Day of the Rangers: The Battle of Mogadishu 25 Years On

by Leigh Neville

  Hemorrhage-control tourniquets were indeed perhaps the key lesson from Task Force Ranger. The development of effective one-handed tourniquets, including a version produced by Delta medics, has led to a marked increase in survivability on the battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq. Tourniquets are even more important in these environments where IEDs routinely traumatically amputate soldiers’ limbs.

  A history of the development of the modern combat tourniquet noted:

  After the 1993 Somalia conflict (Operation Gothic Serpent), the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) held many after-action reviews in which tourniquets were a major lesson learned. These lessons anticipated many things seen later in Iraq and Afghanistan – the need for more tourniquets, forward transfusion, field antibiotics, and better pain control, as well as definition of associations between better armor and survival rates with junctional injuries.

  Soon, an SOF medical working group started developing tourniquet designs that were refined incrementally over the years; these three veteran SOF experts later made the first prototypes of the Combat Application Tourniquet. In 1997, US Navy SEALs and the 75th Ranger Regiment, an SOF unit, adopted Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) techniques including the use of tourniquets.36

  In the case of the Rangers, this was the Ranger Ratchet Tourniquet.

  Another innovation was the Combat-Ready Clamp, which might have saved Corporal Jamie Smith. The device works like a junctional tourniquet by applying direct pressure on the groin to manage femoral artery bleeds and is now standard issue in the trauma kits of field medics after being adopted in 2010. By 2012, an estimated 2000 service members’ lives had been saved by tourniquet and clamp use in Iraq and Afghanistan – an incredible achievement that can be directly related to the courageous Delta, Ranger, and Air Force medics who worked tirelessly to find better ways of saving lives after their experiences in the streets of Mogadishu.

  Aerial resupply was another area Moser explained was improved upon in light of the battering Super 66 took as it conducted its dangerous low-level resupply:

  We also saw a void with respect to airdropped resupply – shortly after our return some of the guys developed a friction device, similar to a Petzl D11, which was scaled for a fast rope. It could be used to limit the station time of a Black Hawk and safely deliver loads. We also developed a remote-control parachute delivery system using a ram-air canopy similar to our free-fall rigs.

  Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) technology was another innovation that saw its genesis in Mogadishu. During October 3, there were at least the Navy P-3 Orion and the OH-58 Kiowas providing full-motion video that was beamed back to the JOC. This gave Garrison and the headquarters team a unique and unparalleled view of the battlefield in real time, the first time in history that technology enabled such an event. From these humble beginnings, ISR technology has now advanced to a stage where armed unmanned aerial vehicles can loiter over a battlespace for hours, transmitting video feeds that can be viewed by squad leaders in real time by carrying a tablet-like receiver.

  Training for combat was revolutionized almost overnight by the experiences of October 3. An operator who was part of the assault force summed it up: “It had everything to do with training, and still does today. From shooting, mission planning, medical training … ” Norm Hooten added: “Train like you fight,” he said. “Don’t train like you think you’re going to fight. Don’t train like you want to fight. Do a real good analysis of the enemy, because he’s 50 percent of that equation, and then train like you will fight. Get used to being creative and adapting to the enemy’s actions.”

  The Rangers soon took this on board. The Rangers’ Regimental Training Guidance spelled out the change from a European-focused “wooden environment” to “our most probable combat situation [is] physically grueling, lethal operations encountered in a night, MOUT [military operations in urban terrain] environment.”37

  The Ranger Regiment also identified four principles that needed to be mastered by all Rangers: physical fitness, battle drills, medical training, and marksmanship. Physical fitness now focuses on foot marches with full equipment to improve endurance, combat-related physical training, and an extensive combatives (hand-to-hand combat) program based on Brazilian jujitsu. Every Ranger is now a combat lifesaver with an EMT (Emergency Medical Technician) trained soldier in every squad and a medic in every platoon.

