Day of the Rangers: The Battle of Mogadishu 25 Years On

by Leigh Neville

  The snipers of 3 Troop employed both suppressed CAR15s and a range of customized 7.62x51mm M14s and M21s with competition-grade triggers. Other rifles including the M24 bolt-action sniper rifle were also available but were not employed on October 3. The Delta M14s used a Brookfield Precision Tool scope mount to attach an Aimpoint 5000 red dot optic. At least one, Randy Shughart’s weapon, was also fitted with the AIM-1D infrared laser. Sniper Jim Smith confirmed that there were no AR-10s or SR-25s used, only the M14s/M21s.

  As noted earlier, some of the Delta snipers carried both the M14/M21 and CAR15s in the helicopters. This gave them the choice of platform in case they were dropped off to provide sniper support from a nearby building. In that case, the operator could take the M14/M21 to provide extended range, while the CAR15 was used for sniping from the aircraft as it could be rapidly fired in volleys against ground targets.

  In contrast, most of the SEAL snipers carried modified CAR15s fitted with early ACOGs and longer 16-inch barrels. The ACOG or Advanced Combat Optical Gunsight was a fixed four-power magnification optic ideal for short- to medium-range precision shooting. One SEAL carried a modified M14. The SEALs also brought with them .300 Winchester Magnum bolt-action Remington 700s in McMillan aftermarket stocks and these were used whilst providing overwatch for at least one of the earlier missions. In terms of sidearms, each SEAL was issued the 9mm SIG-Sauer P226, the same pistol then in use with the British SAS and known for its accuracy.

  All operators carried hand grenades. Flashbangs were carried by some operators on the assault teams but they were mainly “kept on the aircraft for crowd dispersion,” according to Hooten. Instead he carried fragmentation grenades. Many of the operators and some of the Rangers used the Dutch V40 mini-grenade, a “mini-frag” that had been in use since the Vietnam War. The advantage of these grenades was their small size, enabling a considerable number to be carried, and their relatively small detonation radius, making them ideal for using within buildings.

  Stingball riot grenades were also used. When these detonated, they sprayed rubber pellets which, whilst non-lethal, were nonetheless painful. These were also carried on some of the helicopters for crowd control. Some of the breachers used AN-M14 thermite grenades for demolitions work or for denying immobilized vehicles or aircraft to the enemy, as they could burn through metal and armor. These were employed on the immobilized 5-ton truck at the objective and on the two Humvees abandoned at the K-4 Traffic Circle. They were also used by John M and his team at Super 64.

  Delta wore their own non-standard protective equipment. Instead of the Kevlar PASGT worn by the Rangers, nearly all of the operators chose the lightweight plastic ProTec hockey or skateboard helmet. Although offering zero ballistic protection, many operators felt that the principal risk facing them was hitting their heads when climbing through windows or otherwise operating in tight spaces.

  The ProTec helmets had debuted during Panama four years earlier. Some ProTec helmets were wrapped in tape to reduce their infrared signature, others were hand painted in desert colors. Most had an infrared strobe attached. The snipers chose to wear no helmets at all as it impeded their cheek-weld with their weapons. One operator did continue to wear the standard-issue PASGT helmet, nicknamed the “K-Pot,” a more ungainly and heavier helmet but one that afforded some degree of ballistic protection. At least one operator noted after the battle that he had made a very smart choice. Delta quickly adopted ballistic helmets soon after Mogadishu.

  The operators wore modified Desert Camouflage Uniforms with extra pockets sewn onto the upper sleeves. Glint tape was affixed to their upper sleeves and on their helmets. This allowed them to be seen and identified as friendly forces through night-vision devices. Most also wore lightweight knee pads. Their communications were via TASC-1 microphones running through Motorola radios. This allowed them to communicate within their teams, a luxury the Rangers did not have. As Hooten mentioned, Delta team leaders often carried two Motorolas – one set to the team frequency, the other to the Assault Force Commander’s frequency.

  There has been much confusion over the years about the black body armor worn by Delta. In Mogadishu they wore the NATO Special Forces model manufactured by TG Faust with custom-configured AWS chest rigs to carry magazines and grenades worn over the top of the vest. The operators had large colored US flag patches affixed on a Velcro strip on the chest portion of their body armor. “I’m pretty sure our body armor at the time was Faust. I know we used Faust for a long time. Paraclete were used later on,” confirmed Hooten.

