A Companion to Assyria

by Eckart Frahm

  The army rather advanced directly southwards or southeast to the Diyala River, perhaps via Tell Imlihiye. From there it probably targeted – as Tiglath‐pileser I would do one century later – Babylonian cities such as Dur‐Kurigalzu and Sippar. According to the Tukulti‐Ninurta Epic, Kaštiliaš first faced the enemy, confident of attaining a victory. But he was defeated in the first battle and therefore sought to avoid further confrontation afterwards, hoping to gain a victory in impassable terrain and with deceptive manoeuvres. As we know, the Assyrians were the ones who emerged victorious. While the captured Babylonian king was abducted to Assyria, his opponent Tukulti‐Ninurta was enthroned above all other rulers and without any remaining rivals. At least, that is how the king saw himself according to an inscription (RIMA 1, A.0.78.23) on a stone tablet found in a foundation pit within the ziggurat of Kar‐Tukulti‐Ninurta (Galter 1988: 220).

  A remark about Tukulti‐Ninurta’s rule as lord of Sumer and Akkad is followed in the inscription by a list of lands and cities that were acquired, as the structure of the text seems to suggest, immediately after the victory over Kaštiliaš. The list also includes, besides Mari, Ḫana, and Rapiqu, numerous lands with names of non‐Semitic, perhaps Kassite or Hurrian, origin (Zadok 1995: 442f.). Apart from Arrapḫa (modern Kirkuk), the names occur almost exclusively in this text. While their exact location remains difficult to establish, they must have been situated in the area between the Ḥamrin and the Zagros mountains.

  It is impossible to decide to what extent the Assyrians’ grand claim of dominance corresponded to reality. Even contemporary administrative tablets provide only limited assistance in this regard. Although there is evidence for the existence of an Assyrian administration in the city of Arrapḫa about one decade later (eponym year of Salmanu‐šuma‐uṣur; MARV II 17:44, Frag. 4:50’; MARV I 5:18), the reference to tribute payed by the lands named in A.0.78.23 is a clear indication that the Assyrian control was rather indirect at the time of writing.

  It should not be excluded that the Assyrian army carried out military operations east of the Tigris River in conjunction with the campaign against Kaštiliaš, either in the beginning of the expedition or afterwards. But an incorporation of the districts in question into the provincial system of the state was apparently not achieved.

  Another inscription from the ziggurat debris (RIMA 1, A.0.78.24) is of interest as well. The find’s context suggests that it was deposited on a higher level within the brickwork, i.e. during a later construction stage. The text is closely related to the aformentioned one because of the reference to 28,800 “Hittite people from beyond the Euphrates” who were deported to Assyria at the beginning of Tukulti‐Ninurta’s reign. This episode has been a subject of controversy among scholars, in particular because it is missing from the king’s earlier inscriptions (Galter 1988).

  Emphasis should be placed on the changes as compared to the presumably older version RIMA 1, A.0.78.23. While the report of military successes in the north and northeast, as well as in Syria, has been shortened and the listing of the lands conquered after the victory over Kaštiliaš is missing, the king’s titles now include “King of Karduniaš,” “King of Sippar and Babylon,” and “King of Tilmun and Meluḫḫa,” indicating an Assyrian claim to power in the area of the Persian Gulf. A.0.78.24 must have been written after the prestigious conquest of Babylon. Taking the find’s circumstances into account, we may presume that, as a result of this historically important event, the earlier version within the foundation was regarded as in need of revision and therefore replaced.

  The king’s distinctive pride in what was achieved seems all the more understandable if we consider to what extent the time since the beginning of the conflict with Babylonia had been a time of changes. There are some hints in administrative tablets that indicate that the victory over Kaštiliaš had been dearly bought. It has already been mentioned that the army had not been supplied with rations on the way home and, therefore, soldiers were “starving” by the time they returned to the capital, not to mention the Assyrian refugees from Babylonia.

