in Syria, even including one variant mounting a TOW II antitank guided-missile system for use against Islamic State suicide car bombs. “Simply by having that vehicle reduces the number of people who can kill you by a whole lot. Now they [Delta] don’t go anywhere without them,” concluded Hooten.

  After experimenting with a number of platforms including the German-made Wiesel, the Rangers too adopted an armored vehicle, although it was the bitter counterinsurgency fight in the streets of Iraq that finally prompted the move. Instead of the Pandur, the Ranger Regiment received 16 Stryker variants in 2005. The Stryker is an eight-wheeled infantry carrier vehicle capable of transporting an infantry squad and equipped with a remote weapons station mounting either the .50 cal. or the 40mm Mk47 automatic grenade launcher, the replacement for the venerable Mk19 that had served so well in Mogadishu. The Rangers also still use the Stryker and a number have been seen in Syria, all modified for their specialist role.

  HELICOPTER VULNERABILITY

  “They routinely flew in low circles above the ground force at about 500 feet – well below the burnout elevation of an RPG … It was almost as if they thought they could not be hit.”

  GENERAL THOMAS MONTGOMERY

  Much has also been made of the use of helicopters in a sprawling urban environment like Mogadishu, and in particular the employment of two low-flying Black Hawks as aerial sniping and surveillance platforms. Today, many of the veterans concede that the tactic perhaps displayed an overconfidence in their abilities. Many also argue that it showed a lack of appreciation for their enemy, particularly after the September 25 downing of the QRF helicopter, Courage 53.

  John Belman from the CSAR team recalled on the day: “I remember thinking the Black Hawks were flying low and slow. In retrospect that probably was a bad idea. Two of the three that went down were performing that role [sniping and aerial observation].” Norm Hooten was also wary of the tactic, commenting:

  To slow down to the speed that is necessary for a guy to take a single shot with a sniper rifle is really not the best use of a Black Hawk. If I’m going to be shooting from a helicopter I want to use something really effective like a rocket or a minigun, I don’t want to slow down and take a single shot. Not a good use of a helicopter, I could do the same thing putting me down on a roof and coming back and getting me later.

  The technique had found its genesis in Delta’s Aztec or counterterrorism mission where helicopter-borne snipers provided aerial overwatch for the assaulters as they broke into a hijacked aircraft, train, or bus. Indeed, Hooten noted that to use the tactic: “It would have to be in a very permissive environment where I had no risk to the aircraft.” Mike Moser also noted his uneasiness with the tactic: “From the very beginning, I, and I’m sure others, were concerned that our aerial platforms were quite vulnerable. Infil needed to be quick and accurate; keeping the sniping birds hovering made me nervous.”

  Karl Maier agreed: “Sooner or later, when you have a 22,000-pound aircraft flying around at 100 feet off the ground doing circles, you’re going to get nailed. And it’s daylight. It was definitely something the bad guys took advantage of.” Indeed, Marine General Anthony Zinni later all but confirmed this after speaking with Aideed himself:

  And so when they held a meeting, he put people on the roofs of the houses around the meeting place with the machine guns and rocket launchers, and they were to concentrate all their fire on the helicopters. He really believed if he shot a helicopter down, that would cause them to gather around the helicopters. They could fix them and pin them in one area.14

  MH-60s are still used today in the aerial sniper support role, although lessons have been learnt from the Somalia experience. Close-range, intimate sniper support in dense urban environments has become increasingly a capability delivered by the smaller, more agile MH-6. The raid on the al Qadisiyah research center, codenamed Objective Beaver, in western Iraq in March 2003 is a very useful comparison between the helicopter tactics used in Mogadishu 1993 and in Operation Iraqi Freedom a decade on and is worth examining in detail.

  At al Qadisiyah, in the same manner as the October 3 infiltration, two AH-6s led the armada and were tasked to overfly the target and ensure there was no imminent threat to the assault force. If air defenses, RPGs, or heavy machine guns were seen, the AH-6s would engage them and neutralize the threat before the lift package arrived. Just behind the AH-6s were a pair of MH-6s with SEAL Team 6 snipers perched on the people pods, one on each side of the aircraft.

  Next came the blocking force in four MH-60Ks carrying chalks from the 2nd Battalion of the Ranger Regiment. As in Mogadishu, the Rangers would establish four blocking positions around the objective, the Black Hawks landing to deposit their cargo rather than fast roping the troops in. Immediately behind the lift helos were a pair of DAPs or Direct Action Penetrators, the armed version of the MH-60 equipped
with a 30mm cannon, rockets, and miniguns. As we have seen earlier, DAP kits were taken to Mogadishu and the flight crews trained with them, but they were not employed on October 3.

