by Lynn Schler
In the era following the publication of the Salubi report, seamen continued to suffer racial oppression, but they also internalized the fact that they could no longer protest for themselves. This can be seen in the following letter from the crew of the MV Apapa at port in Liverpool in 1961:
To our greatest surprise, when we arrive at Las Palmas this trip . . . the stewards who feel to buy drinks collect their money and give it to one man. The cleaners do likewise. On those men returning the ship, the captain was on the gangway himself and started to dump these drinks in the water before the passengers who were looking [at] the view of the town. Despite all the pleas by the head cleaner, he dump everything, including only one that Ibeji hold for himself. . . . Despite all the explanations to the captain, the drinks were dumped. The attitude so provoked our minds. Because none of that of the [white] sailors were dumped so we [took] it for another discrimination so an emergency general meeting was called and it last 20 minutes. We took a decision the two head men were delegated to the captain that we the entire crew want our drinks or he pay for them. . . . The captain promised to pay for the drinks. The headmen told him . . . that he cannot take it upon himself to accept the money for the whole crew . . . before we sail way on the Thurdsay [sic] the 20th we do not take any step either, we are just putting it to your knowledge at the same time we would like to know from you whether to receive the money from him or not. Reply not needed until our arrival.76
The seamen’s letter is testimony to the entrenchment of the union’s authority in the postcolonial era, and the recognition among seamen that they could no longer act for themselves. We have seen that Nigerian seamen successfully exploited opportunities arising within the context of colonialism to participate in globalized economies and cultures, exposing them to new solidarities and empowering them to seek an improvement in their lives. At the same time, political, economic, and ideological actions taken by union leaders in the era of decolonization sought to secure lasting power and influence for themselves through the manipulation of political institutions, and this occurred continually at the expense of seamen’s autonomy. Thus, while able to engage with the globalized world, African seamen were prevented in the transition from colonialism to independence to secure for themselves positions of power and autonomy as an effective labor movement in the postcolonial context. As will be seen, the era of independence brought with it new contradictory and ambiguous experiences for Nigerian seamen.
4
The Birth of the Nigerian National Shipping Line
WHILE SEAMEN WERE AGITATING for better working conditions and an end to discrimination onboard Elder Dempster ships in 1959, the political elite of Nigeria were taking steps to strengthen Nigeria’s position in the international system by creating a national shipping line. The establishment of a national line in 1959 was promoted as a vital step in Nigerians’ march toward political and economic independence, and the clamoring for an indigenous shipping company was steeped in nationalist discourse and ideology. The vocal struggle of politicians calling for Nigerians to break free from the hold of colonial economic exploitation and to take control over their own national destiny through the establishment of a national line quite probably played a role in emboldening seamen in their struggle for rights on colonial vessels. For political and commercial elites, the Nigerian National Shipping Line (NNSL) aroused nationalist anticipation and optimism about the meaning of independence. As Okechukwu Iheduru described it, the historical struggle of developing nations over international shipping rights and ownership is one clear example of the ceaseless struggle between the haves and have-nots, and the efforts of the weak to change the international system in their favor.1
But beneath the surface of the nationalist rhetoric and aspirations, a far more complex reality emerges regarding the founding of the Nigerian National Shipping Line. The federal government of Nigeria lacked the capital to fund the shipping line, as well as the organizational and technical knowledge to establish and run the venture. The creation of a national shipping line in Nigeria could not have been accomplished without massive foreign backing in the form of capital investments, managerial expertise, and technical support. Moreover, the structural and financial disadvantages facing this indigenous line in the international shipping industry meant that the venture was doomed to fail in its goal of wresting control of Nigeria’s economic destiny from the power of a disadvantageous international shipping regime. The Nigerian line could not operate outside the West African Lines Conference, and it was forced to join the very shipping cartel whose exploitative rates had inspired its establishment. Thus, it will be seen that what began as a strong expression of economic nationalism was soon revealed as a complex arrangement that only deepened Nigeria’s dependence upon foreign capital and expertise.
