A Companion to Assyria

by Eckart Frahm

  Despite a remark that Katmuḫu was conquered as a whole, at least one additional campaign was necessary to reach this objective. This final expedition, which led to the devastation and looting of the country, took place in rough, mountainous landscapes and provided, therefore, an excellent opportunity to stress the special skills, courage, and bravery of the king.

  In the west, likewise, Tiglath‐pileser did not remain impassive. In the context of the reconquest of northern Syria, the lands of Alzu and Purulumzu, which had ceased paying tribute, were reminded of their duties. Kaška and Urumu warriors from the land of Ḫatti, i.e. Syria, who had occupied Assyrian territories with 4,000 troops, voluntarily submitted, as Tiglath‐pileser would have us believe, immediately upon the king’s arrival.

  This motif is one element of the self‐characterization of Tiglath‐pileser, who continually tells us how he forced his way into regions previously unknown to his ancestors. It goes without saying that he claims to have triumphed over all his enemies, notwithstanding the most difficult conditions. To emphasize the importance of these achievements, it was often stated that adversaries did not stand a chance, even if they created coalitions against Tiglath‐pileser.

  A further innovation of Tiglath‐pileser’s inscriptions is that the names of the opponents’ leaders were recorded systematically, with the exception of a passage about the war against the Nairi lands that lists the rulers concerned only with the title šarru, “king,” followed by their respective dominion. The report concerning this conflict is of particular interest regarding the political structure of that region. Similar to the situation of Katmuḫu, the term “Nairi lands” stands for a coalition of independent kinglets who joined together in defense but pursued their own agendas otherwise. For quite a while, their realm had an unusual attraction for Assyrian kings, not least because of their knowledge of horse breeding. Tiglath‐pileser did not cover up the fact that he fought a war of aggression against the Nairi lands that combined the effect of deterrence with the goal of acquiring a reasonable supply of horses for the Assyrian army. The tribute required from Nairi included not only 2,000 sheep and goats but also 1,200 horses per year.

  The prism inscription RIMA 1, A.0.87.1, which covers the activities of the first five years of his reign, gives real insight into Tiglath‐pileser’s concept of kingship. The young king was attempting to teach all of the lands that had been subordinated to Assyria in the past but lost in times of distress, to respect him. Moreover, he was trying to establish new boundaries beyond the former Assyrian territory. The regions attacked by Tiglath‐pileser’s armies spanned from northeastern Syria and the Zagros Mountains all the way to the lands southeast of the Lower Zab, in the border area to Babylonia: “Altogether, I conquered 42 lands and their rulers from the other side of the Lower Zab in distant mountainous regions to the other side of the Euphrates River, people of Ḫatti, and the Upper Sea in the west – from my accession year to my fifth regnal year. I subdued them to one authority, took hostages from them, (and) imposed upon them tribute and impost” (vi 39–48). This practice of taking hostages from among defeated enemies was not new. Already at the end of the 13th century BCE, during the reign of Tukulti‐Ninurta I, hostages from the land of (U)qumanu are mentioned. Likewise, the captured Babylonian king Kaštiliaš – according to the Tukulti‐Ninurta Epic – was not deported alone, but with any other family members who could be found. But Tiglath‐pileser was the first Assyrian king to refer to hostages, especially the children of defeated adversaries, as an instrument of politics in official inscriptions.

  It was also new that punitive measures against defeated opponents were described in detail. We thus learn that a city within the realm of the kings of Qumanu was spared under the condition that the inhabitants destroyed all of the fortifications down to their foundations. In addition, 300 families with members who participated in the rebellion against Assyria were forced into exile (Frahm 2009: 28).

  The military successes of his first regnal years required a powerful army. To what extent Tiglath‐pileser may have adopted strategies from his father cannot be estimated with certainty. It is also conceivable that he realized ideas he had developed while serving as crown prince. His affinity for chariotry, at any rate, is striking. Chariotry’s development, partly supported with captured resources, is discussed in the context of extending boundary‐lines and increasing the Assyrian population and its welfare: “I had in harness for the forces of my land more chariots and teams of horses than ever before. To Assyria I added land and to its people I added people. I brought contentment to my people (and) provided them with a secure abode” (vii 28–35).

  Elsewhere in the text, the charioteers receive a prominent place as a branch of the military as well. Only where mountains were too rough did the king go without his chariot, handing it over to his soldiers to carry and leading his army on foot. Chariots were also used by the enemies of the Assyrians, and consequently, great importance was attached to chariotry when the conflict with Babylonia intensified in the final years of Tiglath‐pileser’s reign.

