The First Victory

by Andrew Stewart

  The very final steps were now being taken with African colonial troops in the vanguard of the assembled forces.20 Amongst them was the 3rd Battalion, Nigerian Regiment, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel H. Marshall, originally of the Royal Lincolnshire Regiment, which was sent to Garissa where it relieved 1st Battalion, KAR. As was the case with all the men of this West African brigade, they were regular soldiers recruited from northern Nigeria and led mostly by regular British officers and NCOs. This particular battalion was the forward unit and had a ten-mile front to defend, which included a bridgehead on the far back of the River Tana where the District Commissioner’s house was still occupied by a local administrator.21 One company was placed in slit trenches guarding the pontoon ferry used for crossing the fast-flowing river, with orders to hold it to the last man and the last round.22 The remainder of the battalion was two miles to the rear, close to a forward airfield at which the South African Air Force (SAAF) had a squadron of vintage Bristol and Hartebeeste aircraft piloted by Rhodesians. There were also some Natal-born engineers who provided expert advice on how to dig communication trenches and generally help strengthen the temporary base. The only attacks during this period came from Italian aircraft bombing from great altitude and which did little damage. A greater threat was posed by the local wildlife, one patrol having to take shelter in the trees after being surprised and attacked by a troop of elephants.23 There were giraffe, deer and zebra which avoided the surrounding mines, and one night-time lion which became entangled in the barbed wire and ‘roared his disapproval’, but pulled free. The real danger at this stage remained the weather as the rainy season produced a sea of mud which made it impossible to move forward. The Nigerians’ conclusion, however, was that defending the Tana was ‘rather boring’ and, along with many of other troops along the southern front, they actually appeared pleased that the advance into Italian Somaliland was about to begin.

  After one final regional tour during which he had met with Cunningham in Nairobi, on 2 February Wavell was able to advise Dill that he had given his approval for the attack on Kismayu and this would begin in the middle of the month.24 Despite having already shared his concerns during the December planning meeting, he took this final opportunity to remind his two senior commanders to make maximum efforts to capture Italian East Africa as quickly as they could. He had already written candidly to his colleague in Nairobi the previous month telling him of the ‘continual pressure from home to the effect that operations in your theatre do not look like paying an adequate dividend in the amount of material [sic] and personnel involved’, and warning again that ‘it is constantly suggested that it would be better to cut them down to pure defence and employ the troops elsewhere’.25 As he went on, Wavell reminded his superiors in London of the political advantages victory in this theatre offered and that it would ‘release a considerable military effort’ for operations elsewhere. Cunningham later confirmed that when he met with Wavell immediately prior to the offensive he had been asked if it was possible to begin his attack sooner, but no undue pressure had been placed on him to change his plans.26 He had been given autonomy of action and Wavell’s assurance that ‘I think you will be justified in taking considerable tactical risks against these Italians, whose morale cannot be high, and I will certainly support you in any bold offensive you decided is worthwhile’.27

  A small potential complication arose at this point when a most secret message was intercepted, which suggested that the Italians were actually poised to surrender.28 Referencing a ‘hitherto reliable source’, almost certainly a message sent from the Japanese embassy in Berlin to Tokyo, it detailed ‘a serious disagreement’ that had arisen between the German and Italian High Commands. Due to shortages of war equipment, and ‘to save avoidable slaughter’, the authorities in Rome were apparently considering seeking terms with the British but the Germans, and the Japanese, wanted them to fight on as long as possible to tie down enemy forces. Reports such as these can only have increased the calls from London for a rapid but decisive effort to be made which might demonstrate to the Italian military that they were right to want to give up the fight and allow desperately needed British and Commonwealth troops and equipment to be sent further north. Churchill’s comments from the previous summer can never have been very far away from Wavell’s thoughts.

  3 Advance of British and Commonwealth forces from Kenya into Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia.

  As it was, shortly afterwards Cunningham was advised that Aosta had now received direct orders from Mussolini which had once again stiffened his resolve to continue, and this meant the fight was on.29 The capture of the small town of Afmadu, an administrative and trading centre on the important crossroads running from Garissa to Gelib in one direction and Kismayu in the other, was settled on as the first serious test for the attacking troops. Advancing into enemy territory in a brigade group, the column extended more than fifty miles in length as it marched forward. Cunningham had spent some time conducting his own deception piece, which suggested that this was only a patrol movement, and the size of the attacking forces must have come as something of a shock to the Italians.30 Three battalions from the KAR were used and, before first light on 11 February, and in the absence of any supporting armour, they pushed large numbers of Bangalore torpedoes – pipe-laden explosive charges designed to clear a way through for the men – through the three layers of barbed wire.31 These failed to create large gaps, but the African troops charged into what turned out to be an empty town, much to the disgust of their commanding officer. Heavily bombed by the SAAF the night before, with nearly eight tons of high explosives dropping on the defenders during the course of an hour-long attack, the demoralised Italian garrison had fled.32 There were no casualties amongst the attackers other than those already suffering from malaria and dysentery.33

  It had been an initial success. But just as quickly as the advance to Addis Ababa had begun, uncertainty now arose as to whether it would continue. This small town had fallen easily but the commander in Cairo now had to decide whether he had sufficient forces to carry on the fight in East Africa.34 Ever since the Italian attack on Greece launched from Albania in October 1940 Wavell had faced considerable pressure from the War Cabinet in London and knew that its policy was to ‘be able to send the largest possible land and air forces from Africa to the Balkans’.35 Now, with the Italian position in the Western Desert appearing to him to be on the verge of complete defeat, Wavell decided that he could afford to take some risk and press on, but once again warned Platt and Cunningham that they might soon have to give up some of their already limited forces.

