The First Victory

by Andrew Stewart

  It was as much concern about this threat as anything else that had led Wavell to order that, when the opportunity presented itself, his main attacking forces should regain complete control of the border region. With his flanks protected, the aim would then be for the British and Commonwealth forces to press on towards the Red Sea port of Massawa, a distance from the frontier of approximately 230 miles. Wavell had made available two divisions from the Indian Army to lead the advance on this front and the first of these, the 5th Indian Division, reached the Sudan in September 1940 having been moved in a convoy of nearly forty ships. Although attacked by Italian aircraft as it neared Port Sudan, nothing was lost and this fully equipped and trained body became Platt’s main resource of manpower throughout the months that followed. Perhaps the key decision of the whole East Africa campaign, however, was Wavell’s subsequent move of the 4th Indian Division from the Western Desert, albeit only for a few months, to operate alongside them. This division had been involved in the decisive victory won at Sidi Barrani in December and could potentially have been used in North Africa to help with the pursuit of the retreating Italian forces.21 The commander in Cairo concluded that securing his maritime supply routes was too important an objective to ignore and ordered the division’s temporary move south, which was a bold move.

  The lead elements from the 7th Indian Infantry Brigade arrived in the Sudan on the last day of that same month.22 They were accompanied by a battery of six-inch howitzers and a squadron of Matilda tanks from 4th Royal Tank Regiment. At the time, nobody could have guessed the level of concern Frusci had about facing British armour: he was subsequently proved to be entirely right to fear the impact of the enemy’s tanks and these played a huge role once the advance got under way. Thanks to Wavell, Platt also benefited from having, at this stage of the war, two of the best divisional commanders. In charge of the 4th Indian Division was another gunner, Major-General Noel Beresford-Peirse, ‘an extrovert, plain-spoken, orthodox soldier’ who had already established something of a reputation for himself as ‘a dashing commander’ during the fighting in the Western Desert.23 In charge of its sister unit was Major-General Lewis Heath, known universally as ‘Piggy’, and ‘his qualities of dash and drive, [and] his humane and sympathetic disposition made him a popular commander’ both throughout the division and beyond.24

  The attack had originally been scheduled to begin on 8 February 1941 by which point, it was believed, the two Indian divisions would both be available along with their supporting armour. It called for an advance to Kassala, leaving two brigades for defence against any possible Italian flanking move, before eventually heading in the direction of the Italian garrison at Gondar and on to the Red Sea. The immediate key objective was Agordat, 2,000 feet up on the Eritrean plateau and where the well-surfaced Italian road began which travelled all the way to the coast. Prior to the offensive beginning, there were still the best part of two colonial divisions facing Platt’s forces and nothing to suggest the Italians would not put up a strong defence. British intelligence reports noted that enemy morale was low but as the enemy had ‘good rations, a strong defensive position to hold and little air activity against them’ it was assessed that they could still potentially hold out indefinitely.25 Perhaps the most significant contribution provided by Wavell’s intelligence advantage came at this point with the discovery that the Italians were actually already withdrawing from their frontier positions. Plans were now hastily revised and it was confirmed that the advance could begin nearly three weeks earlier than planned, on 18 January, even though elements of the 4th Indian Division were not yet ready. Although he had only recently arrived, Beresford-Peirse nonetheless seemed to fully understand Platt’s intentions and what the plan entailed and he was prepared to accept a much greater level of risk than his opponents.26 As the advance subsequently developed, he in fact took considerable risks extending his lines of communication to a sometimes dangerous length as he quickly concluded that the initiative lay with the British and Commonwealth forces.27

