by Lynn Schler
But for the political and economic elite of Nigeria, the achievement of political independence was far more tangible than economic independence. The process of decolonization did not lead to the severing of ties between the local economy and British economic interests, and some critics have in fact argued that the power and influence of foreign investors has only grown over time. In the process of decolonization, Nigerians did succeed in expanding into areas that had been traditionally controlled by expatriate firms. But in doing so, they often had to rely on the capital or expertise of foreign firms, and these circumstances ultimately reaffirmed the influence of expatriates within the local economy. Foreign firms cemented their postcolonial involvement by drawing Nigerians into their companies, forming joint ventures with local actors, and by focusing on niches that were relatively safeguarded from nationalist attacks.18 This is not to suggest that there were no significant improvements in the economic autonomy of Nigerian business interests in the process of decolonization. Indeed, according to Harneit-Sievers, several developments in the final years of colonial rule reflected a significant bolstering of African commercial and business sectors in Nigeria. These included the creation of the Department of Commerce and Industries, which was aimed at promoting development projects and maximizing the participation of Nigerians in them, and the gradual takeover of marketing boards by African producers. But European firms also maneuvered and adapted their business organizations and strategies to the approaching end of colonialism. Efforts were made to establish closer ties with African business elites, and cooperation became more widespread and entrenched. Thus, Harneit-Sievers argued, nationalist agitation of the postwar years ultimately gave way to a preference for cooperation between African and European business elites that carried over into independence.19
Economic nationalism that shaped postwar ideologies and political agendas did not successfully mobilize a Nigerian takeover of the economy, and many have argued that the outcome of decolonization was quite the opposite. Some have blamed the ruling elite for their complacency. It has been argued that the nationalist elite perpetuated colonial economic policies that preferred state-owned monopolies of industry, and discouraged the development of a strong indigenous entrepreneurial class.20 Decolonization did little to break the hold of foreign economic interests over major sectors. As Björn Beckman has charged, “Nationalists have been co-opted by imperialism. They ‘inherited’ the colonial state, a state imposed by imperialism for its own purposes. The nature of the state itself therefore did not change fundamentally. The nationalists never really challenged the pervasive domination of the economy by imperialism. They were placed in a position where they were left to administer the state on behalf of foreign capital.”21 Similarly, Olasupo Ojedokun claimed that in the first years of independence, Nigeria’s economic policy “oscillated between a benevolent acceptance and a selective rejection of the pattern of economic relations inherited at independence,” and left intact the “Lagos-London economic axis.”22
The ideal of self-reliance remained apparent in political discourse throughout the first decades of independence, and it was translated into periodic calls on the part of the government to “Nigerianize” the business sector. But while “indigenization” was trumpeted as the key to economic autonomy and national pride, the government failed to translate the pursuit of self-reliance into effective measures.23 Nigerianization was limited to a cosmetic changeover from foreign to Nigerian hands in management positions of some industries and firms, but foreign interests still continued to dominate many sectors of the economy.24 According to Adejugbe, the weakness of the economy in the 1960s made it impossible to forgo foreign investment, as seen in the National Development Plan for 1962–1968, which relied on foreign loans.25 Others have seen the problem as a lack of commitment on the part of the government that remained largely procapitalist, and as Nwoke has charged, the Nigerian government was not orientated toward “doing serious battle with international capitalism.”26 Thus, Adejugbe claimed, the Nigerian political leadership in the early 1960s faced a dilemma: “Political leaders of an inherently capitalist outlook find that only through government can a private enterprise be created: the nationalism leads them to support ousting of foreign private enterprise while economic reality compels them to welcome expatriate capitalists.”27
In the final reckoning, the process of Nigerianization in the early years of independence was of limited impact on the balance of power between Nigerian and expatriate economic interests. As Akinsanya wrote, indigenization “did not achieve much in terms of actually placing the control of the economy in Nigerian hands because majority equity participation by Nigerians does not necessarily imply or suggest actual control of an indigenized business enterprise. . . . [Expatriate staff] deal with critical and key issues of finance, management and production.”28 The frustration can be heard in Akinsanya’s pronouncement: “It is an unpardonable naivety to assert that Nigerians are in full control or will ever be, of their economy.”29 In his view, the vast majority of Nigerians did not reap the benefits of indigenization. Rather, the policy further concentrated wealth in the hands of a very few, and widened the gaps and inequalities between the rich and the poor in Nigeria.30
THE NATIONALIST SHIPPING VENTURE IN NIGERIA