  Unbeknownst to Wavell, the Italian strength in Somaliland had in fact been overestimated prior to the invasion; as it was, they had only a slight advantage, with the best part of two colonial divisions, another brigade of infantry in reserve and various bande groups, in total around 20,000 men supported by eighty-four artillery pieces and fifteen armoured cars.36 The defence was further hampered by De Simone’s conviction that the 300 miles of desert would prevent his opponents from carrying out any large movement of forces and limit them to making raids. He had only been given command of the Juba sector in January 1941 and, following a detailed inspection, he found the morale of his men to be very low.37 When Cunningham’s hastily assembled mobile forces launched their surprise attacks, this vulnerability was ruthlessly exposed. To achieve a decisive advantage, the British general had taken great risks and used to best effect his access to intelligence and his belief that the Italians did not really grasp even a basic notion of how deception was used.38 He consequently sought to make his forces look much stronger than they were and in locations that tied down his opponents. A good example was the 1st South African Brigade which had spent the previous month defending the wide central front but had been moved in secret from Wajir to join the advance, leaving a wide and vulnerable open front. A handful of troops had remained along with a signals unit and sixty dummy tanks that were moved each night and poorly camouflaged du
ring the day so as to be spotted by enemy aircraft. This force was redesignated the ‘Fourth Australian Division’ and played on Italian fears, convincing the nearest commander at Bardera that he faced a significant opponent when he could in fact have driven straight to Nairobi.39

  The battle was being fought as much in the mind as anywhere else and De Simone was making huge errors as he tried to anticipate his opponent’s plans. He had assumed that once the British-led forces developed their attack they would head for the port of Mogadishu. Cunningham, however, had always assumed that fierce resistance would be met along the natural defensive barrier presented by the River Juba and the capture of Kismayu remained his focus. As he had told his subordinates, they had ten days to achieve this or he would order a withdrawal back to the Tana. What he did not know was that the Italian commander, with Aosta’s approval, had at the same time reached the conclusion that the key target – which Smuts had so vigorously argued was central to the entire campaign – could not be held, and orders had been given to evacuate and move the garrison north to defend what was now seen as the vital Juba crossing.40 The British and Commonwealth forces needed Kismayu to overcome their potentially fatal supply weakness and gain confidence that the advance could be maintained, and the Italians were playing along.

  Unaware of the strategic pressures on their commanding generals to conclude the campaign in short order, the advancing troops enthusiastically exploited the initial opening that had been won at Afmadu, moving with a relentless pace. Following an order from their commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel ‘Tank’ Western, the men of the 3rd Battalion, Gold Coast Regiment went into action resplendent with moustaches to hide the fact that the white officers and non-commissioned men were all so young.41 Despite their youth and lack of experience, the 24th Gold Coast Brigade was able to move sixty miles in a single day across difficult terrain and captured the well-defended positions on the west bank of the Juba at Buro Erillo in what Cunningham described as ‘a most courageous and dashing attack’.42 Nearly 600 feet wide, the river split into two branches with a small island in the middle; both linking bridges had been destroyed and the Italians had created a strongly fortified position guarded by one colonial battalion, a battery of field guns, some armoured cars, tank traps and rifle and machine gun pits.43

  A delay followed, but by 13 February the defences along the riverbanks had been cleared and patrols of West Africans were searching for a place to cross the river – eventually accomplished at Mabungo – while men from the Royal Engineers provided training for the brigade in how to use paddles.44 Neighbouring Gobwen and its airfield had been captured by the South Africans at about the same time but the Italians also still held the riverbank opposite in considerable strength and with more good defences. It was three days before their commander, Dan Pienaar, flying overhead in a reconnaissance aircraft, was able to identify a suitable crossing point seven miles upstream at Yonte. The Italians referred to this as the Bulo Merere ford, but the river was five feet deep and crossing it was not easy as the banks were steep and high in places. The South African brigadier nonetheless decided this provided the opportunity he needed and two platoons of his infantry crossed in improvised assault boats. Despite an immediate counter-attack later on the night of 17 February, followed by two more days of sustained fighting and assaults by the Italian 101st Division who were well dug in, the position was held. This allowed a temporary bridge to be constructed and reinforcements, including armoured cars and artillery, to be pushed across the river.45

