Looking Down the Corridors

by Kevin Wright

  Special Photographic Interpretation Reports (SPIR)

  SPIRs were an in-depth analysis tool that used all available photography and any other collateral intelligence to produce a rounded, assessed intelligence product. SPIRs were initiated either in response to a formal Intelligence Staff tasking, or by an individual PI after the operations officer’s authorisation. They were not usually time constrained. The analysis of the BMP-2 equipped Motor Rifle Regiment (MRR) at Schlotheim in the Southern Corridor is illustrated in image 48. Producing this level of detail involved many hours of study and analysis.

  The Divisional Studies: The ‘1910’ Reports 1968–731

  In 1968, G(Int) – the Intelligence Staff Branch at HQ BAOR – directed 6 (PI) Coy to carry out an in-depth study of two typical Soviet divisions. The initial report in 1969 became a seminal work proving the soundness of the analytical techniques used. Subsequent reports further refined them in the light of the experience gained. The initial report’s main aims were:

  • To analyse a barracks infrastructure, identify individual unit areas and calculate if there was sufficient accommodation to house the personnel, vehicles and equipment of the unit believed to be occupying that area.

  • To confirm the divisional units and sub-units occupying individual unit areas.

  • To confirm, or modify, the HQ BAOR Intelligence Staff’s publication on Divisional organisation of Soviet/GDR forces.

  • To record the units’ and sub-units’ vehicle and equipment holdings, compare them with the HQ BAOR Divisional Tables of Organisation and Equipment, and report any anomalies.

  • To report the presence of any units not held on the HQ BAOR divisional organisation.

  The two divisions selected as subjects for this mammoth study were the 19 Motor Rifle Division (19 MRD), subordinate to the 20 Guards Army (20 GA) housed in the Dallgow-Döberitz complex just to the west of Berlin, and the 10 Guards Tank Division (10 GTD), subordinate to the 3 Shock Army (3 SA) housed in Krampnitz and Potsdam. The choice of these two divisions was driven by the fact that their barracks lay under the BCZ so they could be subject to maximum coverage from Corridor, BCZ light aircraft and, in some cases, AMLM ground tour photography.

  The report’s production involved a large proportion of 6 (PI) Coy’s resources, including the current activities section, reporting on all coverage of the target areas, regardless of activity levels, and the special studies section, which concentrated on data analysis by studying equipment parking patterns, associating vehicles with specific sheds and bays, studying the turret number sequences and then comparing the findings with the published TO & E.

  The reports used the unit designators from the HQ BAOR ORBAT. These could not be derived from photography, which could only confirm or deny the type of unit occupying the area. The unit’s designation had to come from other intelligence sources. In August 1968, 19 MRD moved to Czechoslovakia as part of the 1968 invasion but they did not return to GSFG because, unknown to Western intelligence, they were transferred to mainland Russia, as the Soviet authorities considered them ‘tainted’ by their time in Czechoslovakia. It was some time before Western intelligence discovered that their replacement was the 35 Motor Rifle Division (35 MRD). In the interregnum what was actually 35 MRD was being reported as 19 MRD.

  The first ‘1910’ report, published in 1969, was a massive tome recording in detail the construction and capacity of the barracks accommodation and other infrastructure, the location of individual divisional units in the barracks complexes and their equipment holdings, including any anomalies with the published TO & E. Subsequent reports in 1970 to 1973 were smaller works that recorded the changes from the previous year’s report.

  The reports were invaluable to the international intelligence community and became the ‘gold standard’ for analytical reporting. The highlights included:

  • Confirmation that T-54/T-55 tanks equipped MRDs and T-62 equipped TDs.

  • The discovery and confirmation of the existence of an Independent Tank Battalion in 19 MRD equipped with 51 T-54/T-55 tanks.

  • Confirming the existence and locations of the Divisional Free Flight Rocket Battalions (FFR Bns). The signature items of equipment were often seen on local training areas but rarely in barracks (image 47). The BTR-60PA command vehicle, side number 952 seen with the battalion on the training area, was later seen in the barracks area associated with the FFR Bn which confirmed its occupancy.

