Countdown to D-Day

by Peter Margaritis

  They leave to inspect the still-developing 179th. Originally formed in late 1939, it was classified in January 1940 as the 179th Replacement Division. A year later, it was reclassified as a motorized infantry division, and in April 1943, upgraded to replacement panzer division. Three months later, it transferred from Germany to France. Ever since then, it has struggled to maintain its very existence. Habitually drawn from to flesh out other motorized units, it has never really gained stature. Even now it is but a shadow of the size a true panzer division should be, even by 1944 standards.

  In one set of fields, the entourage inspects a makeshift panzer company, an infantry battalion devoid of transport, and a coastal defense battalion, a truly unique formation to be included in a panzer division. Another two regiments of men are training without equipment or transport.

  They watch the division’s recon unit4 demonstrate its readiness near the town of Tinteniac. The men carry French rifles, but otherwise lack equipment, and even a change of clothes, which in rainy Brittany is a sad state of affairs.

  At noontime, the inspection party dines in Rennes at the 179th’s staff quarters. Then it is back to Le Mans, where they go over the results of the tour with Seventh Army Chief of Staff Max Pemsel. To the complaint of lacking supplies, Rommel promises to increase shipments to them and guarantees delivery of some 400,000 mines by the end of the next month.

  Rommel then returns to Fontainebleau and finds out from von Tempelhoff that OKW has turned down their request to move the reserve panzer divisions to the coast. Rommel is disappointed, but is determined not to give up.

  They need those tanks near the beaches.

  1About 28km southeast of St. Malo.

  2In the spring, this unit would combine with the 16th Panzergrenadier Division to form the 116th Panzer Division.

  3Fifty-four-year-old Generalleutnant Walter Boltenstern. A World War I veteran, he commanded the 71st Motorized Infantry Regiment in the early part of the war, and then served with distinction on the Eastern Front, commanding the 29th Motorized Division. Relieved for health reasons, he later took over the 179th.

  41. Reserve Panzer Aufklärungs-Abteilung.

  Wednesday, January 26

  Fontainebleau is visited by one of Gause’s old commanding officers, 61-year-old General der Infanterie Hermann Geyer.1 Rommel had been delighted to invite the man, a fellow Swabian, over for dinner. The general had been Gause’s superior, in charge of the Fifth Military District before the war.2 Geyer had been a highly regarded strategist on the OHL3 during World War I and was considered extremely intelligent. Even legendary General Ludendorff had once said so.

  Geyer had served in the Reichswehr in the 1930s. In the spring of 1939 he left active duty, upset over the fact that he faced retirement just when his country was about to go to war. But he was reactivated just after the Polish campaign to take over promoted General Dollmann’s 9th Infantry Corps. Commanding them, Geyer participated in the 1940 campaign in France, earning him the Knight’s Cross.

  The next year, in the opening months of the Soviet invasion, Geyer had fought well on the Eastern Front. His 9th Infantry Corps in General Hoth’s Fourth Army had advanced through western Russia alongside General Guderian’s panzers. Geyer had pushed his men eastward past Borodino, the sight of Napoleon’s victory back in 1812, and it was Geyer’s infantry that had stood before the gates of Moscow at the end of November. By the time that freezing Russian winter began, they had taken severe casualties during their determined advance.

  Geyer had still been in the process of moving his tired forces up alongside Guderian’s units for an assault on the capital when the enemy units opposing him had launched a furious counterattack in early December. Assessing the situation—the freezing temperatures, the formidable Russian forces probing before him, his depleted units, the extended, slim, overburdened supply lines, threatened with being cut off—Geyer, like several other conscientious commanders, had reluctantly but prudently ordered his exhausted and depleted corps to fall back out of their threatened pocket before they could be surrounded, to dig in for the cold months, and regroup.

