by Lynn Schler
Following the publication of the report, Khayam marked his decisive victory by celebrating the Apapa crisis, as he reminisced: “It was this incident which led to the inauguration, to the setting up of specific machineries for negotiations and settlement of problems, to the real recognition of the Nigerian Union of Seamen, to more respect of Nigerian Seamen because they had proved they are not cowards but can stand up, protest and demonstrate and assert their views before management. We mustered our families, sons, daughters, wives in the most spectacular demonstration ever held in our country.”47 The Salubi report, then, had the unintended consequence of bestowing in Khayam a sense of proprietorship over the official narrative of the seamen’s victory, and enabled him to boldly rewrite the history of his role in it.
Thus, the published report empowered Khayam, and he in turn reminded seamen of his new power: “From now own, we must devote all our energies in working harder, in improving our skill and mastery of the job, in maintaining respect for our superiors and preserving patience until we are on port to report our grievances to the union.”48 Over the course of two and a half weeks in July 1960, Khayam addressed the union four times, calling for seamen to end “tribalism, sluggishness,” and he also spoke “on the need for efficiency, discipline, and consistent cooperation with their superiors.”49
Sidi Khayam in the Aftermath of the Salubi Report
The Salubi report might have solidified Khayam’s status as the undisputed spokesman for Nigerian seamen, but for shipping companies, this did not have the disastrous outcome they had feared. Much to the surprise of management, Khayam’s improved standing led him to adopt a more conciliatory tone with Elder Dempster. This same outcome has been documented in the history of labor unrest throughout Africa in the era of decolonization. According to Fred Cooper, colonial powers commonly sought to mitigate dissent by establishing new channels for negotiations between union leaders and employers. Once union leaders were granted more power and influence with both management and the colonial regime, they shifted their focus to containing the demands of labor and maintaining order.50 They moderated their tone, sought ways to cooperate, and ultimately abandoned the radical stances they had previously maintained.
The shift in Sidi Khayam’s approach toward management following the Salubi report was immediate. He now sought reconciliation and collaboration with Elder Dempster officials. As he wrote in August 1960, “We can radically remove once and for all our present relationship from the wilderness of mistrust into mutual and common purpose.”51 The radical change in Khayam’s attitude did not go unnoticed by management, but not everyone was convinced. One official wrote, “On the few occasions that I have personally met him, Khayam has always been well behaved. I still, however, subscribe to the view that leopards do not usually change their spots. It may well be that Khayam will reform and I am quite ready to give him this opportunity. I will not, however, disguise the fact that doubts still linger.”52 While Khayam did not immediately win their trust, shipping officials did recognize a shift in the general secretary’s allegiances, and one Elder Dempster official wrote, “There is a very cordial atmosphere prevailing in our day to day relations with the Nigerian Union of Seamen. Several times in the past few weeks Mr. Khayam and other senior Union officials have been in contact with us on various subjects and a great deal of good sense and goodwill has been shown and without going into great detail there have been occasions when misinformed seamen making unreasonable demands have been sharply cautioned in our presence by the Union.”53
The new proximity to management required that Khayam and the union give up the rhetoric of racial oppression. In a striking turnaround, he called upon seamen to abandon accusations of racial discrimination. Khayam now explained to union members, “We have a tendency of feeling that everything on the ship is colour bar while using this as pretext for escaping our responsibilities. . . . We must effectively learn more and more that it is not only colour. People cheat and oppress others because they believe in oppression which gives them profits, and whether black or white.”54
Khayam’s new position on race issues could be seen in the Dan Fodio incident of 1960, when allegations of racial tensions brought Khayam on board to investigate. Khayam claimed that his responsibilities in investigating the incident required him to be totally impartial: “I realized early that to make a success of the venture, I had to put myself in a dual position, so to speak, hold no brief for any seaman just because he is African.”55 Khayam asserted that the union wanted to avoid a racial discourse: “The Nigerian Union of Seamen is not interested in racial and social differences and is not anxious to promote any such ideas. . . . We admire white crews and black ones alike and consider some white crews very, very disciplined and social people.”56 Khayam’s investigation led him to conclude that there was no racial discrimination on the ship, and that the real menace on board was “the pettiness of tribalism.” His focus shifted to internal tensions among Nigerian crews, as he wrote: “The trouble right now is not between Africans and Whites, it is between the African and himself.”57
For the shipping companies, the retreat from racial discourse provided security that conflicts with Nigerian labor would remain within a moderate range of disputes between employers and wage earners. As this was a prerequisite for securing his own position, Sidi Khayam was willing to make this compromise. Sidi Khayam’s reconciliation with management was similar to the shift made by an entire sector of the Nigerian political and economic elite as they were slowly integrated into positions of power and influence in the process of decolonization. New avenues for advancement and integration of the educated elite into the power apparatuses of the government and economy resulted in a quick reversal of anticolonial attitudes among this elite. Armed with newly acquired powers, Zachernuk wrote, “the Nigerian leadership assumed a more cordial attitude toward foreign capital and expatriate experts.”58
“NIGERIANIZATION” AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF POWER
In the aftermath of the Apapa strike and the Salubi report, Khayam also took steps to solidify his authority among the seamen themselves. This could be accomplished only by distancing Nigerian seamen from alternative influences within and beyond Nigeria. The Salubi report detailed the role played by diaspora Africans in the Apapa strike, and made it clear that Liverpool-based Nigerians offered to the union an alternative source of leadership for seamen. The Apapa incident only deepened this connection, and reports following the strike claimed that growing numbers of Nigerian seamen were using the Stanley House as their base in Liverpool.59 Seeking the unambiguous loyalty of the seamen, Khayam wanted to redirect their focus toward Lagos and away from Liverpool. He began to portray Liverpool activists as bad influences, and worked with Elder Dempster to cut ties between seamen and the Nigerian National Union (NNU) based in Liverpool. According to an Elder Dempster representative in Lagos, Khayam was “repeatedly bothered by destructive advice given to his seamen from people attached to the N.N.U. . . . [He] is quite sure that much of the discontent which shows itself among his men is the direct result of advice from this organization.” According to the report, Khayam opposed the efforts of the NNU to establish a “Nigeria House” in Liverpool, claiming that the members of the organization were Communists and would use the building to spread propaganda.60 In blocking the development of a community center for Nigerians, Khayam was attempting to reduce the potential for Liverpool-based Nigerians to wield their influence with seamen.