  Although small arms were a weapon of absolute last resort for the aircrews of the 160th SOAR, they carried a range of personal defense weapons. Their primary weapon was the 9x19mm Heckler and Koch MP5K and MP5A3 submachine gun. The A3 model featured a collapsible stock whilst the ultra-compact K model had no stock but instead featured a vertical forward grip. Firing from a 30-round magazine, the MP5 was an accurate and dependable weapon, effective to perhaps 100 meters. The pilots also wore standard Army issue 9x19mm Beretta M9 pistols in thigh holsters.

  Pilot Mike Durant confirmed that he used an MP5K to help defend the Super 64 crash site. He also only carried one spare magazine with him. He noted a number of stoppages with the weapon, unusual for the normally reliable MP5, but admitted his weapon maintenance may not have been all it could have been. MH-6 pilot Karl Maier used his own MP5A3 to good effect, holding back the mobs at the Super 61 crash for a considerable period.

  The pilots liked the MP5 as they were easy to access in the cramped confines of a cockpit but recognized a longer-range weapon would be preferable should the unthinkable occur and they were forced to defend a crash site. The 9x19mm caliber was also considered ineffectual in comparison to the rifle-caliber carbines used by Delta and the SEALs. Indeed the 5.56x45mm Heckler and Koch HK53, a rifle-caliber version of the MP5, was tested as a possible replacement but was considered too heavy and unwieldy.

  Assault rifles were available; crew chiefs stored a pair of 5.56x45mm M16A2 rifles in the rear of the aircraft. As mentioned previously, the aircrews also had access to less-than-lethal grenades and dropped these into crowds as they tried to buy time for the ground convoy to reach the Super 64 crash site. After Mogadishu, the MP5 was replaced with the Colt carbine in 5.56mm which offered ammunition compatibility with their “customers.”

  As we have noted, the Little Birds carried SAWs in the rear cargo compartment for use by operators during the infiltration phase of the mission. Additionally, some Little Bird crews carried M16A2s and at least one AH-6 pilot was recorded using his M16A2 over the Super 64 crash site to engage targets on the ground, perhaps after running out of minigun ammunition.

  The 160th SOAR aircrews tended to wear tan flight suits or DCUs along with black American Body Armor A1-TAC-DSPO vests that featured both front and rear trauma plates and SPH-4 aviator helmets. Most wore modified SRU-21 survival vests with a belt rig. Some wore spare MP5 magazines in a thigh-mounted pouch, and indeed a drop holster for the MP5 was trialed but not deployed to Mogadishu.

  In closing, it was the individual marksmanship skills of the Rangers and Delta operators that kept them alive during the Day of the Rangers. Somali small-arms fire was heavy but inaccurate. Indeed, several veterans are astounded that they were not hit by the tremendous weight of fire directed toward them. October 3 once again proved that it was the training and ability of the shooter to quickly place accurate fire upon an adversary that won the day.

  APPENDIX 3

  FULL JOINT OPERATIONS CENTRE OPERATIONS LOG

  MOGADISHU, OCTOBER 3–4, 1993

  TIME EVEN T

  1350 BLANK [likely CIA] reports possible Salad/Qeydid mtg [meeting] at house near VIC [vicinity] Olympic Hotel (GRG sheet 24, 12.8/M.8; UTM NH36122665).

  1403 Recce launch (2 x H-530 & 1 x OH-58D): [P3] Reef Point previously on station.

  1410 Coords [coordinates] passed to Capt. Donahue (UNOSOM LNO). Confirmed no NGO [non-government organization] in vicinity of target. MG Montgomery not
ified.

  1415 BLANK [likely CIA] reports source/signal may have occurred prior to arrival of Recce.

  1424 Recce reports white Toyota land cruiser parked in front of hotel – fits description given by source.

  1427 Source vehicle (silver with red stripes on the doors) stopped in front of target house and raised hood IAW [in accordance with] prearranged instructions to let us know he was at target.

  1434 BLANK [likely Recce helicopters] will remain on meeting house location; BLANK [likely P3 Reef Point] will track white Toyota vehicle.

  1447 Source may not have given prearranged signal in front of target house (gave signal only to let us know he was in the vicinity); Recce possibly on wrong target; J2 attempting to reconfirm/pinpoint actual target location.

  1450 Source will drive around block again and give signal to reconfirm target location (approx. location 1 block northeast Olympic Hotel; GR sheet 24, 12.9/M.5).

