by Chen Jack W
—————
1. Howard Wechsler writes, “Few Chinese monarchs have been oblivious of the court
scribes at their side who recorded their every word and deed for the perusal of future generations, but Taizong seems to have been more conscious than most that he was an actor on stage, that his speeches and gestures were being written down for all time, and that his total performance would be rated by the Confucian critic-historians of a succeeding dynasty who would compile the official history of his house. In Wechsler, Mirror to the Son of Heaven, pp. 81–82. See also Wechsler, “T’ai-tsung (Reign 626–49) the Consolidator,” p.
189. A similar point is made in Twitchett, “How to Be an Emperor,” p. 4.
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On Sovereignty and Representation
49
never a wholly conscious or intentional process, and goes on to state that,
“Even those in power are affected by the image they project.” 2 It is this
latter point that is most telling, and I would go further and argue that the
idealization of self is also an expression of the self’s desire. The image de-
fines not only how the ruler wishes to be seen, but what he wishes to be—
constituting an ideal version of the ruler to which the ruler might aspire.
To put it another way, the question of representation cannot be separated
from that of sovereignty, because it is representation that, to a large extent,
articulates and defines the sovereign imagination.
In this second chapter, I further develop the theme of imperial repre-
sentation that was discussed in the previous chapter, taking as my focus
Taizong’s prose writings and public statements and the philosophical
sources that underlie Taizong’s own thinking on sovereignty. In a number
of Taizong’s statements, the thematization of sovereignty takes the form
of a judgment on past emperors. Taizong composed two zonglun 總論
(“summations”), one for Jin Xuandi 晉宣帝 (personal name Sima Yi 司馬
懿, 178–251) and one for Jin Wudi 晉武帝 (r. 265–90; personal name
Sima Yan 司馬炎, 236–90); these were appended to the Jin rulers’s re-
spective annals in the Jin shu. He also wrote an essay on Sui Wendi
隋文帝.3 Closer to home, Taizong celebrated the achievements of his fa-
ther in the “Panegyric to Imperial Virtue” 皇德頌 and in the “Inscription
at Jin Shrine, with Preface” 晉祠銘并序.4 One of the more interesting
—————
2. Zanker, Power of Images, p. 3.
3. For “Summation of Jin Xuandi” 晉宣帝總論, see Jin shu, 1.20–22; Li Fang 李昉 (925–96) et al., comp., Wenyuan yinghua, 754.3946a–46b; and Tang Taizong quanji jiaozhu, pp.
163–64. For “Summation of Jin Wudi” 晉武帝總論, see Jin shu, 3.81–82; Xu Jian 徐堅
(659–729), comp., Chuxue ji, 9.216; Wenyuan yinghua, 754.3946b–47a; and Tang Taizong quanji jiaozhu, pp. 168–73. The essay on Wendi refers to the Sui ruler as “Gaozu” 高祖; see “Discussion of Sui Gaozu” 隋高祖論 in Chuxue ji, 9.216–17; and Tang Taizong quanji jiaozhu, pp. 173–76.
4. For “Panegyric to Imperial Virtue,” see Chuxue ji, 9.214 (under the title, “Panegyric by Tang Taizong” 唐太宗頌); Quan Tang wen, 4.48b–49a; Tang Taizong quanji jiaozhu, pp.
151–54. For the “Inscription at Jin Shrine, with Preface,” see Quan Tang wen, 10.125a–26b; and Tang Taizong quanji jiaozhu, pp. 530–38. A copy of the stele rubbing has been published: see Liu Wenzhe, ed., Tang Taizong shu Jin si zhi ming bing xu. There is a synopsis and discussion of this work in Eisenberg, “A Study of Court Factionalism,” pp. 63–65. It is discussed and partially translated by Tracy Miller in her Divine Nature of Power, pp. 68–
70, 86–87.
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50
On Sovereignty and Representation
works is a calligraphic text consisting of short dialogues between rulers
and their ministers that Taizong had composed and inscribed on a screen,
so that he would always be reminded, even in his leisure, to heed the ad-
vice of his ministers.5
Among all of Taizong’s writings on the imperial role, however, the
most celebrated are his two essays, “The Golden Mirror” 金鏡 and
“Model for the Emperor” 帝範.6 These would appear to be the earliest
known meditations on the nature of sovereignty personally composed by
an emperor in China. The first essay, “The Golden Mirror,” was promul-
gated not long after Taizong ascended to the throne, probably in part as a
declaration of intentions to bolster support from the officials and to help
legitimate his claim to the throne.7 “Model for the Emperor” was written
in early 648, near the end of Taizong’s life, as a kind of testamentary
“household instruction” ( jiaxun 家訓) for his son and heir, Li Zhi. To-
gether, the two compositions bookend the Zhenguan period, providing a
glimpse into Taizong’s thinking about sovereignty both at the outset and
at the conclusion of his reign.