  In the surroundings of Dur‐Katlimmu on the Khabur River, no harvest took place in the eponym year of Etel‐pî‐Aššur due to hostile acts (Röllig 2008: n.79:11f.). Moreover, until the year after the following year, the eponymate of Aššur‐bel‐ilane, sowing sesame and spices remained impossible (Röllig 2008: n.106). The city of Duara, administered by the provincial capital Dur‐Katlimmu, seems to have been lost, at least temporarily, if we may interpret the information about an enemy having taken the city wall to this effect (Röllig 2008: n.80:18f ). These short notes from administrative documents clearly suggest that during the eponym year in between (Uṣur‐namkur‐šarre), the security situation in the Lower Khabur region was likewise unstable. The identity of the “enemy” harassing Assyria remains unknown to us. It cannot be excluded that these attacks were somehow related to nomadic raiders, who were already causing problems for the Assyrians in the Khabur region for some time. The father of the present grand vizier Aššur‐iddin, according to Babylonian sources, had already been forced to fight vigorously against warriors of Aramaean stock (Gurney 1949: 139). At the end of the 13th century BCE, the hazardous situation concerning the Aramaeans, who operated from Suḫu, continued (Singer 2008: 237). The attackers may have profited from the fact that Tukulti‐Ninurta was leading a campaign elsewhere, perhaps on the northeastern border of the state (MARV IV 146:12’–14’). Thus, the garrisons of the Khabur region could not have counted on his support.

  Another crisis originated with an Elamite military intervention in Babylonia during the reign of the Babylonian king Enlil‐nadin‐šumi, as reported in Chronicle P. We do not know in what way the Assyrian command responded to these challenges. Enlil‐nadin‐šumi could not keep himself in power much longer and was replaced by Kadašman‐Ḫarbe II who was surely grateful to the Elamites.

  With this background, it is not surprising that in Tukulti‐Ninurta’s report about the restoration of the Sîn‐Šamaš temple in Ashur, which dates to the following eponym year of Aššur‐bel‐ilane (RIMA 1, A.0.78.18), neither Babylonia nor the capture of Kaštiliaš are mentioned, while the king refers in some detail to his successes north and northeast of his state.

  During the same year, the situation changed decisively. Right at the beginning of the following eponym year (Aššur‐zera‐iddina), Babylonian prisoners of war found themselves in Ashur. We may assume that they were linked to the ships coming back from the sea mentioned in KAJ 106. The booty also included a substantial amount of small livestock, as we learn from an administrative document (MARV 27 + MARV III 54) that registers the delivery of wool to builders and their teams who worked at the temple of the god Marduk, probably in Kar‐Tukulti‐Ninurta. It is certainly not a matter of chance that the provisions were taken from stocks whose origin was clearly Babylonia, the homeland of Marduk.

  Everything suggests that another Assyrian campaign to Babylonia had been successfully completed. Meanwhile, three years had passed since the victory over Kaštiliaš. That is exactly the timespan that is given by the Babylonian King List as the reigns of both of his successors, Enlil‐nadin‐sumi and Kadašman‐Ḫarbe II, together. This would mean that Adad‐šuma‐iddina was now in charge of governing Babylonia (see RlA 6: 91). In the light of the sources presented here, we can hardly doubt that his accession was supported by Assyria. This becomes even clearer by the fact that, only a few months later, the Assyrian king set out southwards again, this time immediately to the city of Babylon. This was obviously not a military campaign but a journey meant to make offerings to Babylonian gods, a remarkable event that has come down to us in the date formula of an administrative document (MARV VIII 7:7–11). Such an incident requires political conditions that would enable the Assyrian ruler to come to the Babylonian capital as a guest in a non‐military context.

  The situation seems similar to that described later by Shalmaneser III in connection with his support for the Babylonian mon
arch Marduk‐zakir‐šumi against his brother and rival Marduk‐bel‐usati: after the victory over the usurper, Shalmaneser went to Babylon to make sacrifices to Marduk and his spouse (RIMA 3, A.0.102.5: v 3b–vi 1a). Even the occurrence of “many prisoners” (MARV VIII 7:12, šallata! ma’da; see Jakob, forthcoming) who were brought to Ashur by Tukulti‐Ninurta could be explained by the fact that these men were followers of the overthrown Kadašman‐Ḫarbe and were removed by the Assyrians in order to weaken any opposition (Jakob 2013: 517).

