Looking Down the Corridors

by Kevin Wright

  F-216 was delivered to Metz in June 1989 and was joined by F-221 on 2 July. G-1 flew the first Berlin Corridor mission on 3 July 1989 – less than twenty-four hours after the two aircraft were officially declared operational. Corridor monitoring was their primary task but as the Cold War ended in 1990 so did the flights, although the two aircraft continue to support French SIGINT interests across the globe.

  For Corridor flights C-160Gs flight crew consisted of two pilots, a radio navigator and an engineer. The modified cargo hold, with the rear ramp welded permanently shut, was occupied by eight personnel comprising up to three ELINT, three COMINT and one HF operator plus a systems engineer and Team Leader. The ASTAC system sensor, mounted in wingtip pods, worked in conjunction with ground stations, tracking up to twenty emitters a second and immediately processing the information.

  The data collected was managed by the mobile ground-based Organisation Système d’Intégration du Renseignement et des Informations SIGINT system (OSIRIS). The airborne component processed information and recorded data, producing emitter location maps.31 The OSIRIS ground station received the information by data link, completing the initial on-aircraft processing to produce an overall situation picture. In Metz the Intégration du Renseignement et des Informations SIGINT (IRIS) computer produced a more comprehensive picture of the collected data.

  The C-160G Transall Gabriel VI met a long-standing photographic capability requirement that had never been adequately fulfilled by the Noratlas. For photographic tasks the C-160G carried two Omera 51 panoramic cameras, mounted in tear drop shaped fairings on each side of the fuselage. A protective, sliding cover opened to allow photography. This fit solved the difficulties of previous generations of Gabriel aircraft and the conflicting needs of photographic and SIGINT equipment. The SIGINT community wanted to fly as high as possible so that their receivers could capture the maximum number of emitters. The PHOTINT community wanted to fly as low as possible to collect large-scale, high-quality photography. The Gabriel VI solved this problem by having cameras capable of producing good-quality imagery at high altitude.

  The external configuration of the C-160G Transall made it an obvious SIGINT aircraft and its function would have been very clear when used in the Corridors. There was no great attempt to conceal its true purpose, which speaks volumes for the changing political climate in Germany by 1989.

  Beyond the Corridors

  Besides the Gabriel Corridor and peripheral missions conducted using ‘tactical intelligence’ platforms, other aircraft also mounted flights along the IGB and over the Baltic Sea. These included the DC-8 Système Aéroporté de Recueil des Informations de Guerre Électronique Sarigue (Opossum) ‘strategic’ reconnaissance aircraft and the SA-330 Puma Hélicoptère Électronique Technique (HÉT) that operated along the IGB.

  The DC-8–33 Sarigue

  A DC-8–33 (F-RAFE 45570/134) that was already serving with the AdlA was converted to the electronic intelligence role and entered service in July 1976. Escadre Électronique 00.051 (Electronics Squadron 00.051 – EÉ 00.051 Aubrac)was specifically created to operate this aircraft that was declared operational on 1 June 1977, initially flying from Brétigny before moving to Evreux in December of that year. The aircraft retained the same external colour scheme as other AdlA DC-8 transports but the plethora of bulges and aerials quickly revealed its true purpose. Like the Gabriels, the Sarigue was primarily a SIGINT platform but was also photo-capable.

  The COMINT suite included VHF/UHF radios that could intercept frequencies between 20 and 500 MHz. The ELINT equipment intercepted radar emissions between 30 and 125 MHz and could intercept and locate radars using frequencies between 125 and 18,000 MHz, using interferometry antennae, mounted in wingtip fairings. The ventral radome housed antennae targeted at frequencies above 1 GHz. Photographic equipment consisted of three Omera 36 cameras in a trimetrogen mount (one vertical and two oblique) to give horizon-to-horizon coverage.32

  The Sarigue’s flight deck crew consisted of two pilots; one or two radio-navigators and a flight engineer. Depending on the type of mission, the numbers of the SIGINT team could vary significantly. For European operations thirteen ELINT operators and ten COMINT operators were the usual ‘back-end’ crew, together with a camera operator seated in the left-hand rear of the cabin. The aircraft also operated in Africa, the Middle East and Indian Ocean before being retired in July 2001. Its successor, DC-8–72 (CF) Sarigue NG (New Generation) F-RAFD (46043/443), entered service on 12 April 2001 but operated for only just over three years before being withdrawn from service.

