The Poetics of Sovereignty
Page 11
point. Aristotle, in The Politics, writes, “Whereas a tyrant, as has often
been repeated, has no regard to any public interest, except as conducive to
his private ends; his aim is pleasure, the aim of a king, honour.”17 The ty-
rant is a slave to his own desires, and just as he cannot govern himself, he
is ultimately unable to govern his state. Like Aristotle, Mencius sees the
inability to control one’s desires as resulting in the ruination ( wang 亡) of self and state. By contrast, Mencius argues that the sovereign who rejects
such violence is recognized by the world as virtuous and is thus able to at-
tract people from neighboring states to his side. This is the way in which
Mencius has resolved the problem of understanding the pole-star analogy:
virtue becomes defined as a refraining from violence and lust, which then
draws the world to the sovereign, creating political order.
—————
15. See Mengzi 1A.6 / Mengzi zhengyi, 3.69–74.
16. See Mengzi 6A.7 / Mengzi zhengyi, 22.764.
17. See Aristotle, Politics, V.1311a.2–6 , p. 130. Also see Boesche, Theories of Tyranny from Plato to Arendt, p. 66.
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On Sovereignty and Representation
55
More than a millennium later, the great Song literatus Su Shi 蘇軾
(1037–1101), in commenting on this passage, would write:
The words of Mencius are not considered great without reason. However, those
who understand them only in a superficial manner think them wide of the mark.
Since I perused the Mencius, [I realize that] from Han Gaozu to Guangwu to
Tang Taizong to Taizu of our present dynasty, these four sovereigns who were
able to unify the empire achieved it by not relishing the killing of people. As for
the rest, the more people they killed, then the more the world became disordered.
Regarding the Qin, Jin, and the Sui dynasties, their might was able to unite the
world, but their love of killing had no end; some united the world but it returned
again to disunion, and others consequently lost their states. The words of Men-
cius—how can they be thought careless?
孟子之言，非苟為大而已。然不深原其意而詳究其實，未有不以為迂
者。予觀《孟子》以來，自漢高祖及光武及唐太宗及我太祖，能一天
下者四君，皆以不嗜殺人致之。其餘殺人愈多，而天下愈亂。秦、晉
及隋，力能合之，而好殺不已，或合而復分，或遂以亡國。孟子之
言，豈偶然哉？18
Su Shi applies Mencius’ words to the great sovereigns of history, citing
Han Gaozu 漢高祖 (r. 206–195 bc), Han Guangwudi 漢光武帝 (r. 25–
57), Tang Taizong, and Song Taizu 宋太祖 (r. 960–76) as examples of
rulers who did not relish killing, and so were able to unify the world.
These exemplary historical rulers are contrasted with the Qin, Jin, and Sui
dynasties, which were able to unify the world, but could not maintain
their power for long. While there may be some question as to whether
Mencius would have thought that these four founding rulers truly ab-
horred killing, Su Shi treats them as sovereigns whose initial acts of vio-
lence could be justified by their dedication to their people and preserva-
tion of the sociopolitical order.
The Problem of Foundational Violence
Here, we touch upon a longstanding problem in Chinese political thought,
one that might be framed as follows: how could virtuous sovereignty be
founded upon an act of violence, whatever the justification for the act
might have been? Unlike the models of sacred kingship described by René
—————
18. Quoted in Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200), ed. and annot., Mengzi jizhu, in his Sishu zhangju jizhu, p. 207.
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On Sovereignty and Representation
Girard, where foundational acts of violence and moral transgression were
central to all assumptions of kingly identity, traditional Chinese models at-
tempted to separate (and to some extent, sublimate) violent assumptions of
kingship from non-violent ones.19 Within early Chinese texts, one finds
two models of legitimate dynastic transition: shanrang, which was men-
tioned in Chapter 1 as the voluntary abdication of the sovereign in favor
of one of greater moral worth; and fangfa 放伐, the sanctioned military
deposition of a tyrannical ruler. Acts of shanrang, or sagely yielding, were largely the province of legendary antiquity, and when they were invoked
in dynastic history, it was usually to cloak a forced deposition or coup
d’état. For most dynasties, such as the dynasty that Taizong helped found,
kingship was attained through military uprisings, which were then, after
the fact, legitimated as fangfa.
The
phrase
fangfa originates in a passage from the Mencius in which
King Xuan of Qi 齊宣王 (r. 319–300 bc) asks Mencius whether it was
true that Tang 湯, the founder of the Shang dynasty, had banished ( fang
放) the despotic last Xia ruler Jie 桀, and whether the Zhou co-founder
King Wu had attacked ( fa 伐) the last Shang ruler and tyrant Zhou 紂.20
The problem is that both King Tang’s banishment of Jie and King Wu’s
military attack on King Zhou were clear acts of rebellion, and as such,
suggested that regicide ( shi 弒) would be admissible under certain condi-
tions. Mencius’ response is well-known: he claims that these are acts of
punitive execution ( zhu 誅), not regicide, redefining the terms of dis-
course so that the founding acts of violence do not violate the sacred
bonds between lord and subject.