The NNSL never evolved into a source of economic autonomy or a symbol of national pride, and the Nigerian national line ultimately represented a failed effort at economic empowerment and development in Nigeria. Scholars have debated whether or not indigenous shipping ventures established in the era of decolonization in Africa could have ever overcome the enormous asymmetries of the international system in order to succeed. Nigeria faced insurmountable disadvantages with regard to technological know-how and resources, and a weak position as a late-industrialized nation within the broader world economy. Against this backdrop, Iheduru has suggested that economic nationalism was a destructive force in the history of shipping in the postcolonial era. He argued that rather than attempting to go it alone, Nigeria should have pooled resources into a collective effort in the maritime sector with other West African countries.2
But while regional cooperation might have been the economically sound approach to take in West Africa, the political forces that led to the establishment of the Nigerian National Shipping Line were not primarily motivated by commercial success, or a firm commitment to the economic development of Nigeria. The NNSL was established first and foremost as a political project of the nationalist elite in the era of decolonization, and until its demise in the 1990s, it was continually exploited as a political tool of ruling classes rather than an economic enterprise. Thus, the history of the company cannot be divorced from the shifts, turns, and detours of the political developments dominating the day. The broader political context is reflected in every stage of the NNSL’s development and decline, and the history of the national line therefore provides a window into the turbulent history of postcolonial Nigeria. The ruling elites of each era extracted the resources of the NNSL as they attempted to consolidate a base of support and reap the personal benefits of power. According to Iheduru, “State holders used their access to the state’s economic prerogatives to create a subservient and dependent indigenous maritime class, and to enrich themselves or members of their own class or ethnic group.”3
This chapter will examine the historical processes involved in the establishment of the Nigerian National Shipping Line, including the economic and political motives for its establishment, the terms by which the enterprise was launched, organized, and financed, and the relationship between the NNSL, British shipping lines, and international shipping conferences. We will review the management and development strategies in the first years of NNSL operation until the buyout of the British partners in 1961. It will be seen that the Nigerian line faced immense obstacles to success in a globalized shipping industry that favored former colonial shipping giants. The history of the NNSL raises questions about the significance and possibility of realizing an agenda of economic nationalism in a globalized industry such as shipping. What is the meaning of a “nationalist” venture that was made possible only through the investment of foreign capital and technical backing? It will be seen as well that the organization of the international shipping industry into shipping conferences also severely limited the autonomy of the Nigeria line, as the NNSL could operate only as a junior member of the West African Lines Conference that was dominated by former colonial firms. In broader terms, Nigeria’s foray
into shipping is a striking testimony to the complex relationship of dependency between postcolonial economies and the international system and the impossibility of economic autonomy for postcolonial Nigeria.
But while the NNSL was a doomed project of economic nationalism, this was not only because of the shipping line’s weak position in the international system. Local political complexities in Nigeria played a significant role in shaping this history, and the regional competition, political volatility, and insufficient resources for development that had plagued Nigerian politics from independence also created immense obstacles to success for the NNSL. The fractures and weaknesses that characterized the broader political system of the postcolonial era were reflected in the establishment, development, and ultimate demise of the national line. From the very birth of the national shipping venture in Nigeria, the process of decision making, the allocation of resources, and the appointment of management all reflected a dangerous blurring of lines between economic and political interests. The Nigerian National Shipping Line provided politicians with a platform for promoting a political agenda, and political priorities often came at the expense of economically sound commercial practices. Public criticism of the founding of the NNSL, and the government response to it, foreshadowed the calamitous outcome of the mixing of political and commercial interests in postcolonial Nigeria.
