A Larger Hope 1

by Ilaria L E Ramelli

  The patristic argument that evil, as ontologically non-subsistent, must disappear is criticized by McClymond as ungrounded (286). However, both Origen and Gregory did ground it in Paul’s assertion that God will be “all in all,” which they take as a proof that there will be no evil left in apokatastasis, lest God be found in evil.474 On the other hand, the identification of “the introducer of evil itself” with Satan (288) in Gregory’s Catechetical Oration 16 is correct, which announces the eschatological purification from evil for both humans and the devil as a benefit of “the great Mystery of the divine Incarnation.” Eriugena will remember this when teaching that thanks to the inhumanation of God’s Son, every creature, angel, demon, or human, is saved: Per inhumanationem Filii Dei omnis creatura, in caelo et in terra, salua facta est (Eriugena, Periph. 5.24).475

  I definitely agree with McClymond that “Origen’s doctrine of universal salvation cannot be isolated from his other teachings on the nature of the soul, free will, the relation of human beings to angels and demons, divine providence, the possibility of multiple world-ages, God’s reward according to merit,” etc. (319). Indeed, I argued for this on several occasions.476 Apokatastasis in Origen gains its power precisely from its “fit” within his coherent theological vision.

  Purgatory?

  It is correct that Origen and Origen’s followers equated universal eschatological submission and universal salvation on the basis of Philippians 2 (243) and, I would add, 1 Corinthians 15:24–28, often conflated.477 It is also true that the doctrine of purgatory did not exist before the thirteenth century (270). Clement, Origen, and Nyssen laid the foundations for this notion (and actually many eschatological passages in Gregory were later interpreted as referring to purgatory), but, while purgatory was later distinguished from hell, what these patristic universalists taught is that hell is in fact a purgatory.

  McClymond on Contemporary Origen Scholarship

  McClymond’s chapter on Origen starts with a correct statement: there was no time when Origen was not controversial—it was normal to consider him theologically suspect (232).478 And I agree that Nyssen, Evagrius, and Eriugena had their own versions of universalism (233), grounded in their own theologies. They all are very much indebted to Origen, as they show both explicitly and implicitly; Eriugena overtly cites Origen as his main authority on apokatastasis, and Nyssen even “copied” his arguments and scriptural quotations in support of it.479 I agree too that Origen did not invent Christian universalism (234), but—and here is where we part company—he didn’t appeal to gnostic teachings in support of his doctrine of apokatastasis (contra McClymond, 234), but rather, explicitly, to the Bible (OT and NT), inter-testamentary literature, and some philosophical (Platonic) tenets, such as the ontological non-subsistence of evil, which corresponds to the biblical teaching that evil was not created by God. At the same time, he combated gnostic ideas about freewill and soteriology all the time. The Bible, Jewish-Christian literature, the Petrine tradition, Bardaisan and Clement, and a Platonism consonant with Scripture, are the most likely sources of Origen’s doctrine of apokatastasis.

  In a brief history of the rehabilitation of Origen in recent decades, I am honored to see the account of my own work on Origen (237–38, close to the treatment of Henri Crouzel). This, like my book on Origen in preparation, is definitely no pre-constructed apologetics, but is based on a thorough study of all the texts of Origen, his antecedents in both Christian and “pagan” philosophical thought, his milieu, and his followers.