  4 Advance of British and Commonwealth forces from the Sudan into Eritrea.

  In only a few months Messervy had ‘made a name for hunting Italians’ and, as Platt’s Indian divisions swept east from the Sudan into northern Ethiopia, they were preceded by Gazelle Force, now reinforced by an infantry battalion.28 It was still focusing on distracting the Italian defenders, but more generally it provided flank protection. It also offered protection for the sappers who were clearing tracks through the minefields for the advancing troops. Across the whole border sector more than 1,200 priso-ners were eventually taken, including 30 officers, but when Kassala was reached it was found to be largely deserted.29 To get to Agordat there were two routes the advancing troops could take: the northern one, a poor and narrow road passable only in dry weather, went through Sabderat and Keru and this was taken by two brigades of the 4th Indian Division; to the south there was a much better but less direct road passing through Tessenei and Barentu and this was assigned to the 5th Indian Division. Although each division had only two of its three normal brigades, both made rapid advances along the parallel roads. On the southern road little opposition was encountered and Tessenei was occupied without any fighting. The bridge over the Gash was found to have been mined, and although many mines had been set off by stray camels the attackers were still forced into the sandy bed of the river, which was crossed with some difficulty. Even so, the pace of the advance proved too much for the defenders, who were left with no choice but to fight disorganised rearguard actions and escape with whatever equipment they could.

  After the huge recent defeats suffered in the Western Desert, mounting some form of protracted defence now increasingly seemed the best prospect for the Italian and colonial troops scattered across Africa. For the isolated garrisons this meant a withdrawal from their exposed forward positions in Eritrea to where the rocky foothills of the mountain ranges began at Aicota and Keru.30 The British-led troops followed but, as the lead company advanced towards the first of these points, it began to run into some delays. In addition to the liberally strewn landmines there were three- and four-pronged metal spikes which had been designed to puncture tyres and these slowed down the advance.31 Slim commanded one of the leading brigades and, despite the difficulties he had experienced during the battle at Gallabat, one of those who met him at the time referred to ‘a fighting soldier, clearly well aware, well briefed and fully conscious of the nature of the problem ahead’.32 As another observer put it, ‘he gave every impression of being a chap who was determined to do the job and he clearly in his approach invited full cooperation’. Unfortunately this latest battle was to prove no better an experience for the brigadier than before. On 21 January, when he was being driven on the Aicota road with an escort from the Highland Light Infantry, his truck was attacked by two Italian planes and he was hit by shrapnel in four places, including his backside.33 Slim had to be evacuated to a hospital back in Khartoum, removing him from the battle and the campaign, a somewhat ignominious start to the war for an officer who would go on to become one of Britain’s most distinguished generals.34

  Whilst there was no significant opposition in Aicota, it was entirely different at Keru where an enemy brigade held a strong position and made a concerted effort to fight.35 Troops from both attacking divisions had to work together in what was later described as ‘a brilliant stroke’, as men from the 4th Indian Division advanced towards the town while colleagues from the other – Slim’s 10th Indian Infantry Brigade – defeated an Italian rearguard, allowing them to surround the remainder of the garrison. This rapid move north enveloped the Italians, forcing the surrender of 800 men and several guns. Fought on the same day as Slim had been injured, this action also included the last cavalry charge faced by British troops during this or any other war. There are various accounts of what happened, but a force of between 60 and 250 Eritreans from the Italian Colonial Cavalry, led by a lone Italian officer mounted on a white charger, targeted Gazelle’s artillery, lead
ing to a desperate action involving the guns of D and F Troops of the 144th Field Regiment (Surrey and Sussex Yeomanry). They were defended by the command post staff, armed only with a few rifles and revolvers, which allowed the gunners to turn as quickly as they could before opening fire over open sights.36 This was later described by one of those who witnessed what happened:

  About two miles away to our left flank we heard peculiar noises and saw a lot of dust. The noises and dust came near. Suddenly we saw a mass of mounted men, galloping towards us at a great pace. It was a very very brave cavalry charge commanded by a baron on a white horse. They very nearly caught us completely napping. Two Brens and one machine gun started firing as well as rifle fire. Then of course a moment later considerably more. But they got to within 30 yards of us, firing wildly from the saddle. The gunners wheeled round their guns through 180 degrees and fired point-blank; shells slid along the ground without exploding, others pierced the horses’ chests. The carnage was quite frightful and I think most of us felt sorrier for the horses than the Italians. But it was an outstandingly brave attempt which very nearly had complete success.37

  By the time the Eritreans wheeled and headed for safety they left twenty-five of their number dead and sixteen wounded but their charge had come close to halting the advance.38 Had they been able to do so, even for a short period, the offensive could easily have been slowed and the outcome of the campaign proven entirely different.

