The Poetics of Sovereignty
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in a situation where the only options are rebellion or death.
In a passage condemning this episode, the Song philosopher Cheng Yi
程頤 (1033–1107) wrote:
When the Tang held the empire, although it claimed to have brought about good
government and peace, it nevertheless also possessed a whiff of barbaric customs.
The ‘three bonds’ were not rectified, lacking [the way of] ruler and subject, father and son, and husband and wife. This originated with Taizong.
唐有天下，雖號治平，然亦有夷狄之風。三綱不正，無君臣、父子、
夫婦，其原始於太宗也。19
Cheng Yi attributes the splintering of the Tang into the militarized re-
gions of the Five Dynasties to the failure of Taizong to rectify the “Three
Bonds” ( sangang 三綱). Taizong’s manipulation of his father through
Yangdi’s palace women constituted a triple-transgression of the basic
codes of Confucian thought, undoing the bonds of ruler and subject, fa-
ther and son, and husband and wife, in one move. With such a weak mor-
al foundation, it is not surprising that Cheng Yi metaleptically traced the
Tang failure back to Taizong’s subterfuge.
With plans for the rebellion underway, Li Yuan had Shimin and Liu
Wenjing raise troops in Taiyuan. He also had his eldest son, Jiancheng 建
成 (589–626), and his fourth son, Yuanji 元吉 (603–26), raise troops at
their base in Shanxi 山西. To strengthen his military position and to
ward against further incursions, in the fifth month of 617, Li Yuan nego-
tiated an agreement with Shibi Qaghan 始畢可汗 (d. 619), the leader of
the Eastern Turks.20 The Song dynasty monumental history, the Zizhi
tongjian 資治通鑑 ( Comprehensive Mirror in Aid to Governance), records that “Gaozu himself hand-wrote a petition, using deferential language and
much ritual courtesy, to Shibi Qaghan” 自為手啟，卑辭厚禮，遺始
畢可汗.21 The Da Tang chuangye qiju zhu fills in some of the detail, not-
—————
19. See Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) and Lü Zuqian 呂祖謙 (1137–81), comps., Jin si lu, Zhu Jieren, Yan Zuozhi, and Liu Yongxiang, gen. eds., Zhuzi quanshu, vol. 13, 8.246. Also see Chan, trans., Reflections on Things at Hand, p. 213.
20. For Shibi Qaghan’s biography, see Jiu Tang shu, 194A.5153–54; and Xin Tang shu, 215A.6028–29.
21. Zizhi tongjian, 184.5737.
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20
Reading the Reign of Tang Taizong
ing that Li Yuan’s advisers urged him to change the character qi 啟 to shu 書, making the missive a communication between equals, rather than a
petition from an inferior to a superior, but Li Yuan refused.22 It would
seem that, at least rhetorically, Li Yuan was declaring himself the vassal
( chen 臣) of the Turks in order to gain the support of the qaghan.23
In the sixth month of 617, Li Yuan established the Administrative
Garrison of the Generalissimo 大將軍府 in the Taiyuan region. Com-
mand of his military forces were divided between Li Jiancheng, who was
enfeoffed as Duke of Longxi 隴西公 and appointed General of the Left
Command 左領大都督, and Li Shimin, who was enfeoffed as Duke of
Dunhuang 燉煌公 and appointed General of the Right Command 右領
大都督. In the seventh month, Li Yuan then led his troops out of Tai-
yuan, with the aim of capturing the Sui capital, Daxingcheng, which he
entered in the eleventh month. Yangdi had withdrawn in the summer of
616 to his southern capital of Jiangdu 江都 (the present-day city of Yang-
zhou), so Li Yuan had Yang You 楊侑, the grandson of Yangdi, installed
as Sui Gongdi 隋恭帝 (r. 617–18). Gongdi then enfeoffed Li Yuan as
Prince of Tang 唐王. In the fifth month of 618, Li Yuan deposed Sui
Gongdi and took the throne as the first emperor of the Tang dynasty, to
be known after his death as Tang Gaozu 唐高祖 (r. 618–26).