  In doing so, he no doubt saved the lives of several thousand men. Politically though, it was the wrong decision to make, and he certainly was not congratulated. Hitler, furious with Geyer about his withdrawal, relieved him of his command on December 31 (along with several dozen other commanding officers, including von Rundstedt), less than a week after Guderian himself had been sacked. He had been unceremoniously fired, curtly told that he was too old to continue leading in the field. To make matters worse, word went around the High Command about how Geyer had criticized the Nazi Party before the war. Since then, Geyer had tried several times to get another command, but had remained inactive. By the time of his visit to Fontainebleau he is effectively in retirement.

  After dinner, Rommel and his staff sit and chat with him. Geyer now does little to show his contempt for the Party.4 He wants to know from them why the senior generals still put up with Hitler and his “type of leadership.” Well, someone counters, most of them listen to him because they do not have as much combat experience. Guderian had suggested in December 1941 that experienced front-line generals trade places with the inexperienced ones in OKW and OKH. Hitler had refused to even think about it.

  Geyer does not like their answer, and the debate goes on. Rommel is somewhat bored, and his mind seems to wander. Maybe he is wondering about where he can get more mines.

  The discussion turns to defending against the invasion. A few people mention having thought about the recent landing at Anzio four days ago, and how the Allies have still not made a follow-up attack from the beachhead. Geyer feels that their reserves near the landing area should be all moved forward, since there are few consolidated enemy positions as yet. He had done something similar in Russia in late 1941. Rommel is only half-listening…

  Geyer continues talking about reserves. If you considered their deployment mathematically, he explains, you would discover that there’s a direct function of time and space variables. The formulas could get fairly complicated. He states, “The fact that one square kilometer contains one million square meters does not occur to most people.”

  A million square meters to a kilometer… Rommel raises his head and turns to his chief engineer, Wilhelm Meise.

  “Meise,” he asks, “how many mines do you think that’d take?”

  Meise looks at him, surprised. He hesitates. Rommel does some quick calculations in his head and comes up with roughly one mine per 15 square meters. He concludes, “I figure about 65,000.”

  Meise nods and notes the figure. The conversation goes on to other subjects, like ammunition safety and better cooperation between the Luftwaffe and the panzer units. Rommel seems preoccupied again, probably drifting back to those 65,000 mines.

  The group finally breaks up and General Geyer accepts Rommel’s gracious invitation to stay the night at the château.5

  Later, the field marshal gets to talk to Lucie by phone. Afterward, he writes to her:

  I just spoke to you on the telephone. Now the move seems to be pretty much over, and you are in the new home, which I hope is in every way satisfactory.

  The job’s being very frustrating. Time and again one comes up against bureaucratic and petrified individuals who resist everything new and progressive. But we’ll manage it all the same.

  My two hounds had to be separated, after the older Ajax had well nigh killed the younger with affection. Ajax, the older one, is now with me, the other one with Böttcher.6 Ajax is turning into a lovable pain.

  1General der Infanterie Hermann Freiherr von Geyer. Some sources confuse him with Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenberg, Commander, Panzergruppe West, who happened to visit Rommel the next day.

  2Ruge erroneously reported him as commanding the V Corps.

  3Oberst!e Heeresleitung. The German General Staff and later Supreme Army Command. See Glossary.

  4Geyer was certainly no favorite of Adolf Hitler. He was one of a
few scores of generals blacklisted in back in October 1938 as being unreliable, a member of a sweeping list that had included Generals Ludwig Beck and Gerd von Rundstedt.

  5On April 10, 1946, less than a year after the war ended, General Geyer, despondent over the fate of Germany in the war, and guilt-ridden that he had not done enough to resist Hitler, committed suicide by drowning in Wildsee Lake near his home.

  6Feldwebel Albert Böttcher, Rommel’s longtime secretary. This must have been just a temporaray arrangement, because Rommel will later refer to his “two dogs” again.

  Thursday, January 27

  Generalfeldmarschall von Rundstedt continues his leave at the spa in Bad Tölz.

  ***

  Rommel remains at Fontainebleau today. His lumbago is giving him problems again, and anyway, he wants to catch up on some paperwork. This includes documenting the latest finds from his inspection in Northwest France.