  • Confirmation of the reinstatement of the Divisional Anti-Tank Battalion, equipped with 100mm T-12 anti-tank guns, to the 19 MRD ORBAT when it joined a divisional-level exercise in 1971. The unit had previously been declared surplus to the Divisional ORBAT in 1970.

  • The arrival of BMP-1 Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicles (AIFV) in GSFG in 1971.

  • The replacement of earlier equipment by modern, later generation, equipment in all arms and services.

  A comparison study covering parts of two other divisions, one of each type, located outside the BCZ was done to assess the validity of the findings of the ‘1910 studies’ and to ensure that the Soviets were not employing Maskirovska to deceive the intelligence community.2 The report found only minor differences between these divisions and the ‘1910’ ones, so the report’s concept appeared sound.

  Technical Intelligence Reports

  Technical intelligence reports (TIRs) were detailed analyses of new or modified equipment seen in the GDR. They used all available photographic sources, but predominantly that from AMLMs ground and air tours. Considerable analytical effort was expended in gathering technical intelligence and BCZ light aircraft flights had a unique value because they captured overhead views that were not usually visible to ground tours.3 They often managed to get close to equipment in barracks when it was opened up for inspection, routine maintenance or modification, with open hatches that often revealed the inner workings. Image 49 reveals the breech details of a 2S5 Giantsint-S 152mm self-propelled howitzer from which analysts produced details of its construction and operation. Image 50 shows the detailed layout of the engine compartment of a Mi-8 Hip helicopter. Analysis of electronic equipment, such as the ‘Flat Face B’ radar illustrated in image 51, was greatly assisted by the strong shadows on the image, which clearly show the shape of the radar sails. Operations research and procurement staffs used technical intelligence reports to help design future Western weapons systems required to engage and defeat the Warsaw Pact’s latest equipment.

  Reservists’ Reports

  The Reservists of 21 Int Coy (V) and 7010 Flt RAFVR produced a series of reports from the late 1970s to meet requests from intelligence staffs in Germany. These reports were not time-sensitive because of the limited time available to the reservists. 21 Int Coy (V) produced detailed studies of static Soviet Petroleum Oil and Lubricants (POL) sites which assessed their capacity and established if they were part of a POL logistics chain of depots along likely land forces’ axes of advance into NATO territory. Tactical pipeline storage in these facilities was an important indicator, because it could either provide dispersed refuelling facilities for passing units, or join depots together to establish a forward refuelling chain.

  The collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 rendered those reports obsolete, so the team were redirected to a series of tasks that HQ BAOR did not have the resources to address. They were an eclectic mix, including: confirming the scrapping of obsolete BA-64 armoured cars issued to factory militias/Kampfgruppen; providing evidence of the removal of sensitive material to Russia from the MfS (‘Stasi’) Headquarters in Berlin-Karlshorst; assessing the production flow of MBTs through the major workshop at Kirchmöser near Brandenburg; and undertaking a technical assessment of an ionospheric sounding antenna system. The last two reports were attributed to 21 Int Coy (V) and distributed throughout the international intelligence community, much to the amazement of the Volunteers’ commanding officer.

  In the 1980s, 7010 Flight RAFVR had started a series of studies of minor airfields and Soviet airfield s
upport vehicles to see whether there were sufficient to sustain operations and carry out operational turn rounds of the various aircraft types in use and repair any damage to them. Again the fall of The Wall caught up with these studies that consequently were never published. The TA and RAFVR PIs made a very significant contribution to intelligence-community’s Cold War operations in Germany and beyond and was ahead of their time.

  Significant Reports and Sightings

  Throughout the operations’ lives they were at the forefront of many first sightings and incidents, some of which were of historical significance. A selection are briefly described below to demonstrate the breadth of intelligence gained.

  Indicators and Warning

  In 1956 concentrations of vehicles were seen massing in barracks throughout the GDR. They subsequently deployed to Hungary to quell the uprising. The vacant barracks were then watched to await the return of units from Hungary to ascertain if the same type of unit returned to the same barracks.