The history of the NNSL is a window into broader processes that aroused popular criticism and disillusionment with ruling elites who failed to deliver on the promises of nationalism in the postcolonial era. It will be seen that public discontent fermented precisely in the gaps that emerged between nationalist rhetoric and the actual functioning of a commercial enterprise that was inextricable from a complex and unequal global economy. From its establishment, outspoken critics within and outside the government condemned the terms under which the company was created, and cast doubt on the potential for the national line to truly embody an agenda of economic autonomy. The heated debates surrounding the founding of the Nigerian National Shipping Line foreshadowed a deep sense of disappointment that civil society experienced following the unfilled promises of the nationalist elite. This review will provide important background to examine the ways in which the seamen experienced and interpreted the establishment and operation of the NNSL.
NATIONALISM AND REGIONALISM AMONG THE POLITICAL ELITE
The birth of the Nigerian National Shipping Line must be understood within the complex historical context of nationalist agitation that gained momentum in Nigeria in the postwar era. Following World War II, British colonial officials and the Nigerian political elite undertook the difficult and contested process of negotiations toward a self-governing Nigeria. While political leaders from across Nigeria engaged in determined efforts to establish Nigeria as an independent and unified nation-state, the negotiations between the British and the local leadership ultimately exposed the deep cleavages that existed between the multitude of regional and ethnic constituencies in Nigeria. There was a lack of consensus among the political leadership from across Nigeria regarding the administrative structures that would replace the colonial administration, particularly with regard to the balance of power between the central legislature and regional governments. The process revealed the absence of a strong Pan-Nigerian consciousness, even among the nationalist leaders themselves, as seen in the oft-cited remark of Obafemi Awolowo of the Western Region: “Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographic expression.” Awolowo was not the only skeptic, as Tafawa Balewa of the northern legislature remarked in 1947: “Nigeria has existed as one country only on paper.”4 Divisions only grew over time, and the move toward national unity actually strengthened ethnic and regional affiliations throughout the 1950s. As Toyin Falola and Matthew Heaton wrote, “Nearly everyone recognized that, geographically, politically, economically, and culturally, Nigeria was an extremely diverse place, and a single unitary government was unlikely to please very many people for very long.”5 Over the course of deliberations and ongoing amendments to proposed constitutions, pressure mounted to maintain regional sovereignty. As Rotimi Suberu described this period, “Nigeria’s leaders increasingly and persistently emphasized the need to grant the fullest autonomy to the country’s component groups or regions.”6
The federal structure that emerged in the final stages of colonial rule was thus the product of a long struggle between regional and federal interests. The Lyttelton Constitution of 1954 established a fragile balance of power between the federal government and three regional governments in the North, East, and West. The central administration had its own legislature, with half of the representatives from the Northern Region, and the other half divided between the Eastern and the Western Regions. Regional governments had their own legislatures as well, and each was controlled by a political party largely aligned with the dominant ethnic group of the region. Thus, the Northern Region was led by the Hausa-Fulani party, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC); the Western Region was dominated by the Yoruba-led Action Group; and in the Eastern Region, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) was generally associated with the Igbo. This division of power between the central administration and the three regions remained largely in place when Nigeria gained independence in 1960. The federal government had exclusive control over external affairs, defense, currency, mines, and minerals, and also the major forms of communication and transportation. The three regions maintained control over socioeconomic programs of health and education, as well as agriculture. Marketing boards, established in the colonial era to set prices and collect revenues from agricultural production in each region, also remained under the control of regional governments. Through the marketing boards, the regions maintained an immense degree of financial autonomy and significant control over resources. According to Akanmu Adebayo, the central administration entered independence in a weakened position, as the three regional governments together were more powerful than the federal government.7