  The DAPs were there to provide dedicated close air support along with the AH-6s and the snipers aboard the MH-6s. Two MH-47E Chinooks trailed behind the DAPs, each carrying a contingent of SEAL assaulters. Finally two further MH-47Es brought up the rear, one carrying the CSAR team and one carrying a Ranger Immediate Reaction Force (IRF).

  The Black Hawks of the lift package were the first to come under fire as they landed to insert their Rangers. The last Black Hawk received significant small-arms fire, critically wounding a Ranger; the bullet entered his back, missing the rear trauma plate of his body armor, passed through his chest and embedded itself in the front trauma plate. Once the MH-60Ks lifted out of the target location, they flew to a nearby desert runway previously secured by the Rangers and Air Force Special Tactics where a surgical team was standing by to treat casualties.

  Notably, unlike Mogadishu, here the MH-60Ks landed, engines running and rotors spinning, awaiting the call to return to the target location. As the MH-47Es landed at the target and the SEALs ran down the ramps, the second aircraft was peppered with small-arms fire and a Nightstalker crew chief was shot through the jaw. The Chinook flew the wounded man directly to the forward surgical team whilst his fellow aviators and a SEAL provided emergency first aid.

  Importantly for our discussion, at the target location the DAPs moved out of the immediate area and flew at altitude, engaging technicals that appeared to be intent on reinforcing the enemy on Objective Beaver. Only the Little Birds stayed aloft over the target, the AH-6s suppressing fire from buildings with their rockets and the SEAL snipers delivering precision fire from the bench seats of the MH-6s. Their agility, size, and relative speed improved their survivability over the much larger MH-60Ks.

  After the site was secured and the SEALs conducted their Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) looking for evidence of chemical or biological weapons, the assaulters were picked up by the CSAR and IRF Chinooks as the transport Chinooks that had initially inserted the operators had sustained too much battle damage to safely fly. The MH-60Ks returned to pick up the Rangers from the blocking positions, all under the watchful eyes of the Little Birds and DAPs. The mission lasted a scant 45 minutes from touchdown to extraction. Both the wounded Ranger and Nightstalker recovered.

  What can be gleaned from Objective Beaver and what lessons from Mogadishu have been applied to heliborne SOF assaults? Firstly, the presence of what are effectively two CSAR elements, a doubling of capability since Mogadishu – the Immediate Reaction Force could land to secure a crash site, recover wounded or dead personnel, cut off fleeing enemy, or reinforce ground forces. It has since become a staple of heliborne SOF missions.

  Secondly, the MH-60Ks were moved out of the danger zone as quickly as practicable and held at a secure location nearby until extraction was requested. They were not flying over the objective acting as tempting targets for RPGs. Thirdly, the job of close air support on the target location was given to the Little Birds. Even the larger DAPs orbited further out, and at a higher altitude, to reduce their exposure. The DAPs were available if required, but concentrated on securing the outer perimeter from enemy reinforcement. Aerial snipers were employed from the people pods of the MH-6s, not from the larger and slower Black Hawks.

  In their history of CSAR, authors George Galdorisi and Thomas Phillips argue that “survival at low altitude depended on staying very low and on immediate suppression of hostile ground fire by aggressive gunners. The MH-60s were low but not low enough, and not maneuverable enough, because of their size amongst the obstacles of city housing. Black Hawks are sixty-four feet in length, with a fifty-five foot rotor diameter … big birds.”15

  “Challenged to mask effectively because of their size, [the MH-60s] could not hang around in such an environment for too long, or they would eventually be hit by even unsophisticated enemy fire.” The authors proceed to emphasize that none of the Little Birds were shot down during the October 3 battle, arguing that the size and agility of the Little Bird platform was far better suited for urban special operations.16

  It is something that Karl Maier commented upon:

  I think in that city there were very few places for a Black Hawk to land so all of the infils we had to fast rope. I might be a little biased because I’m a Little Bird guy but there were way more places for us to land and it might’ve been a better idea to have all of us in Little Birds. We even talked about not using blocking positions, just going in with the assault force so we could get them out real quick and didn’t have a whole bunch of people on the ground. The Little Bird has a really small slice of the pie but that slice we have is the urban environment.

