The Connected Discourses of the Buddha

by Bhikkhu Bodhi

  119 The version at AN V 183 includes another line here: “But one who abstains from the destruction of life (etc.) does not engender fearful animosity pertaining to the present life and fearful animosity pertaining to the future life, and he does not experience mental pain and displeasure” pāṇātipātā paṭivirato n’ eva diṭṭhadhammikaṃ bhayaṃ veraṃ pasavati, na samparāyikaṃ bhayaṃ veraṃ pasavati, na cetasikaṃ dukkhaṃ domanassaṃ paṭisaṃvedeti). It seems that the logic of the discourse requires this addition; its omission from the present text could be an early scribal error.

  120 Spk: The factors of stream-entry (sotāpattiyaṅga) are of two kinds: (i) the factors for stream-entry, the preliminary practices that lead to the attainment of stream-entry, namely, associating with superior persons, hearing the true Dhamma, careful attention, and practice in accordance with the Dhamma (see 55:55); (ii) the factors of one who abides having attained stream-entry. The latter are intended here. Confirmed confidence is unshakable confidence (gained) through what has been achieved [Spk-pṭ: namely, the path] (aveccappasādenā ti adhigatena [maggena] acalappasādena).Aveccappasāda is a syntactical compound (see I, n. 68), with avecca (Skt avetya) absolutive of *aveti, to undergo, to know, to experience. The formulas for recollection of the Buddha, the Dhamma, and the Saṅgha are analysed in detail at Vism 197-221 (Ppn 7:1-100).

  121 Spk: The virtues dear to the noble ones (ariyakantāni sīlāni) are the five precepts, which the noble ones do not forsake even when they pass on to a new existence.The terms are explained at Vism 222 (Ppn 7:104). These virtues are “ungrasped” (aparāmaṭṭha) in the sense that they are not adhered to with craving and wrong view.

  122 Spk: The method (ñāya) is both dependent origination and the stable knowledge after one has known the dependently arisen. As he says: “It is dependent origination that is called the method; the method is also the Noble Eightfold Path” (untraced). Wisdom here is repeatedly arisen insight-wisdom (aparāparaṃ uppannā vipassanāpaññā).Spk-pṭ: Dependent origination is called “the method” because, with the application of the right means, it is what is known (ñāyati) as it actually is in the dependently arisen. But knowledge (ñāṇa) is called “the method” because it is by this that the latter is known.

  Despite the commentators, ñāya has no relation to ñāṇa but is derived from ni + i.

  123 Spk: Suffering here is the suffering of the round (vaṭṭadukkha ). There are two kinds of origin, momentary origin (khaṇikasamudaya) and origin through conditions (paccaya-samudaya ). A bhikkhu who sees the one sees the other. Passing away is also twofold, final passing away (accantatthaṅgama; Spk-pṭ: nonoccurrence, cessation, Nibbāna) and dissolutional passing away (bhedatthaṅgama; Spk-pṭ: the momentary cessation of formations). One who sees the one sees the other.

  124 Spk: The world here is the world of formations (saṅkhāraloka ). On the nature of the world in the Buddha’s teaching, see I, n. 182.

  125 Dhammapariyāya, a method of presenting the teaching. This sutta recurs at 35:113, where it is called Upassuti, “Listening In.” On Ñātika, see V, n. 330.

  126 See 12:17, 18, and n. 39, n. 40.

  127 A brahmin Jāṇussoṇi is mentioned at 45:4 and elsewhere in the Nikāyas. Spk says that he was a great chaplain (mahāpurohita) of much wealth who had gained his name by reason of his position. On the theme of this sutta see 12:15.

  128 Lokāyatika. Spk says that he was versed in lokāyata, the science of debate (vitaṇḍasatthe lokāyate kataparicayo). Spk-pṭ explains the etymology of the word thus: “Lokāyata is so called because by means of this the world does not strive for, does not advance towards, future welfare (āyatiṃ hitaṃ tena loko na yatati na īhatī ti lokāyataṃ). For on account of this belief, beings do not arouse even the thought of doing deeds of merit, much less do they make the effort.”Spk-pṭ’s explanation seems to reflect the understanding of lokāyata held at the time of the commentaries, as seen in MW’s definition of the word as “materialism, the system of atheistical philosophy (taught by Cārvāka).” There is cogent evidence, however, that the word acquired these connotations only in a later period. As Rhys Davids points out in a detailed discussion (at Dialogues of the Buddha, 1:166-72), lokāyata is used in the Nikāyas in a complimentary sense to designate a branch of brahmanical learning (as at DN I 88,7, 114,3, etc.). He suggests that the word originally meant nature-lore and only gradually acquired the negative meaning of sophistry and materialism. Jayatilleke has proposed that since the word is always used with reference to loka, the world, or sabba, the all, it originally signified, not nature-lore in general, but cosmology, and that the arrangement of lokāyata theses in opposing pairs indicates that the brahmins used the rival cosmological theories as topics of debate (Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, pp. 48-57).