  The Regiment realized after Mogadishu that standard Army qualification shoots did not prepare soldiers in any way for shooting in combat – a vastly different animal. Prior to this only the special mission units like Delta conducted any kind of advanced “stress-shoots” and close-quarter battle shooting. The Ranger Marksmanship program soon focused on four key areas: day qualification, night qualification, close quarters marksmanship (CQM), and combat or stress firing.

  The Ranger CQM sums up their objective succinctly: “Who shoots the fastest and most accurately lives.” The “stress-fire” component focuses on firing accurately whilst on the move in an urban environment, from all shooting positions including using the off-hand and firing around obstacles. Shooting techniques were also influenced by the lessons learned. One Ranger instructor explained to veteran SEAL and historian Dick Couch: “Shoot until the enemy goes down. The double tap (firing two shots) is not a guarantee. We train using controlled pairs in as many multiples as needed.”38

  Simunitions, plastic training ammunition that can be fired through modified versions of all standard small arms, was another innovation that progressed from Delta to the Rangers. It allowed so-called force-on-force training where soldiers assaulting an objective could engage live role-players acting as the enemy who were themselves equipped with Simunitions. Unlike live ammunition, it also allows training in a wider variety of locations due to the reduced risk of injury.

  Breaching also became a more widely disseminated skill within the Ranger Regiment. Each Ranger squad was issued a set of mechanical breaching tools, including the Halligan Tool (a pry-bar-style entry tool first developed by New York firefighters and now standard amongst infantry and SOF units) and an eight-pound sledgehammer.

  Each squad was additionally now issued a shortened 12-gauge Remington 870 shotgun with specialist Hatton ammunition designed to destroy door locks and hinges. The Regiment’s Master Breachers also developed a standard breaching charge known as a close-proximity charge that was designed to explosively breach most types of doors safely with a charge small enough to fit within a cargo pocket.

  The Rangers also identified a need for an “enclosed space, shoulder-fired AT/breaching weapon,” specifically from their experiences in Somalia. A lightweight rocket that could be employed from within a building to explosively breach into another or suppress an enemy firing point located in an adjacent building would have enabled Task Force Ranger far greater freedom of movement, particularly at the first crash site. This need was eventually realized in the CS (Confined Space) variant of the AT4 (M136) 84mm single-shot launcher. Delta were experimenting with a thermobaric variant a few years later. The key to the AT4 CS was its employment of a unique saltwater counter-mass that absorbed much of the backblast of launch, meaning Rangers could fire the AT4 CS from within structures relatively safely.

  Pistols began being issued to every Ranger: “I am a believer that every soldier should have a sidearm … being in the back of a Humvee with enemy surrounding you and having to pass a 9mm [M9 Beretta pistol] around to whoever has a shot because the unit is short on [9mm] ammunition is a bad, bad situation to be in,” noted Matt Eversmann. “You can only plan so deep, and you can only carry a finite amount of ammo. I shot 13 [M16] magazines, as did most. In a situation where you must shoot or die, it is a terrible feeling to know that you are out of ammo.”39

  Field first-aid training was also revolutionized. The effect of this training and the introduction of widespread use of the tourniquet has meant that not a single Ranger with treatable wounds has died from those wounds in Afghanistan. Then-Co
lonel Stanley McChrystal had ensured in 1998 that the Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) program became one of the four pillars of Ranger training.

  The Air Force also took away their own lessons from the battle. According to Gene Adcock’s history of Air Force Special Tactics including the Pararescueman Jumpers, after Mogadishu:

  Special Tactics recognized the need for a more effective system for extracting personnel from downed aircraft. The rapid extraction deployment system (REDS) kit is now standard issue and the search and rescue (SAR) Security Team reflects the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) learned from the Somali operation. Day and night urban close air support (CAS) tactics were reevaluated and modified to assure compatibility with current tactics. The most significant outcome was the shift in attitude among sister-service commanders. Special Tactics proved to be essential to the joint team effort.40

  SOMALIA

  “The African Union troops have been very effective, helped and trained by US Special Forces and others. They have attacked and thrown al-Shabaab out of most of their strongholds. They are on the run, but they are not out yet.”