  SA-330 Puma HÉT

  The AdlA Hélicoptère Électronique Technique (HÉT) programme commenced in spring 1989 using a modified SA-330 Puma helicopter (No. 1595). It belonged to part of Escadrille 21/54 and was based at the Goslar ground listening station. The Puma had a flight crew of three: a pilot, pilot-navigator and flight engineer. The rear cabin housed a team of three: the ‘Team Leader’ who operated a console (similar to the Furet IV on the Sarigue) that detected and designated the signals, together with two ELINT operators. The Puma carried three retractable antennae in main cabin wells to detect Soviet electronic emissions. The detection and analytical systems carried by the Puma HÉT were fully capable of collecting and classifying the new radars then entering Soviet service. The ‘Fall of the Wall’ in November 1989 meant that the Puma’s operational life was very short.33 The helicopter was subsequently transferred to Mont-de-Marsan to continue operations for a while before being reconverted to a standard transport configuration.34

  Why Not More Co-ordination and Co-operation?

  The French devoted significant resources to monitoring Soviet and Warsaw Pact communications and electronic emissions throughout the Cold War. This emphasis on SIGINT allowed them to develop a full picture of the Soviet EOB. French Corridor photographic intelligence collection was of less significance. Why did the French not co-operate more extensively with the British and Americans?

  The best explanation is probably a combination of domestic French politics and national interests. The creation of the Fifth Republic in 1958 brought Charles de Gaulle to a greatly strengthened presidential office. The conclusion of the Algerian war had freed up military resources that were redeployed to meet France’s modest NATO commitments, which it had been unable to fulfil for some years. It allowed ELINT gathering equipment and personnel to be redeployed from North Africa to the FOZ of Germany and Berlin. De Gaulle’s distrust of both the British and the Americans led him to pursue his goal of establishing a ‘strong and independent France’ to take its rightful place in the modern world. In particular, his ambition to create an independent French nuclear deterrent significantly changed France’s future intelligence needs as a new priority became the development of reconnaissance and targeting capabilities for the embryonic Force de Frappe.

  One effect of this was the cessation of Corridor imagery exchange, probably known as ‘Blue Train’, but this was no great loss because it never produced a significant quantity of material. From the British and US perspective the French were minor players in photographic intelligence collection mainly because their Corridor photographic sorties were so infrequent. In fact contemporary British PIs cannot remember ever having seen French Corridor imagery.35 The supply of French BCZ imagery continued because it was subject to the formal Tri-Mission agreement covering AMLM exchanges.

  Tactical and strategic aircraft provided the mainstay of the early French nuclear forces and needed to be capable of penetrating the Warsaw Pact’s air defences if they were to reach their targets deep in Eastern Europe. The arrival of the Mirage IV bomber intensified the need for ELINT to enable their bombers to penetrate deep into Warsaw Pact air defences to deliver their deadly payloads. This requirement was the principal driver of French emphasis on EOB collection along the Corridors, IGB and Baltic.

  There was little formal co-operation between the French and other Allies over Corridor missions. Besides interference from issues of high politics, there w
ere simple pragmatic reasons too. British and US co-operation and co-ordination were not only facilitated at the highest national political levels but day-to-day efforts were delegated to operational theatres and individual units. British and US Corridor flight operations were in relatively close geographic proximity to each other in Germany, but French operations, from the mid 1960s, were centred on Metz-Frescaty in eastern France. This isolated them from the British and American operating locations and simply made co-operation physically more difficult.

  It was mandatory to file flight plans with the BASC to operate in the airspace so potential conflicts could be identified and managed safely, but all three Allies operated differently in the Corridors and BCZ. Where possible the British operated at lower levels as their emphasis was on photographic collection. The French usually flew at higher levels to achieve better signals reception, only flying at lower levels for photographic missions. It was only the Americans, because they operated across the full altitude range available in the Corridors, who ran significant risk of collision with their ‘partners in espionage’. Accounts from all three countries have not revealed any instances of systemic airspace conflicts. Certainly the comparative lack of Anglo-American co-operation with French-related operations, other than the AMLMs, throws into even clearer relief the extremely close British and American co-operation on intelligence issues.

