Looking Down the Corridors

by Kevin Wright

  ‘I made a hard right bank, relinquished control back to the pilot, and began photographing the equipment around the wash ramp. At that time, I heard SFC St John tell me over the intercom that a lens he was changing on his camera had slipped from his hand during my hard banking of the craft, and he thought it had fallen on top of the ‘Sovs’. He also said we should immediately head back to report this occurrence to HQ. I saw that most of the ‘Sovs’ around the wash ramps were pointing up at us, some with their AKs. However, this was not unusual, since any time we flew over their installations, the ‘Sovs’ and East Germans would point at us, some would wave, some shook their fists, and some pointed their weapons.

  He added that he believed the Soviets protested to Henry Kissinger via the Soviet Ambassador about the ‘bombing’ as they called it, but because British and/or French aircraft also arrived overhead the same barracks at the same time it was difficult to definitively verify ‘who had dropped what on the Soviet wash ramp.’ Indeed this event passed into the folklore of the three allied missions told and retold many times.

  When we returned to USMLM and I reported to Colonel Thorsen, his first reaction was: ‘Troyan, you again, I hope you have your bags packed,’ or words to that effect; however, SFC St John saved my hide by saying that it was he who dropped the lens. At this point then, Colonel Thorsen became very gracious to SFC St John, stating that, after all the time he had been running this programme, the odds that an unforeseen event would occur was only natural. He told me to accompany SFC St John to Berlin Brigade and pass on to Colonel Baker, the Berlin Brigade Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, not be too hard on SFC St John. He also ordered me to come up with a Standard Operating Procedure that would ensure that all ‘lens swapping would be done inside the flight bag, which would be secured to the aircraft seat’.

  Another participant, Major Thomas Spencer, explained how he became involved in the programme:

  In 1975, a Lark Spur observer position become available and I volunteered to extend my tour at USMLM for one year if I could be the USMLM Lark Spur programme officer. I had undergone pilot training earlier and I knew my two years of ground touring in East Germany had prepared me well for equipment identification, map reading, and the like. Two previous USMLM officers, who worked part-time on Lark Spur, had proven that the combination of proficient USMLM officers, with their equipment identification skills and local area familiarity enhanced that programme. USCOB owned the Lark Spur programme and its assets (planes and people) and realized that USMLM augmentation made for a more effective intelligence collection effort. This was a real win-win for the American intelligence aerial collection efforts within the BCZ.

  When his request was approved he became the first full-time USMLM Lark Spur Officer:

  A Berlin Brigade NCO, Staff Sgt St John, and I flew as aircraft crewmen out of Templehof Airfield. We both studied extant Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements that were submitted by various governmental agencies to guide us in our collection efforts, but also never missed an opportunity for targets of opportunity.

  During our missions, we wore fire-retardant Nomex flight suits with no insignia to provide some superficial masking of our identities. We did carry our military identification cards in case of having to land in East Germany. In actuality, we were pretty certain that the Soviets and East Germans knew what those aboard the Lark Spur aircraft were doing. It sometimes felt ridiculous knowing that the only people who really didn’t know the Lark Spur programme existed were our own American people. But those were some of the games played during the Cold War.

  He continued:

  Our aircraft were always outside the hangars so we carried our camera equipment in our aircraft helmet bags from the hangars to the aircraft and usually wore our helmets walking to the aircraft. As a photography lover, it was a privilege to have photographic equipment that I personally could not afford. We used Nikon F camera bodies, with or without motor drives, 50mm, 135mm, 500mm, and 1,000mm lenses, plus unlimited amounts of Kodak Tri-X black and white and Ektachrome colour film. Our onsite USMLM photo-processing laboratory completed the job and we could get film developed within hours in a rush. USMLM’s wide range of camera equipment, and especially our quick turnaround photographic laboratory, plus the experienced USMLM officers, who were quick at military equipment identification, may well have been the deciding factors for USCOB agreeing to our joint LARKSPUR operations and reports but USCOB retained programme ‘ownership’ and got first credit for outstanding reports. However, overall results were much better, more responsive, and we produced a very large number of Intelligence Information Reports (IIR) that helped greatly in satisfying the American intelligence community’s requirements.

  We removed the Beaver’s upper trapezoidal windows from the rear doors for several reasons. First, there was a firm mandate to minimize dropping any equipment from the aircraft while doing our ‘wing over’ at 45-degree-plus angles as we circled over targets for the best shots. Typically, SFC St John and I sat in the back, each looking out one side for designated targets that had outstanding intelligence requirements from the myriad of intelligence agencies, plus always seeking targets of opportunity. Generally, the Soviets and East Germans paid little attention to us; however, if we did experience any signs of hostility, we took it as an indicator that we might be observing new equipment or something out of the ordinary. This usually just doubled our interest. On such occasions, if we had an adventurous pilot, we would ask for a ‘wing over.’ Aerodynamics being what they are, this manoeuvre resulted in the aircraft spiralling down in altitude and we would ‘accidently’ slip below the 1,000ft AGL we were supposed to maintain.