  East–West relations took a further turn for the worse in 1961 as the second Berlin crisis escalated. Western politicians were understandably nervous and made strenuous efforts to avoid provoking the Soviets. One consequence of this increased tension was a total embargo on British photographic flights in the Corridors and BCZ. The almost overnight building of the infamous Berlin Wall on 16 August 1961 seriously curtailed the output from some intelligence sources and some ceased altogether. This tense atmosphere, coupled with limited hard intelligence, was fertile ground for rumour and speculation: unsubstantiated reports stated that the NVA was in East Berlin, contrary to the terms of the Four Power agreement. Soviet forces from mainland Russia were said to be massing to the east of Berlin. The lack of intelligence meant that the BRIXMIS Chipmunk assumed even greater importance in confirming or refuting these rumours. On the morning of 16 August the Chipmunk made a visual reconnaissance sortie with the crew allegedly still in their pyjamas! They reported the presence of East German Army troops in East Berlin. JIC (Germany) lobbied JIC London and the PM personally approved a single-figure number of Chipmunk photographic flights that had to be executed in a strictly defined time.4 The photography from the flights showed that the rumours were totally unfounded. There were no Soviet troops massing to the east of Berlin and NVA troops had withdrawn from the city, so the alert state was downgraded. The flights demonstrated that negative intelligence is as vital a component as positive intelligence in the generation of an accurate intelligence picture.

  In the spring of 1968 Alexander Dubçek’s Czechoslovak government contemplated leaving the Warsaw Pact and Soviet sphere of influence. In mid summer, a Corridor flight covered the Dallgow-Döberitz, complex housing 19 MRD. In the barracks the division’s vehicles were formed into unit columns, including their logistic vehicles. The presence of these vehicles was significant because they were usually parked in the unit’s POL and ammunition storage areas and never joined their parent unit, even for exercises. This was because they were fully loaded with their war stocks. The high level of activity in the complex delayed the production of the First Phase signal. When the PI responsible for the Dallgow-Döberitz input was pressed about the delay, his somewhat testy response was: ‘I’ve just finished counting 300 tanks in 263 [the location number] and I haven’t even started on the artillery and APCs.’ This caused a fluttering in the dovecotes because of the uncertainty it generated. Was this part of a plan to intervene in Czechoslovakia, or a precursor to invading the West? On 20 August the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia. As in the previous Hungarian crisis, the PIs monitored the barracks for evidence of units returning and to ensure that the same types of unit returned to their previous locations. In fact, some of the deployed units did not return to the GDR but were replaced by similar units on a ‘like-for-like’ basis.

  History repeated itself in December 1980 and January 1981 at the height of the Polish Solidarity crisis. Speculation was rife that the Soviets planned to intervene to suppress the crisis as they had in Czechoslovakia in 1968. An RAF Corridor mission over the Dallgow-Döberitz complex, now housing 35 MRD, showed that the logistic vehicles had again moved from their normal storage areas to join their parent units. The spectre of Czechoslovakia raised itself and the PI responsible, Peter Jefferies, reported this to his section commander, a WRAC captain who was later promoted to brigadier. They then spent several hours in a series of ‘full and frank’ exchanges justifying the call to their own immediate superiors and the HQ BAOR Intelligence Staff. In the event the Soviets did not invade Poland but the move of the logistic vehicles indicated that it was a serious option. Based on the call, SACEUR raised the NATO alert state as a precaution.

  Another indicator of likely Soviet military intentions in Poland came in April 1981 when an MMFL flight, with Major Roland Pietrini as the observer, photographed vehicles at Schönwalde marked with a prominent ‘K’ on their roofs (see image 56). Historically, during the interventions in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviets forces had painted similar identification markings on their vehicles so that they could be clearly distinguished from above to reduce the possibilities of fratricide.

  Capability Changes

  The Cold War period saw many enhancements to GSFG’s and the NVA’s capabilities to conduct combat operations.