Despite the overthrow of the Sui, there were still formidable enemies
to dispatch.24 Gaozu had to face a number of rival claimants to the Sui
legacy, including the warlord Xue Ju 薛舉 (d. 618) to the northwest
(whom I will discuss in more detail in Chapter 5); the Sui general Wang
Shichong 王世充 (d. 621) who held the eastern capital of Luoyang 洛陽;
Dou Jiande 竇建德 (573–621) to the northeast; Li Mi to the east of Luo-
yang; and the regicide Yuwen Huaji at Jiangdu. The Tang pacification of
the empire was a prolonged affair, and the last major uprising would not
be settled until 624, when the rebellion led by Fu Gongshi
—————
22. Da Tang chuangye qiju zhu, p. 9.
23. This is discussed at length and documented in the essay, “Tang Gaozu cheng chen,” in Li Shutong, Tang shi kaobian, pp. 214–46; and again in “Zai bian cheng chen yu Tujue shi,” in Li Shutong, Tang shi xinlun, pp. 69–118. For an overview, see Pan, Son of Heaven, pp. 169–71.
24. On the Tang military consolidation, see Graff, Medieval Chinese Warfare, pp. 160–82.
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Reading the Reign of Tang Taizong
21
輔公祏 (d. 624) in the Jiangnan region was put down by the Tang general
Li Xiaogong 李孝恭 (591–640).25
The Xuanwu Gate Incident
With the end of the major military campaigns, the problem of succession
emerged. Despite the prominent role played by Shimin in the Tang upris-
ing and subsequent pacification efforts, Gaozu had installed Jiancheng as
crown prince in the first year of the Wude 武德 reign. However, accord-
ing to the Xin Tang shu and the Zizhi tongjian (but not the Jiu Tang shu), it would seem that Gaozu had originally wanted to install Shimin as
crown prince. Near the end of the fifth year of Gaozu’s reign (622), the
Zizhi tongjian states:
When the emperor staged the uprising at Jinyang, this was all due to the plans of
Shimin, Prince of Qin. The emperor [at that time] said to Shimin, “If this affair
is successful, then the winning of the empire is all owing to you, and it would be
appropriate to make you the crown prince.” Shimin bowed and respectfully de-
clined. When he [Li Yuan] became Prince of Tang, the military commanders and
staff assistants also petitioned to have Shimin raised to crown prince. The em-
peror wanted to install him, but Shimin strongly refused and so he [Gaozu] went
no further. Crown Prince Jiancheng by nature was liberal and easy-going, delight-
ing in wine and women and hunts in the fields, and Yuanji, Prince of Qi, had
many faults and flaws; neither was favored by the emperor. Shimin’s deeds and
fame increased by the day, and the emperor often had the intention of using him
to replace Jiancheng. Jiancheng inwardly felt insecure, and so with Yuanji, plot-
ted together, both hoping to bring about Shimin’s downfall and each pledging
himself to the other as an ally.
上之起兵晉陽也，皆秦王世民之謀，上謂世民曰：“若事成，則天下
皆汝所致，當以汝為太子。”世民拜且辭。及為唐王，將佐亦請以世
民為世子，上將立之，世民固
辭而止。太子建成，性寬簡，喜酒色遊
畋；齊王元吉，多過失；皆無寵於上。世民功名日盛，上常有意以代
建成，建成內不自安，乃與元吉協謀，共傾世民，各引樹黨友。26
—————
25. For a convenient table of the various Tang rivals and an overview of major events in the pacification campaigns, see Cen, Sui Tang shi, pp. 75–88. A concise summary of the period may be found in Wechsler, “Founding of the T’ang Dynasty,” pp. 162–68. For a much more detailed account of the entire period, see Niu Zhigong, Tang Gaozu zhuan, pp. 84–166.
26. Zizhi tongjian, 190.5957.
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Reading the Reign of Tang Taizong
These two attempts by Gaozu to elevate Shimin above Jiancheng would
supposedly be followed by a third in the sixth month of the seventh year
(624), in conjunction with the failed rebellion of Yang Wen’gan 楊文幹
(d. 624), who had formerly served in Jiancheng’s guard.27 While the third
attempt is dated within Sima Guang’s chronology, there are no dates giv-
en to Gaozu’s first two attempts to make Shimin the crown prince. The
historian Li Shutong 李樹桐 has persuasively argued that this passage is a
later fabrication, one that he attributes to Xu Jingzong 許敬宗 (592–672),
who served in Taizong’s court and later, in a more controversial manner,
in the court of Wu Zetian 武則天 (r. 690–705).28
What is striking here is the way in which Gaozu’s attempts to install
Shimin as crown prince are modeled upon what David R. Knechtges calls
“the rhetoric of imperial abdication and accession.” Knechtges examines
this rhetorical performance in the four edicts of abdication issued by Han
Xiandi 漢獻帝 (r. 190–220) to Cao Pi 曹丕 (187–226), Cao Pi’s three re-
fusals, and the various memorials by the members of the Han and Wei
courts.29 Cao Pi and his court manufactured legitimacy for the Wei usur-
pation by forcing Han Xiandi to perform an act of shanrang 禪讓, a
yielding of the throne to a subject of surpassing virtue.30 It was this exam-
ple that Taizong hoped to borrow for his own accession to the throne.
