by Chen Jack W
own Tang subjects, since it was located far from the heartland of the em-
pire. Instead the stele addresses the historical memory of China, as it de-
clares an end to the earlier shame of Tang military and political weakness,
and in its place, pronounces the new balance of powers between the Tang
and its neighbors.
Following the success against the Eastern Turks in 630, Taizong then
turned his attention to the Western Turks and to the peoples of the oasis
states to the west of modern-day Gansu. As before, he was fortunate to
have circumstances on his side: the Western Turkish confederacy was al-
ready divided by internal squabbling among the various groups. The ulti-
mate aim for Taizong seems to have been control of the Tarim Basin, its
oasis states, and the Silk Road that passed through these lands. Taizong
used a variety of incentives, from court audiences and marriage alliances
to military expeditions, and by 649, he was able to establish the Four Gar-
risons 四鎮 of the Tarim Basin.90 The actual conquest of the Western
Turks would, however, have to wait until the reign of Tang Gaozong
唐高宗 (649–83), Taizong’s ninth son and eventual successor.
The End of Taizong’s Reign
Taizong’s expansionist foreign policies were quite successful in terms of
the Turkish nations, but they proved rather less so once he decided to in-
vade the Korean peninsula in 644.91 The memory of Sui Yangdi’s disas-
trous attempts to conquer the state of Koguryŏ (Gaoli 高麗) weighed
heavily upon both Gaozu and Taizong in the early years of the empire’s
consolidation, and neither emperor initially sought to disrupt the peace
that existed between the Tang and Koguryŏ. However, near the end of his
reign, following the Turkish conquests, Taizong decided to turn his at-
tention to Koguryŏ, seeking to conquer that which had previously eluded
Yangdi’s grasp. Taizong led the army in person, and in 645, he began the
—————
90. See Chavannes, Documents sur les Tou-kiue (Turcs) occidentaux, pp. 259–68; Wechsler,
“T’ai-tsung (Reign 626–49) the Consolidator,” pp. 223–28; Pan, Son of Heaven, pp. 193–95.
91. For summaries of the Korean expedition, see Wechsler, “T’ai-tsung (Reign 626–49) the Consolidator,” pp. 231–35; and Pan, Son of Heaven, pp. 204–17.
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Reading the Reign of Tang Taizong
43
march across the Liao River, only to have to turn back in the face of the
bitter Korean winter. On the retreat, the army was caught in heavy snows
and violent winds, and many of the Tang soldiers died from exposure.92 A
second expedition was sent in 647, though once again, Taizong was not
able to achieve his objective.93 In 648, Taizong once again planned a large-
scale invasion, with the intention of eliminating Koguryŏ once and for
all.94 However, before this massive undertaking could be launched, the se-
cond Tang emperor passed away, succumbing at last to an ailment
( pneumonia) that the histories suggest was first contracted during the
Korean campaigns.95
A different explanation of Taizong’s death has been put forward by the
Qing historian Zhao Yi 趙翼 (1727–1814), who argued that it was because
of the alchemical concoctions ( danyao 丹藥) Taizong had consumed.96
Throughout his reign, Taizong engaged, to a certain extent, in both Bud-
dhist and Daoist religious practices, though I would argue that he viewed
religion more as a means of political legitimation than as a personal belief
system.97 In his last years, however, he became increasingly interested in
attaining longevity through the ingestion of medicines prepared by fang-
shi 方士, “masters of the methods.” Throughout the earlier part of his
reign, Taizong had sneered at the follies of the First Emperor of Qin, who
was seduced by charlatans promising the secrets of immortal herbs, and
yet, by the end of his own reign, he was willing to believe the same charla-
tans who now offered him a solution to the condition of mortality. Seek-
ing a cure to his sickness and declining health, Taizong even had an In-
dian fangshi sent to him, but all these efforts were for naught.98
—————
92. Zizhi tongjian, 198.6230.
93. Zizhi tongjian, 198.6245–47. Sima Guang represents the Tang army as victorious over the Koguryŏ forces during this campaign, but does not elaborate on why the Tang army returned without conquering the Korean state.
94. Zizhi tongjian, 199.6258–59.
95. See Zhao and Xu, Tang Taizong zhuan, p. 404.
96. Zhao Yi, Nian’er shi zhaji jiaozheng, 19.398.
97. On Taizong’s involvement with Buddhism, see Wright, “T’ang T’ai-tsung and Bud-
dhism,” pp. 239–263. On the role of Daoism in the establishment of the Tang and during Taizong’s reign, see Seidel, “The Image of the Perfect Ruler,” pp. 216–47; Benn, “Taoism as Ideology,” pp. 14–43; and Kohn and Kirkland, “Daoism in the Tang,” pp. 340–42.