  GENERAL JAMES MATTIS ON AL-SHABAAB

  In the wake of the United States’ and later United Nations’ departure from Somalia in 1994, the country descended even further into open warfare between the clans. Aideed pronounced himself the country’s de facto president in opposition to Ali Mahdi Muhammad, who had been recognized by the United Nations as the country’s leader. Aideed struggled against rival clans until his violent death in 1996, shot three times by gunmen loyal to his former colleague Osman Atto.

  In a bizarre twist, Aideed’s son, Hussein Mohamed Farrah Aideed, a naturalized US citizen, had served with the US Marine Corps in both Operation Desert Storm and with Restore Hope in Somalia. After leaving the service he returned to Somalia and was declared president by the SNA days after his father’s death. They also declared him the new leader of the Habr Gidr clan. He later became part of the United Nations-brokered Transitional Federal Government and still resides in Mogadishu.

  The nascent presence of jihadist elements hinted at in some of the Task Force Ranger intelligence reports eventually spawned a Salafist (an extreme form of Sunni jihadism) insurgency by an al-Qaeda-linked terrorist organization called the al-Itihad al-Islami (AIAI), who had begun in Ethiopia but soon spread to Kenya and Somalia. The AIAI provided support for the al-Qaeda bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 but, in the aftermath of September 11, many of the jihadists fled to Yemen. Those remaining in Somalia faced an incursion by the Ethiopian military, intent on destroying the organization. Some survived and established the Eritrean-backed Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and its militant wing, al-Shabaab.

  By the turn of the millennium, a fledgling federal government had been formed in Somalia and the Somali military was beginning to be re-formed to battle the ICU, which had grown into a major power and controlled much of the southern part of the country. It was also receiving operational funds from al-Qaeda associates. United States military SOF and CIA Special Activities Division personnel began covert operations in Somalia under Operation Black Hawk, seemingly chosen in memory of Task Force Ranger, often recruiting local clan members to conduct missions against al-Qaeda, who had infiltrated into the country.

  JSOC’s Task Force Orange, another name for the Intelligence Support Activity, monitored cellular traffic to assist in the targeting of al-Qaeda members by these locally recruited gunmen. Importantly, their targets were members of al-Qaeda’s East Africa cell, not the ICU and al-Shabaab. After prolonged fighting, the ICU actually managed to briefly seize power in June 2006, capturing Mogadishu. Ethiopia, alarmed at the prospect of a jihadist-controlled neighboring state, invaded Somalia at the end of the year. JSOC operators, including a number from Delta, were secretly embedded within Ethiopian ground forces and called upon two AC-130s based in Ethiopia to strike concentrations of al-Shabaab fighters.

  The Ethiopians managed to wrestle control of Mogadishu from the jihadists and, in late 2007, the United Nations-supported African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) began peacekeeping operations. Al-Shabaab was forced to retreat from the capital into both central and southern Somalia, where they still operate to this day. The US has continued to conduct operations into Somalia, carrying out both air strikes and kill/capture raids targeting al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda leaders.

  In 2017, the US military suffered its first casualty in Somalia since the events of October 3, 1993. Elements drawn from SEAL Team 6 were operating in a low-profile role within the country, conducting what is known as “Train, Advise and Assist” alongside Somali Army SOF. Whilst accompanying a local force on a raid against al-Shabaab in their base area of Bariire, a SEAL was killed and two of his colleagues severely wounded in a firefight. In August of 2017, Bariire fell to combined Somali and AMISOM forces, assisted by United States special operations forces on the ground. In Somalia, the war continues.

  FINAL THOUGHTS

  “The way I see it, we went into the tiger’s cage. We took his bone. And we came out.”