Detailed readings of “The Golden Mirror” and “Model for the Em-
peror” make up the heart of this chapter, though to understand the sig-
nificance of the arguments put forth in the two essays, one first has to un-
derstand that against which Taizong was arguing. The deeply problematic
manner in which he had assumed the throne was certainly one factor in-
fluencing Taizong’s thinking and rhetoric, though the depth of Taizong’s
engagement with the historical and philosophical issues of sovereignty is
not convincingly explained simply by the need for political legitimation.
In what follows, I will look to the historical context of sovereignty, exam-
ining first the basis of the very institution of sovereignty that Taizong in-
—————
5. This untitled work is known simply as “Calligraphic Text on the Screen” 屏風書 (or 屏
風帖). The Mitsui Collection at the University of California, Berkeley possesses a copy of Kojima Seisai 小島成斎 (1796–1862), Tō Taisō byōbusho shakumon. It has been reprinted in Fushimi, ed., Tō Taisō heifūsho; Tang Taizong pingfeng ci; and Tang Taizong quanji jiaozhu, pp. 182–84.
6. Denis Twitchett has translated both of these essays with comprehensive annotations and textual and analytical commentaries, in Twitchett, “How to Be an Emperor.” Though I use my own translations for the sake of consistency, I am heavily indebted to Twitchett’s work.
7. See Twitchett, “How to Be an Emperor,” p. 8.
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On Sovereignty and Representation
51
herited in the early seventh century, and next the debates within Tai-
zong’s court over the nature of that legacy.
The True King and the Tyrant
In his discussions of sovereignty, Taizong drew upon a variety of historical
and philosophical influences, though he was often quickest to display his
knowledge of the Five Classics and other early Confucian texts. The Con-
fucian model of kingship drew upon the concept of de 德, a term that is
often conveniently translated as “virtue,” but also signifying something
like “moral charisma
.” The early usage of the term played upon a ho-
mophony with the word de 得, “to get,” thereby setting up the claim that
the virtuous ruler could attract the common people to his side.8 This is
the underlying argument of a key passage from the Lunyu 論語 ( Analects), in which Confucius states, “Governing through virtue may be compared
to how the pole-star resides in its place while the multitude of stars turn
towards it in obeisance” 為政以德，譬如北辰居其所而眾星共之.9
The virtue of the sovereign, however, does not simply “get” the people to
come to his side; like the attractive force of the pole-star, the sovereign’s
virtue is what constructs the central point by which the world is ordered
and the polity is created.
If this passage is somewhat oblique as to what precisely constitutes the
sovereign’s virtue, there does seem to be a kind of ritual logic present here,
one that underlies the effortless organization of sovereign and subject. Re-
lated to this, I would argue, is the following Analects passage: “The Master said, ‘In terms of not acting, yet putting things in order, was not Shun
such a one? What did he do? He made himself respectful, faced south,
and that was all’ ” 子曰：無為而治者其舜也與？夫何為哉？恭己正
南面而已矣.10 The sage-king Shun 舜, celebrated for his perfect filiality,
is described here as ruling without conscious effort ( wuwei 無為). The
idea of wuwei is often related to Daoistic naturalism, but here it is perhaps better understood as ruling without having to issue edicts and commands,
—————
8. On the idea of de as charisma, see Boodberg, “Semasiology of Some Primary Confucian Concepts,” pp. 323–26. On the pun between “virtue” and “getting,” see Nivison, Ways of Confucianism, p. 33.
9. Lunyu 2.1 / Cheng Shude, Lunyu jishi, 3.61.
10. Lunyu 15.5 / Lunyu jishi, 31.1062.
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52
On Sovereignty and Representation
or ruling without the appearance of ruling.11 Shun simply faces south and
adopts the proper pose of respect, underlining the simple efficacy of his
sovereignty. The implication is that ritual correctness and innate virtue is
enough to transform the world, that the true sovereign need not take ac-
tion, but that all will nevertheless be achieved.
The passage, it should be said, contains a self-contradiction, since the
act of facing south is an action, and not one devoid of significance. South
is, of course, the traditional direction of the sovereign, and it also serves as
the orienting direction of terrestrial space—an echo of the pole-star’s
cosmological center. The sovereign who constructs himself as occupying
the central position organizes space and objects around him, creating or-
der where before there had only been undifferentiated space.12 In this, a
ritual choreography is anticipated, a potentiality of subjects, positions,
and movements that gives form and structure to the polity in the moment
that it is born through the sovereign’s demonstration of virtue.
The words of Confucius were not always clear or easily understood, and
it is perhaps telling that Mencius, in his recorded dialogues, was often at
pains to define the terms of philosophical and political discourse. In con-
sidering the nature of sovereignty, Mencius used the term wang 王 for rul-
ers he considered “true kings,” that is, sovereigns who treated their officials
and other subjects with benevolence ( ren 仁) and ruled for the benefit of all.