  SA-2 Guideline SAM Deployed into the Forward Area

  The deployment of the SA-2 Guideline SAM system into the forward area increased GSFG’s capability and posed a credible threat to traffic in some of the Corridors and BCZ airspace. It also ratcheted up the pressure on Berlin, because its appearance had serious political and military implications. The effort expended untangling the facts from the fiction of the SA-2 story used multi-source intelligence to paint the full picture, with Corridor and BCZ photography playing a major part in this effort.

  A suspected military construction started in 1957 at Glau, south-west of Berlin, on the edge of the BCZ. It was seen on a Corridor mission and consisted of six emplacements circling a single large central one (image 53 shows a similar site in Cuba). Even at this early stage of construction it was camouflaged and high security was evident.

  The Allied interpretation units’ initial thoughts were that it was probably a new type of heavy anti-aircraft gun site, and its configuration and the arrival of heavily sheeted equipment in the six outer emplacements tended to confirm this. As construction carried on through 1957 and 1958 doubts began to emerge. The outer emplacements were of a ‘drive-through’ design, not normally associated with AAA systems, and ‘electronic-type’ vehicles appeared in the central emplacement area. A BRIXMIS ground tour photographed sheeted equipment on a train that was identical to that seen at Glau. This convinced the APIU (BAOR) PIs that they were not anti-aircraft guns. They took a bold step and reassessed their original findings and now identified Glau as a probable SAM site. The HQ BAOR Intelligence Staff supported this assessment and the importance of the site, which was the first SAM deployment outside Russia, was now fully appreciated. Some intelligence agencies expressed doubts about the reassessment but the appearance of SA-2 Guideline missiles on their transporters settled the matter. This unique opportunity to gather intelligence on a state-of-the-art Soviet SAM system, the missiles’ details, the target acquisition and fire control radars, the firing unit’s TO & E and the system’s support equipment was too good to be missed and was firmly grasped. A major collection effort was set in train, involving AMLM ground tours, Corridor and BCZ photographic flights, the ELINT collectors and technical intelligence staffs pooling their information to produce an all-source assessment.

  The site’s position on the very edge of the BCZ, the difficult access for AMLM ground tours and the overall sensitivity of the collection effort meant that the best way of photographing it, and the associated equipment, was the BRIXMIS Chipmunk. It could provide detailed, close-up images of the site and equipment from which technical drawings and the system’s modus operandi could be compiled. On Wednesday 16 July 1959 the Chipmunk, crewed by W
ing Commander Hans Neubroch as pilot and Squadron Leader Harry Nunwick, a specialist electronics officer, as observer, took off from Gatow. They set course for the site, adopting the normal flight profile until very close, when, to preserve an element of surprise, Hans took the aircraft down to 300ft and used the trees to conceal their approach. He then circled over the target twice so that Harry could take photographs. They then returned to Gatow at a normal altitude. The flight was an outstanding success. The following day, Hans and Group Captain J. Boardman, the Deputy Chief BRIXMIS, showed the photographs to the C-in-C RAF Germany, who congratulated Hans on a successful sortie. He arranged for the photographs to be flown to the US intelligence organisation in Frankfurt. By Wednesday 21 July they were on President Eisenhower’s desk.5

  Repeated photographic coverage of the site enabled the determination of an SA-2 battery’s TO & E and provided the first and very important initial reports on the missiles, transporters and launchers (image 54) as well as the first technical reports on the Spoon Rest target acquisition and Fan Song fire control radar (image 55). JARIC (UK) provided plans of cable runs and detailed scale drawings of all the system-associated equipment. BRIXMIS provided a steady stream of ground and air photography that showed more detail and new aspects of the equipment.

  The final analysis was a combination of the PI’s eye and the electronic eavesdropper’s ears that enabled the full determination of the radar’s appearance, configuration, operational frequencies, range and operation. This combined effort embraced the whole gamut of intelligence reporting by the Germany-based PI units: indicators and warning when site construction started; establishing its function when the first equipment appeared; determining the TO & E of the firing unit; and producing technical and equipment reports. The SA-2 Guideline was credited with downing Powers’ U-2 in 1960 and the system, albeit in highly modified form, remains in service today. Over the years the sites were progressively hardened.