98. Jiu Tang shu, 198.5308.
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44
Reading the Reign of Tang Taizong
Taizong’s reign ended on an anticlimactic note, having failed in his ef-
forts to conquer the Korean peninsula. Historians tend to view Taizong’s
later years rather critically, particularly as he began to echo the destructive
behavior of Sui Yangdi both in his increasingly militarist policies and in
his new interest in the construction of detached palaces. Regarding the
latter, the most egregious example may be the construction of the Xiang-
cheng Palace 襄城宮 near the Western Mountains 西山 in Ruzhou 汝州
(southwest of Luoyang). Taizong desired a cool site for the hot summer
months, but once he visited the palace in person and found the area in-
fested with poisonous snakes; in a fit of pique, he had it torn down and
the architect demoted.99
Of more lasting consequence, however, was the crisis of succession that
brought Taizong much grief near the end of his reign. Right after the
Xuanwu Gate coup, Taizong had installed Li Chengqian 李承乾 (d. 645),
the eldest son of Empress Wende, as crown prince. The histories describe
the young Chengqian as quick of mind and beloved by Taizong, who en-
trusted the prince with overseeing state affairs when Taizong was out of
the capital. However, when Chengqian came of age, he began to indulge
himself in extended hunts and the pleasures of music and flesh, including
an affair with a boy-singer who was executed when Taizong found out
about it. The crown prince’s scandalous behavior reached its peak with a
rejection of Chinese customs and a fixation on the Turkish culture of his
early forebears. Sima Guang writes,
Moreover, he [Chengqian] loved to emulate Turkish speech and their manner of
dress. He chose from among his retinue those who had Turkish features and
grouped them in bands of five; he made them plait their hair, wear sheepskins,
and herd sheep. He had made five wolf’s head banners and tents
and set up yurts.
The crown prince took up residence here; he gathered sheep and cooked them,
and then, drawing out his waist-knife, he would carve the meat and let everyone
eat.100 And once he told the members of his retinue, “I would like to try experi-
—————
99. The account is preserved in Tang huiyao, 30.560. Also see Wechsler, Mirror to the Son of Heaven, pp. 148–49.
100. The wolf’s head was a banner design used by the Eastern Turks to commemorate the origins of the Turkish people, who, according to a legend, were descended from the coupling of a man and the she-wolf who raised him. See Li Yanshou 李延壽 (fl. 618–76),
comp., Bei shi, 99.3285. Chengqian is asserting not only Turkish identity, but also Turkish sovereignty; there is at least once instance of the banner being given by a qaghan to a Chi-This content downloaded from 129.174.21.5 on Sat, 20 Jul 2019 13:01:35 UTC
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Reading the Reign of Tang Taizong
45
encing the death of a qaghan. You all will put on a funerary ceremony.” Thus, he
laid himself on the ground, and the crowd all keened and wept, galloping horses
around him in a circle. When they approached his body, they cut their faces.101
After a while, the crown prince suddenly got up and said, “One day I will possess
the empire, and I will lead tens of thousands of riders to hunt in the lands west of Jincheng.102 After that, I will tie up my hair as a Turk and entrust myself to Si-mo.103 When this is arranged, I will not be the inferior of any man.”
又好效突厥語及其服飾，選左右貌類突厥者五人為一落，辮髮羊裘而
牧羊，作五狼頭纛及幡旗，設穹廬，太子自處其中，斂羊而烹之，抽
佩刀割肉相啗。又嘗謂左右曰：“我試作可汗死，汝曹效其喪儀。”
因僵臥於地，眾悉號哭，跨馬環走，臨其身，剺面。良久，太子欻
起，曰：“一朝有天下，當帥數萬騎獵於金城西，然後解髮為突厥，
委身思摩，若當一設，不居人後矣。”104
Chengqian’s behavior has commonly been interpreted as that of a mad-
man, and indeed, his desire to place himself under the sovereignty of Ash-
ina Simo, a qaghan who had submitted to Taizong, was a strange ambi-
tion. At the same time, however, the desire for a Turkish restoration was
not utterly enigmatic, since the Li clan was itself of Sino-Turkish origins.
In this way, Chengqian’s fetishization of Turkish culture becomes a re-
turn of the ancestral repressed, a last gasp of the northern ethnicity that
had been displaced and buried under the new Tang Chinese identity.
Efforts by Wei Zheng to reform the crown prince failed. Even as a
coup by Taizong’s son Li You 李祐 (d. 643), Prince of Qi 齊王, was un-
derway in 643, Chengqian was himself scheming to avenge the execution
of his boy-singer with a similar plot, one that involved the support of Tai-
zong’s half-brother Li Yuanchang 李元昌 (d. 643), Prince of Han
—————
nese leader to confirm allegiance to Turkish authority. See Skaff, “Survival in the Frontier Zone,” p. 126.
101. This was supposedly a practice of various northwestern peoples (from Xiongnu 匈奴
to the Turks) that involved mourners cutting their faces to show their grief. See Bei shi, 99.3288.
102. Jincheng probably refers to Jincheng Pass, which is located north of present-day Gaolan 臯蘭 prefecture, in Gansu province.
103. This is Ashina Simo 阿史那思摩, a qaghan who was granted the imperial surname of
Li 李 and led the Turks following their pacification and resettlement. See Jiu Tang shu, 194A.5163–64; and Xin Tang shu, 215A.6039–41.