  Once their opponent had managed to pass this obstacle, and with their reserves all gone, the defenders quickly lost their resolve.46 A further dash north followed and a link-up with the Gold Coast troops as the advance headed for the next target, Gelib on the east bank astride the main road north. The limited initial objectives already seemed to have been too cautious in nature. It could also be argued that the battle for the Yonte bridgehead and the successful construction in record time of what was christened ‘Union Bridge’ was one of the most significant events not only of this campaign but of the entire war fought in Africa. It confirmed to the attackers that within only a few weeks the Italians had been psychologically defeated and precipitated the dynamic advance that was to follow. Cunningham and those closest to him later concluded that this first part of the campaign was all that really mattered, and once a crossing over the river had been secured, in his own words, ‘the Italians in front of me broke’.47

  While the South Africans were fighting to cross the Juba, another success was being completed at what at one stage was considered to be the campaign’s principal objective. By the evening of 14 February, just two days later than the schedule originally set by Cunningham, the leading elements of 22nd East African Infantry Brigade had entered Kismayu.48 They found their opponents had again retreated, leaving behind them a considerable amount of abandoned guns and ammunition along with more than 200,000 gallons of petrol. Kismayu was a dusty little town with litter all over the streets but the residents, many of whom were ‘rolling drunk’ having looted the wine stores, were pleased to see the men of the KAR who set about checking for booby traps and any remaining Italian forces.49 There were twenty-five scuttled wrecks in the harbour and the bay was ‘an oily swell as a result of the sunken ships and tankers’; with a single jetty and access roads which crumbled within days, prospects did not look great.50 Whilst some demolitions had been carried out by the retreating Italians, it took only three weeks to make the necessary repairs and the first British freighter was actually moored just five days after the port had been captured.51 Following De Simone’s orders, Kismayu had apparently been evacuated in ‘two panic stages’, the first following the initial crossing of the frontier and the second when it was heard that additional reinforcements had arrived at Mombasa. This led Aosta, who had visited on 11 February, to give the order to withdraw, which took place in an entirely chaotic fashion.52

  As this anticlimax to what had been anticipated as being a major battle was drawing to a close, the South African troops who were much farther to the west had continued their advance across the Chalbi desert to outflank the Italian positions in front of them. In the desert – described as a ‘vast, flat, white waste of soda and soft lava dust, totally devoid of vegetation and reflecting the scorching sun’ – there was a dusty road but it was passable for only three months of each year.53 The rains had come a month earlier than expected but four days after Kismayu’s capture, and following some confusion and heavy fighting in drenching rain and bitter cold, the attackers captured the fortress at Mega – forty miles inside Ethiopia and 7,000 feet up a steep escarpment – taking 1,000 prisoners.54 Moyale, one of the first locations to have been fought over the previous year, was recovered five days later. Cunningham appeared to be correct in his conclusion that the war in East Africa would not last long.55 As the pace of the advance increased, the Italians were certainly already showing some signs that pointed to the rapid collapse that would follow.56

  The approach to Mogadishu was thick with dense bush which was so heavy that vehicles could not push through, and the askaris and Nigerians worked in relays with their pangas to cut a track.57 As they arrived at the outskirts shortly before dusk on the evening of 24 February an Italian armoured car, flying a white flag, approached the leading African troops.58 Inside were well-dressed Italian officers who had come to request that the port be declared an open town. The staff captain for 23rd Nigerian Brigade entered the following morning at dawn and met with the mayor, ‘a fat little man looking immaculate in white drill uniform’, who accepted all of his orders without question. After the surrender, the senior police officer, who spoke excellent English, took him for a full breakfast. At midday the Union Jack was hoisted over the former Fascist headquarters but only after one of the recently arrived Nigerians climbed the flagpole on top of the building and cut down the Italian flag; some of the Somali crowd cheered but were then forced away by police who were still on the streets.59 It was found that a prisoner
of war cage had already been built and the Scottish NCO from the Southern Rhodesia Regiment who was placed in charge arrived to find the nominal roll and 250 Italians waiting for him.60 He did not have the most difficult of wartime jobs, although there was at first some disappointment amongst his prisoners that they were not allowed temporary leave and an evening ‘sleeping out pass’; breakouts were, nonetheless, rare. The Italians quickly accepted their defeat and ‘it wasn’t more than a day or so before the shops were open and the policemen back on their little stands directing the traffic, this time however on the left of the road’.61

  For the victors, a rest camp was quickly established by the sea where they were able to bathe and wash their clothing for the first time since crossing the frontier. The askaris could not believe that there was any body of water larger than Lake Victoria, and when they went for a swim in the Indian Ocean many were taken ill after drinking salt water.62 Fresh vegetables and fruit were also temporarily available to enhance their rations.63 The men had already advanced 200 miles in two weeks accompanied by a South African water company which, unusually, had white drivers, a reminder that this was considered ‘the most vital of all commodities’.64 These drivers sometimes had to go back 100 miles in a day to fill up and, even with the discovery at Hagadera, it took eight of these companies – equipped with tens of thousands of 44-gallon drums that they had brought, each carrying 250,000 gallons of water – to keep Cunningham’s forces moving.65 Now they could pause and replenish as the press admiringly reported back in Britain that the West Africans had proved that colonial troops possessing ‘loyalty, discipline and a high standard of training can stand up to the conditions existing in modern warfare’.66 The Nigerians were in fact showing themselves to be particularly well suited for fighting Italians, perhaps more so than all the other British and Commonwealth forces.