Khayam also enlisted the help of the British-based National Union of Seamen in discrediting Liverpool Nigerians and their interventions in seamen’s protests. The Salubi report had recommended that a representative of the British seamen’s union be stationed in Lagos to advise the Nigerians on trade union organization and to help negotiate relations with management. At first, Khayam strongly opposed any intervention from the NUS, and he refused offers from Sir Thomas Yates of the NUS to mediate between the Nigerian union and Elder Dempster. He claimed that the Nigerian Union of Seamen ha
d to be completely independent.61 His ulterior motive was to block the influence of the British union on local processes, and he said that the seamen would not agree “to the introduction of someone from outside.”62 Despite Khayam’s opposition, the NUS sent officer A. Paxton to Nigeria at the beginning of 1960. Khayam was ambivalent about Paxton’s appearance at first, but he quickly warmed to him. As Paxton reported on the week of his arrival, “Khayam said he had kept me under close observation all day Monday and had decided I was a good man and recommended to his Executive that I should be accepted to give all the help I can to carry out Salubi report recommendations.”63 Paxton soon became Khayam’s ally, and Khayam enlisted his help in blocking the ongoing influence of Liverpool-based Nigerians among seamen. Paxton reported to Yates in August 1960:
Khayam has asked me to pass on his thanks for your assistance with telegrams to various ships in Liverpool. He is firmly convinced that the cable he received from crews of ships named was not the work of his own men. He reckons that words used in the cable would not be understood by African seamen and while the men may have knowledge of it he is sure that it was worded and inspired by somebody ashore in Liverpool. He also says that this is not the first time that elements ashore have tried to influence his members to take action against their own interests. . . . Khayam intends to visit the various ships concerned on their arrival at Lagos and advise his members not to be influenced by anybody abroad unless on the advice of his Executive.64
Khayam also sought to eliminate opposition within the seamen’s union. He was particularly sensitive to the potential for Kru seamen based in Lagos to challenge his authority. Kru seamen were known to oppose organizing efforts of the Nigerian union, and they regularly broke ranks during strikes and onboard protests. Thus, following the publishing of the Salubi report, Khayam demanded that all Freetown ratings be removed from the Lagos registry. According to one Kru steward on the MV Sekondi, Khayam was angered by Freetown ratings who did not submit to his authority or join in protests called by the union. In a letter to Elder Dempster, the Kru seaman claimed that Khayam was attempting to run Sierra Leoneans out of Lagos, saying: “You Freetown people always make trouble for us Nigerian men who want to strike. He then asked me for me Union card stating that I would not get any more jobs off Elder Dempster ships unless I should go back to Freetown.”65 Starting in early October 1959, as the result of pressure from the Union, Freetown ratings were gradually removed from Lagos articles.66
The process of decolonization enabled these kinds of maneuvers, as Khayam drew upon nationalist rhetoric to consolidate his power. Under the banner of “Nigerianization,” the union leadership was able to consolidate its power both vis-à-vis management and over the rank- and file membership. As soon as nationalism became the main trope around which Nigerians were organizing, it was easier for Khayam to sideline competing solidarities. The discourse of “Nigerianization” provided a justification for a turn inward, and a hardening of ideologies and identities around new political borders.