  129 Jeṭṭhaṃ etaṃ lokāyataṃ. Spk glosses jeṭṭhaṃ with paṭhamaṃ and explains: “Lokāyata is an inferior, tainted speculative view that appears great and deep” (mahantaṃ gambhīran ti upaṭṭhitaṃ parittaṃ sāsavaṃ diṭṭhigataṃ; reading as in Se, which seems more reliable here than Be).

  130 Ekattaṃ. Spk: He asks whether it has a permanent nature (niccasabhāva); the first and third views are forms of the eternalist view (sassatadiṭṭhi).

  131 Puthuttaṃ. Spk: This means a nature different from the previous nature; the second and fourth views are forms of the annihilationist view (ucchedadiṭṭhi).

  132 The bracketed passages here and below are enclosed in brackets in all three eds., with notes to the effect that they are not found in certain eds. (Se says they are not found in the Thai ed. or in Sinhalese mss). It is really necessary to exclude them, for if they are included nothing would distinguish this sutta from the following one. Spk confirms this with its comment on 12:50 that this sutta differs from the preceding one only by stating the two methods together (dve nayā ekato vuttā), on which Spk-pṭ remarks: “This is said because the method stated in the ninth sutta, beginning ‘When there is consciousness, name-and-form comes to be,’ is included by the method stated in the tenth sutta, beginning ‘When there is ignorance, volitional formations come to be.’”

  133 This vagga is entitled Dukkhavagga in Be and Se, but Rukkhavagga in Ee.

  134 Kittāvatā ... bhikkhu parivīmaṃsamāno parivīmaṃseyya sabbaso sammā dukkhakkhayāya. Spk glosses parivīmaṃsamāno with upaparikkhamāno.

  135 Jarāmaraṇanirodhasāruppagāminī paṭipadā. Spk: The way leading on that is in conformity with the cessation of aging-and-death means the way leading on by its conformation with the cessation of aging-and-death, being similar (to cessation) by reason of its undefiled nature, its purity.In the repetition series just below, Ee omits jāti panāyaṃ kinnidānā, no doubt an editorial oversight.

  136 Spk: A meritorious volitional formation (puññaṃ saṅkhāraṃ) is the thirteen kinds of volition (i.e., the volitions of the eight wholesome sense-sphere cittas and the five wholesome cittas of the form sphere; see n. 7). Consciousness fares on to the meritorious (puññūpagaṃ hoti viññāṇaṃ): the kammic consciousness becomes associated with a meritorious kamma, the resultant consciousness with the fruits of merit. A demeritorious volitional formation (apuññaṃ saṅkhāraṃ) is the twelve kinds of volition (i.e., in the twelve unwholesome cittas; see n. 7). An imperturbable volitional formation (āneñjaṃ saṅkhāraṃ): the four kinds of volition (i.e., in the four wholesome cittas of the formless sphere). And here by mentioning the three kinds of kammic formations, the twelve-factored principle of conditionality is implied. To this extent the round of existence is shown.An analysis of these three types of volitional formations is at Vibh 135. At MN II 262-63 the Buddha explains in detail how viññāṇa becomes āneñjūpaga.

  137 Paritassati clearly represents Skt paritṛṣyati, “to crave, to thirst for,” and is connected etymologically with taṇhā. However, in Pāli (and perhaps in MIA dialects generally) the verbal stem has become conflated with tasati = to fear, to tremble, and thus its noun
derivatives such as paritassanā and paritasita acquire the sense of nouns derived from tasati. This convergence of meanings, already evident in the Nikāyas, is made explicit in the commentaries. I have tried to capture both nuances by rendering the verb “to be agitated” and the noun “agitation.”Here Spk glosses na paritassati: “He is not agitated with the agitation of craving (taṇhāparitassanā) or the agitation of fear (bhayaparitassanā); the meaning is, he does not crave and does not fear.” Neither Spk nor Spk-pṭ comment on parinibbāyati, but what is meant is obviously the attainment of kilesaparinibbāna, the full quenching of defilements, on which see the General Introduction, pp. 49-50. On the arahant’s reviewing knowledge, see I, n. 376.