  As it was, by 25 January Platt’s forces had already managed to cut communications between Agordat and Barentu and, as the two divisions once more returned to different axes of attack, reinforcements arrived over the next three days, including the British tanks which were being used for the first time. They now moved on to tackle both of these important positions, each of which had excellent natural defences. Dominating the approach road, Agordat was surrounded by rough bare slopes which extended up to Mount Cochen, a massive hill feature, and the isolated rocky Fort Laquetat. Realising it could weaken his entire defensive position, Frusci had recognised the danger of losing this town and moved his best troops to bolster the garrison: the 2nd Colonial Brigade, which had an unbroken tradition of victory since its formation nearly fifty years earlier. This meant that there were now fourteen battalions supported by seventy-two guns and twenty-four tanks, a formidable force in a well-prepared position. Initial attempts were made by Gazelle to once again outflank the position, first from the south and then later from the north, as part of efforts to convince the Italian garrison that much larger forces had been moved to face them. Once again, they were taken in by this deception.

  Brigadier Reginald Savory’s men had fought in the Western Desert and led the attack at Sidi Barrani; aside from the action at Gallabat this had been the first time during the war that troops from the British Empire had gone on the offensive. Along with the rest of the 4th Indian Division, they had then been transported south but Savory’s experiences during the battle for Mount Cochen now left him apprehensive. There was a suggestion that, after the success they had enjoyed previously, the morale of his Indian troops was extremely high but, perhaps, this had led them to underestimate the fight the Italians might put up. Of much greater concern, it was the first battle of the campaign where the troops were organised on a mechanised basis with the infantry being moved by trucks and then de-bussing to fight the battles. This was because it was impossible for wheeled transport to move too far forward and, with no horses, mules or camels, all the supplies had to be physically moved down the main Barentu road; at least one company in each battalion was forced to carry water, food and ammunition. Some units were consequently left understrength and unable to do much beyond holding their positions, and all the troops suffered severely from thirst.39 This physical exertion severely affected their fighting ability and the men from the 3rd Battalion, 14th Punjab Regiment were eventually forced to withdraw in some disarray, exhausted. Savory concluded that as the advance continued it would take nearly half a battalion delivering the supplies to allow the other half to keep fighting. Along with the other senior British officers, he greatly worried about the difficulties that might lie ahead.40

  Nonetheless a decisive victory was secured at Agordat and the key proved to be the intervention of British armour. As the Italian tanks were drawn out into the open by Indian and British infantry they were attacked by four of the Matildas, which left most of the opposition flaming wrecks. Frusci’s concerns about the inadequacy of his equipment proved well-founded and the only weapons available to the defenders against this potent threat were Boys anti-tank rifles that had been captured in British Somaliland, but even these had no effect.41 It had been a stern defence with repeated attacks and counter-attacks but the introduction of the tanks proved decisive and the battalions facing them fled in confusion. According to the British regimental history, so great was the impact that ‘no more Italian armour appeared for the rest of the campaign’.42 At the same time the 11th Indian Infantry Brigade was able to capture the crest and advance along the heights to secure the position. After three days of hard fighting, on 31 January other troops from the 4th Indian Division had also managed to outflank the town and these cut off the road to the east when they captured the four fortified hills which sat astride it.43 This left the remaining garrison exposed and, although the bulk of the defenders were able to withdraw towards Keren, the town fell the following day, leaving the attackers to collect more than 1,500 prisoners and a number of captured guns.

  Instructions having been issued that all Italian civilians were now to fight side by side with the defending garrisons, elsewhere a combination of fire and manoeuvre by the 5th Indian Division pushed the Italian forces back towards Barentu, which was attacked next.44 With its aerodrome, Swedish Mission Hospital and, twenty-eight miles away, the Guala goldmine, this was another naturally strong position with skilfully prepared defences, including a very well-sited fort, a strong garrison of 8,000 infantry and thirty-two artillery pieces.45 As had been the case at Agordat, at first all the signs pointed to a potentially effective defence and the British and Commonwealth forces faced heavy resistance as they approached.46 The Italians had blocked the main road in two places by blasting away huge portions of the rock face and it took painstaking work by Indian engineers, sometimes under heavy fire, to clear the way. Three defensive lines had also been well prepared, one behind the other, which, although not particularly extensive, allowed for some organisation of troops and guns.

