The Connected Discourses of the Buddha

by Bhikkhu Bodhi

  This sentence serves as the heading for an entire treatise of Paṭis (No. 10; II 86-91), which applies the metaphor of cream in detail to all the factors of the Buddhist training.

  65 We should read, with Be and Se, tesaṃ te kārā amhesu mahapphalā bhavissanti, as against tesaṃ vo kārā in Ee. The sense of this line has been missed by C.Rh.D at KS 2:24, and Walshe follows her at SN-Anth 3:20. Cp. MN I 140,23-24, 31-32: Yaṃ kho idaṃ pubbe pariññātaṃ tattha me (no) evarūpā kārā karīyanti. PED recognizes kāra in the sense of “service, act of mercy or worship,” but does not include these references.

  66 Alam eva appamādena sampādetuṃ. These words anticipate the Buddha’s final injunction at 6:15 (I 157,34-158,2).

  67 For an essay based on this important sutta, see Bodhi, Transcendental Dependent Arising. The opening paragraph recurs at 22:101, but with a different sequel; see too n. 58. Spk states that the destruction of the taints (āsavakkhaya) is arahantship, which gains this name because it arises at the end of the destruction of the taints (āsavānaṃ khayante jātattā).

  68 Spk: Having set up the teaching with its climax in arahantship, the Buddha next shows the preliminary practice along which the arahant has travelled. The knowledge of destruction in regard to destruction (khayasmiṃ khaye ñāṇaṃ) is the reviewing knowledge (paccavekkhaṇañāṇa) which occurs when the destruction of the taints—namely, arahantship—has been obtained (see I, n. 376 and Vism 676; Ppn 22:19-21). Liberation is the liberation of the fruit of arahantship (arahattaphalavimutti), which is a condition for reviewing knowledge by way of decisive-support condition (upanissayapaccaya). First the fruit of arahantship arises, then the knowledge of destruction.Spk glosses sa-upanisā as sakāraṇa, sappacayya, “with cause, with condition.” Spk-pṭ adds: upanisīdati phalaṃ etthā ti kāraṇaṃ upanisā; “the cause is called the proximate cause because the effect rests upon it.” Thus the commentators take upanisā to be the equivalent of Skt upaniṣad, not a contraction of upanissaya. Although, as CPD points out, “a semantic blend” with the latter takes place, the two words must be kept distinct because not everything that is an upanisā (proximate cause) for other things is an upanissayapaccaya (decisive support condition) for those things. The latter refers solely to something which plays a strong causal role.

  69 Spk glosses the terms in the above sequence thus (starting from the end): Suffering is the suffering of the round (vaṭṭadukkha ). Faith is repeatedly arising faith (aparāparaṃ uppajjanasaddhā ; that is, tentative faith, not the unwavering faith of a noble disciple). Gladness (pāmojja) is weak rapture, while rapture proper (pīti) is strong rapture. Tranquillity (passaddhi) is the subsiding of distress, a condition for the happiness preliminary to absorption. Happiness is the happiness in the preliminary phase of meditative absorption, concentration the jhāna used as a basis (for insight; pādakajjhānasamādhi). Knowledge and vision of things as they really are (yathābhūtañāṇadassana) is weak insight, namely, the knowledges of the discernment of formations, of the overcoming of doubt, of exploration, and of what is and what is not the path (see Vism chaps. 18-20). Revulsion (nibbidā ) is strong insight, namely, knowledge of appearance as fearful, of contemplation of danger, of reflection, and of equanimity about formations (Vism 645-57; Ppn 21:29-66). Dispassion (virāga) is the path, which arises expunging defilements.Note that in the next paragraph suffering replaces aging-and-death of the usual formula.