  Major Spencer explained the outcomes:

  This resulted in much closer photos that were hand-focused at 1000 AGL (no automatic focus cameras were available in the 1970s). One had to concentrate, because the 500mm and 1,000mm lens on the Nikon F motor-driven body could eat up the 36 frames of a Tri-X 35mm film in a very few seconds. By putting the wing over and circling a target, we were able to capture many pictures of the same subject, which could then be viewed by special optics that yielded three-dimensional views and provided intelligence analysts with more information. We even were able to look down into the interior of targets such as tanks, self-propelled artillery, and armoured personnel carriers. The aircraft transponder, which sent our position and altitude to Berlin air traffic controllers, sometimes ‘accidently’ failed to work on such occasions and the pilots would receive a radio call notifying him that they had lost contact with us. It was always interesting that the transponder would magically come to life again when we reached 1,000ft AGL. The full-frame, better-quality pictures sometimes resulted in questions from Colonel Thorsen as to how we were able to obtain such great pictures at 1,000ft AGL. (I don’t remember Sgt St John’s superiors ever asking that question.) My response to our commander Colonel Thorsen was that it was just the effect of flying at 1,000ft AGL using a 1,000mm lens that makes it look like you are only one-foot away. He would only smile, shake his head, and walk away. He had been a military attaché in Warsaw, so knew very well that attachés and USMLM Air and Ground tour officers sometime took chances in order to succeed. And, sometimes it just was the better part of valour to not tell all.

  There were several intelligence-gathering advantages to the Lark Spur programme. Primarily, our aerial photographs presented equipment in a totally different perspective and provided details for analysts that satellites at the time could not obtain. They supplemented any ground-level views and gave a fuller picture of capabilities. Secondly, we enjoyed relative safety as compared to being detained, run off roads, assaulted, and especially being shot at by the Soviets and East Germans. However, it was not unusual to have weapons pointed at us and, more frequently, flare guns fired at the aircraft. The pilots had complete freedom to fly the plane as necessary to avoid flares, other aircraft, and so on. This allowed Sgt St John and me, as aircraft crewmen observers and photographers, to concentrate o
n our targets. After flying missions in the ‘ring’ for several months, we were able to discern patterns of behaviour such as what days training took place and where, what days were wash days, maintenance days, and inspection days, and so forth. Understanding these patterns helped guide us in our collection efforts. Our observations also enabled us to provide subjective comments and personal analysis of activities, tactics, and training that a desk analyst could not do as well as someone who actually had eyes on the target.

  Then Army Captain Tim Bloechl ran the programme from August 1984 to December 1986 as the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Officer for the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence (ODCSI). He described flying in the UV-20A:

  The aerial view of Soviet and East German facilities also provided a perspective of the difference between these forces. Soviet garrisons were often untidy and poorly maintained. Indeed, when one flew over the aircraft hangars at Oranienburg, you could look through the holes in the roof to count the helicopters housed inside. Trash was everywhere. On the other hand, the East German barracks were very well maintained. One could sense a higher degree of discipline and morale within the East German forces.

  Periodically USMLM officers would go on missions with us to check areas they were thinking about checking out the next day on the ground. On another occasion, in December of 1985 if I recall correctly, while in the vicinity of Oranienburg Airfield, three Soviet helicopters tried to interfere with our flight and it appeared to the pilot and crew members this was an attempt to force the plane down. So the plane left the area for a time, but when the crew felt the coast was clear, went right back to the airfield to see what they might be hiding. Our higher HQs was not very happy that they did so!

  Otherwise, we largely conducted each mission without incident. Our biggest challenge was usually weather. Low cloud ceilings and reduced visibility, particularly in the winter months, caused many mission cancellations. Also during the winter, it got awfully cold with the side door open on the plane!

  Describing the altitudes at which the aircraft operated then he said:

  The flight altitude was routinely 1,000ft (But when deemed important to mission execution, we flew below 1,000ft to as low as 500ft for short periods) and 3,000ft over the airfields. The MiGs used to routinely buzz us to mess with us. We sat sideways in the plane and opening the door – left to right – to hang out and take pictures.41

  An article from the US Army publication Soldiers in 1990 illustrates the rapidly changing situation in Berlin following The Wall’s collapse. The detachment now had six UH-1Hs and had three main tasks: providing priority air transport for US, British and French military personnel as well as US and West German government officials; conducting ‘special air missions as directed by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence’; and providing support to the US Berlin Brigade’s three infantry battalions. The unit establishment was some twenty-one soldiers and sixteen civilians, several of the latter being German mechanics responsible for unit-level maintenance and technical inspections, together with the US Army enlisted crew chiefs. The ten pilots were rated to fly both helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. The two UV-20As left in August 1991 as US activities in the city wound down.