104. Zizhi tongjian, 196.6189–90. Crown Prince Chengjian’s behavior is also noted in Jiu Tang shu, 76.2648–49; and Xin Tang shu, 80.3564–65.
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46
Reading the Reign of Tang Taizong
漢王.105 Li You’s coup failed, and Chengqian’s plot was revealed by a fol-
lower of the Prince of Qi. The crown prince was demoted to commoner
status and imprisoned in a frontier command, where he would die shortly
thereafter. Though Taizong wanted to pardon the Prince of Han, his of-
ficials opposed this, and so the emperor allowed Yuanchang to commit
suicide at his own residence.106
During the height of Chengqian’s scandals, Taizong had already begun
to reconsider his choice of heir, turning his attentions to Li Tai 李泰
(618–52), Prince of Wei 魏王.107 Once Chengqian was disgraced, Li Tai
became Taizong’s favored choice for the succession. However, Zhangsun
Wuji led the call to name Li Zhi 李治 (628–83), Prince of Jin 晉王, as Tai-
zong’s heir. Li Tai, thinking that Li Zhi might be made crown prince, made
a thinly veiled threat to Zhi, saying that the Prince of Jin, having been a
former intimate of the Prince of Han, should now be worried. Word of this
got back to Taizong, and fearing that if Tai were to become emperor, both
Chengqian and Zhi would be murdered, he reluctantly sent Tai into exile.
In 643, Li Zhi was elevated to crown prince, a choice about which Taizong
seemed rather uncertain. Later in the same year, Taizong sought to install
another son, Li Ke 李恪 (d. 653), Prince of Wu 吳王, as his heir, but again
he was dissuaded by Zhangsun Wuji.108 In the end, it would be Li Zhi who
would take the throne and, after his death, be known as Gaozong.
•
As we have seen in this chapter, the historiography of Taizong’s reign is
complex, both because of his own attempts to control his image and be-
cause of the ways later historians have sought to portray him. Still, histori-
cal memory has, for the most part, forgiven the failures and disappoint-
ments of Taizong’s later years, choosing instead to celebrate the second
—————
105. See Jiu Tang shu, 76.2657–58; Xin Tang shu, 80.3572–74; and Zizhi tongjian, 196.6192.
106. Zizhi tongjian, 197.6193.
107. A different reading of the Chengqian-Tai succession crisis may be found in Eisenberg,
“Study in Court Factionalism,” pp. 39–69. Eisenberg reads this crisis, as he does the Xuanwu Gate coup that put Taizong in power, as a policy on the part of Taizong to fac-tionalize the court. I see the evidence for “authorial intentionality” as much less certain, preferring to read both this struggle over the succession and the 626 coup as a complex play of forces without a central architect.
108. Zizhi tongjian, 197.6206.
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Reading the Reign of Tang Taizong
47
Tang emperor for his earlier achievements, and perhaps even more for the
image of Confucian restraint and civilization that he sought to embody.
Scarcely a century later, officials at the court of Wu Zetian would already
think back wistfully upon the Zhenguan era as one of wise rulership and
collegial relationships. Over the longer span of time, Taizong would be-
come a cultural symbol of Chinese greatness—not only for the Chinese
themselves, but for foreign regimes seeking dynastic legitimation. Thus,
when Khubilai Khan (r. 1260–94) sought
to make the Mongol Yuan pal-
atable to his Han Chinese subjects, he specifically invoked comparisons
between himself and Tang Taizong.109 Similarly, the Qianlong Emperor
of the Qing (r. 1735–95), another non-Han Chinese sovereign, explicitly
modeled himself upon Taizong, seeing in the Tang ruler’s reign an ideal
union of military power and cultural achievement.110 However, as we turn
from the historical overview to Taizong’s actual writings, the question of
what it means to fashion one’s own image remains. For Taizong, as we
shall see, the constructed image was never as simple as a performed role or
donned mask, but something that could not be divorced from the very
notions of imperial selfhood and subjectivity.
—————
109. See Rossabi, Khubilai Khan, pp. 68–69.
110. See the discussion of Taizong and the Qianlong emperor in Joanna Waley-Cohen,
“Commemorating War in Eighteenth-Century China,” pp. 885–88.
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T W O
On Sovereignty and Representation
It has been remarked that Taizong often seemed rather self-conscious in
his words and actions, as if he were performing a role before the court dia-
rists whose records would allow future historians to pass judgment on his
reign.1 Such a heightened attention to image and representation is clearly
present in many of the anecdotes recorded about him, which portray Tai-
zong at pains to demonstrate either his imperial wisdom or humility be-
fore his officials. If Taizong was anxious about his image, he had good rea-
son: as detailed in Chapter 1, his rise to power was less than ideal. Yet,
while the initial goal of Taizong’s interest in representation may have
been to ensure the whitewashing of his personal failings and transgres-
sions, it is important to recognize that the construction of the imperial
image cannot be reduced to mere propaganda.
The classicist Paul Zanker, in discussing image-making during the
reign of the Roman emperor Augustus, has argued against viewing impe-
rial imagery as the product of cynical campaigns to manipulate the popu-
lace. Instead, Zanker notes that the crafting of the imperial image was