Nevertheless, for Cao Pi to make Han Xiandi grovel is one thing; to rep-
resent Tang Gaozu as almost begging to have his son accept the crown
princeship is quite another.
—————
27. In fact, the history of association between Yang Wen’gan and Crown Prince Jiancheng was acknowledged by Gaozu, who perhaps feared that a full investigation might uncover a deeper plot than he was willing to face. See Zizhi tongjian, 191.5987. Again, Li Shutong doubts the veracity of this account, believing that Xu Jingzong had fabricated much of this.
See his “Tang Yang Wen’gan fanci,” in Tang shi kaobian, pp. 99–117.
28. Xu Jingzong is traditionally blamed for many of the alterations to the historical record during Taizong’s reign. See Li Shutong, “Tang Gaozu san xu li Taizong bianwei,” Tang shi kaobian, pp. 192–213; and Twitchett, Writing of Official History under the T’ang, pp. 127–28.
29. See Knechtges, “Rhetoric of Imperial Abdication.” Also see Leban, “Managing Heav-en’s Mandate,” in Roy and Tsien, eds., Ancient China, pp. 315–41.
30. The great twentieth-century scholar Gu Jiegang has traced the idea of shanrang back to the Mohist corpus in his “Shanrang chuanshuo qiyu Mojia kao,” Shixue jikan 1, pp. 163–
230. This is also discussed in Wechsler, Offerings of Jade and Silk, pp. 80–81. For a recent study of this topic, see Pines, “Disputers of Abdication,” pp. 243–300.
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Reading the Reign of Tang Taizong
23
Sima Guang’s narrative of Gaozu’s private preference for Shimin
serves to lay the narrative groundwork for the Xuanwu Gate Incident
in 626.31 Much has been written about the infamous palace coup, which
brought Shimin to power as Taizong.32 The most detailed and accessible
account of the incident is found in the Zizhi tongjian, which records
that, in the ninth year of the Wude reign, Shimin discovered that
his brothers Jiancheng and Yuanji were plotting to harm him. On the
fourth day of the sixth month, Shimin and his supporters, including
Zhangsun Wuji 長孫無忌 (d. 659),33 Yuchi Jingde 尉遲敬德 (585–
658), 34 Fang Xuanling 房 玄 齡 (578–648), 35 Du Ruhui 杜 如 誨
(585–630),36 Yuwen Shiji 宇文士及 (d. 642),37 and Gao Shilian 高士廉
—————
31. For a revisionist reading of the Xuanwu Gate Incident, see Eisenberg, “Kingship, Power and the Hsuan-wu Men Incident,” pp. 223–59. Eisenberg provides the intriguing theory that Gaozu consciously manipulated the rivalry between his sons, following Turkish customs, though this remains largely a matter of speculation.
32. For example, see Bingham, “Li Shih-min’s Coup I,” pp. 89–95; Bingham, “Li Shih-
min’s Coup II,” pp. 259–71; Nunome, Zui Tō shi kenkyū, pp. 257–313; Wechsler, “Founding of the Tang Dynasty,” pp. 182–87; Zhao Keyao and Xu Daoxun, Tang Taizong zhuan, pp. 61–82; Yuan Yingguan and Wang Jieyun, Tang Taizong zhuan, pp. 69–87; and Li Shutong, “Xuanwumen zhi bian,” in Tang shi kaobian, pp. 153–91.
