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The Poetics of Sovereignty

Page 19

by Chen Jack W


  Here, Taizong is making an argument we have not seen previously in his

  writings. When he writes, “If the five gateways are closed off to what is

  close at hand, then this will allow virtue to flourish even at a remove; if

  one is vulnerable within to the thousand desires, then the wellspring of

  disaster will gush outwards,” he is no longer paraphrasing from the

  —————

  106. Marx’s idea of use-value has been criticized for drawing on such explanatory fictions as “nature” or “necessity.” See Baudrillard, Mirror of Production, pp. 22–23. However, even in the early writings of Marx, one sees an awareness that concepts such as “use-value” and

  “need” are complex. For example, Marx and Engels describe the production of second-

  order needs from the fulfillment of first-order needs. See Marx and Engels, German Ideology, p. 49.

  107. The “five gateways” ( wuguan 五關) refer to the eye ( mu 目), ear ( er 耳), nose ( bi 鼻), mouth ( kou 口), and body ( shen 身).

  108. This is a paraphrase of a passage in the Lüshi chunqiu. See note 111.

  109. “Red osmanthus” and “scarlet flames” would seem to be parallel allusions or figures concerning excellence or potential greatness. However, while “red osmanthus” is often used to figure men of talent, “scarlet flames” does not seem to have such a meaning.

  110. Di fan zhu, 2.1a–2a; and Tang Taizong quanji jiaozhu, pp. 610–13.

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  On Sovereignty and Representation

  Huainanzi. Instead Taizong is using language that draws upon the Lüshi

  chunqiu: “Thus it is said, when desires from within do not get out, it is

  called barring [the gate]; when desires from without do not enter, it is

  called shutting [the door]” 故曰,中欲不出謂之扃,外欲不入謂之

  閉.111 What both Taizong’s argument and the Lüshi chunqiu have in

  common is the ideal of a body that is closed off—hermetically sealed—so

  that desires from inside cannot cause imbalance without, and stimuli

  from outside cannot disorder the mind within.

  The closing of the sensory organs or the body off from the world arises

  from the rhetoric of stillness. Again, one of the earliest sources is the

  Laozi: “Block its apertures, shut its gates, and all your life you will not suffer; open its apertures, meddle in affairs, and all your life nothing will save

  you” 塞其兌,閉其門。終身不勤。開其兌,濟其事。終身不

  救.112 What the hermetic body of the Laozi represents here is an elegant

  solution to the problem of desire. Against the Confucian position that

  desires can be governed through ritual or sovereign example, the Laozi-

  inspired traditions argue that the only way to control desire is to contain

  it. For texts such as the Lüshi chunqiu and the Huainanzi, it is only the disciplining of the body—the practice of askēsis— that can allow the sovereign not to visit harm upon the empire. Thus, Taizong argues that, “De-

  sires are born in one’s body; if they are not kept in check, then the body

  will perish.” The problem is not that society needs social conventions that

  will govern the flow of desires, but that desires have to be neutralized

  while they are still within the body of the sovereign.

  As “Model for an Emperor” was composed at the end of Taizong’s

  reign, there is a clear sense of how Taizong has himself failed to live up to

  the principles of self-discipline upon which he insists. In the postface to

  the essay, Taizong adopts an almost plaintive tone, telling his heir not to

  take him as the model of sovereignty, but rather to emulate the wise sover-

  eigns of the past. He diminishes his own reign and achievements, speaking

  in the voice of a humble ruler who recognizes his failings. Here, Taizong

  takes up the recurring theme of the essay—the problem of imperial de-

  sires—but in a personal tone largely absent from the rest of the essay:

  —————

  111. Lüshi chunqiu xinjiaoshi, 17.1059–60. I have consulted the translation in Knoblock and Riegel, Annals of Lü Buwei, p. 409.

  112. Laozi jiaoshi, 52.206–207.

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  On Sovereignty and Representation

  103

  Since I assumed the throne, my failings have been numerous.113 Marvelously

  beautiful adornments, splendid brocade, and pearls and jade were ceaselessly set

  before me—this was a case of not inhibiting my desires.114 As for carved pillars

  and engraved columns, high terraces and deep ponds, each gave rise to its respec-

  tive labors—this was a case of not moderating my will. As for hounds and horses,

  hawks and falcons, I had to send for them no matter how distant they might be—

  this was a case of not restraining my mind. On numerous occasions there were

  tours and visits, frequently causing the people to toil—this was a case of not

  humbling the self. These numerous affairs were my profound offenses. Do not

  take this as correct and afterwards model yourself upon this.

  Still, in my aiding and nurturing the common people, the benefits have been

  many; in my pacifying and settling the territories, the achievement has been great.