  The amount of RPGs available to the Habr Gidr was severely underestimated by Task Force Ranger in Mogadishu. Had the RPG threat been understood, changes to the plan to use two of the Black Hawks as sniper platforms would have been made. One report argued:

  TFR failed to develop a plan and execute an operation that protected its tactical decisive point – its helicopters. MH-60, the most vulnerable helicopter, was kept in orbit within Somali RPG range for forty minutes (1540–1620) after the initial assault … While the ground force was coming under sporadic fire, no crisis existed on the ground that required MH-60s to be used in the ground support role. AH-6s with miniguns or MH-6s with snipers could have been used instead if necessary. MH-6s and AH-6s are much smaller, faster, [and] more maneuverable, and would have been much more difficult for the Somalis to hit with RPGs.17

  To a man, veterans interviewed felt that the AH-6s had literally held the tide against the enemy during the October 3 mission, particularly around the first crash site. Tom DiTomasso summed up the feelings of many when he said: “The Little Birds saved our ass. They don’t have a lot of ammo on them, they just kept on flying and coming back. If they had not done that I don’t think we would have survived because we were running out of ammo.”

  COMBAT LEADERSHIP

  “In this dire circumstance that every infantryman wonders about, the men reacted in textbook fashion.”

  SERGEANT MATT EVERSMANN

  At Ranger squad and platoon level, small-unit leadership during the battle was exemplary. Many cite Lieutenant Tom DiTomasso as a perfect example of combat leadership. He made tough calls in a situation that had escalated beyond his control, particularly as a relatively inexperienced junior officer. Sergeant Matt Eversmann too, on his first day on the job as chalk leader, and his team leaders held their blocking position against murderous enemy onslaughts. Lieutenants Larry Moores and Larry Perino and Sergeant Jeff Struecker have also been noted in their adherence to the Ranger creed, repeatedly leading their often battle-weary and bloodied men back out into the city to rescue their comrades. There was no lack of bravery on display during the battle.

  Sergeant Eversmann commented on the quality of the individual Rangers under his command:

  Young Rangers were able to shoot, move and communicate under fire with little or no direction from me. I remember at one point of the battle doing a quick assessment of the perimeter and smiling as I watched the men aggressively engage the enemy from three directions. We had a debate with my platoon leader about SLA Marshall’s claim concerning how many men would actually pull the trigger under fire. We had 12 of 13 and I have to believe that if he could have, Ranger Blackburn would have done the same thing.

  Where some Rangers may have hesitated to engage targets, particularly in the vicinity of unarmed civilians, most of whom were certainly combatants, this is understandable considering their relative inexperience and the ambiguities in facing such an asymmetric enemy, let alone the shock of being involved in such a high-intensity urban battle. The vast majority of the Rangers had never heard a shot fired in anger. When Rangers hesitated, their team leaders and the Delta operators gave them guidance which to their credit they followed unfailingly.

>   Jeff Struecker agreed:

  The greatest compliment I can make to the young Rangers was that despite how terrified they were – and they were terrified – they loyally did whatever I as their leader asked them to do. When the bullets were hitting all around them, their eyes were on me: “What do you want me to do now, boss? I’m going to do exactly what you tell me to do next, otherwise we’re going to die.” They didn’t react to the enemy without first hearing from their leaders.

  Matt Eversmann explained:

  A big concern was the ROE, again a very real first [for the young Rangers]. It was very detailed and the situation was complicated by the fact that there were, for instance, some Somalis who were allowed to carry weapons (e.g. those working for the UN) and others that couldn’t. It took briefings from the staff Judge Advocate General and the commander to spell out everything so that every 19-year-old [Ranger] understood the ROE. “What can I do when the bullets are flying and x happens? Do I shoot or not?”18

  Much praise was reserved for Lieutenant DiTomasso. Karl Maier’s comments were representative of the high esteem in which he was held by the other members of the Task Force:

  He had to fight his way from the original objective to the crash site and had already gone through a little bit of hell to get there. At the time he was a pretty young lieutenant and I was pretty proud of him. I’ll tell you a story [about DiTomasso]: fast forward to Iraq, Baghdad in maybe 2006 or 2007 and I’ve walked into the TOC [Tactical Operations Center] and he’s there, and now he’s a Lieutenant Colonel, and he points at me, didn’t miss a beat and said “Oh look, there’s the guy who tried to kill me!” He’s a funny guy!

  The much-maligned Captain Steele, commander of the Rangers’ Bravo Company and a man who so divided opinion within the Task Force, took his own lessons from October 3. He appears to have believed that his Rangers were unprepared for the kill-or-be-kill environment they found themselves in on the streets of Mogadishu. According to a profile in The New Yorker, Jerry Boykin said: “Somalia left Mike Steele with a determination that he would never go into combat with soldiers that he was responsible for without making sure that they were fully prepared. I think he thought that it was problematic that some of the young soldiers were not expecting the impact of trauma, not prepared emotionally for the impact of seeing dead bodies.”19