  For a short while, the situation within the formerly threatened districts of the Assyrian state became more peaceful. In Dur‐Katlimmu on the Lower Khabur, for example, the harvest accounts from the previous year were settled (Röllig 2008: n.80). But very soon afterwards, it became obvious that Adad‐šuma‐iddina, who was once happy to accept Assyrian assistance for his usurpation, would henceforth be unwilling to act as a puppet king, as the Assyrians had intended.

  The first severe crisis may be dated to the eponym year of Ina‐Aššur‐šumi‐aṣbat. In a letter from a certain Qarrad‐Aššur to his father, the grand vizier Aššur‐iddin, from the 6th day of the month of Kuzallu (v) we learn that the city of Lubdi in the Eastern Tigris River region was besieged.

  A refugee who fled from the inner city reports that the inhabitants had provisions for only two more months. One and a half weeks earlier, Aššur‐iddin was already dealing with troops from Lubdi in his correspondence (Cancik‐Kirschbaum 1996: 154f.). At this point, the grand vizier saw himself forced to intensify his efforts to support the city, after receiving an explicit rebuke from the king himself concerning hesitance on the grand vizier’s part regarding Babylonia (Cancik‐Kirschbaum 1996:, n.9, 36–42). In his communication from the 5th day of the month of Sîn, the monarch let him know that the entire land of Karduniaš would have been “like a richly laid dining‐table.” Was he implying that the Assyrians did not sufficiently pursue the Babylonian troops and these troops, therefore, made up ground in such a way that they strengthened important cities like Lubdi?

  The inscription RIMA 1, A.0.78.6, a stone tablet from Ashur describing work on the New Palace, dating to the year in question, alludes to the preceding victory over Babylonia only in the form of epithets like “(the one who) brought about the defeat of Sumer and Akkad” and “(the one who) captured Kaštiliašu.” Considering another inscription from the year of Aššur‐bel‐ilane, RIMA 1, A.0.78.18, which shows an almost identical inventory of epithets (cf. Cifola 2004: 8) and which was clearly written in a phase when Assyria was largely deprived of influence in the South, a similar situation should also be assumed for the current eponym year.

  We do not know the further fate of Lubdi, but there is some evidence that Adad‐šuma‐iddina was ultimately forced to give in.

  According to an adminstrative notice, on the 24th day of Ša‐kenate, the Assyrian king was staying in the city of Dur‐Adad (elû), the town on the Middle Euphrates River that was – as mentioned above – captured by the Assyrian army during the first Babylonian campaign of Tukulti‐Ninurta. This visit is most likely linked to a letter bearing the date formula “day 21,” written by a certain Aššur‐tapputi on behalf of the royal administration and addressed to the grand vizier Aššur‐iddin while residing in Dur‐Katlimmu (Cancik‐Kirschbaum 1996: 147–53). From this communication it becomes clear in what way the “provisioning” (piqittu) for every member of a royal travelling group should be supplied during their upcoming stay in that city. Here, the mention of the “Kassite king” with his wife and a royal household is of special interest. They are travelling – presumably coming from the Assyrian capital – accompanied by a high‐ranking Assyrian delegation, most likely with Tukulti‐Ninurta himself.

  It would be helpful if the sender of the letter had revealed the identity of that “Kassite king,” but an entire series of indicators suggest that it was not Kaštiliaš, who was already living in Assyria for years as a hostage, but rather Adad‐šuma‐iddina, who was the reigning king in Babylon at this point of time; only the latter, the acting Babylonian monarch, would have been allowed – according to Assyrian legal views – to claim the title “king.”

  The month of Ša‐kenate took place after the months of Sîn and Kuzallu, in which the siege of Lubdi was a matter of concern for the grand vizier and his staff. The journey of Adad‐šuma‐iddina to Assyria might have been motivated by a royal order from his overlord to take a new oath of allegiance, most likely in conjunction with sanctions in case of infringement.