  In two separate years, a battle array of chariots was drawn up against the Babylonian king Marduk‐nadin‐aḫḫe. In addition, the Assyrian army successfully attacked several cities and royal palaces in Babylonia. Our sources provide different accounts of the events. The “Synchronistic History” opens with the mention of chariot battles on the Lower Zab and near Gurmarritu, “which is upstream from Akkad,” continues with the conquest of Dur‐Kurigalzu, Sippar, and Babylon, and ends with the plunder of the region stretching from Ugar‐Sallu to Lubdi and a claim that the Assyrian kings controlled the Middle Euphrates River region up to the city of Rapiqu (Grayson 1975: 165). In a royal report from the eponym year of Taklak‐ana‐Aššur, the chariot battles are dated to the two consecutive (cf. Freydank 1991: 78–9) eponym years of Aššur‐šuma‐eriš and Ninu’ayu, but are otherwise placed at the end of the narrative. During the first expedition to Babylonia, one part of the Assyrian army initially ran a military campaign east of the Lower Zab via Lubdi to the region northwards of the Diyala River, while other contingents of troops advanced in Suḫu along the Euphrates River against Babylonian border fortresses.

  The “Synchronistic History” notes in remarkable detail that all Assyrian chariots available in the Lower Zab area were involved in battle (Grayson 1975, 164). In the inscription RIMA 2, A.0.87.10:36, the starting point of the campaign, the city of Turšan, is explicitly mentioned (cf. Llop 2003a: 207).

  A second expedition took place at the behest of the god Ninurta. It ended with the conquest of the cities also mentioned in the “Synchronistic History” and with the looting of the royal palaces of Babylon. While the first campaign appears to be comprehensible within the scope of the Assyrian expansion policy, the second campaign seems rather like a brutal raid, mainly focused on destruction and disorder. Perhaps the violent deaths of two princes, for which Babylonia was blamed, were the actual reasons for a hasty revenge campaign (Llop 2003b: 206ff.).

  It seems that Tiglath‐pileser could not possibly have hoped to impose Assyrian supremacy on its southern neighbor. In the previous years, all available funds were needed for the fight against Aramaean tribes in the western part of the state. The success of these actions was apparently very limited, as suggested by several lists of provincial centers from the administration of the “regular offerings” (ginā’u) to the god Assur. It may be deduced from these documents that important parts of Assyrian territories, especially in Ḫanigalbat in the west, were lost during Tiglath‐pileser’s final years. Consequently, the propaganda feats on which he prided himself were not of long‐lasting value. No other Assyrian king before him had ever conducted a campaign to the Levant or received tribute in Arwad, Sidon, and Byblos (RIMA 2, A.0.87.4:24–30), and no earlier royal inscription mentions the crossing of the Euphrates River (RIMA 2, A:0.87.4:34–6).

  Since the king claims that such crossings took place annually, totalling twenty‐eight times, and were aimed at pur
suing the Ahlamû nomads, it is obvious that these non‐sedentary groups, who were living, according to Tiglath‐pileser’s report, from Amurru and Suḫu in the Middle Euphrates River region to the Babylonian border fortress Rapiqu, posed a permanent risk to the entire western region of Assyria and were nearly impossible to control.

  In the course of Tiglath‐pileser’s thirty‐nine‐year‐long reign, many parallels to the reign of Tukulti‐Ninurta I can be observed. On the one hand, the king succeeded in strengthening the position of Assyria in the international community, leading Assyrian sovereignty in a new direction, on the other hand, he allowed himself to be drawn into long‐term conflicts.

  At the height of the gradually escalating crisis, the city of Babylon was looted, but this action was motivated by personal feelings of vengeance rather than by political considerations. Resources were tied up that were needed in the west to secure the borders. Assyria suffered from “imperial overstretch” and moved more and more into a defensive position, responding only to current threats at the regional level instead of developing a sustainable strategy.

  Tiglath‐pileser’s son and successor Ašared‐apil‐Ekur (1075–1074 BCE) was unable to change this situation during his short reign. It was left to his brother Aššur‐bel‐kala (1073–1056 BCE) to recreate the ancient splendor of Assyria, albeit only for a short period of time.