  The Rufinus–Jerome Debate on Origen

  Rufinus as a Good Interpreter of Origen

  Part of the debate on the orthodoxy (or otherwise) of Origen relates to the defense of Origen provided by his follower Rufinus. Is Rufinus’ orthodox Origen a faithful presentation of the real Origen or a whitewash to cover over his sub-orthodox ideas? McClymond dismisses Rufinus’ pro-Origen works as an implausible attempt to make him palatable to the orthodox. However, scholars are progressively exposing Rufinus’ deep understanding of the aims of Origen’s thought—entirely grounded in the concern for theodicy—as well as his overall reliability as a translator, who abridged, simplified, and glossed Origen’s texts, more than altering them. Sidonius Apollinaris highly praised the quality of Rufinus’ versions: Rufinus grasped “both the letter and the sense” of Origen’s oeuvre (ad uerbum sententiamque, Ep. 2.9.5) and translated Origen even better than Apuleius translated Plato, and Cicero Demosthenes. As Rufinus himself states in the epilogue to his translation of Origen’s Commentary on Romans, in his versions of the Homilies on Joshua, Judges, and Psalms, he translated simply, without toiling to adapt Origen’s text to the Latin public (simpliciter ut inuenimus et non multo cum labore). This is also confirmed by the newly discovered Greek homilies on Psalms in the Munich codex, which allow for further, fairly extensive comparison between Origen’s Greek and Rufinus’ translation, and confirms the latter’s overall reliability.480 Sometimes, Rufinus performs tiny adaptations and simplifications, for instance by dropping technical terms such as epinoia (H.2Ps.36.1, fol.42v), in reference to Christ’s epinoiai, or ways of conceptualizing Christ-Logos-Wisdom. Rufinus’ reliability is also confirmed by Edmon Gallagher: in general, Rufinus reflected faithfully Origen’s NT canon.481 In his preface to his translation of Princ. 2, Rufinus claims that he was simply following Jerome’s method: smoothing out “stumbling blocks” in Greek, that Romans might find nothing “against our faith.” Jerome admitted that he had “emended what he wished” in his translation of First Principles (Ep. 84.7). Pace McClymond, it is not the case that Jerome translated faithfully, while Rufinus alone made Origen “more orthodox.”482 Hilary and Victorinus paraphrased Origen’s homilies;483 Ambrose translated Origen’s Hexaëmeron, but made it look like Hippolytus and Basil (Jerome Ep.84.7).

  According to McClymond, Origen’s work was rejected by the church as heretical. However, Photius in the ninth century could still read all of Origen’s Peri archōn in Greek: thus, even Origen’s most “dangerous” work was not yet destroyed by that time, not even in its original Greek, over three centuries after Justinian and the supposed anathemas against Origen. Moreover, the Latin translation of Origen’s Peri archōn and other speculative works of Origen, by Rufinus, who deemed and presented Origen as “orthodox,” should (on McClymond’s account) have been destroyed; yet it survived up to Eriugena and the mediaeval monasteries, and has reached us in numerous manuscripts. Paradoxically, what has perished is not Rufinus’ version, but Jerome’s (after his volte-face), which aimed at uncovering the allegedly “heretical” nature of Origen’s work.

  Was Origen’s Work Interpolated?

  Rufinus famously stated that Origen’s manuscripts were tampered with, which introduced questionable ideas not his own. This claim is declared by McClymond to be an “implausible suggestion” (309), but in fact this was what Origen himself lamented already in his earthly life.484 It is, indeed, what Origen denounced in a letter, containing Origen’s self-fashioning as a victim of misunderstandings and interpolations, reported by Rufinus in Adult. 7, which, significantly, was placed by him at the very end of his translation of Pamphilus’ apology for Origen. This letter is Origen’s famous letter to friends in Alexandria. After addressing the charge of supporting the salvation of the devil, Origen focuses on the interpolations in his works and adduces three examples.485 The first concerns a “heretic” and promoter of “heresy” (quidam auctor haereseos) who, after having a public debate with Origen in the presence of many people, “took the manuscript from those who wrote it, and he added what he liked, cancelled what he liked, and changed what seemed best to him, and then he circulated this manuscript under my name!” (accipiens ab his qui descripserant codicem, quae uoluit addidit et quae uoluit abstulit et quae ei uisum est permutauit, circumferens tamquam ex nomine nostro). Some Christians in Palestine then sent someone to Origen, who was in Athens, to receive the non-interpolated copy of the debate from Origen himself. Origen at last
found it, not without difficulty, given its state of neglect.486