  French Light Aircraft and Helicopter Flights in the BCZ

  French photographic flights over the BCZ started around 1960 using a single Cessna L-19E Bird Dog detached from the Platoon Aviation Légère de l’Armée de Terre de Commandant Chef de Forces Français en Allemange (Pl ALAT CC FFA). The aircraft was flown by ALAT pilots detached from Baden-Baden and Armée de l’Air (AdlA) pilots on the MMFL’s strength. Army and Air Force observers, of all ranks, were drawn from the MMFL. A Berlin detachment of Pl ALAT CC FFA formed at Berlin-Tegel on 1 August 1968 following the arrival of a second L-19. The L-19s were small and their tandem seating arrangement was far from ideal for photographic operations because the narrow cabin gave the observer very little manoeuvring room to use the large 400mm lenses, but provided the MMFL with an airborne photographic reconnaissance capability. The L-19s continued in service until 1993, close to the end of French operations in the city.42 The ALAT CC FFA title was used from 19 June 1969 until 1 September 1978 when it became the Liaison Squadron: 1 Army which itself disbanded on 31 May 1987.

  In May 1987 two SE3160 Alouette III light helicopters were detached from 12 Groupe d’Hélicoptères Légères (12 GHL) to provide security for a Berlin state visit by French President François Mitterrand. After the visit they remained in the city and continued operations within the Western Sectors until 1990. The two ALAT detachments at Berlin-Tegel were combined on 1 July 1989 to become the Détachment Aviation Légère de l’Armée de Terre Berlin (DETALAT BERLIN), subordinated to the Commandant of the Forces Français en Berlin (FFB). The combined detachment had two L-19Es that left Berlin on 21 April 1993 and the two Alouette IIIs departed on 30 June 1994.

  The ALAT L-19s were supplemented by Armée de l’Air (AdlA) Max-Holste MH-1521M Broussards based at Berlin-Tegel. These were flown by AdlA pilots on MMFL’s strength, in a similar way to the British use of their Chipmunks, to maintain their pilots’ qualifications as an overt justification for their presence. Observers were Army and Air Force officers, or NCOs, from the MMFL. The Broussard, being a larger aircraft, could carry up to six people in its cabin, which significantly improved the observation capabilities. The Broussard was replaced in 1988 by a De Havilland Canada DHC-6–300 Twin Otter which left in 1990 when the MMFL ceased operations.

  French flights in the BCZ were conducted in a similar manner to those of the other Allies. However, the French pushed the boundaries by using ‘technical’ flights to return aircraft to France for maintenance as an excuse for additional intelligence collection. Peter Jefferies recalls a flight in late 1969 when the French flew down the Centre Corridor, during which they took photographs and circled Soviet installations, in a similar fashion to a BCZ mission. Flights down the Centre Corridor allowed observation of several significant targets that were in PRAs, such as the Letzlinger Heide major training area and Mahlwinkel helicopter base. The flight attracted a very robust Soviet response. The French were very lucky that the aircraft was not engaged because nearly all Soviet installations outside the BCZ had active air defence sites in close proximity to them. They were certainly not used to seeing strange light aircraft manoeuvring at low level.

  Although there is no definitive evidence, Peter believes that subsequent French flights along the Centre Corridor were non-photographic because he never saw further photographs from these ‘technical’ flights. The French possibly decided that any photographs taken by these flights fell outside the Tri-Mission exchange agreement, so perhaps kept them to themselves. Following the Soviet protest to the 1969 flight, the French modified their procedures. Subsequent ‘technical’ flights required the aircraft to fly directly to West Germany without orbiting any Soviet installations en route, so these flights were probably confined to visual reconnaissance.

  A 1975 British report gives an example of French procedure. On 12 June the French posted a VFR flight plan down the Centre Corridor at below 2,500ft. The Soviet Controller raised the standard objection to Allied flights below that level, whilst the British and French maintained that in order to stay VFR and avoid cloud they might have to fly below 2,500ft. The exchange ended with the Soviet Controller stating that ‘in view of the fact that you are planning an unauthorised flight level that may bring about a dangerous situation in the air, I do not guarantee the safety of its flight’.43 He stamped the BASC flight card accordingly. Flying without radio or IFF contact, the aircraft flew along the Centre Corridor and landed at Braunschweig (Brunswick), and the crew informed the BASC French Controller that they had exited the Corridor.

  The DETALAT BERLIN’s main role was helicopter surveillance of The Wall and The Wire and the installations close to them from within the Western Sectors. The fixed-wing element often ventured beyond the city boundaries into the BCZ. After the MMFL stood down in September 1990, DETALAT
BERLIN provided a local photographic reconnaissance capability to the FFB, tasked by the 2ème Bureau at HQ FFB. In 1991 the German authorities opened up the airspace between the north boundary of the North Corridor and the south boundary of the Southern Corridor to military aircraft. Unlike the British and Americans, the French took full advantage of this airspace liberalisation. They had a cavalier approach to this ‘restriction’ and allowed the Alouettes to roam at will both inside and outside the designated airspace on photographic sorties. Images 36 and 37 were taken by DETALAT in 1993 and 1994 of Mahlwinkel and at Welzow, which was well outside the designated area. A YouTube video of the Soviet farewell parade and Open Day at Sperenberg on 27 May 1994 shows it being overflown by a DETALAT Alouette III.44