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Social Psychology

Page 7

by Paul Seager


  Food for thought

  The next time you observe someone and reach a decision about them (perhaps when you meet a fellow student for the first time, or when you watch an interview with a celebrity on the television), take ten minutes later in the day to try to understand why you made the attributions about them that you did (e.g. did you think they were ‘genuine’ or perhaps ‘arrogant’). Did you use all of the information available to you, or just some of it? How could the information presented in this chapter have helped you to reach a different attribution?

  Dig deeper

  Choi, I., Nisbett, R. E. & Norenzayan, A. (1999). ‘Causal attribution across cultures: Variation and universality’. Psychological Bulletin, 125(1), 47–63.

  Fincham, F. D. (2002). ‘Attributions in close relationships: From Balkanization to integration’. In Fletcher, G. & Clark, M.S. (Eds.) (2002). Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Interpersonal processes. Wiley-Blackwell.

  Forsterling, F. (2001). Attribution: An Introduction to Theories, Research and Applications. Psychology Press

  Hewstone, M. (1989). Causal Attribution: From Cognitive Processes to Collective Beliefs. Oxford: Blackwell.

  Fact-check

  1 Which of the following is not an idea on which Heider based his naïve scientist approach to why people make attributions?

  a If our behaviour has a reason behind it, then another individual’s behaviour must also have a cause

  b We look for both internal and external causes for another’s behaviour

  c We look for stable traits in others in order to bring predictability to our world

  d We have an innate need to understand scientifically the behaviour of others

  2 ‘Beth is happy person because she is always smiling’ is what type of attribution?

  a A defining attribution

  b An internal attribution

  c An external attribution

  d A co-varying attribution

  3 Which of the following is not a source of information used by people according to correspondent inference theory?

  a Does the behaviour always occur in a given situation?

  b Is the behaviour freely chosen?

  c Is the behaviour socially desirable?

  d Does the behaviour lead to a specific effect?

  4 In the Jones & Harris (1967) study looking at participants’ judgements of the writer’s attitudes regarding Fidel Castro, the results in which of the four conditions seemed to violate social inference theory?

  a For Castro; Free choice

  b For Castro; Forced choice

  c Against Castro; Free choice

  d Against Castro; Forced Choice

  5 Which of the following is not a source of information used in Kelley’s model to attribute a cause to a behaviour?

  a Distinctiveness

  b Consensus

  c Representativeness

  d Consistency

  6 According to Kelley’s co-variation model, if we observe a behaviour by another individual that only, and always, occurs in the presence of an object, then this behaviour is high in:

  a Distinctiveness

  b Representativeness

  c Consensus

  d Consistency

  7 The co-variation model claims that if the information we have about another’s behaviour is high in consistency, consensus and distinctiveness, then the cause of the behaviour is probably due to:

  a The situation in which the individual finds themselves

  b The individual’s personality

  c A combination of the individual’s situation and personality

  d None of the above

  8 Which bias claims that we tend to make an attribution that makes us feel good about ourselves?

  a Fundamental attribution error

  b Actor-observer effect

  c Self-serving bias

  d The correspondence bias

  9 Jane decides that her fellow teacher Geoff is an angry person because he shouts a lot, but when she shouts a lot, she claims it is because of her unruly students. This attribution bias is referred to as:

  a Fundamental attribution error

  b Actor-observer effect

  c Self-serving bias

  d The correspondence bias

  10 In his time at Chess club, Peter has met a fellow player called Norman. Peter has noticed that in discussion about previous famous chess players, Norman always says he likes Bobby Fischer (despite everyone else saying that they dislike Fischer), both when he is at Chess club and at other places too, and he doesn’t seem to have any other favourite chess players. Which of the following ‘chess’ attributions can we make about Norman?

  a None with any degree of certainty

  b Norman has a ‘chess’ personality

  c Norman only likes Bobby Fischer when in a ‘chess environment’

  d Whether Norman likes Bobby Fischer is dependent on both his personality and the situation that he finds himself in.

  4

  Social cognition

  We come into contact with many thousands of people, objects and situations in our lifetime, and, to our credit, we deal with most of them quite successfully. We make decisions about what is important for us to pay attention to, and what we can safely ignore. The topic of social cognition looks at how we do this, and why occasionally we might not use the information optimally.

  When presented with information, whether it is in the form of meeting a person for the first time, or finding ourselves in a novel situation, such as attending a club or society, there are two main ways that we process it – quickly or slowly. The quick method tends to use minimal effort, ‘rules of thumbs’ (referred to as heuristics – see later in this chapter), and sometimes unconscious (automatic) processes to deal with the information as rapidly and as efficiently as possible. When people do this, the term cognitive miser can be applied: our time is precious to us and we don’t want to spend more time than necessary on any given problem, especially if we have a limited cognitive capacity (for whatever reason). Decisions reached by ‘cognitive misers’ tend to be ‘good enough’ for most of the time. They are prone to biases in their thinking and decision making.