Since the Tang had come to power through the exercise of force, set-
tling the question of its moral legitimacy was a paramount concern. Thus,
a little over a year after Taizong deposed his father and killed two of his
brothers, we find Taizong discussing precisely this question of violence
and dynastic longevity with members of his court. The Zizhi tongjian re-
cords the following episode:
On the maoshen day [August 14, 627], the emperor was discussing with his attending officials the strengths and weaknesses of the Zhou and Qin dynasties.
—————
19. See Girard, Violence and the Sacred, pp. 89–118; as well as his Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, pp. 48–83.
20. See Mengzi 1B.8 / Mengzi zhengyi, 5.145–46.
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On Sovereignty and Representation
57
Xiao Yu responded, saying, “The tyrant Zhou behaved dissolutely, and so King
Wu launched a punitive expedition against him. The Zhou and the six states
were without blame, but Qin Shihuang, the First Emperor, destroyed them.
Though in winning the empire they [the Zhou and the Qin] may have been the
same, in the hearts of the people there was a difference.” The emperor said, “My
lord knows the first part, but has not yet gotten t
he second. When the Zhou won
the empire, they greatly valued morality; when the Qin won the empire, they
heavily esteemed deception and force. This is the point of difference between
their respective strengths and weaknesses. It is thus that in seizing the world, perhaps one can take it through rebellion, but in keeping it, one cannot not follow
the proper course.” Yu apologized for his lack of understanding.
戊申，上與侍臣論周、秦脩短，蕭瑀對曰：“紂為不道，武王征之。
周及六國無罪，始皇滅之。得天下雖同，人心則異。”上曰：“公知
其一，未知其二。周得天下，增脩仁義；秦得天下，益尚詐力：此脩
短之所以殊也。蓋取之或可以逆得，守之不可以不順故也。”瑀謝不
及。21
For the Tang, the two major models of dynasty-founding were those of
the Zhou and Qin, both of which, like the Tang, had come to power
through military means. Thus, Taizong’s interest in discussing the reasons
for the Zhou dynasty’s longevity and the Qin’s brief reign is clear. The an-
ecdote does not present the whole of the discussion, but rather focuses on
a comment by Xiao Yu, a son of Emperor Ming 明帝 (r. 562–85) of the
Later Liang 後梁 (554–87).22 Xiao Yu became a leading official under
Gaozu and served as Vice-Director on the Right of the Secretariat 尚書
右僕射 under Taizong.23 Here, Xiao Yu makes the normative argument
that the Zhou rebellion was actually a “punitive expedition” ( zheng 征)
sanctioned by Heaven against the Shang tyrant Zhou, whereas the First
Emperor of Qin had no justification for destroying the Zhou and the six
states of Han 韓, Zhao 趙, Wei 魏, Chu 楚, Yan 燕, and Qi 齊. Thus, Xiao
points out that the Zhou had the support of the people, whereas the Qin
did not.
—————
21. Zizhi tongjian, 192.6036.
22. This Later Liang was a client state successively of the Western Wei, Northern Zhou, and Sui and is not to be confused with the Later Liang (907–23) of the Five Dynasties period.
23. For Xiao Yu’s biography, see Jiu Tang shu, 63.2398–2404; and Xin Tang shu, 101.3949–
52.
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On Sovereignty and Representation
Taizong responds to Xiao Yu’s comment in a typical fashion, taking
the opportunity to display his own (greater) understanding of the history
of sovereignty. While the Vice-Director of the Secretariat may have some
insight into the matter, the true reason for the people’s support of the
Zhou was not simply a result of the sanctioned uprising against the last
Shang ruler, but rather because the Zhou dynasty honored morality ( renyi
仁義) once they had possession of the empire. In a similar fashion, the
Qin dynasty failed not only because they conquered the Zhou without
moral justification, but because after the conquest, they still relied upon
deceit and force. What Taizong wants to emphasize is how the two dy-
nasties acted after the fact of military conquest, shifting the discussion
away from the rationale of punitive expeditions and to the conduct of the
dynastic house following its establishment. This is safer ground, in many
ways, because the line between treacherous rebellion and Heaven-
ordained uprising was, at best, often ambiguous. Equally important is how
Taizong wants not to depend upon the rhetoric of military virtue for the
Tang ideological foundations, but to show that he will embody the virtues
of civility and culture now that the empire is at peace.