The creation of the Nigerian National Shipping Line must be situated in this broader history of political and economic nationalism in the era of decolonization. Calls to establish the National Shipping Line were steeped in rhetoric espousing self-reliance, economic autonomy, and indigenization. In the final decade of colonial rule, some politicians targeted the colonial shipping industry as a persistent symbol of the economic injustices of the colonial era, and argued that independence could not be achieved without a national shipping line. Representatives from the Western Region were particularly strong advocates of this position. Chief T. T. Solaru declared in a debate in the Nigerian House of Representatives in 1957, “We are tired of these shipping rings, . . . we do not want shipping lines to go on dictating us how much we have to pay in order to carry our goods.”31 In another debate in 1958, one representative warned that the ongoing dependence on foreign shipping spelled “nothing but sheer national ruin and economic suicide,” and protested, “Are we emerging from political colonialism only to step into economic serfdom?”32 This animosity toward colonial shipping lines was not uniquely Nigerian, and according to Iheduru, efforts to “Africanize” the shipping industry throughout the continent were part of larger programs of economic nationalism: “Just as the establishment of national armies, national airlines, embassies, etc. were viewed as part of the trappings of modern statehood in the 1950s and 1960s, the establishment of token national shipping lines was believed to add to the prestige and symbolic capability of the newly independent countries.”33 Ayodeji Olukoju has argued that rivalries and competition for prestige between African colonies and postcolonies also played a role in the clamoring for national lines, as the launching of the Black Star Line in Ghana in 1957 added to the Nigerian sense of urgency in establishing the Nigerian National Shipping Line.34
But behind the slogans for economic independence and national prestige, a far more complicated picture emerges around the founding of the NNSL. From the very start, it was clear that a Nigerian shipping venture would not be purely Nigerian, and its establishment and running would require cooperation with foreign capital and expertise. The question of which foreign entities would be involved was a highly contested and charged issue. The idea of forming a national shipping line was discussed in meetings of the National Economic Council (NEC) in 1956, and the council recommended that the federal government investigate the viability of such a venture. In January 1957, the council reviewed the federal government’s memorandum, presented by the minister of transport, Amanze Njoku. The minister’s report had concluded that Nigeria was not in a position to establish a shipping line. His initial inquiries revealed that the capital required would be at least £4.5 million—an astronomical sum for t
he government to expend, and a cost that had not been allocated in the current budget. The minister admitted that the preliminary investigation had been conducted with the aid of foreign shipping companies’ expert knowledge, and to his admission, “these companies could hardly be expected to give assistance in establishing an organization which would compete with them.”35 Nonetheless, under these circumstances, it was concluded that there would be little point in proceeding to a more in-depth investigation, and Njoku suggested that the venture be held in abeyance until six months before the start of the next development program.
The Western Region representatives of the council were disappointed with these findings, and suggested that the government verify the possibility of establishing a joint overseas line with other West African governments. They also recommended approaching the International Bank for funding. The minister countered that there was little point in approaching other governments when Nigeria itself did not have the funds required, and the International Bank had already made it clear that it would not invest in the project. Moreover, he claimed that neither the Gambia nor Sierra Leone had the resources to fund such a venture, and the Gold Coast was shunning regional cooperation in general. But while the minister hoped to table the discussion for a later date, the council members from the Western Region prevailed. It was decided that the minister would send a semiofficial inquiry to the other West African governments to verify their interest in a joint overseas shipping line.36 These inquiries did not turn up anything of significance, and in the following meeting of the NEC in October 1957, the Western Region once again expressed dissatisfaction with the government’s position, and promised to raise the issue again.37
The pressure to establish a shipping line was undoubtedly influenced by the launching of Ghana’s Black Star shipping line in 1957. Ghana’s national line was a joint venture with the Zim shipping line of Israel, which provided 40 percent of the capital investment and undertook the management of the line and the training of Ghanaian officers and seamen. British colonial officials recognized that the establishment of the Ghanaian line might spur Nigerian efforts to establish their own line, as one official wrote in August 1958: “Since Ghana has established its own shipping line, Nigeria will feel impelled by motives of prestige or rivalry to establish one also (if possible bigger and better!).”38 Recognizing that these African ventures would create competition for British shipping lines, this official recommended sending the Nigerians an official communication “pointing out objectively the actual disadvantages of such a proposal.”39 Colonial fears were not unfounded, as the Nigerians were undoubtedly motivated by the Ghanaian-Israeli partnership, and political pressure on the federal government in Nigeria increased with the launching of the Black Star Line. In September 1957, a resolution of the House of Representatives called for the federal government to make provisions for a national shipping line in the next five-year plan. Throughout 1958, popular discontent with the