  70 The simile also occurs at 55:38, AN I 243,27-32, and AN V 114,6-14.

  71 On the identity of the four views see above n. 37.

  72 A stock passage in the Nikāyas, recurring in SN in slightly different forms determined by the context, at 12:25, 12:26, 22:2, 22:86, 35:81, 42:13, 44:2, and 45:5. The readings alternate, even within the same volume, between vādānuvādo and vādānupāto, and it is uncertain which of the two is more original. The passage has stumped previous translators, mainly because of the phrase koci sahadhammiko vādānupāto, which at KS 2:28 is rendered “one who is of his doctrine, a follower of his views.” To avoid such errors two meanings of sahadhammika must be distinguished: (i) a noun meaning a follower of the same doctrine (unambiguously so at MN I 64,13); and (ii) an adjective meaning legitimate, reasonable (unambiguously so at 41:8; IV 299,25 foll.). Here the second meaning is applicable.Spk explains: “How (should we answer) so that not the slightest consequence or implication (vādānupāto vādappavatti) of the ascetic Gotama’s assertion—(a consequence) which is reasonable because of the reason stated (vutta-kāraṇena sakāraṇo hutvā)—might give ground for criticism?” This is meant: “How can there be no ground for criticism in any way of the ascetic Gotama’s assertion?” I dissent from Spk on what is to be safeguarded against criticism: Spk takes it to be the Buddha’s assertion, while I understand it to be the inquirer’s account of the Buddha’s assertion. In other words, the inquirer wants to be sure he is representing the Buddha’s position correctly, whether or not he agrees with it.

  At AN III 4,10, 19 sahadhammikā vādānuvādā gārayhā ṭhānā āgacchanti occurs in a context where it means simply “reasonable rebukes, grounds for criticism, come up,” and is contrasted with sahadhammikā pāsaṃsā ṭhānā āgacchanti, “reasonable grounds for praise come up.”

  73 On the expression tadapi phassapaccayā, “that (too) is conditioned by contact,” Spk says that this may be known from the fact that there is no experience of suffering without contact. It seems to me, however, that the point being made here is not that suffering does not arise without contact (though this is true), but that the adoption of a view does not occur without contact. The Brahmajāla Sutta states the same point in relation to the sixty-two speculative views—that the proclamation of each of these views is conditioned by contact and the views cannot be experienced without contact. See DN I 41-43, translated in Bodhi, All-Embracing Net of Views, pp. 85-87, with the commentary at pp. 197-98.

  74 Gambhīro c’ eva assa gambhīrāvabhāso ca. The same two terms are used at 12:60 and at DN II 55,9-10 to describe paṭiccasamuppāda . For the explanation of Sv, see Bodhi, The Great Discourse on Causation, pp. 64-67. Spk explains “that same meaning” (es’ ev’ attho) to be the meaning of dependent origination implicit in the proposition, “Suffering is dependent on contact.”

  75 He gives his name to the Bhūmija Sutta (MN No. 126), where he answers some questions of Prince Jayasena and then engages in conversation with the Buddha. The first part of the present sutta repeats the first part of the preceding one except that it is phrased in terms of “pleasure and pain.”

  76 It is difficult to understand how these ascetics could be “proponents of kamma” (kammavādā) when they hold that pleasure and pain arise fortuitously. Neither Spk nor Spkpṭ offers any clarification.

  77 This passage is also at AN II 157-59. Spk says that the Buddha added this section to show that pleasure and pain do not arise with contact alone as condition, but with other conditions as well. In this case the bodily, verbal, and mental volitions (kāya-, vacī-, manosañcetanā) are the kammically effective volitions that function as conditions for the resultant pleasure and pain (vipākasukhadukkha). I follow Be and Se in reading avijjāpaccayā ca and in taking this clause to belong to the end of the present paragraph. This has the support of Spk, which explains that this is said to show that these volitions are conditioned by ignorance. Ee reads va for ca and places the clause at the beginning of the next paragraph.

  78 Spk identifies the three volitional formations—kāyasaṅkhāra, vacīsaṅkhāra, manosaṅkhāra—with the three types of volition mentioned just above. One generates them “on one’s own initiative” (sāmaṅ) when one acts without inducement by others, with an unprompted mind (asaṅkhārikacitta); one generates them “prompted by others” when one acts with a prompted mind (sasaṅkhārikacitta). One acts deliberately (sampajāno) when one acts with knowledge of kamma and its fruit; undeliberately (asampajāno), when one acts without such knowledge. This text may be the original basis for the Abhidhamma distinctio
n between sasaṅkhārikacitta and asaṅkhārikacitta, on which see CMA 1:4.

  79 The term used here is manosaṅkhāra, but from the context this is clearly synonymous with cittasaṅkhāra at 12:2. There is no textual justification for identifying the latter with the cittasaṅkhāra at 41:6 (IV 293,17) and MN I 301,28-29, defined as saññā and vedanā.

  80 I read with Be and Se, imesu Ānanda dhammesu avijjā anupatitā . The chasu in Ee appears superfluous.Spk: Ignorance is included among these states under the heading of decisive support (upanissaya); for they are all comprehended under this phrase, “With ignorance as condition, volitional formations.” (On the interpretation of paṭicca-samuppāda by way of the twenty-four conditional relations of the Paṭṭhāna, see Vism, chap. 17, concisely explained in Nyanatiloka Thera, Guide through the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, pp. 159-73.)

  81 Spk: That body does not exist which, if it existed, would enable pleasure and pain to arise conditioned by bodily volition; the same method of explanation applies to speech and mind. (Query:) But an arahant acts, speaks, and thinks, so how is it that his body, etc., do not exist? (Reply:) In the sense that they do not generate kammic results. For the deeds done by an arahant are neither wholesome nor unwholesome kamma, but merely functional (kiriyamatta); thus for him it is said, “that body, etc., do not exist.”On the functional consciousness of the arahant, see CMA 1:15. An alternative explanation might be simply that with the elimination of ignorance there will be no further arising of the five aggregates, the basis of all experience, and thus no further experiencing of pleasure and pain.

  82 Spk: There is no field (khetta) in the sense of a place of growth; no site (vatthu) in the sense of a support; no base (āyatana) in the sense of a condition; no foundation (adhikaraṇa) in the sense of a cause.

  83 Upavāṇa is the Buddha’s attendant at 7:13. The present sutta is almost identical with the first part of 12:24 except that it omits the qualifying expression kammavādā in the description of the ascetics and brahmins.

  84 Spk: He understands the condition by way of the truth of suffering, and the origin of the condition, etc., by way of the truth of the origin, etc.

  85 This whole passage is repeated at 12:28, 33, 49, and 50. Spk: He is endowed with the view of the path (maggadiṭṭhi), the vision of the path, etc.Sekha is used here as an adjective to qualify ñāṇa and vijjā. The sekha or trainee is one who has arrived at the supramundane path and is training in it but has not yet reached arahantship, i.e., a stream-enterer, once-returner, or nonreturner; on reaching arahantship he becomes an asekha, “one beyond training.”

  The rendering of amatadvāraṃ āhacca tiṭṭhati at KS 2:33 as “who stands knocking at the door of the Deathless,” if intended literally, shows a misunderstanding of the idiom āhacca tiṭṭhati. In both canon and commentaries the expression is often used to mean “reaching right up to, standing up against,” and does not imply knocking on a door, which in Pāli is expressed by the verb ākoṭeti (e.g., at Vin I 248,5). The idiom is also at 17:28, 29 (II 238,5, 16-17). For other instances, see CPD, s.v. āhacca. The Deathless, of course, is Nibbāna. Spk identifies the door to the Deathless as the noble path.

  86 This sutta is almost identical with 12:13; the only difference is in the operative verb, there pajānāti and here parijānāti. Spk says this sutta was spoken in accordance with the inclination (ajjhāsaya) of the bhikkhus who recite the words, for they are able to penetrate (the sense) when the prefix pari- is used.

  87 The Pārāyana, the “Going to the Far Shore,” is the last chapter of Sn. It consists of sixteen sections (plus prologue and epilogue), in each of which the Buddha replies to questions posed by one of sixteen brahmin students. “The Questions of Ajita” is the first of the sixteen sections.

  88 Spk-pṭ: Those who have comprehended the Dhamma (saṅkhātadhammā ) are the arahants, who have penetrated the (four) truths. The trainees (sekhā) are the seven types of persons—those on the four paths and the lower three fruits.Saṅkhātadhammā could be understood to mean either “those who have comprehended the Dhamma,” i.e., the teaching, or “those who have comprehended things,” i.e., phenomena and their principles. Nidd II 34-35 (Be) glosses in both ways: as those who have known the Dhamma (ñātadhammā), by knowing all formations as impermanent, etc.; and as those who have comprehended the aggregates, elements, sense bases, etc. The trainees (sekhā) are so called because they train in the higher virtue, the higher mind (the jhānas), and the higher wisdom. Though Norman says that Pj II and Nidd II do not take sekhā and puthū as going together (GD, p. 367, n. to 1038), read correctly both these texts do place the two words in apposition. The trainees are manifold (puthū) because they fall into the seven types.