  THE LATE STAFF SERGEANT JEFF BRAY, 24TH SPECIAL TACTICS SQUADRON

  “The mission was a success in that we captured the two SNA lieutenants we were after that day. It came at great losses. The enemy got lucky that day,” said Tom DiTomasso. “They rallied the civilians to basically fight where they were at, and there was some command and control but it wasn’t organized enough that they could defeat us – think about what we had, maybe 30 guys at the [Super 61] crash site and they couldn’t overrun the crash site. We stayed until we decided to leave. I see many articles saying ‘the Rangers were pinned down in Mogadishu’ – that’s absolute bullshit – we left when we wanted to leave. We stayed there to get Cliff Wolcott out of the helicopter. As hard as it is to say, this was a tactical success. We were never overrun, we stayed there as along as we had to remove Cliff out of the helicopter and then we left and that’s that.” Matt Eversmann agreed: “I believe in my heart that it will always go down as a complete tactical victory and a dismal strategic failure.”

  DiTomasso continued:

  We released all the prisoners we had captured, we released them all. On October 2nd the mission was important enough to the United States to have Task Force Ranger there. On October 3rd, after 73 casualties and 18 men killed, all of a sudden it wasn’t that important any more and they pulled us all out. I disagree with this course of action.

  Colonel, now General, Boykin, the Delta Force commander noted in a statement to the House of Representatives: “These men battled against incredible odds to defend fallen comrades and did so without hesitation or reservation. Honor was preserved but at a price. Given the same dilemma again, it is a sure bet that every man would do the same thing.”41

  The fallen are remembered every day at their respective units, but never more so than on the anniversary of the battle when veterans gather for a day of remembrance. The 20th anniversary in 2013 included a visit to the Delta compound at Fort Bragg where operators made a presentation to the veterans highlighting all of the lifesaving tactical and technical advancements that were the result of the battle of Mogadishu.

  Task Force Ranger was the subject of a stunning exhibition at the Airborne & Special Operations Museum, which ran from 2014 to 2016 and which won the Society for History in the Federal Government’s John Wesley Powell Prize for “an outstanding contribution to furthering history.” Exhibits were donated by Task Force Ranger members and included Mike Durant’s Bible in which he made secret annotations detailing his capture and confinement by the Somalis, and the recovered main rotor assembly from Super 61.

  In 2013, two civilian companies working in Somalia managed to recover a number of significant items from the crashed Black Hawks. The US Army’s Special Operations Aviation Command assisted in the repatriation of the remains of the main rotor assembly and foot pedals from Super 61 and an M134 minigun from Super 64. A former Army intelligence officer, David Snelson, and his wife, former w
ar correspondent Alisha Ryu, were instrumental in recovering what could be salvaged from the Super 61 crash site. The couple run the Aran Guest House in Mogadishu along with a security service for visiting business people and journalists.

  Individuals have also been memorialized. There is for instance now an “SFC Earl Fillmore Army Health Clinic” and US Navy training ships named after Randy Shughart and Gary Gordon, along with a number of training facilities. Rick Lamb, Jeff Struecker, Craig Nixon, and Larry Moores would all be inducted into the Ranger Hall of Fame.

  Keni Thomas and Jeff Struecker returned to Mogadishu to film a short film, Return to Mogadishu: Remembering Black Hawk Down, in 2013, revisiting the K-4 Traffic Circle, Hawlwadig Road, the Olympic Hotel, and the target building. Struecker mentioned that even today he remembered those streets and could note battle damage caused on October 3.

  Tragically, the battle is still being fought for some veterans of Mogadishu. At least four of their number have taken their own lives and some still struggle with deep psychological wounds. Others carry the marks of the battle on their bodies. Many have hearing problems, whilst others have continuing serious health issues directly related to wounds suffered on October 3 and 4.

  Matt Eversmann explained:

  We realized that the reality of combat is that, no matter what, the best-trained soldiers are going to die at the hands of an inferior, poorly trained, poorly equipped enemy. That’s just a fact. Nothing replicates that in training, but you train people to a high standard, hold them accountable, and make sure they know what they’re supposed to do – that goes a long way.