THE NIGERIAN UNION OF SEAMEN IN THE POSTCOLONIAL ERA
As Sidi Khayam moved closer to the colonial power elite in the aftermath of the Salubi report, his autonomy, and that of the seamen’s union, was compromised in the process. Khayam was not alone in this outcome, and trade union leaders across Africa experienced a similar loss of power as a result of political maneuvering in the era of decolonization. As Björn Beckman, Sakhela Buhlungu, and Lloyd Sachikonye have argued, trade union leaders who allowed themselves to be co-opted into positions of power ultimately lost the capacity to pursue an autonomous agenda.67
The transition to independence further weakened the seamen’s union as an instrument of labor agitation and organizing in part because the Nigerian government adopted similar strategies to those of the British for dealing with the potential threat of labor unrest. According to Peter Waterman, trade unions in postcolonial Nigeria were regularly undermined and weakened by a process similar to the one seen in the aftermath of the Apapa strike. In times of unrest, union leaders were co-opted by the government, and awarded recognition, power, and influence in exchange for abandoning more radical stances. The effect was to prevent, undermine, or domesticate trade unionism: “Trade union leaders who were willing to ally themselves with one or another of the major parties were favoured with posts on government boards, parliamentary seats and memberships of delegations abroad.”68 Waterman claimed that these tactics served to moderate and tame the radical tendencies among union leaders.
Although Nigerian trade unions in the postcolonial era could count to their credit some effective initiatives, such as the General Strike of 1964, organized labor made very few actual gains for working classes following independence. As many scholars have noted, infighting within unions, caused largely by ethnic competition and struggles for limited resources, handicapped unions as effective advocates for labor.69 Trade unions were also neutralized by state interventions aimed at keeping labor movements in check, and limiting industrial action and political resistance.70 Thus, in 1968, under the pretext of the state of emergency necessitated by the civil war, unions were barred from initiating strikes. After the war, the ban was only partially lifted, with workers in several key industries prohibited from striking. In 1976, the state forced the dismissal of leading trade unionists such as Michael Imoudu and Wahab Goodluck from their leadership positions in their respective unions. Finally, the military government of 1978 dissolved all labor federations and existing trade unions, banned key leaders from holding office, outlawed affiliation to international labor centers, and instituted a new unitary national union structure, known as the Nigerian Labour Congress.71 All of these offensives were debilitating for trade unions in postcolonial Nigeria, already engulfed in factionalism.
Ultimately, rank-and-file labor paid the price for the weakening of the Nigerian seamen’s union in the transition to independence. The Nigerian seamen who had been accustomed to relying on a broad range of ideological and geographical solidarities across the black diaspora now faced a process of Nigerianization that limited opportunities for garnering support or inspiration from outside Nigeria. Many blamed Khayam for their weakened position in the postcolonial era, claiming that he had abandoned the seamen and manipulated his new position of power for his personal benefit alone.
Despite the broad-based support that Khayam had during his first two years as general secretary, following independence, seamen accused him of becoming corrupt like the officers who preceded him.72 A report from an official of the Palm Line in 1963 claimed that Khayam was having a tough time with union members, and he could not account for union funds. Animosity against Khayam was so great that he reportedly had to flee from a union meeting.73 Disappointment with Khayam was described by one seaman: “Our rights that we were supposed to get from both the Management of Elder Dempster Line and the Federal Government were not given to us, so, he failed in his promise.” According to this seaman, Khayam put more effort into his own political career: “He was busy with other trade union activities because these people also wanted him and he abandoned us without fulfilling his promise to us.”74 Others were far more critical of Khayam, as can be seen in the following interview with a former seaman:
R: A useless man . . . He was one of those people who stole Nigerians’ money. . . . Khayam collected money from seamen’s union and did not deliver as he was delegated to do. . . . All the benefits and percentage seamen’s union were supposed to get, he collected all of them, everything.
Q: Do you mean that seamen didn’t like him?
R: Never, how would they like him, a thief? Nobody likes a rogue! Someone steals from me and you expect me to like him? Some did like him because they were given part of the stolen money but as for me, I was always mad at them for stealing. You had to pay to the union. . . . This man, Khayam, we paid dues to him from our stipend. We didn’t have a house of our own—no chair, no car of our own. He is a bloody rogue. For so many years, the union never had any property or offi
ce where it could operate from and we all paid our compulsory dues to him. These are people who spoilt Nigeria. Some goods like a freezer, a fridge, a bed, that he cannot ordinarily afford to buy, all he owned and yet he never did anything to develop the union. What! We placed [him] in position of authority and [he] didn’t do anything!75
For Nigerian seamen, the political and ideological currents favoring the strengthening of the union served to disempower them in their ship-based protests, and the union’s insistence that crews rely solely on a “Nigerian” leadership rather than a fluid set of tools based in a multitude of locations represented a profound silencing. The imposition of Nigerianization severed the historic racial and class links that seamen had forged between themselves and others beyond the borders of Nigeria. The Apapa strike, and hundreds of incidents leading up to this action, grew out of a belief among African seamen that they could achieve the vision of justice they constructed for themselves. Their struggles were not limited to concerns over pay scales and clothing allowances, but expressed deeper and more fundamental wishes for color-blind camaraderie of men, perhaps similar to that enjoyed by black seamen in the Age of Sail. Crews fought discrimination through transnational alliances, and their sense of empowerment led to creative and forceful initiatives such as walkouts and demands for firing of their European bosses. The Salubi inquiry was a typical and effective tactic of the colonial regime and local Westernized elites to eliminate the radical and destabilizing creative force of African laborers that was so clearly evident in the Apapa strike.