  89 Spk: Why did he remain silent up to the third time? He was not puzzled by the question but by the Buddha’s intention (ajjhāsaya). For it was possible to answer in many ways—by way of the aggregates, elements, sense bases, or conditionality—and he wanted to catch the Teacher’s intention. Then the Teacher, aware of the reason for his silence, gave him the method with the words, “Do you see...?”

  90 Spk: This has come to be (bhūtam idaṃ): this is said of the five aggregates. Thus the Teacher gave the elder the method, implying, “Answer my question by way of the five aggregates.” Then, just as the great ocean appears as one open expanse to a man standing on the shore, so as soon as he was given the method the answer to the question appeared to the elder with a hundred and a thousand methods. With correct wisdom (sammā paññāya): one sees it with path-wisdom together with insight. One is practising: from the stage of virtue as far as the path of arahantship one is said to be practising for the purpose of revulsion, etc. This section shows the practice of the trainee.

  91 Tadāhārasambhavaṃ. On nutriment see 12:11, 12, and n. 18 above. No doubt it is the dependence of the five aggregates on nutriment that accounts for the inclusion of this sutta in the Nidānasaṃyutta. A similar treatment of nutriment, in catechism form, is at MN I 260,7-32.Spk resolves tadāhārasambhavaṃ as taṃ āhārasambhavaṃ, apparently taking tad to represent the five aggregates. I see the whole expression as qualifying an implicit subject (“its”) and take tad (“that”) as a specification of āhāra. Such an interpretation seems required by the parallel statement on cessation. See too the use of the expression tadāhāra at SN II 85,6, 86,12, 87,6, etc., which supports this interpretation.

  92 Anupādā vimutto. Spk: One is liberated by not grasping anything at all with the four kinds of clinging (upādāna). This section shows the arahant.

  93 The bhikkhu Kaḷāra the Khattiya is met only here. Moḷiyaphagguna appears in 12:12; see n. 21. “Returned to the lower life” (hīnāyāvatto) means that he reverted to the state of a layman.Spk and Spk-pṭ together help to illuminate this cryptic exchange thus: “He did not find solace (assāsa)” means that he had not attained the three (lower) paths; for if he had attained them he would not have reverted to the lower life since then he would not have been tempted by sensual pleasures (his reason for disrobing). Sāriputta says “I have no perplexity” (na kaṅkhāmi) about having attained solace since his support is the knowledge of a disciple’s perfection (sāvakapāramīñāṇa). “As to the future” (āyatiṃ) refers to future rebirth; the question is an indirect way of asking if he has attained arahantship.

  94 Spk remarks that Sāriputta did not declare final knowledge in such words, but the elder Kaḷāra Khattiya had ascribed this statement to him because he was happy and pleased. Final knowledge (aññā) is arahantship.

  95 Spk: The Blessed One asked him this question to get him to declare final knowledge, thinking: “He will not declare final knowledge of his own accord, but he will do so when answering my question.”

  96 Spk: Here too (as in 12:31) the elder was puzzled not by the question but by the Buddha’s intention; he was unsure how the Teacher wanted him to declare arahantship. But he started to speak in terms of conditionality, which was what the Teacher wanted. When he realized that he had grasped the Tea
cher’s intention, the answer appeared to him with a hundred and a thousand methods.I have translated the first part of Sāriputta’s reply in accordance with the gloss of Spk thus: “With the destruction of the specific condition for birth, I have understood, ‘As the condition for birth is destroyed, the effect, namely birth, is destroyed.’”

  97 Spk: The Buddha asks this to get Sāriputta to roar a lion’s roar in his own proper domain. For Sāriputta attained the knowledge of a disciple’s perfection after he had discerned the three feelings while the Buddha taught the wanderer Dīghanakha “The Discourse on the Discernment of Feelings” and this became his own domain (savisaya).Spk refers here to the Dīghanakha Sutta (MN No. 74; see esp. MN I 500,9-501,6), and seems to be using “Vedanāpariggaha Sutta” as an alternative title for that text. Ee (S II 53,8-9, 12) should be amended to read vedanāsu nandī.