  The second example adduced by Origen in his self-fashioning as a victim of plagiarism and falsity is not even an interpolation, but a sheer invention, coming from a lack of intellectual confrontation. A heretic in Ephesus, as Origen recounts, first refused to have an open discussion with him: “Finally, in Ephesus, when a heretic saw me, he did not want to have an encounter with me: he did not even want to open his mouth with me, although I have no idea why he wanted to avoid that.”487 After avoiding a discussion with Origen, this man invented a fictitious debate and spread this false text in various places: then, he composed a discussion between me and him in the way he liked, and transmitted it to his disciples: those who were in Rome, but undoubtedly also to others who live in other places” (postea ex nomine meo et suo conscripsit qualem uoluit disputationem et misit ad discipulos suos . . . ad eos qui Romae erant, sed non dubito quod et ad alios qui per diuersa sunt). Indeed, this adversary of Origen spread this spurious text in Antioch, too: “He also strolled around Antioch (and mocked at me), before I arrived there, so that the above-mentioned written debate, which he brought with himself, fell in the hands of many of our friends and followers” (insultabat autem et apud Antiochiam, priusquam ego illuc uenirem, ita ut et ad conplurimos nostrorum perueniret ipsa disputatio quam portabat).

  When Origen finally met this opponent publicly, he asked him to produce that dialogue, in order to show that the parts ascribed to himself did not bear his own style and way of arguing: “But when I arrived and was there, I argued with him in the presence of many. Since he still continued, without any restraint, to maintain the false shamelessly, I asked that his book could be produced in the middle of us, that my style could be recognized by our brothers, who definitely know well which my arguments are in a discussion and what teaching I generally use.”488 The “heretic,” however, refused to meet Origen’s requests, having no courage to produce his falsified book, and was thereby convicted of forgery: “Now, this man dared not produce the book, so he was found guilty by all and was convicted of forgery, and therefore the brothers were persuaded not to pay attention to accusations.”489 Origen means specifically accusations against himself—which were abundant already during his life and increased after his death—and, by extension, charges against anyone.

  The third example concerns a letter of Origen that was tampered with: “If anyone wants to believe me, since I am speaking under the eyes of God, let this person also believe me concerning the parts which in my letter are interpolated, that is, added afterwards (by someone else). If, instead, one does not want to believe, but simply wants to speak evil of me, he does not actually inflict any harm on me: rather, he himself will turn out to be a false witness against his neighbor before God, since he utters false testimony himself, or gives credit490 to those who utter it.”491 Origen, therefore, represents himself not only as innocent and not responsible of all the tampering which has been done by others with his works, but even warns the interpolators and falsifiers that their action does not harm him, but rather themselves, since they turn out to be guilty of false testimony. This is a mortal sin, being against the Eighth Commandment (Exod 20:16), and God will punish it.

  Origen denounced the same phenomenon of the adulteration of his works in another letter, also read by Rufinus: he adds this particular after reporting the letter of Origen I have analyzed above: “Origen himself, while he was still on earth, complained about the passages that he could personally discover as interpolations and falsifications in his own oeuvre. Actually, in another letter as well, I remember having read a similar complaint concerning the falsification of his writings. I have no copy of this letter now here with me, that I may add Origen’s testimony to the others I have already adduced, testifying to their truth.”492

  For Rufinus

  In the treatment of the Jerome-Rufinus debate over Origen,493 McClymond suggests that “Rufinus tolerated Origen’s errors because he did not understand them,” since “his grasp of theological issues was rather weak” (310). However, another reason for his toleration of Origen may be that he knew that these were not errors (indeed, in many respects Origen grounded future orthodox tenets494). The “minimalist” definition of orthodoxy rightly individuated by Elizabeth Clark about Rufinus (“God the Creator, the Incarnation, the Trinity,” with “freedom to discuss points that had not been so defined, such as the origin of the soul and the fate of the devil,” cited on p. 310) indeed comes straight from the very same definition by Origen in the prologue of Peri archōn. Jerome’s attack on Origen’s apokatastasis (though only after his apparent U-turn against Origen) on the grounds that “it allowed no difference of rank in heaven” (315) refers merely to the very last stage of the process of restoration. Origen, in fact, did postulate big postmortem differences, depending on merits and demerits, and these lay in the length and severity of purifying punishments.