The historic struggle between regional and national interests leading up to independence in Nigeria has been condemned by subsequent generations of scholars as the basis for ethnic competition, political instability, and corruption that have plagued Nigeria in the postcolonial era. Referring to the first decade of independence, Peter Ekeh wrote, “It is the sad history of a nation in which exaggerated loyalty to communities, ethnic groups, regions and religions overweighed the tenuous loyalties to state and in which the battle was for the control of state structures in the understanding that those who won such control would use state resources for the exclusive benefits of their primordial groupings.”8 Many scholars have claimed that elite interests have been at the root of these destructive ethnic tensions. It has been argued that the rise in regionalism and ethnic chauvinism in the era of decolonization was the result of the cynical manipulation of ethnic solidarities by elites seeking to protect their own material base. Thus, Rotimi Suberu argued, in the push for regional autonomy, the elite classes attempted to safeguard local resources from national distribution. Particularly for the political elites of the groundnut-producing North and the cocoa-rich West, federalism was seen as an instrument for protecting regional power and resources rather than a means for enabling national integration.9 Okwudiba Nnoli has also charged that regionalism in the era of nationalist organizing was flamed by elite classes who used political machinery to amass wealth and privileges. As he argued, elites “used emotive ethnic symbols and played on negative feelings arising from alleged ethnic conflicts of interest as a means of mobilizing mass support for their own personal and class interests.”10 Some scholars have even accused the nationalist leadership of being primarily motivated by their economic grievances as an elite class, and charged that political agitation was merely the demand for “moderate constitutional demands as a means of finding a solution for the economic plight of the African merchant, producer and businessman.”11
This political context provides essential background for understanding why national
ist projects, such as the Nigerian National Shipping Line, were ill-fated from their establishment. In a context where nation-building was fundamentally compromised and weakened by parochial interests, so, too, would the projects established in the spirit of nationalism suffer from a lack of real commitment. As elite classes continually exploited political power for their personal benefit and to the benefit of their constituencies, even those projects undertaken under the banner of nationalism have been fundamentally shaped by sectorialism. As Falola and Heaton wrote, “Efforts were made to promote a strong central state and a state-run economy that focused on development initiatives across Nigeria. All these efforts were meant to bring Nigerians closer together politically, economically and culturally, to promote commonalities and to downplay differences. Ultimately, however, these efforts failed, largely because of the overwhelming trend in the political sphere towards consolidating power at the regional level at any cost.”12
ECONOMIC OBSTACLES TO NIGERIANIZATION
While political competition and elite rivalries created immense challenges to nationalist projects in Nigeria, there were equally significant economic structures that prevented Nigeria from achieving economic independence in the postcolonial era. Decolonization signified the end to former British rule, but it will be seen that the march toward economic autonomy was far more complex and incomplete long after the departure of British colonial administrators. Despite the fact that economic independence was a critical element of the nationalist agenda in all regions, the transfer of economic power from foreigners to Nigerians was protracted and piecemeal far after the establishment of political independence.
Expressions of economic nationalism were seen in colonial Nigeria from the 1930s, as the business elite, particularly in southern Nigeria, began to make vocal demands for more participation of local interests in industry and trade. A significant growth in this trend could be seen in the postwar era, when there was a rise in the number of initiatives, described by Axel Harneit-Sievers as “politically-motivated trading enterprises” that were aimed at “self-reliance.”13 As Nigerian businessmen, traders, and politicians launched ventures in banking, commerce, industry, and agriculture aimed at economic and political empowerment and autonomy, they promoted a strong nationalist ideology as the rationale for their efforts. The spirit of these ventures is captured in the founding document of the National Bank of Nigeria, established in 1933: “No people can be respected or regarded as a nation unless it has its own national institutions, and the greatest of all national institutions is the financial institution in the form of a bank.”14 Economic nationalism had growing momentum in the 1950s, and politicians in the nationalist movement, particularly in the Western Region, developed elaborate economic agendas that reflected demands for more local control over economic growth and development. Obafemi Awolowo stated in the House of Representatives in 1952, “Nigeria’s industrial progress should not be achieved by issuing invitations to foreigners to come in a large number into this country to exploit its resources but by allowing Africans to embark upon the industrialization of their country.”15 As local commercial interests in Nigeria sought a larger role for themselves in the local economy, the accelerating struggle against foreign capital and dominance led many to take up leading positions in the political struggles for independence.16 Thus, as Robert Tignor has argued, in the final years of colonial rule, the lines between economic and political interests blurred, and Nigeria’s major indigenous business groups became deeply embroiled in the political fray.17