  Key idea: Cognitive miser

  An individual who employs a short-cut to make a decision due to a limited processing capacity.

  The slow method is used when we decide that the situation or person with which we are confronted merits a more careful, logical and systematic analysis to ensure that any decisions we make are good ones. When people do this, the term naïve scientist can be applied (see also Chapter 3): we feel that we will gain the most from a more controlled and conscious (intentional) processing of the facts before making a decision. The assumption is made that such an individual is a rational decision maker with ample time and motivation to consider all of the facts of any situation they encounter, allowing them to reach a considered conclusion. They are less likely to be prone to biases in their thinking.

  Key idea: Naïve scientist

  An individual who employs a careful, logical and systematic approach when making a decision.

  If presented with the same ‘facts’ about a person, the cognitive miser and naïve scientist could reach two different conclusions. The cognitive miser is more likely to engage in stereotyping (see Spotlight below) and utilize heuristics (see section on cognitive heuristics below), whereas the naive scientist is more likely to carefully engage with the facts of the situation to reach a more considered conclusion.

  Regardless of the type of processing, people have the goal of understanding their environment, and to do this, they engage in social categorization.

  Social categorization

  In order to make sense of our surroundings and of other people, we attempt to understand them by trying to figure out the things to which they are similar (the categories to which they belong) and dissimilar. This can apply to objects, attitudes, opinions, concepts, people and events, and it is referred to as categorization.


  Spotlight: Cognitive misers vs. naïve scientists

  When driving along a road, if they see a car in front of them engage in some risky manoeuvring, a cognitive miser may make the assumption that the driver is a man; if they get stuck behind a slow driver, they may assume that the driver is elderly; if they see a car trying to park less than successfully, they may assume that the driver is a woman. These are common stereotypes of drivers. Naïve scientists (assuming they are a passenger and not a driver, thus giving them more time and cognitive capacity to process information) may identify other possible causes for the behaviour, such as the driver is unfamiliar with the road, and hence they may reach a different conclusion about the identity of the driver.

  The way in which we define a category does not have a precise boundary, but instead is a little more ‘fuzzy’. We think of things in terms of being more or less typical of a category. For example, if we take the category ‘Pet’, then a dog is more typical and a snake is less typical, but both can fall under the category of ‘Pet’. The more prototypical something is of a category, the quicker we are to categorize it, and thus the more representative it is of that category.

  Key idea: Social categorization

  The act of classifying things, such as objects or people, as belonging to specific groups (or categories).

  We are more likely to bring a category member to mind if it is more prototypical of the category (see Spotlight below). However, this can sometimes lead to an error in our thought processes.

  Spotlight: Exploring prototypicality

  For the following categories, write down the first three things that come into your mind:

  1 Type of Fruit

  2 Type of Transport

  3 Type of Sport

  It is likely that your answers include apple, banana, oranges (prototypes), rather than kiwi fruit, lychee or date; train, car, plane rather than balloon, hovercraft or cable car; football, tennis, cricket, rather than sumo wrestling, lacrosse or fencing. Of course, your personal circumstances may affect your categorization process, therefore if you are a lychee-loving sumo wrestler, then your answers to the exercise above may not be typical.

  The way in which the content of categories is created is usually by some form of social learning (e.g. we are taught categories at school, by our parents or other role models) or exposure (e.g. we learn first-hand), but there is a danger that this can lead to stereotyping – the prototypes can become stereotypes. In many cases this won’t be too much of a problem: for example, if someone says they are a pet lover, you will likely make the assumption that they own a cat or a dog. However, negative stereotyping is all too common, one type of which is called an illusory correlation.

  An illusory correlation claims that two variables are related to one another even though there is no link. An example of this would be where people believe that members of certain races or social groupings are more likely to commit a crime despite no real evidence existing to support this notion.

  A typical experiment to highlight the illusory correlation goes as follows: information is given to participants about two groups: group A is the majority and group B is the minority (if it helps, think of group A as representing males and group B as representing females), and twice as much information is given about group A as about group B; in both groups, twice as much positive information is given compared to negative information. Although there is no link between the group and the proportion of positive or negative information provided, when participants are presented with the information about the two groups, they are more likely to attribute negative behaviours to group B. Therefore, despite there being no real difference between the two groups, we are more likely to attribute a link in one group (an illusory correlation), but not the other, where no link actually exists.