  Superficially, Tukulti‐Ninurta may have shown strength. Letters from various official archives in the western part of the realm, however, clearly demonstrate that he, too, was interested in stabilizing Assyro‐Babylonian relations as soon as possible. Besides the usual obligations such as leading patrols, the surveillance of agricultural production, personnel administration, jurisdiction, and difficulties with nomads, there were constantly new, unexpected incidents, demanding a quick response. A few examples may suffice to illustrate the problem:

  Within the district of Aššukanni, the harvest fell victim to locusts. The urban population left the city, and thus nobody was available anymore to guard a group of fifty Kassite and Hurrian prisoners (BATSH 4/1, 2; month of Sîn, 20th day).

  Fifty soldiers disappeared after receiving their provisions. Elsewhere as well, officials complained about a grievous lack of personnel. This was exceedingly unwelcome news since the enemy had assembled an army of 1,500 men near the Hašumu Mountains to attack the Assyrian territory (BATSH 4/1, 3; month of Kuzallu, 5th day).

  A raid on the provincial capital Ḫarbe in northeastern Syria resulted in the loss of humans and animals. There would be no harvest that year (BATSH 4/1, 4; month of Kuzallu, 22th day).

  In the following month, the situation within the region of Ḫarbe remained precarious. A caravan returning from Carchemish was attacked and robbed on Assyrian territory. The merchants were to be compensated (BATSH 4/1, 6; month of Allanatu, 27th day).

  A notice about two Sutians “hanging around” and finally being picked up gave rise to the suspicion that nomads were involved in some of the aforementioned conflicts (BATSH 4/1, 13; month of Belat‐ekalli, 24th day).

  Five‐thousand men were mustered to lay siege to a city whose name remains unknown to us. It seems to have been an extensive operation. It should be noted that the four divisions of the army, having returned from their first campaign to Babylonia, were hardly more extensive (see above MARV I 1). A further 1,000 men helped to arrest a “servant” of the addressee of the letter (i.e. the grand vizier?). It is also interesting that there were “officers of Karduniaš” who were under Assyrian command. The date formula of the letter has been lost, but it seems most likely that it was written in the same year as the examples above, i.e. at the time of Adad‐šuma‐iddina’s visit to Assyria. If that is the case, the Babylonian soldiers were evidently viewed as an integral part of the Assyrian army (BATSH 4/1, 8).

  During the following years, the political situation in Assyria continued to change. The mountain regions northwest and northeast of Assyria gave rise to some cause of concern, both in Uqumanu (MARV IV, 148; eponym of Kaštiliaš) and the area north of the Syrian Jazira (Jakob 2009: 92f.; eponym Ber‐išmanni).

  At some point, Adad‐šuma‐iddina seems to have attracted the wrath of the Assyrian king yet again. It should not be excluded that there were poor counsellors at his court. On the other hand, the king could have acted on his own initiative. Be that as it may, Tukulti‐Ninurta began another campaign to the south. The punitive action was not only targeted at the disloyal vassal himself but equally at the inhabitans of Babylon. This time, the city was looted and the statue of the god Marduk abducted to Assyria (Yamada 2003: 162).

  The sequence of eponyms during the second decade of Tukulti‐Ninurta’s reign cannot be determined with absolute certainty. Thus, one can only guess that the campaign against Zamban “on the bank of the Diyala River,” recorded in an administrative notice (MARV I 9) fr
om the eponym year of Qarrad‐Aššur, son of Aššur‐iddin, may be related to the conquest of Babylon. The text lists a large amount of barley, sesame, and groats that was imposed on Zamban as a tribute. The military units mentioned in the text are, in part, the same ones as those who participated in the first Babylonian campaign of the year of Etel‐pî‐Aššur, in particular the four so‐called lē’u divisions (cf. Freydank 2001). Although a connection to the second campaign to Babylon cannot be proved, it seems to be quite plausible.

  At the beginning of the eponym year of Ninu’ayu, however, the international community was apparently reacting to the new situation. Within a period of two months, several letter orders from the office of the grand vizier were sent to district governors of three provincial capitals in North Syria (Jakob 2009: 59–69) concerning international delegations from the Great powers Ḫatti and Egypt, but also from Amurru and from the city of Sidon. According to these documents, the foreign delegates were on their way home from Ashur after having had an audience with the Assyrian king. The list of provisions for every envoy and his escort, plus horses and donkeys, provides us with detailed information about the composition of the respective delegation.