  1459 Source confirmed on target. Recce maneuvering to provide video of both sides of building. Recce advises this area has reported numerous small-arms fire in recent past. Aircrews/ground forces brief mission.

  1505 Confirmed airspace deconfliction with QRF [quick reaction force] helos.

  1509 Recce provides obstacle/hazard info on planned helos.

  1519 BLANK [likely P3 Reef Point] reports 1+00 fuel on-station remaining BLANK = 1+10.

  1523 (AH-6) Flight repos to FARP [forward armament and refueling point].

  1527 Assault force route passed to Recce; BLANK [Barber AH-6] flight will have rockets – no pre-planned fires at this time. Convoy route (K4 – National – Olympic) 9 x HMMWV & 3 x 5 tons: will depart when helo force departs airfield.

  1529 Assault force pax [personnel] loaded and ready for launch.

  1530 Recce reports 2 x roadblocks (burning tires) VIC of 21 Oct Rd and National. Route checked against possible land mine locations.

  1532 Helo assault force launches.

  1535 Ground reaction force convoy departs TF Ranger compound.

  1537 Initiate assault codeword [Lucy] passed to all elements.

  1540 Recce passes convoy route is clear of all obstructions.

  1542 Helo assault commences on target/exact target building unknown/city block will be cleared.

  1543 Super 61 reports ground force hitting the ground; Recce is providing flight following instructions to ground force.

  1545 Ground reaction force at pre-planned hold point.

  1546 AK-47s sighted/reported in compound; BLANK [Barber AH-6] reports forces too close to hotel to fire rockets.

  1547 Large crowd coming up National toward target. Ground forces report sporadic ground fire contact – no KIA/WIA [friendly killed in action/wounded in action].

  1550 Super 61 reports friendlies on roof of target building.

  1551 Recce reports 8–9 enemy (militia) approx. one block over and en route to target.

  1553 RPG/small-arms fires reported 1 block east next to green water tank; ground reaction force moves to effect link-up with assault force.

  1555 Super 62 will engage green water tank; man with RPG ran down street and is in small shack – Barber [AH-6] will engage. Women/children in area; Star [MH-6] ELE [element] to RTB [return to base] for FARP.

  1558 RPG reported hit 5-ton – one WIA (gunshot to leg) and vehicle disabled.

  1600 Recce reports troops with AK-47s moving toward target.

  1602 LTC [lieutenant colonel] McKnight reports 9 x PC [precious cargo – prisoners] with possible principal captured.

  1604 All forces to begin collapsing to building #1 for link up and ground exfil of all forces and PC. Will use bldg. #1 roof PZ [pickup zone] if required.

  1610 Super 61 reports RPG burst over target; location of fires passed to Barber [AH-6].

  1613 McKnight reports one critical WIA will evacuate by ground ASAP [as soon as possible]; helos will provide guns as required. GRF #1 at building #1 for exfil.

  1620 Super 61 shot down by RPG – Somalis approaching crash site. GRG sheet 24, 16.2/0.7, UTM NH 36142685. Ground reaction force 1 moving to secure crash site. Survivors climbing out of wreckage – ACFT [aircraft] is not on fire. Assault force personnel (approx. 7) securing the position. Report: area secure for MH-6 ELE to effect exfil of casualties (2 x KIA, 2 x WIA).

  1622 Report: Large crowd of Somalis approaching crash site.

  1624 MH-6 has landed at crash site – Super 62 providing cover – RPG gunner reported in target area – Barber inbound.

  1626 GRF #1 will move to crash site with ASLT [assault] force and PC; move to crash site #1 approximately 1635. PC en-route back to TF Ranger compound via 5 ton with HMMWV security. QRF assistance requested; QRF to report to TF Ranger compound to link-up.

  1628 Super 68 (SAR) [search and rescue] infils SST [SAR security team] at crash – Super 68 hit by RPG – require RTB ASAP.

  1630 Super 68 lands TF Ranger compound. Crew trans-loads to spare aircraft.

  1631 MH-6 exfil 2 x WIA from crash.

  1634 Report: RPG fire 200 meters east of crash site.

  1641 Super 64 is down – RPG; Grid 36402625, Super 62 fast-ropes 2 x snipers on site. BLANK [likely C2 helicopter] directs assault force assist ASAP. Reports: large crowd moving toward second crash site.