  138 Spk: After the arahant’s reviewing knowledge has been shown, this passage is stated to show his constant dwelling (satatavihāra). The passage recurs, but with a different simile, at 22:88, 36:7, 8, and 54:8.

  139 Spk: A feeling terminating with the body (kāyapariyantikaṃ vedanaṃ) is one delimited by the body (kāyaparicchinnaṃ); a feeling terminating with life (jīvitapariyantikaṃ vedanaṃ) is one delimited by life. As long as the body with its five sense doors continues, the feelings occurring at the five sense doors continue; as long as life continues, the feelings occurring at the mind door continue.

  140 Spk: Will become cool right here (idh’ eva ... sītibhavissanti): Right here, without having gone elsewhere by way of rebirth, they will become cool, subject to no further occurrence, devoid of the palpitation and disturbance of their occurrence.

  141 The unusual use of the plural sarīrāni here mirrors the unusual use of the plural kapillāni to mean potsherds. Spk glosses sarīrāni as dhātusarīrāni, bodily elements, which Spk-pṭ identifies as the bones (aṭṭhikakaṅkala). Kapilla usually means a pot or a bowl, but Spk says the plural here denotes potsherds bound together along with the rim.Spk elaborates the simile: The blazing potter’s oven represents the three realms of existence, the potter the meditator, and his rod the knowledge of the path of arahantship. The smooth piece of ground represents Nibbāna. The time when the potter removes the hot clay pot from the oven and places it on the ground is like the time when the meditator, having attained the supreme fruit of arahantship, removes his individual form from the four realms of misery and places it on the surface of Nibbāna by way of fruition attainment. Just as the hot clay pot (does not break up at once), so the arahant does not attain parinibbāna on the same day he reaches arahantship. He lives on for fifty or sixty years, striving to sustain the Buddha’s dispensation. When he reaches his last thought-moment, with the breakup of the aggregates he attains parinibbāna by the Nibbāna element without residue. Then, as with the potsherds of the pot, only inanimate bodily remains are left behind.

  142 Spk: “Would a rebirth-consciousness (paṭisandhiviññāṇa) be discerned?”

  143 Spk: “Just this is the end of the suffering of the round, its termination, that is, Nibbāna.”

  144 Upādāniyesu dhammesu. Spk: In the phenomena of the three planes, which are the conditions for the four kinds of clinging. On upādāniyā dhammā, see 22:121, 35:110, 123, where clinging (upādāna) is explained simply as desire and lust (chandarāga) for the things that can be clung to.

  145 Spk: The great bonfire represents the three realms of existence; the man tending the fire, the blind worldling attached to the round. His casting of fuel into the fire is like the worldling who contemplates gratification, creating wholesome and unwholesome kamma through the six sense doors on account of craving. The increase of the bonfire is like the blind worldling’s repeated production of the suffering of the round by the accumulation of kamma.

  146 Spk: A benefactor might come along and teach the man how to extinguish the fire, and the man would follow his advice. The benefactor represents the Buddha; his advice, the explanation of a meditation subject and an exhortation to gain release from suffering. The time the man follows the instructions is like the time the meditator is sitting in an empty hut applying insight to the phenomena of the three planes. The time when the man has bathed and adorned himself and is sitting tranquil and happy represents the time when the meditator, having cleansed himself of defilements by the noble path, sits absorbed in the attainment of fruition having Nibbāna as object. The time when the great bonfire is extinguished represents the time when the arahant’s aggregates break up and he passes away into the Nibbāna element without residue.

  147 Saṃyojaniyesu dhammesu. Spk: The conditions for the ten fetters. On “things that can fetter,” see 22:120, 35:109, 122. Here too “the fetter” is explained simply as desire and lust.

  148 Spk: The great tree represents the round of existence with its three planes; the roots, the sense bases; the sending up of the sap through the roots, the building up of kamma through the six sense doors; the stability of the tree, the blind worldling’s long continuation in saṃsāra as he repeatedly sustains the round by building up kamma.