monopoly of European shipping companies mounted, and the issue of high freight rates was raised in the House of Representatives and the press, particularly around the rates for shipping timber. The National Economic Council in 1958 requested that the government conduct an investigation into freight rates set by the West African Lines Conference (WALCON) in comparison with other parts of the world. Notes from an August 1958 meeting of the council claimed, “There is unquestionably a very widespread feeling that West African Shipping Conference has established a monopoly or near-monopoly position which places the Nigerian economy largely at its mercy.”40 Both the Western and the Eastern Regions wanted renewed pressure on the government regarding a national shipping line. The Western Region wanted the federal government to establish an agreement with the Israeli line, Zim, similarly to Ghana. The Eastern Region was more militant, demanding that the federal government not conduct negotiations with any existing member of the conference. The government response to this was adamant: no potential partners would be rejected outright, and negotiations in the preliminary stage would be conducted with as many different interests as possible. The minister explained that technical experience and knowledge were of utmost importance in developing a shipping industry, and the federal government would not exclude the members of the West African Lines Conference from these negotiations. In fact, Minister Njoku revealed, proposals from Elder Dempster and Palm Lines had already been received and were under review.41
It seems that Elder Dempster and Palm Lines were also nervous about the Israeli incursion into West African shipping, and had hastily approached the Nigerians with a proposal for establishing the national line several months before. In a January 1958 letter to other members of the West African Lines Conference, the British shipping giants explained their motivation for initiating a partnership with the Nigerians:
In the last few days we have received information that made Elder Dempster and Palm Line think that an urgent move should be made with regard to a Nigerian Shipping Company, with a view to trying to ensure that no fresh Line is brought into the West African Trade. We have reason to think that some newcomer is about to approach the Nigerian Government, and, as we would naturally prefer that any Nigerian entry to Trade is accomplished with our assistance and participation rather than that of a newcomer, we have come to the conclusion it is urgently necessary for us to make a proposal of our own to the Nigerian Government. . . . After hurried but serious consideration between ourselves, Palm and Elder have decided to make a joint approach to the Nigerian Government that a new company should be formed in Nigeria with Nigerian Government and Palm and Elder participation, in a manner that we hope will prove attractive to the Nigerians and ensure stability in the Trade, and also ensure the minimum damage to the existing Line’s interests. . . . We discarded the idea of a consortium of all Lines because such an approach might be thought to be an attempt by the Conference to get a grip on Nigeria’s own shipping rather than a genuine offer of help.42
The letter makes it clear that the interest of Elder Dempster in the Nigerian national line was far from altruistic, and was aimed at blocking the Israelis and other parties from encroaching on their monopoly. Elder Dempster was highly aware of the negative image the company had in West Africa, and speculated that the inclusion of the Palm Line in the venture would be more palatable to the Nigerians: “We thought a partnership of Elder Dempster and Palm would be likely to be more acceptable than Elder Dempster alone, who were sometimes accused of being too big a single party.”43
Negotiations with Elder Dempster took place over the course of 1958, and in fact had already been ongoing when the NEC representatives from the Eastern Region demanded that the government refuse to negotiate with any member of the West African Lines Conference, of which Elder Dempster was the undisputed controlling interest. Minister Njoku did not reveal this in the August NEC meeting, but the real surprise came to both the Nigerian House of Representatives and the National Economic Council when Njoku addressed the House of Representatives on 25 November. In this session, he asked the House to amend the 1957 decision calling for the establishment of a national shipping line within five years, calling instead for the establishment of a national shipping line “at the earliest possible date.”44 The minister explained that circumstances had drastically changed over the last year, and a worldwide recession had led to a dramatic decrease in the cost of ships. “Now is the time to float our national shipping venture. This is the moment for which your Government has been waiting, this is the moment when caution can be thrown aside, and Nigerian ships be launched upon the oceans of the world.”45 Njoku did not reveal any of the specific details of the negotiations, but claimed that he had spent the last three months scrutinizing proposals submitted to the Ministry of Transport and interviewing the fourteen foreign shipping firms or groups who had submitted them. He refused to provide details, claiming that “negotiations on this scale cannot be undertaken in the glare of publicity.” But while the talks remained confidential, he assured representatives the final agreement would reflect
three conditions that he had established for any partnership: (1) Nigerians would have the controlling share in the enterprise; (2) the technical partner would make a substantial investment of equity and do everything he could to make the venture succeed; and (3) Nigerians would both learn a new skill and obtain a fair share of the carrying trade to and from Nigeria.46 Njoku explained the need for cooperation with a foreign shipping company:
