Countdown to D-Day

by Peter Margaritis

  Now, unsettled by Hitler’s attitude and remembering his own dealings with the Führer in the past, von Rundstedt returned to Paris, convinced that his troubles in the West would rebound on him many times over when the Allies finally invaded. And the invasion could very well come in a few months.

  To convince Hitler of the gravity of his situation, the field marshal ordered an extensive survey of the coastal positions all along the English Channel, the Atlantic seaboard, and the Mediterranean. He wanted the study to show how many defensive positions there actually were, their state of completion, a detailed order of battle for all branches of service, and an analysis of the men in his units. The report would be sent to the Führer when it was ready.

  Maybe then they would get some cooperation.

  1Lit. “War machine.” The term was used from 1935 on to describe the combined German Armed Forces and included the Army (Heer), Air Force (Luftwaffe), the Navy (Kriegsmarine), and the Waffen SS, which in wartime was attachéd to the Army.

  2Feldmarschall Erwin von Witzleben took over a month later.

  3Army Group South.

  4The Berghof was a chalet by design, formerly owned by the Wachenfeld family. Hitler purchased it in the mid-1930s and expanded the layout over the years, paid for in part by some of the proceeds from his famous testimonial, Mein Kampf. At the onset of the war, he began using it as his mountain getaway and out-of-country residence. As the war continued and Berlin came under attack from bombers, the Berghof became a secondary seat of power as he isolated himself more and more from the Reich. Speer and Bormann oversaw expansion of the complex to include villas for senior party officials and generals, security checkpoints, anti-aircraft positions, quarters for policemen, troops, and auxiliary staff, bunkers for air raid shelters, and the infrastructure to support this massive contingent.

  5Hitler’s full title was Der Führer und Oberst!e Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht des Grossdeutschen Reichs.

  6Fifty-six-year-old Bodo Zimmermann was a World War I veteran. In 1920, he started a publishing firm that produced military publications, including training manuals. Re-entering the Army before war broke out, he was appointed to the staff of the First Army and saw service on the Western Front. When von Witzleben in October 1940 took over command in Western Europe of the newly-formed Heeresgruppe D (First, Sixth, and Seventh Armies), Zimmermann was appointed to its general staff. After von Rundstedt took command in the spring of 1941 and given the title of Commander, Western Theater, Zimmermann was promoted to colonel at the beginning of December 1942 and became von Rundstedt’s chief of operations.

  7Von Rundstedt himself had often dubbed Hitler “Dieser böhmische Gefreiter,” having picked the phrase up in the early 1930s from World War I hero Chancellor Paul von Hindenburg. The older field marshal, when first told that Hitler’s home town was Braunau, mistook it for another town with that identical name in Bohemia, and not Austria. After their initial meeting (in which each at once took a strong dislike to the other), von Hindenburg would often use the expression “that Austrian corporal,” although as time went on, he leaned towards replacing the adjective “Austrian” with the more pejorative adjective “Bohemian.” After all, he mused, Bohemians were essentially gypsies, and not as wholesome or refined as the cultured Austrians, much less the highbrow Prussians. To these aristocrats, this nickname was of course viewed as a keen slur. Naturally, von Rundstedt grimly found the insult fitting and adopted it himself.

  In an interview between author Cornelius Ryan and Rommel’s operations officer, Hans-Georg von Tempelhoff on March 26, 1958, von Tempelhoff was quoted as saying, “You know, it is a very strange thing that I believe it was [Field Marshal Wilhelm] Keitel who once said to Hitler, ‘Do you realize that Rundstedt called you a Bohemian corporal?’ and Hitler said ‘Yes, but he’s still the best field marshal I have.’”

  OB West Summary Report, 1943

  The next month (May), OB West began an intensive survey of its Western defenses. The staff conducted a series of queries and analyses that took some time, especially since there was no immediate deadline. The study involved extensive planning, organizing, surveying, investigations, and meetings to draw appropriate conclusions. The detailed findings were finally completed five months later. During that time, von Rundstedt looked over the drafts several times, editing them for content and adding snippets of information or clarity here and there. Knowing his audience, he wanted to get across his own points about the situation on the Western Front and the level of preparedness of the Atlantic Wall in the most effective (and tactfully safest) way.

  Finally, towards the end of October, the field marshal was ready to release his official in-depth report. In its opening, the memorandum stated that its purpose was to show how the West’s sideline status would radically change in the next year. Von Rundstedt knew that his findings were more negatively realistic than optimistic and would not be favorably received. Still, he felt that they were necessary. His biggest concern was that his conclusions would be glossed over (as his concerns had been that spring at the Berghof), and he wanted to minimize that risk. After all, to the High Command, the fighting in the West, raging in the skies over Europe and in the stormy Atlantic, was still viewed as much less critical than the desperate struggle against Russia. However, von Rundstedt knew that this would change in the months to come when the Allied invasion began.

  Because of his concerns, the field marshal, before submitting his findings, first contacted the OKW1 chief of staff, Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel. Von Rundstedt told him that he knew that the Führer had a busy daily agenda and at present had his hands full with the situations in the East and in Italy. Nevertheless, the field marshal would consider it a favor it if the Führer at least took the time to read his report.

  The situation in the West, he explained to Keitel, was soon going to be serious as well, and von Rundstedt was just doing his job by informing the High Command of this fact. If, down the road, defeat were to come in France, von Rundstedt did not afterward want the Führer to accuse him of not having informed him of the fundamental problems that had been facing them. Of course he did not add that this type of accusation had been leveled against him back in December 1941, when they had faced their first setbacks in the Soviet Union.

  His report, dated October 25, 1943, reflected the field marshal’s concerns. The Allied landings would certainly come within the next year and start probably in the spring or summer. The obvious location for the main invasion was the Pas-de-Calais because of its short supply line and air routes to England and its relatively direct distance straight into Germany. However, given the enemy’s enormous logistical forces, this was by no means the only possibility. There were other potential landing areas in either Normandy or Brittany. He reported that the enemy had him outmanned, both in numbers of divisions and in the quality of their soldiers. And of course, he had to state the obvious nature of the Allied forces’ overwhelming air and naval superiority. This gave them not only the capacity to cover and supply any invasion along the coast, but also the flexibility to conduct more than one landing, although one specific area would be the main effort.

  Von Rundstedt prided himself among other things on being pragmatic. He knew that, given the dynamics of mobility, he would not be able to fight an active defense behind the Atlantic Wall the same way static defenses had been effectively used in previous wars. The upcoming campaign would incorporate all the advanced concepts of a modern conflict. As such, he contended in the report that strongpoints along a rigid position would not be nearly enough. To defeat the enemy, the Atlantic Wall defenses would have to be considerably more extensive, especially in critical areas. Sufficient reinforcements would have to be readily available, and above all, a powerful mobile reserve would be needed to mount a crushing counterattack.

  He then pointed out that he was sadly lacking in all those features, and that he could therefore not at this time defeat any invasion that the enemy might launch. His static fortifications were few and far bet
ween, and the coastal defense line lacked any appreciable depth to it. Any reinforcements that he created were usually siphoned off to Italy or the East. And he had no significant reserve.

  Various sections in his 30-page report outlined his concerns. Among other things, in support of his static line argument, he detailed the long length of his front and the lack of units at his disposal to man a fixed line, especially compared to World War I.

  A defense in the true sense of the word is not possible on many portions of the front of the Western Command, but only a security, and on the First Army and Nineteenth Army fronts merely a reinforced observation. This fact is a direct result of the general situation. We must make the best of it and try with all means to apply the type of defense that offers us the greatest likelihood of success…

  We cannot and may not fall back in the West, because the space separating the Channel from the Western German frontier is too restricted…

  He addressed in general the subject of fortresses and fixed defensive strongpoints:

  In spite of all fortifications, a rigid defense of the long stretch of coast is impossible for any considerable length of time.

  This fact must be kept in mind…

  The defense therefore is based primarily on the general reserves, especially of tanks and motorized units. Without them it is impossible to hold the coasts permanently. But these reserves must not only be available in sufficient number; they must be of such quality that they can attack against the Anglo-Americans, that is, against their materiel, otherwise the counter-attack will not go through…

  Fixed fortifications are indispensable and valuable for battle, as well as for propaganda. But it must not be imagined that this wall cannot be overcome when the enemy attacks it with the most powerful weapons of American might from the sea, from the air, and from the rear. With the available means in men and matériel, and in the time at our disposal, it is out of the question to erect a deep continuous wall of permanent construction.

  It is therefore a question of accepting limitations dictated by a proportioned, sober reckoning of time and availability in personnel and materiel…

  After detailing supply shortages and the shortcomings of the navy and the air force, von Rundstedt listed the units in his theater and their compositions. Then he discussed equipment, supply problems, and troop morale. He also pointed out the risks of using “liberated” prisoners:2

  I have accepted the Turk battalions in exchange for German battalions for the East in order to have some men to show on the thin fronts. Everything will depend on their reliability, about which we cannot judge yet today. If they prove unsatisfactory, then they will constitute more of a liability than an asset.

  He then contrasted the present situation with that of the year before:

  The enemy is in a position to attack from England across the channel at any time… In comparison with 1942, the situation in the West must also be considered much more critical in view of the general situation. In 1944, O.B. West must expect large-scale attacks on his fronts…

  After recapping his conclusions, he closed on a positive note for the Führer:

  If the day of the large-scale attack arrives, we shall not hesitate to do everything in our power that can be done with the means then available, down to the last man!

  (signed) von Rundstedt

  Oberbefehlshaber West

  ***

  Near the end of October, a day after the report was sent, 53-year-old GeneralOberst! Alfred Jodl, the balding, square-framed operations chief of staff for OKW, received two personal letters backing up von Rundstedt’s concerns.

  The first one, initially sent to Jodl’s assistant, Walther Warlimont, was from Fremde Heeres West3 commander Oberst!leutnant Alexis Freiherr von Roenne.4 His letter described a troubling picture of enemy buildup in England. The Allies, Roenne estimated, had some 43 front-line enemy divisions available for a landing—two dozen infantry, a dozen armor, three airborne divisions, and several specialized, independent brigades. Opposing them were only 26 German divisions of any comparable value. A report included in the letter listed several intelligence claims of numerous possible landing sites for an invasion, and recent intelligence reports confirming that Allied landing craft were leaving the Mediterranean, probably headed for England.

  The second letter, far more colorful in its language, was from Fifteenth Army commander GeneralOberst! Hans von Salmuth.5 It came attachéd to a copy of an original assessment that he had previously sent to OB West in Paris. The accompanying letter was a frank, personal note, addressed to Jodl himself. In it, von Salmuth pulled no punches. He bluntly stated his case, emphasizing points here and there with double and even triple exclamation points. In his judgment, the collection and positioning of both personnel and matériel on the coast at present did not amount to much:

  The forces NOW available are adequate neither in size nor in quality. The draining away process must cease…

  …There must be no “ostrich-like” policy; otherwise there may be a very unpleasant awakening! No enemy invasion will be shattered at the Atlantic Wall!!!

  His letter scorned the navy with its “prima donna-like” behavior and farcical chain of command. He also attacked the army’s long-standing practice of weakening the West to help the other fronts. His conclusions were forthright and callously direct:

  The Atlantic Wall is no wall!! Rather is it like a thin, in many places fragile, length of cord, which has a few small knots at isolated points, such as Dieppe and Dunkirk…

  When I visit the positions, I invariably receive the report: “…workers have been transferred to OT construction work for the Air force—usually, of course, “on the Führer’s orders.” Hell! Are we soldiers of the Army just dirt?? We are supposed to stand, up to the last man, up to the last cartridge. And we do it. Then they should treat us accordingly!

  Von Salmuth also addressed the issue of enacting forced labor laws. After detailing several other important items—again peppered here and there with sarcasm and exclamation points—the Fifteenth Army commander concluded:

  My dear Jodl, this letter has been very frank on all points. It gives neither a pessimistic nor an optimistic viewpoint, but a purely realistic one. I feel myself bound to put things into words as I see them, and to make the requests which I deem necessary. I am aware that you cannot fulfill all my requests; for that the cloth is too thin everywhere. But with good will, much can still be accomplished here which will benefit the situation as a whole.

  Heil und Sieg!

  Yours,

  (signed) von Salmuth

  Von Salmuth’s assessment went out to OKW on October 28, and Jodl formally presented both von Rundstedt’s study and von Salmuth’s addition to the Führer at the daily conference two days later.

  Hitler went over von Rundstedt’s negative (although quite comprehensive) study in detail for several reasons. First, of course, was the field marshal’s request that he do so. Anyway, the crisis on the Eastern Front had temporarily subsided. Winter was setting in, and the Russians had paused to replenish and consolidate their recent gains. They would not begin any major campaigns until the spring thaws next year. The recent three-week Moscow Conference6 had just concluded, extensively reported by enemy radio broadcasts. The Allies called for unconditional surrender by the Axis, all but convincing Hitler that an invasion in the West was now just a matter of time. Up until that point, he and Jodl had still fervently hoped that they might in one way or another be able to reason with the Western Allies, and despite long odds, manage to agree upon some type of honorable peace accord. Not now, though. The news was quite specific on that.

  Thus, faced with an all-or-nothing proposition, Hitler, Jodl, and Field Marshal Keitel now took the time to discuss in detail von Rundstedt’s report, along with von Salmuth’s communiqué. If all the disturbing facts given were for the most part correct, the Atlantic Wall was not nearly as formidable as they had imagined. If what the old man had written was really true, the inevitable Alli
ed invasion of France, which could come as early as next spring, would have little chance of failing. At that point, the opening of a new front in the West to complement the two in Italy and Russia would forever remove any long-term chance of winning the war. The Reich would be doomed and would not survive.

  With hopes of a last chance for peace gone, the thought of a successful invasion of Europe depressed Hitler. Just as Napoleon had assumed he had decisively taken the Prussians out of action in the early phase of the battle of Waterloo, Hitler had essentially assumed after the fall of France in 1940 that he had won the war in the West. He had not really changed his opinion about this, despite the fact that England had managed to survive and then hold its own these last three years, especially with America now in the war. Hitler had long accepted the arrogant mindset that he would not have to worry about a major land campaign on that front. Now, it looked like he might very well lose Western Europe at a time to be chosen by the enemy.

  So what then had von Rundstedt been doing for the last two years? Where was that iron barrier that Hitler had wanted finished last May? Hitler only wondered.

  1Oberkommando der Wehrmacht. The German supreme command for all the armed forces.

  2In September 1943, OKW decided on trading German battalions stationed in France for öst newly organized battalions in a ratio of two-to-one. During September and October, about forty-five Cossack, Georgian, North Caucasian, Turkoman, Armenian, Volga-Tatar, Azerbaijanian, Volga-Finn, and other miscellaneous Eastern Europe battalions were transferred to the West. By May of 1944, the Seventh Army alone would have nearly two dozen of these battalions, about a sixth of the entire army’s rifle battalions.