  Notes

  1 ‘Electronic Warfare Association’.

  2 Comité Historique de l’Association Guerrelec (2009), Les Avions de Renseignement Électronique (Panazol: Lavauzelle Graphic) and http://www.16va.be.

  3 J.R. de Soultrait (2009), ‘L’EE 54 “DUNKERQUE” de Lahr-Hugsweier, 1965, a Metz-Frescaty, 1967’, Renseignement Électronique, p. 101.

  4 http://www.16va.be/gabriel_part1_eng.html.

  5 A. Cape (2009), ‘La Guerre Électronique en Algérie’, 1959–1962: des Detachments sol au C-47 Gabriel, Renseignement Électronique, p. 68.

  6 The N2501 was also known as the ‘Grise’ (grey) in the French Air Force because of its colour.

  7 J. Martinot-Lagarde (2009), ‘Création du Groupe Électronique 30/450, 1963–1965’, Renseignement Électronique, pp. 79–80.

  8 P. Baratault (2009), ‘Les grands programmes industriels Français dans le domaine ELINT’, Renseignement Électronique, p. 41.

  9 After further development some of that equipment appeared on the AdlA’s reconnaissance DC-8 Sarigue aircraft.

  10 These cameras were also used on Mirage F-1CR and Mirage IVR aircraft.

  11 M. Adam (2009), ‘Des oreilles et des ailes ou quatre ans a l’escadrille Électronique EE 54 “DUNKERQUE”, 1968–1972’, Renseignement Électronique, p. 107.

  12 P. Pallot (2009), ‘Témoignage d’un opérateur ELINT sur Nord Gabriel’, Renseignement Électronique, p. 180.

  13 The various operator designations and operating positions on the Gabriel Vs changed over the years as equipment was modified or replaced. A summary of some of these changes can be found in Annex 2 to Renseignement Électronique, pp. 399–403.

  14 Pallot (2009), pp. 162–3.

  15 de Soultrait (2009), pp. 96–7.

  16 M. Danthon (2009), ‘Deux ans au Groupement Électronique Tactique 30/351’, Renseignement Électronique, p. 121.

  17 Pallot (2009), p. 169.

  18 D. Aubert (2009), ‘Du GET à la 54 Escadre Électronique Tactique et du Nord Gabriel au Transall Gabriel, 1986–1989’, Renseignement Électronique, p. 218.

  19 Adam (2009), p. 108.

  20 Ibid., p. 109.

  21 de Soultrait (2009), p. 103.

  22 Pallot (2009), pp. 166–8.

  23 Note by Peter Jefferies. This was probably the Rosslau SA-6 Gainful site which was close to the corridor edge.

  24 Danthon (2009), pp. 145–8.

  25 USMLM Annual Report, 1964, p. 15.

  26 D. Gordon (2006), Tactical Reconnaissance in the Cold War (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books), p. 132.

  27 J. Martinot-Lagarde (2009), Renseignement Électronique, pp. 83–4. This account records the incident as 4 January 1964. All others record the RB-66 loss as 10 March 1964. However, a USAF T-39 aircraft was shot down on 28 January 1964 near Erfurt. In either case it demonstrates the capabilities of the French systems.

  28 C. Fontaine (2009), ‘Quelques souvenirs sur Nord Gabriel’, Renseignement Électronique, p. 152.

  29 Aubert (2009), p. 220.

  30 Ibid., p. 219.

  31 H. Wetzel (2009), ‘Du Transall Gabriel au DC-8 Sarigue NG’, Renseignement Électronique, p. 215.

  32 Hugo Mambour, http://www.16va.be/gabriel_part1_eng.html.

  33 H. de Quatrebarbes (2009), ‘Le programme hélicoptére d’ELINT Technique (HÉT) sur SA330 Puma modifié’, Renseignement Électronique, pp. 359–67.