  Key idea: Illusory correlation

  The assumption that two things are linked when in fact no such link exists.

  ’Illusory correlation refers to an erroneous inference a person makes about the relationship between two categories of events.’

  (Hamilton & Gifford, 1976, p. 406)

  So, in the example above, we know little information about the members of group B, but there is distinctiveness about the negative information; for group A, the same amount of negative information exists but it is almost diluted by the amount of other positive information. The negative information is seen as more representative of group B than it is of group A.

  WHY DO WE CATEGORIZE?

  It might be asked that if categorization can be bad, then why do we categorize? The short answer is that there are more good reasons to categorize than there are bad reasons, for example:

  • It saves us time and cognitive processing in as much as it frees up cognitive resources for more important tasks.

  • It makes things clearer/simpler and focuses our perception of the world.

  • It gives us meaning and understanding.

  • It helps us to make predictions about things (e.g. objects and social behaviour).

  • It can help us to understand ourselves in relation to others.

  WHEN DO WE CATEGORIZE?

  Typically we categorize for many of the same reasons outlined above; that is, when time and cognitive load are limited, and when we need a rapid and straightforward impression of something. However, categorization can sometimes be invoked unconsciously by the features of something that we come across first (temporal primacy), when there are obvious differences between things or people (perceptual salience) and when some categories, such as race and gender, are so common (chronic accessibility).

  CONSEQUENCES OF CATEGORIZATION

  When we categorize, it can lead to a biased perception of information whereby we rely on certain stereotype-consistent information (see Spotlight below). One study found that if participants were told that a woman was a librarian then they were more likely to recall that she wore glasses; however, if they were told that she was a waitress then they were more likely to recall that she was drinking beer. Categorization can influence both our perception and what we remember, leading us to evaluate potentially the same information differently. It is not a large leap to see how social categorization can lead to prejudice (see Chapter 13).

  Spotlight: Stereotyping

  If you are invited to a party and told that you will meet a primary school teacher, you will be making assumptions about them before you have even been introduced. This is referred to as stereotyping, and will involve drawing on prototypes from categories. For example, you will likely assume that they will be female and quite young. Similarly, if you were told that you will be introduced to an engineer, you might assume you will meet a middle-aged man, who is quite practical.

  Making such judgements, which are made almost without thinking, will in all likelihood allow you to deal with the situation more efficiently when it happens. However, there will be times when you are in for a shock as these types of short-cut can let you down.

  If we should find ourselves categorized as part of a group to which a negative stereotype has been attached, then in all likelihood our performance at a task may be affected; this is referred to as a ‘stereotype threat’. The reason for our poorer performance may simply be that we are worried about conforming to the negative stereotype. For example, it is an oft-cited ‘fact’ that girls are not as good at maths as boys, or that African-Americans are less intelligent than white Americans. In the latter case, it may be possible to induce the stereotype threat simply by asking a candidate to state their race at the beginning of a test. Research has certainly shown that if a person is made aware of a negative stereotype of the group to which they belong, it is more likely that their subsequent performance on a task will be impaired.

  Cognitive heuristics

  Given that most of the time we act as ‘cognitive misers’, we tend to make speedy and automatic (intuitive) decisions, thus engaging in non-systematic processing. We find that we can make adequate judgements about people and situations without s
pending a vast amount of time and effort: of course, these judgements may not be the best that we can make (because they can result in biased decisions and errors in judgements at times), but generally they will suffice and we are happy enough with this state of affairs. In summary, people have a tendency to reduce complex situations to simple ones by using ‘rules of thumb’ or heuristics. There are a number of common heuristics that we use.

  THE REPRESENTATIVENESS HEURISTIC

  This process involves using ‘prototypical features’ to classify a person or a situation. For example, if you walk in to a classroom or a lecture hall, and there is someone standing at the front, then you will assume that this person is the teacher or lecturer.

  Case study: Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky

  Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1972) are two researchers synonymous with cognitive biases and heuristics. In one experiment, they gave the following description of a man called ‘Thomas’ to their participants: ‘short, slim and a lover of poetry’. They then asked them to decide whether Thomas was an Ivy League Classics Professor or a Truck Driver. Which would you choose? If you’re anything like Kahneman and Tversky’s participants, you probably said ‘Professor’ because the description sounds more like a typical professor than a typical lorry driver. However, given that there are only a very small number of Ivy League Classic Professors, and probably many thousands of lorry drivers, statistically speaking, Thomas is more likely to be a lorry driver. However, making the choice of ‘professor’ is an example of the representativeness heuristic.

 

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