  Clement, Origen’s Precursor

  Regarding Clement, the precursor of Origen’s doctrine of apokatastasis (together, I add, with Bardaisan), I agree with McClymond that he read and commented on the Apocalypse of Peter and was influenced by its penchant for universal salvation (240); indeed, I argued for this thesis in “Origen, Bardaisan,”495 in Apokatastasis, 67–136, and further in “Stromateis VII and Clement’s Hints of the Theory of Apokatastasis.”496 A fragment from the Hypotyposeis, in which it is declared that God “saves all,” is rightly taken as evidence of Clement’s teaching on universal salvation (242). Only, his teaching on apokatastasis, mainly based on the remedial nature of postmortem punishment, is not so systematic and widespread as in Origen. Lilla claimed that Clement intended to turn the Christian faith into a philosophical system (as we are reminded by McClymond on p. 240); but surely he wanted to defend Christianity from the accusation of irrationality and intended to support faith through the logos, as I have argued elsewhere.497

  Photius’ accusations to Clement (244) were studied by Piotr Ashwin,498 who, as we are reminded on p. 245, thinks that the accusation of believing in metensomatosis finds no confirmation in Clement’s oeuvre. This appears true, although new research is going on by Sami Yli-Karjanmaa, who has already written an interesting although somewhat controversial book, Reincarnation in Philo of Alexandria (Atlanta: SBL, 2015), and is extending the research to Clement.

  Contra McClymond, the “interpretation of ‘gnostic’ in terms of soteriological elitism and soteriological determinism,” an interpretation I endorse, is not my own (247), but rather Clement’s and especially Origen’s; on this basis Origen constructed his polemic, which led to his doctrine of apokatastasis. Interestingly, in many respects Origen’s criticism of “gnostic” ideas coincided with the criticism of his contemporary (and fellow-disciple at Ammonius’) Plotinus against the “gnostic” worldview: he was interestingly criticizing “gnostics” who attended his school.499 Of course, I am well aware that the writings from the Nag Hammadi Corpus differ from the accounts of the heresiologists.500 It is worth noticing that Origen and Plotinus are more cautious and less schematic in their understanding of “gnostic” tenets, which they heard and knew prima manu.

  Gregory of Nyssa and Origen

  Gregory Draws on Origen

  McClymond’s short account of what I call Gregory of Nyssa’s “theology of freedom” on p. 280 is well done. It must, however, be noticed that Gregory’s account of freewill depends entirely on Origen, as I extensively argued elsewhere.501 In this connection, Gregory’s tenet that “evil exists only through the exercise of the creatures’ will against God” (285) is exactly what Origen taught in his ontological monism. Nyssen’s short treatise on 1 Corinthians 15:28, In Illud: Tunc et Ipse Filius (briefly examined on 285–86), depends entirely on Origen’s exegesis and links anti-subordinationism (in reference to the Son) to the argument of apokatastasis, through the identification of the submission of all humanity—the body of Christ—to God as its salvation.502

 
McClymond is correct that for Gregory “free and deliberate choice by individual human beings is not in contradiction to corporate salvation but is integrated into it” (289). This held true for Origen as well, and I think it depends on the fact that they both embraced ethical intellectualism.503 That the purifying fire may last pros holon aiōna refers to the future age before apokatastasis, according to Gregory, as well as according to Origen.504 Gregory’s insistence on postmortem suffering (281) is rightly indicated: it is purifying and relates to the theology of the cross. Plato himself had insisted that evil can be removed only through suffering, something that struck both Origen and Gregory, although we are not sure that Plato was speaking of vicarious suffering. This, however, along with Scripture, was an important source for their conception of purifying suffering.

  Gregory Did Not Reject Origen

  McClymond rightly observes that Nyssen surely “rejected the doctrine of preexistent souls that fell from the love of God and then inhabited mortal bodies” (280), but neither did Origen endorse this theory. Gregory in Op.hom. 28, which links metensomatosis to the preexistence of souls theorized by people who wrote on protology, is not aimed at criticizing Origen (contra McClymond, 280n.183), as most people think, but likely “pagan” Neoplatonists such as Porphyry, who wrote On First Principles, or Manichaeans.505 Nyssen, claims McClymond, “offered a version of universalism that omitted Origen’s preexistent souls” (320): but as I have argued, this assertion, with regard to Origen, is very debatable.506

  (Theophilus of Alexandria,507 in the Festal Letter of 404, specified that the first humans were not “naked souls” (305–7). Who was he opposing? Origen? This idea of “naked souls” was certainly denied by Origen himself, who never postulated a preexistence of disembodied souls.508 It may instead be Theophilus’ response to his misunderstanding of Evagrius’ notion of a “pure or naked Nous.”)