Taizong’s final words are a paraphrase of a famous comment by the
Western Han scholar Lu Jia 陸賈 (ca. 228–ca. 140 bc). Lu Jia often
praised the Classics of Poetry and Documents, which irritated the peasant-born Han Gaozu. Gaozu scolded Lu Jia, saying, “I, your lord, have won
the empire on horseback, so why should I concern myself with the Poems
and Documents?” 迺公居馬上而得之，安事《詩》、《書》. Lu Jia re-
sponded:
One may win the empire on horseback, but how can one govern it from horse-
back? And though King Tang [founder of the Shang] and King Wu [co-founder
of the Zhou] may have taken the empire through rebellion, by following the
proper way they were able to keep it. Employing both cultural and martial virtues
together is the way [for the dynasty] to endure long.
居馬上得之，寧可以馬上治之呼乎？且湯武逆取而以順守之，文武並
用，長久之術也.24
Lu Jia is pointing to the necessity of cultural power as a means of creating
social cohesion, which is to say, to the role of ideology. As Martin Kern
—————
24. See Shi ji, 97.2699.
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On Sovereignty and Representation
59
has written, “Nicht nackte militärische Gewalt, sondern die zivile Tu-
gendkraft ( wen-te 文德) und daraus resultierende kulturelle Überlegen-
heit galten als Grundlage der Macht” [“It was not naked military violence,
but rather civil virtue and its resulting cultural dominance that validated
the basis of power.”]25 Military unification must be followed by a concep-
tual unification, by a unification of political, social, and moral values, or
the empire will once again fragment. By correcting Xiao Yu through a
paraphrase of Lu Jia, Taizong is both showing his superiority to Han
Gaozu, who did not understand the importance of wen 文, or “cultural
power,” and reminding Xiao Yu that he does not need a Lu Jia (who
should be played by Xiao Yu) to warn him away from the emphasis on wu
武, or “martial power.”
The Zhou Ideal and the Anxiety of Empire
While the memory of Han dynastic power was clearly on Taizong’s mind,
there was also an ambivalence towards the political choices that the Han
had ultimately made, and in particular, towards the decision to retain the
Qin imperial system. The institution of empire by Qin Shihuang, the
First Emperor of Qin, was both the formative moment in the history of
imperial sovereignty and its most traumatic moment. Whereas the Zhou
sovereigns had attributed their authority to the will of Heaven, thus call-
ing themselves by the title “Son of Heaven,” the First Emperor considered
his power to be self-authorized. In this way, as Michael Puett has argued,
the First Emperor saw his dynasty as constituting a complete break from
the past, since he would be the author of a new age of history, one that
would end the cosmological cycle governing all previous dynasties.26
Taizong’s reaction to the Qin creation of empire can be partially seen
in his interest in reinstating the fengjian 封建 (“enfeoffment” or “feudal”)
system of the Zhou dynasty. During a banquet on January 15, 628 (the six-
teenth day of the twelfth lunar month in the second year of the Zhenguan
reign), Taizong asked, “We desire to let our descendants reign long and to
have the altars of earth and
grain enjoy lasting peace—what is the princi-
ple [by which this could be done]?” 朕欲使子孫長久，社稷永安，其
—————
25. Kern, Die Hymnen der chinesischen Staatsopfer, p. 70.
26. Puett, Ambivalence of Creation, pp. 142–50.
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On Sovereignty and Representation
理如何. To this, Xiao Yu argued that the granting of fiefs was the reason
that dynastic houses such as the Han had endured long, and when dynas-
ties such as the Qin, Wei, and Jin abolished the feudal system, their reigns
were, as a result, much shorter.27 Though Taizong approved of this argu-
ment, most of the court officials, including influential figures such as Li
Boyao 李百藥 (565-648) and Wei Zheng, opposed it.
There is no question that a Tang restoration of the fengjian system
would have been an ideological, rather than a practical, gesture. The Zhou
royal house had initially set up the feudatories as a means of colonizing
the territories surrounding the central Zhou domain.28 When the Han, in
its early years, partially restored the feudal system, it too was responding
to the necessity of gaining some measure of control over territories that
did not recognize the sovereignty of the central court. The Tang, by con-
trast, had largely taken control of the empire by Taizong’s reign, and was,
in fact, looking to expand its territories; the proposal to share power
among the members of the imperial house was chiefly ideological, and not
born out of urgent political necessity.
The debate over the fengjian system would resurface in the last decade
of Taizong’s reign, and its longevity was perhaps due to Taizong’s lack of
confidence in his heir. Still, it is important to recognize the extent to
which the memory of the Zhou held sway over the early Tang political
imagination. In an anecdote dated to the beginning of the Zhenguan
reign, Taizong asked the ministers Wei Zheng, Du Yan 杜淹 (d. 628),
and Fang Xuanling during a banquet which of the Three Ages (Xia,
Shang, Zhou) the Tang should emulate in formulating its ritual code. Wei
Zheng pointed out that neither the Xia nor the Shang can be known in