  When the benefits are many and the harms few, the people will not take it as a

  cause for grievance; when the achievements are great and the offenses minor,

  then my virtue was not lacking. However, to compare it to “the tracks of perfect

  beauty”—there I would be much chagrined; or to compare it to “the way of per-

  fect goodness”—looking at this I would feel shame.115

  Moreover, you are without the slightest bit of achievement, only relying on

  the foundations and treading in the grace [of your forebears]. If you revere good-

  ness and broaden virtue, then you will make the patrimony great and your person

  secure. If you give free rein to your passions and lose yourself in iniquity, then you will topple the patrimony and bring death to your own person. Further, that success comes slowly and defeat comes quickly is the basis of the state; that loss is

  easy and gain is hard is the apportionment of Heaven. Can this not be regretted?

  Can this not be feared?

  吾在位已來,所缺多矣。奇麗服翫、錦繡珠玉,不絕於前,此非防慾

  也。雕楹刻桷、高臺深池,每興其役,此非儉志也。犬馬鷹鶻,無遠

  必致,此非節心也。數有行幸,以亟人勞,此非屈己也。斯數事者,

  吾之深過也。勿以茲為是而後法焉。

  但吾濟育蒼生,其益多矣,平定區宇,其功大矣。益多損少,民不

  以為怨,功大過微,德未之虧。然猶盡美之蹤,於焉多愧,盡善之

  道,顧此懷慚。

  —————

  113. Luo Zhenyu’s text reads, “What I have instituted is numerous” 所制多矣. I follow the Yongle dadian, which reads que 缺, instead of zhi 制.

  114. Here, Luo Zhenyu’s text reads, “are not practiced before me” 不施於前. I follow the Yongle dadian text, which reads jue 絕 instead of shi 施.

  115. This is an allusion to Lunyu 3.25 / Lunyu jishi, 6.222–24. I discuss it below.

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  On Sovereignty and Representation

  況汝無纖毫之功,直緣基而履慶。若崇善以廣德,則業泰而身安。

  若肆情以縱非,則業傾而身喪。且成遲敗速者,國之基也。失易得難

  者,天之位也。可不惜哉?可不慎哉?116

  At last, Taizong evaluates his own reign, comparing his actions and con-

  duct to the principles that he has laid out in the twelve preceding sections.

  He admits to Li Zhi that he himself has not been able to live the life of

  frugality and moderation that he had espoused in the previous sections.

  This is a striking moment, since Taizong so consistently represents him-

  self through the rhetoric of askēsis in his speeches and writings. His con-

  fession of failure is, however, in keeping with the representational mode

  of the postface: Taizong is stepping out of the voice of sovereign to speak

  forthrightly about the successes and failures of his reign—as if his reign

  were already over, or as if he were about to bestow the throne upon his

  heir at the very moment of writing.

  Though the essay may take the form of an address to Li Zhi (the “you”

  of the work), Taizong remains the inescapable center of his own argu-

  ment. In raising the question of succession (and whether his son is prepared

  for such responsibilities), Taizong returns to his own problematic acces-

  sion to the throne. Taizong speaks of being ashamed by comparisons to

  “perfect beauty” and “perfect goodness,” which are periphrastic references

  to a comment by Confucius regarding the respective “Shao” and “Wu” suc-

  cession dances of the sage-king Shun and King Wu of the Zhou dynasty:

  The Master said of the “Shao”: “It is perfect beauty, and moreover, perfect good-

  ness.” He said of the “Wu”: “It is perfect beauty, but not yet perfect goodness.”

  子謂《韶》:“盡美矣,又盡善也。”謂《武》:“盡美矣,未盡善

  也。”117

  Shun was given the throne by Yao in the first example of shanrang, or ab-

  dication in favor of a worthy successor. King Wu overthrew Zhou, the last

  ruler of the Shang dynasty, as an act of fangfa , or legitimate conquest of a despotic regime. For these two rulers, the musical dances of the “Shao” 韶

  and the “Wu” 武 symbolize the propriety of their exemplary successions—

  the first in peace and the second in war. Of course, it should be noted that

  while the “Wu” is exemplary, it is not as perfect as the “Shao,” since Shun

  —————

  116. Di fan zhu, 2.4a–4b; and Tang Taizong quanji jiaozhu, p. 620.

  117. Lunyu 3.25 / Lunyu jishi, 6.222–24.

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  On Sovereignty and Representation

  105

  was given the empire without having to use force; succession by virtue is

  always more esteemed than succession by righteous war.

  By contrast, Taizong came to the throne through the unsanctionable

  violence of fratricide and unfilial behavior. Of course, Taizong would rep-

  resent his actions at Xuanwu Gate in the rhetoric of both shanrang and

  fangfa, since later historical accounts of the incident describe his killings as “punishments” and depict his father as voluntarily abdicating to the future Taizong. The question, then, is why Taizong would draw attention

  to the actual circumstances of his accession in a work that he seems to

  have conceived as the last testament of his reign. After all, he might have

  merely passed over the subject without making even the slightly peri-

  phrastic references to Shun and King Wu. It is tempting to take the con-

  fessional tone of the postface as the voice of the true Taizong—the sover-

  eign laying his soul bare in the face of his own mortality. However, even

  when Taizong speaks as himself, he cannot escape the fact that he is the

  sovereign performing the act of negating the sovereign voice. The “truth”

  of the sovereign is that he is always sovereign, regardless of the manner of

  his representation. This is the problem at the heart of imperial literary

  self-representation, which I will take up more directly in the following

  chapters.