33. Zhangsun Wuji was the scion of the Northern Wei imperial clan and the elder brother of Taizong’s consort, the Empress Wende 文德皇后 (601–36). Zhangsun came to know
Li Shimin at an early point, serving on the Prince of Qin’s staff during the Tang military uprising at Taiyuan and helping the prince plot the Xuanwu Gate Incident. He was Taizong’s most trusted and most influential adviser throughout the Zhenguan reign. For his biography, see Jiu Tang shu, 65.2446–56; and Xin Tang shu, 105.4017–22.
34. Yuchi Jingde originally was a general for the rebel Liu Wuzhou 劉武周 (d. 622). He surrendered to the force of Li Shimin in 620, entering into the services of the Prince of Qin afterwards. For his biography, see Jiu Tang shu, 68.2495–2500; and Xin Tang shu, 89.3752–55.
35. Fang Qiao 房喬 is known primarily by his style-name, Xuanling. He was, second only to Zhangsun Wuji, the most powerful figure in Taizong’s court. Fang headed the Department of State Affairs from 629 to 642, and oversaw many of the court projects, including the compilation of the dynastic histories. For his biography, see Jiu Tang shu, 66.2459–67; and Xin Tang shu, 96.3853–58.
36. Du Ruhui is often mentioned jointly with Fang Xuanling, as the two worked together closely until Du’s untimely death in 630. With Fang, Du was co-head of the Department of State Affairs from 629–30. For his biography, see Jiu Tang shu, 66.2467–69; and Xin Tang shu, 96.3858–60.
37. Yuwen Shiji was the son of Yuwen Shu, who helped lead the Sui armies in its conquest of the Chen dynasty. His older brother was the Sui regicide Yuwen Huaji. Shiji served on Li Shimin’s staff during the pacification campaigns and was later appointed Director This content downloaded from 129.174.21.5 on Sat, 20 Jul 2019 13:01:35 UTC
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Reading the Reign of Tang Taizong
(577–647)38—all of whom would go on to serve in high positions in Tai-
zong’s government—ambushed the two princes and their followers at
Xuanwu Gate. This is how the Zizhi tongjian recounts the event:
On the gengshen day [July 2, 626], Shimin led Zhangsun Wuji and others into the Palace City, and concealed troops at Xuanwu Gate.
39 Zhang Jieyu secretly learned
Shimin’s express intentions, and hastened to inform Jiancheng. Jiancheng sum-
moned Yuanji to strategize, and Yuanji said, “We ought to marshal the palace
troops and excuse ourselves from morning court on account of illness so we may
observe the situation.” Jiancheng said, “The preparation of the troops is already
well underway; you and I should enter and personally ask what is afoot.” Thus
they all entered and sped through Xuanwu Gate. The emperor, at this time, had
already summoned Pei Ji, Xiao Yu, Chen Shuda, and others, wanting to put a
stop to the event.
Jiancheng and Yuanji arrived at Lake Overlook Basilica, and feeling some-
thing was amiss, turned their horses around to return to the palace. Shimin fol-
lowed and shouted after them. Yuanji took out his bow to shoot at Shimin; he
tried three times but could not fully draw his bow. Shimin shot Jiancheng and
killed him. Yuchi Jingde then arrived at the head of seventy riders; from left and
right, they all shot at Yuanji, who fell off his horse. Shimin’s horse fled and en-
tered the woods and was tangled up by tree branches; Shimin fell from his horse
and could not rise. Yuanji suddenly arrived, snatched away his bow, and was
about to grapple with him when Jingde leapt astride his horse and cursed at him
[Yuanji]. Yuanji was about to flee to Wude Basilica on foot, but Jingde shot after
in pursuit and killed him.
庚申，世民帥長孫無忌等入，伏兵於玄武門。張婕妤竊知世民表意，
馳語建成。建成召元吉謀之，元吉曰：“宜勒宮府兵，託疾不朝，以
觀形勢。”建成曰：“兵備已嚴，當與弟入參，自問消息。”乃俱
入，趣玄武門。上時已召裴寂、蕭瑀、陳叔達等，欲按其事。
建成、元吉至臨湖殿，覺變，即跋馬東歸宮府。世民從而呼之，元
吉張弓射世民，再三不彀，世民射建成，殺之。尉遲敬德將七十騎繼
—————
of the Secretariat. For his biography, see Jiu Tang shu, 63.2409–411; Xin Tang shu, 100.
3934–36.
38. Gao Jian 高儉 is generally known by his style name, Shilian. Descended from the