  Besides, he has another problem today. None other than Baron Geyr von Schweppenburg will be coming to visit today. The baron commands Panzergruppe West.

  Geyr and von Rundstedt share a number of similarities—background, training, tastes, and most importantly, their theories on the role of armor during an invasion. This partly explains why the old man selected Geyr for his command position. Despite the fact that OB West thinks him a capable leader, the feeling is not mutual. Geyr feels that von Rundstedt has not kept up with the latest developments in modern, mobile warfare, and that despite his critical role in the early blitzkrieg theories, he knows less about panzer tactics than most of the younger generals. Geyr considers him an armchair strategist, the last of a dying breed; an infantry dinosaur in a modern, blitzkrieg world. The old man, in his opinion, belongs at home.

  Nor does Geyr have any respect for Blumentritt, his chief of staff. The man in his view does not have the qualifications or demeanor for his post.

  And Rommel? To Geyr, he is an upstart; a johnny-come-lately who, while admittedly having learned the fundamentals of tactical mobility, nevertheless has had no real training in strategic warfare. He had been far luckier than he should have been in North Africa. And Geyr considers him socially just a commoner: Rommel’s father had, after all, only been a schoolteacher.1

  Geyr of course is a strong panzer warfare advocate and colleague of GeneralOberst! Guderian’s, having joined the panzer forces in 1937. Having commanded a number of panzer units in France and Russia, he holds the Knight’s Cross. He thinks he knew it all, and is prepared to advocate his principles.

  He and Rommel have already met once, a brief meeting on January 8. Now, having talked to Jodl at OKW a week ago, Geyr is ready to restate and insist upon his theories.

  Geyr enters Rommel’s study, and after pleasantries, they get serious. As expected, he and Rommel disagree over the positioning of the panzer divisions. Rommel is already tired of playing this game, having gone a few rounds with von Rundstedt and OKW. The baron, reinforced in his view by OKW, von Rundstedt, and Guderian, insists that the panzers be kept inland, strategically located, ready to strike en masse. Rommel agrees that they should be ready to hit hard and fast, but should be near the coast where they can engage without delay.

  Geyr disagrees, pointing out his experience. Rommel counters that he has some too. And yet, experience means little in the face of the technologically advanced Western Allies, with their command of the Channel, their massive air fleets and their modern equipment.

  Geyr accuses him of reducing the role of the panzers to semi-mobile artillery. Rommel replies that the danger will not come from swift-moving armor but from masses of infantry moving right off the beaches. He adds that once the enemy gets firmly ashore, there will be no getting rid of them. He cites Salerno and Anzio.

  After the meeting, Rommel is perturbed by the encounter. So he drives up to Paris and goes to OB West’s staff quarters (von Rundstedt is still on leave). There he talks with von Rundstedt’s staff members about the panzer problem. They agree with Rommel that the tanks must hit fast, but support Geyr’s general position. Rommel leaves, somewhat frustrated. He is running up against too many brick walls.

  1Later, when Rommel got another chief of staff (Hans Speidel), Geyr would dislike him too, claiming that the man has never “commanded anything larger than an infantry company.”

  Friday, January 28

  General Jodl at OKW in the Wolf’s Lair is busy worrying about a massive Soviet pincer attack on the Eighth Army at Cherkassy. But his report on his inspection of the West earlier this month has just gone out. On the whole, it supports von Rundstedt’s theories but is not flattering to the old man himself, currently on leave at Bad Tölz.

  The basis of the report is the level of unpreparedness along the coast, followed up by the premise that there are two strategies on how to deal with the invasion. He covers Rommel’s hold-them-at-the-beaches position, and outlines Rommel’s experiences with the Afrika Korps and Italy. Rommel’s line is, “Don’t let them get ashore.” Von Rundstedt’s on the other hand is, “Hey, let them come.”