  34 Aubert (2009), p. 225.

  35 Peter Jefferies in conversation with British PIs of that era.

  6

  ALLIED BCZ LIGHT AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTER PHOTOGRAPHIC FLIGHTS

  The Berlin Control Zone covered about 125 square miles of GDR territory, including the divided city of Berlin. Within this space several major Soviet and East German airfields, garrisons, logistic and support installations were located. Some of these were in PRAs that prevented ground observation by AMLM ground tours but could be viewed from the air and this spawned the idea that the Western Allies could use BCZ airspace to their advantage.

  The 1945 agreement allowed local flights in the BCZ so that the four wartime Allies could exercise their freedom of access to this airspace. Flight safety requirements were the only restrictions to this freedom. From the outset there was disagreement between the Western Allies and the Soviets over the definition of ‘local flights’. The agreement’s actual wording was:

  It is desirable that, wherever possible, local flights (testing, training etc) be executed above the national sectors. However, if necessary they may be executed above the remainder of the Control Zone, subject to normal clearance by the BASC.1

  The Soviet view was that the Western Allies could only fly over their City Sectors. The Western position was that ‘local flights’ encompassed the whole of the BCZ. This impasse prevailed until the end of the Cold War in 1990. The Soviet response to the Western stance was to endorse all BASC flight clearance cards for flights originating in Berlin, but not destined to terminate in West Germany, with ‘safety of flight not guaranteed’. Despite this there were never any major incidents involving locally based Allied aircraft or helicopters. After the arbitrary Soviet imposition of altitude limits on the Corridors in 1953, there were concerns that the Soviets might try to extend these limitations to the BCZ airspace below 2,500ft by only recognising tracks that, whilst allowing arrivals and departures to the three West Berlin airfields, would deny the Western Allies the full freedom of flight in the BCZ.

  Allied Light Aviation in Berlin

  The Western Allies’ light aviation assets consisted of fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters to support their field formations and national commands in the city. Helicopters were confined to flying over the city’s Western Sectors, although there was no clear legal reason why they could not roam further into the BCZ. This self-imposed restriction probably reflected concerns about the range and reliability of early generation helicopters and the possible consequences if they suffered engine failures over urban areas. The fixed-wing elements were allowed to venture outside the city limits into the wider BCZ. The units’ tasks included border patrols, liaison, visual and photographic reconnaissance, troop lifts and resupply of outposts.

  To avoid duplication of effort and to deconflict flight paths, the AMLMs held monthly liaison meetings to co-ordinate forthcoming flights in a similar manner to the way that they co-ordinated their ground tour programmes. The meetings produced a jointly agreed programme allocating certain days and times to each mission. This generally worked well but there were some difficulties because the French and US aircraft belonged to their respective city national commands who decided when and where their aircraft
would fly and their missions had no control over this. BRIXMIS, on the other hand, had the sole use of the British aircraft on a number of days each week, so they had total control over the conduct and timing of their photographic flights. These split control arrangements sometimes led to two aircraft being in the same place at the same time, causing red faces and confusion all round. By the 1980s a more professional attitude prevailed and amicable co-operation was the order of the day. Under the Tri-Mission agreement photographs taken during the flights were exchanged so no nation ‘lost out’. The modus operandi for all the Allies’ photographic flights were broadly similar, but we concentrate on the conduct of British flights, with some further details about American and French operations.

  In mounting the BCZ light aircraft photographic flights the British led the way, starting them in 1956. The French did not base a light aircraft (a Cessna L-19 Bird Dog) in Berlin until 1960 and, although the USA had light aircraft based at Tempelhof, they did not start their photographic missions – Project Lark Spur – until 1968.

  BRIXMIS Chipmunk flights

  A single De Havilland Canada DHC-1 Chipmunk trainer aircraft arrived at RAF Gatow in 1954 to form the Station Flight. It had three overt roles: to provide RAF aircrew on ground tours in Berlin with continuation training to maintain their flying skills and, more importantly, retain their flying pay; to maintain the British right of access to BCZ airspace, especially below 2,500ft; and to provide assistance with public relations tasks. In April 1968, after much wrangling mainly caused by FCO concerns that the Soviets may have viewed the arrival of the additional aircraft as an ‘escalation’ or a ‘provocative’ act, a second Chipmunk was allocated to the Gatow Station Flight to ensure that at least one aircraft was available at all times to respond to any intelligence, political or tactical requirements for visual or photographic reconnaissance.2