  149 Spk: The man wishing to destroy the great tree represents the meditator, his shovel (or axe) knowledge, the basket concentration. The time the tree is cut down at its root is like the occasion when wisdom arises in the meditator as he attends to his meditation subject. The cutting of the tree into pieces is like attending to the body in brief by way of the four great elements; the splitting of the pieces is like attending to the body in detail in forty-two aspects (Vism 348-51; Ppn 11:31-38); reducing the pieces to slivers is like the discernment of name-and-form by way of derived form and consciousness; cutting up the roots is like the search for the conditions of name-and-form. The time of burning the slivers is like the time when the meditator attains the supreme fruit (of arahantship). The collecting of the ashes is like the arahant’s life up to the time of his parinibbāna. The winnowing of the ashes, or their being carried away by the river, is like the stilling of the round when the arahant attains parinibbāna by the Nibbāna element without residue.

  150 Nāmarūpassa avakkanti. Spk does not comment, but in the light of other suttas we might assume the statement to mean that the craving that underlies “contemplating gratification in things that can fetter” is the principal sustaining cause for the process of rebirth, which begins with “the descent of name-and-form.” See in this connection 12:39, 12:64, and n. 115.

  151 Viññāṇassa avakkanti. At DN II 63,2-4 it is said that if consciousness were not to descend into the mother’s womb, name-and-form would not take shape in the womb. The “descent of the embryo” (gabbhassāvakkanti)—spoken of at MN I 265,35-266,6, II 156,29-157,3, and AN I 176,31—presumably refers to the descent of the consciousness that initiates conception.

  152 The opening of this sutta as far as “the nether world, saṃsāra” is nearly identical with the opening of the Mahānidāna Suttanta (DN No. 15), which differs only in including the aorist avaca. The present sutta is a composite, made up of the opening of the Mahānidāna grafted on to the body of 12:55. Spk here incorporates the long opening of the commentary to the Mahānidāna, for which see Bodhi, The Great Discourse on Causation, pp. 58-73. Spk, however, does not attempt to explain how the same opening could have such a different sequel.

  153 Spk: Uninstructed (assutavā): devoid of learning, interrogation, and discrimination regarding the aggregates, elements, sense bases, conditionality, the establishments of mindfulness, etc. Worldling (puthujjana) is a “many-being,” so called because of generating many diverse defilements, etc. (puthūnaṃ nānappakārānaṃ kilesādīnaṃ jananādikāraṇehi puthujjano); and also because he is included among the many people (puthūnaṃ janānaṃ antogadhattā), in number beyond reckoning, who are engaged in a low Dhamma contrary to the Dhamma of the noble ones. Or else puthu means “reckoned as separate”; the worldling is a person separated from the noble ones, who possess such qualities as virtue, learning, etc. (puthu vā ayaṃ visuṃ yeva saṅkhaṃ gato; visaṃsaṭṭho sīlasutādiguṇayuttehi ariyehi jano ti puthujjano).This twofold etymology stems from a twofold understanding of Pāli puthu: as representing either Vedic
pṛthu = numerous, many; or pṛthak = separate, distinct. The BHS form pṛthagjana indicates a preference for the latter derivation, though the Pāli commentators tend to take the former as primary.

  154 Cittaṃ iti pi mano iti pi viññāṇaṃ iti pi. Cp. DN I 21,21: Yaṃ ... idaṃ vuccati cittan ti vā mano ti vā viññāṇan ti vā. Spk says these are all names for the mind base (manāyatana). Normally I render both citta and mano as “mind,” but since English has only two words of common usage to denote the faculty of cognition—“mind” and “consciousness”—here I am compelled to use “mentality” as a makeshift for mano. While technically the three terms have the same denotation, in the Nikāyas they are generally used in distinct contexts. As a rough generalization, viññāṇa signifies the particularizing awareness through a sense faculty (as in the standard sixfold division of viññāṇa into eye-consciousness, etc.) as well as the underlying stream of consciousness, which sustains personal continuity through a single life and threads together successive lives (emphasized at 12:38-40). Mano serves as the third door of action (along with body and speech) and as the sixth internal sense base (along with the five physical sense bases); as the mind base it coordinates the data of the other five senses and also cognizes mental phenomena (dhammā), its own special class of objects. Citta signifies mind as the centre of personal experience, as the subject of thought, volition, and emotion. It is citta that needs to be understood, trained, and liberated. For a more detailed discussion, see Hamilton, Identity and Experience, chap. 5.