Opposed to this were flawed rulers, like the “hegemons” or ba 霸, who
wielded power for the sake of self-interest, and the tyrants, or baojun 暴君,
who brought their kingdoms to ruin in seeking to gratify their base desires.
In Mencius’ ideal polity, the sovereign and his officials constituted a
single mind and body, whereas in more problematic cases of rulership, the
officials would turn against the sovereign in their hearts. In one of the
central passages that elaborate on this issue, Mencius argues,
If the sovereign looks upon his ministers as his hands and feet, then his ministers
will look upon the sovereign as stomach and mind. If the sovereign looks upon
his ministers as his dogs and horses, then his ministers will look upon the sover-
eign as an ordinary subject. If the sovereign looks upon his ministers as dirt and
weeds, then his ministers will look upon the sovereign as a bandit or enemy.
—————
11. See the comments on this passage in Creel, “On the Origin of Wu-wei,” pp. 58–61. For a study of the concept in general, see Slingerland, Effortless Action.
12. On the construction of political centers, see Helms, Craft and the Kingly Ideal, pp. 173–91.
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On Sovereignty and Representation
53
君之視臣如手足，則臣視君如腹心； 君之視臣如犬馬，則臣視君如國
人； 君之視臣如土芥，則臣視君如寇讎。13
This passage elaborates upon the issue of sovereign-subject interdepen-
dency by constructing three pairs of balanced similes. Mencius begins with
a statement that comes very close to the analogy of the body politic in
Western political rhetoric, describing political society as a single human
body in which the sovereign functions as the vital organs of the organism
while subordinates act as the limbs.14 However, if the sovereign does not
treat his subjects with respect, then the organic totality of the body politic
is not obtained. Thus, in the second pair, Mencius describes a situation of
mutual political indifference and contempt where the sovereign is looked
upon merely as an ordinary person in the realm and the subordinates as
domestic animals of the household. Finally, the last pair recalls the problem
of the ruler’s unjust and excessive use of violence, which in turn endangers
the ruler’s own person. Mencius depicts the relationship as one of mutual
enmity, even suggesting the possibility of regicide or rebellion.
Perhaps reflecting the increasingly tumultuous age in which he lived,
Mencius seems very much preoccupied with the problem of sovereign vio-
lence. Virtuous kingship, for Mencius, thus becomes defined in terms of
the refusal to engage in violence:
Brusquely, the king asked me, “How can the world be settled?” I replied, “It can
be settled through unification.” He asked, “Who can unify it?” I replied, “One
who does not relish killing people can unify it.” He asked, “Who would join with
him?” I replied, “In all the world, there is no one who would not join with him.
Does the king know about sprouts? If there is a drought between the seventh and
eighth months, then the sprouts will wither. If Heaven creates clouds thickly and
sends down rain in torrents, then the sprouts will lushly spring forth. If it is like this, then who could stop it? Now, among the world’s shepherds of people, there
is not yet one who does not relish killing people. However, if there were one who
d
id not relish killing, then the world’s peoples would all stretch their necks to-
wards him to gaze upon him. Indeed, if it were truly like this, then the people
would go to him like water coursing downwards—pouring forth in torrents, who
would be able to stop them?
—————
13. Mengzi 4B.3 / Jiao Xun 焦循 (1763–1820), annot., Mengzi zhengyi, 16.546.
14. On the analogy of the body politic, see Hale, Body Politic, pp. 18–47; and Hale, “Analogy of the Body Politic.”
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54
On Sovereignty and Representation
卒然問曰：“天下惡乎定？”吾對曰：“定于一。”“孰能一之？”
對曰：“不嗜殺人者能一之。”“孰能與之？”對曰：“天下莫不與
也。王知夫苗乎？七八月之間旱，則苗槁矣。天油然作雲，沛然下
雨，則苗浡然興之矣。其如是，孰能禦之？今夫天下之人牧，未有不
嗜殺人者也，如有不嗜殺人者，則天下之民皆引領而望之矣。誠如是
也，民歸之，由水之就下，沛然誰能禦之。”15
Mencius argues that the chaos of the Warring States could be united by a
sovereign who does not “relish killing people.” Though Mencius is often
taken as a pacifistic thinker, he is, in fact, not condemning all acts of vio-
lence, but rather focusing on the problem of the pleasure taken in killing.
The argument revolves around the character shi 嗜 (written also as 耆), a
term having to do with the sensuous appetite. We may compare its usage
with the appearance of the term shi in another passage in the same text:
“Palates, in regard to flavor, have the same tastes” 口之於味有同耆也.16
When used to refer to the liking of particular flavors, shi means some-
thing like “taste” or “delectation”; however, when used figuratively, it
means, “to be greedy for something.” As such, it becomes a term of cen-
sure, describing a desire that has exceeded the bounds of mere satisfaction,
becoming gluttony.
The distinction between the just king and the tyrant is germane at this