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  T H R E E

  The Reception of Literature

  in Tang Taizong’s Court

  One of the most distinctive aspects of the Tang founding was its atten-

  tion to the question of literature and its place within the imperium.1 To

  be sure, literary discourse had long been understood as belonging to the

  political sphere, and prior to the Tang, historians and scholars had argued

  for the interrelation of sovereignty and literary production. For example,

  the textual sources of the late Zhou represented the recitation of poetry as

  a means of revealing character in social and diplomatic exchanges, since

  the poem was seen as the outward expression of one’s aims or political in-

  tent ( zhi 志).2 Moreover, at the dawning of empire, both Qin Shihuang

  and Han Wudi saw poetic and literary form as a significant medium for

  the fashioning of imperial ideology.3

  —————

  1. For other discussions of Zhenguan literary thought, see Owen, Poetry of the Early T’ang, pp. 14–59 passim; Yang Encheng, “Lun Tang Taizong de wenxue guan,” Tangdai wenxue yanjiu, pp. 522–31; Wang Yunxi and Yang Ming, Sui Tang Wudai wenxue piping shi, pp.

  37–60; Luo Zongqiang, Sui Tang Wudai wenxue sixiang shi, pp. 22–38; and Warner, Wild Deer amid Soaring Phoenixes, pp. 23–33.

  2. Among other studies, see Van Zoeren, Poetry and Personality, pp. 56–79; and David Schaberg, A Patterned Past, pp. 234–43.

  3. See Kern, Stele Inscriptions of Ch’in Shih-Huang; and Knechtges, “Emperor and Literature,” pp. 51–76.

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  The Reception of Literature in Tang Taizong’s Court

  107

  By the time of Taizong, however, the relationship between literary

  writing and sovereignty would become much more complex. No longer

  would literary works be seen as merely testifying to the success or failure

  of earlier dynasties, a hermeneutical model in which literature was subor-

  dinated to the role of supplemental historical evidence. Instead, under the

  court of Taizong, the history of literature would not be understood so

  much as an index of dynastic history, but as, in fact, one of its sources.

  That is, Taizong and his court would insist upon an essential identifica-

  tion between literary history and dynastic history, one in which literary

  trends during a given historical period were not simply consigned to an

  indexical or reflective status within the cultural superstructure, but played

  a direct and active role in the construction and preservation of sovereign

  power. Consequently, for the new Tang rulers, much importance was

  placed on the forging of a new literary style, one that would reflect the

  successful unification of northern and southern cultural practices, while


  avoiding the failures and deficiencies of both.

  The early Tang discourse on literature would itself draw upon a long

  and complex history of literary debate. In this chapter, I first examine the

  critical background to the early Tang conception of literature, showing

  how the arguments over literary significance and dynastic fortune first de-

  veloped out of earlier comments and writings on literature. In the second

  part of the chapter, I turn to Taizong’s own comments on literature, as

  well as the literary views represented in the dynastic histories compiled

  during Taizong’s reign.

  Defining Poetry in Early China

  I begin with a scene from the Zuo zhuan, an episode that has to do with

  Chong’er 重耳 (the future Duke Wen of the state of Jin 晉文公, r. 636–

  628 bc). In the course of his wanderings, Chong’er was feasted by Duke

  Mu of Qin 秦穆公 (r. 659–621 bc). At the feast, Chong’er recited a poem,

  “The Yellow River’s Waters” 河水, and Duke Mu responded with “Sixth

  Month” 六月.4 At this, Chong’er bowed deeply, touching his head to the

  —————

  4. Commentators such as Du Yu 杜預 (222–84) considered the “Yellow River’s Waters” a

  “lost poem” ( yishi 遺詩), but as numerous later scholars have pointed out, it almost certainly refers to the poem “Waters of the Mian” 沔水 (Poem 183), in the Classic of Poetry.

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  The Reception of Literature in Tang Taizong’s Court

  ground. The duke protested this display of humility, but Zhao Shuai 趙

  衰, Chong’er’s retainer, said, “In what you, my lord, said about “helping

  the Son of Heaven,” you have laid the charge upon Chong’er—how dare

  Chong’er not bow to you?” 君稱所以佐天子者命重耳,重耳敢

  不拜.5

  This is a hermeneutical situation. Chong’er has chosen a poem to re-

  cite; the Duke of Mu has understood Chong’er’s choice and responded in

  kind; Chong’er has understood the Duke of Mu’s intentions and thus

  prostrates himself. The duke politely protests, but Zhao Shuai quickly in-

  terjects, making explicit what had been implicitly understood already by

 

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