  1644 RPGs being launched from numerous locations.

  1654 GRF #1 reports numerous casualties (numbers/type unknown).

  1655 Unable to leave crash site #1 – cannot recover 1 x KIA in aircraft.

  1656 GRF #1 reports heavy sniper fires.

  1701 Super 62 taking regular/close RPG fire; most from west side of 2nd crash site.

  1703 Second Ranger ground (GRF #2) ELE reconstituted as recovery force for 2nd crash site (27 pax on 7 HMMWVs).

  1710 QRF arrives compound.

  1713 PC w/security and WIAs en-route to TF Ranger compound. GRF #1 continuing to crash site #1 under heavy fire.

  1715 BLANK [likely Barber AH-6] ELE RTB to FARP.

  1720 GRF #2 approaching 2nd crash site; road has been blocked with tire fires; GRF #2 receiving heavy fire.

  1723 BLANK [likely C2 helicopter] RTB to FARP; BLANK [likely Garrison] requests GRF #1 return to crash site #1 to reconstitute. U64 [Uniform 64 – McKnight] has numerous casualties – cannot return to crash site.

  1726 ASLT Force elements move overland to crash site #1 and secured.

  1727 Super 62 hit – going down at new port- require MEDEVAC [medical evacuation] ASAP – numerous casualties.

  1730 Super 68 (spare) en-route to new port to evacuate casualties.

  1734 BLANK [likely CSAR] 2 x urgent casualties at northern crash site – need GRF assist ASAP; also live casualties at southern site still in ACFT – need GRF to secure that site also.

  1735 QRF depart for crash site #2.

  1740 GRF #2 link-up w/GRF #1 at K-4 circle. GRF #2 attempting different routes; receiving heavy fire wherever he goes; chance link-up … returning to compound transload PC and WIA from disabled vehicles – entire force RTB.

  1743 Super 68 will pick up remaining pax at Super 62 (New Port).

  1744 AH-6 continues taking RPG fires (approx. 50M north of

  2nd crash site); BLANK [likely Barber AH-6] reports aircraft has taken numerous rounds – can still fly.

  1745 QRF in firefight VIC K-4 circle; will proceed to crash sites ASAP.

  1746 Somali road block being built at 2nd crash site – Barber [AH-6] will engage to dissipate crowds.

  1751 Require EOD [explosive ordnance disposal] to disarm possible active grenade at TF Ranger compound on remains- 10th Mountain notified (TF Ranger EOD w/assault force).

  1755 ASLT force reports running short of ammo and med supplies.

  1758 AH-6 right gun jammed – will RTB and get it replaced.

  1801 AH-6 rockets only capable – at crash site #1.

  1808 AH-6 taking fires – no damage.

  1810 QRF ([Lee] van Arsdale w/BN C2 [battalion command and control]) pinned down at K-4 circle.

  1820 ASLT Force ammo getti
ng critical.

  1830 Super 68 will RTB & P/U [pickup] ammo and IV [intravenous] bags/QRF reconstitutes force after breaks in contact caused by ambush; RTB TF Ranger compound.

  1836 Numerous RPG launches in VIC N [north] crash site; still have one body trapped in ACFT – unable to get due to numerous small arms.

  1854 AH-6 break from K-4 and RTB north crash site.

  1855 AH-6 taking RPG fires.

  1856 North crash site still working recovery of body from ACFT – will not leave the body.

  1900 Plan approved for QRF to move to crash site w/2 x Malaysian mech [mechanized] companies & 1 x Pakistani armor.

  1908 Super 66 will drop resupply items at crash site #1; PZ marked by IR [infrared] strobe; BLANK [likely AH-6] supporting with guns. Assume friendlies at the strobes. Taking fires from 9-o’clock; resupply successful. At least 20 enemy with AKs in VIC.

  1926 ASLT requests QRF get to crash site #1 ASAP!! Need to look at driving to Paki stadium then get air exfil to AFLD [airfield]. BLANK [likely P3 Reef Point] reports 21 Oct hwy [highway] is clear/quiet.

  1947 Report from ASLT. Pilot still pinned in crash, will need jaws to retrieve him, requests evac (again) for 2 x critically wounded pax ASAP.

  2025 ASLT advises that “If QRF does not get there (North crash) soon, there will be more KIAs from previously received WIA; Get the one star [general] to get his people moving!”

  2027 ASLT force advises 1 x critical WIA at crash site #1 is now KIA.