  When the attack began on 31 January, the 1st Battalion, Worcestershire Regiment, part of the 29th Infantry Brigade, were amongst the leading troops and had their first real experience of fighting as they captured the ridges to the west.47 They fought in extreme heat and, as well as the thirst, were also battling the thorn bushes, which cut and tore clothing and skin, and the dry soil which crumbled under their boots. Two of the defensive lines were quickly cleared but the Italians had kept precise coordinates of these positions and mortared and machine-gunned their opponents, who were forced back. So effective was this response that the Indian troops who were part of the attack had to withdraw entirely, but what the defenders had failed to do was to secure their flanks and a machine gun company from the SDF discovered a track that allowed them to approach from the east. As this opening was exploited, and with news reaching the defending garrison that Agordat had fallen, the town was evacuated on the night of 1/2 February and the garrison withdrew rapidly using any vehicle they could find. Once again, large numbers of prisoners and all of their artillery were captured. Such was the speed of the Italian flight that when the Indians of 3rd Battalion, 2nd Punjab Regiment and men from the Worcestershire Regiment entered, they found field kitchens containing hot food that had just been prepared. During the first two weeks of the advance the lead battalions had covered 130 miles and already fought four actions, each of which had ultimately resulted in an overwhelming victory. British and Commonwealth forces had taken 6,000 prisoners, and captured or destroyed 80 guns, 26 tanks and 400 trucks, but
there was still a large number of untested Italian and colonial troops remaining on the road to the Red Sea.

  In the brief pause at Agordat that followed during clean-up and salvage operations, a message to the garrison from Aosta was found, urging all ranks to fight to the last. Although this had not happened there was plenty of evidence of just how well equipped the Italian forces still appeared to be, and more than 300 rifles and thousands of rounds of ammunition and grenades were sent back to the brigade headquarters.48 The men from the Royal Fusiliers who had taken part in the attack were, however, allowed to keep the Chianti, brandy, mineral water, sugar and tinned tomatoes they found, which made an excellent change from their normal diet of tea, biscuits and bully beef. At Barentu the post-battle phase was not so organised and the town was systematically looted, first by the Italian troops, then by the local population but finally by the British, a rare example of ill-discipline which lasted for the best part of twenty-four hours.49 The civilians who were caught looting were flogged on the spot but nothing could be done about the British offenders because they included some of the junior officers, so news of what had happened was suppressed.

  In some respects Frusci had displayed a good deal of military logic in withdrawing from the often exposed forward positions he had held on the Sudanese frontier. He had fought a series of delaying actions, some better than others, as he moved his troops towards the high Ethiopian plateau which extended broadly all the way to the distant mountain fortress at Gondar. He was also doing so in the knowledge that he was falling back on what was one of the best natural defensive positions available to any commander throughout the entire Second World War. The main road from Agordat climbed through a gradually narrowing gorge with hills and mountains on either side, rising several thousand feet before it reached Keren, where the Italians had the best chance of halting the northern thrust. The town had no great fortifications but was protected by eleven peaks which dominated the only route of advance and afforded the Italians excellent observation of the flat, waterless plains below. To the north-west of the single road winding through the mountain pass were Brig’s Peak (the highest, at 5,890 feet) and Mount Sanchil (5,860 feet), both of which were covered with boulders and scrub and razor-edged ridges. These were particularly difficult obstacles as artillery could not fire on the rear-facing slopes where the defending forces gathered and from where they were able to easily launch attacks against any troops who attempted to gain the summit. Another important feature in front of these was Cameron Ridge (5,245 feet), which would need to be taken first prior to any assault on the other two features. To the left of them was Mount Samanna, which was not quite as much of a challenge, but behind this and approximately midway between it and Brig’s was Mount Amba. Here the Italians had created excellent artillery positions and used the ideal terrain to conceal reserves from which numerous counter-attacks would later be launched. To the east of the approach road was Fort Dologorodoc and the equally commanding features of Mount Zeban (5,630 feet) and Mount Falestoh (5,770 feet). Along with Mount Zefale, known as ‘Sphinx’, and Mount Becana, all of these combined to make the prospect of a successful attack extremely difficult.