  Jodl then states von Rundstedt’s position: that the coast is too long to adequately defend every mile—which is plainly obvious—and that the enemy, with their formidable command of the air and the sea, can concentrate wherever they want and penetrate at any point, no matter what type of defenses are up. The answer then, in the old Prussian’s opinion, is to put out along the coast a few dozen static divisions to slow the enemy up, and then hit them with a powerful, mobile, strategic reserve force when they began to advance inland. If that does not work, they will just have to defeat the enemy units in the French interior itself.

  Jodl writes that, based upon what he has seen, von Rundstedt is right in one respect: the coast cannot at present be held. However, Jodl also writes that he somewhat agrees with Rommel’s theory of hitting the enemy on the beaches (especially since the Führer still favors this strategy). On the other hand, Jodl also states that von Rundstedt’s concept of a strategic reserve, centered somewhere around Paris, is a sound one. He adds that OKW is not going to sanction the placement of reserves on the coast because of the “general situation.”

  On matters of preparation though, the report digs hard at OB West. The rich, soft Parisian lifestyle, Jodl feels, has decayed their fighting ability. He writes in his report with chilly distaste:

  The C-in-C West would do well to exchange his Hôtel Georges V for a command post where he can see the blue sky—where the sun shines, and which smells fresher.

  And he does not stop there in his derision.

  Lower headquarters and officers’ accommodations are a danger not only to security but also to inner attitudes and alertness. The bloom of war is completely missing. Deep armchairs and carpet lead to royal household allures.

  As of March 1, all staffs are to move into their command posts. Unfortunately, these too have largely been built next door to fine châteaux.

  Jodl has certainly not pulled any punches. And he is not making his point out of envy. No, the officers here are not thinking like warriors—rather, like relaxed gentlemen who are getting ready to go out on the town.

  Hitler believes in Rommel’s hit-them-at-the-beaches strategy, but is sufficiently persuaded by Jodl’s report to let Panzergruppe West continue to exist.

  ***

  Tonight, after a few weeks of reorganizing and replenishment, some 26 aircraft undertake another Steinbock air raid against England. Results are paltry. Clearly, the offensive is not having any measurable effect against the enemy. Wisely, General Pelz, commanding the IX Air Corps, suspends the raids again for a few days to regroup.

  After over nearly three and a half years of war with England, the Germans have still not learned the lessons of the Battle of Britain.

  Saturday, January 29

  Despite another bout of lumbago, Rommel rides out to inspect the 84th Corps sector, including the coastline from the Seine Bay west to the Channel Islands, formerly owned by the British. He especially wants to check out that one section of be
ach west of the Orne River that Pemsel briefed him on a week ago.1

  The corps is commanded by cantankerous General der Artillerie Erich Marcks. Rommel finds the 52-year-old fellow to be a tough but straight bird with a solid army background, and a highly competent strategist.2 A sharp tactician, he is a product of the old, pre-Nazi officer cadre. Despite his competence in the Generalstab though, the Nazis have never really favored him, mainly because of something in his political past.3

  Marcks is optimistic about being able to turn back the enemy, even though he is responsible for a large area of the coastline. His confidence is surprising to the inspecting group. Rommel though, has a decidedly different feeling about the defenses here, and chides Marcks for his sanguinity. If the invasion comes here, he will find his defenses woefully inadequate.

  Marcks points out that he must cover the Seine Bay from the Orne River westward, along the eastern shore of the Cotentin peninsula, through the strategic port of Cherbourg, down the western coast of the peninsula, and lastly, the Channel Islands. This amounts to some 400km of coast, and to cover this long stretch, Marcks has only five divisions.

  One of these is the 319th Infantry Division.4 Though it has been weakened as a fighting unit by experienced men being transferred out into combat divisions, especially those at or bound for the fighting fronts, it is still a capable unit. However, because of its location, it might just as well be stricken from the list of available units in the West. OKW has placed the entire division offshore, way out on the Channel Islands of Guernsey and Jersey, dozens of kilometers west of the Cherbourg peninsula. Although these islands are of little military value outside of protecting coastal traffic around Brittany, their occupation nevertheless carries a significant psychological weight for Hitler, since they are basically the only portions of original British territory that the Reich still controls.