  Aššur‐bel‐kala’s annals have come down to us in several fairly fragmentary copies, so it is still impossible to reconstruct a definitive chronology of events. But the stylistic resemblance to the inscriptions of his father is unmistakable. This can be seen in his report on the military campaign of his accession year, which led into the the mountainous regions northeast of the Assyrian heartland. There, the path was so difficult that the king was forced to hack out a passage for his chariots with bronze pickaxes in order to reach the entry of the land Uruaṭri (RIMA 2, A.0.89.2: i 8’–18’). A very similar passage can be found in Tiglath‐pileser’s report on his first campaign against Katmuḫu. Along the same lines are Aššur‐bel‐kala’s remarks concerning gifts from Egypt, including a female ape and a crocodile, which were received by the king during a campaign to the Levant (RIMA 2, A.0.89.6:4’–5’). Tiglath‐pileser claims to have received such gifts from Egypt as well (Frahm 2009: 29–31).

  Generally speaking, the many parallels can be explained by the fact that the political objectives had not changed since Tiglath‐pileser’s time. It was mainly the Aramaeans who deserved special attention. An essential part of the so‐called “Broken Obelisk,” the most extensive inscription of Aššur‐bel‐kala found so far, is dedicated to the war against the nomadic tribes. On the basis of the report on military activities around the eponym year of Aššur‐rem‐nišešu, we can roughly define the area inhabited by the Aramaeans and deduce the danger posed to the Assyrian power by this threat.

  The earliest campaign can be dated to the fourth month (Dumuzi) of the year preceding Aššur‐rem‐nišešu’s eponymate. But only a few months later, in the month of Kislev (ix), when the Assyrian soldiers reached the city of Carchemish crossing the Euphrates River with rafts made of inflated goatskins, can the area of operations be specified,.

  By the beginning of the eponym year of Aššur‐rem‐nišešu, the conflict had shifted eastwards into Muṣri and up to the Kašijari Mountains (Ṭūr ‘Abdīn). Three months later, the army of Aššur‐bel‐kala also fought against the Aramaeans south of this location, finally intervening in the district of Ḫarran in the month of Araḫsamna (viii). The report of the Assyrian king simply notes that a combat took place. This is a clear indication that no decisive victories were won. In fact, the geographical range of the place names where the respective battles took place suggests that the Aramaeans managed to impose their tactics on the adversary: they avoided open battle and restricted themselves to entangling the Assyrians in numerous minor skirmishes. Thus, the Assyrians could not take advantage of the possible technical superiority of their military equipment.

  Encounters took place in constantly varying locations. The Assyrian army, pursuing the nomad warriors, was forced to respond to the attacks by the Aramaean troops rather than to act according to a specific strategy. In the eponymate of Ili‐iddina (which may have followed that of Aššur‐rem‐nišešu), the Assyrian troops again repeatedly encountered Aramaean warriors. In the month of Kislev (ix) the two sides first confronted each other at Makrisa in the Middle Khabur area, then further south, near the city of Dur‐Katlimmu in the Lower Khabur region (RIMA 2, A.0.89.7: iii 20b–22).

  The Aramaeans were not the only adversaries in the west of the Assyrian heartland. From his accession year to his third regnal year, Aššur‐bel‐kala waged two campaigns against a certain Tukulti‐Mer, king of the Land of Mari (RIMA 2, A.0.89.1:14’–16’; A.0.89.2: ii 5’–11’; Frahm 2009: 41, l. 6’–12’). All in all, the enduring military conflicts with the Aramaean tribes left nobody victorous. The king’s references to Assyrian triumphs over them from the Babylonian frontier at Rapiqu to Suḫu, Tadmar, and the Lebanon say more about the vast areas now threatened by the Aramaeans than about the sustainable successes of the Assyrian military. In this sense, Aššur‐bel‐kala could not decisively surpass his father.

  Like Tiglath‐pileser’s inscriptions Aššur‐bel‐kala’s include accounts of royal hunts for wild animals (RIMA 2, A.0.87.1: vii 4–12). They are imbedded in lists of countries and lands through which Aššur‐bel‐kala marched during his campaigns. He geographically equated his hunting ground with the entire territory under his rule: from Lebanon in the west to the Ḥamrin Mountain (Ebeḫ) in the east (RIMA 2, A.0.89.7: iv 1–34a).

  Aššur‐bel‐kala’s Babylonian policy differed from that of his father. First, while Marduk‐nadin‐aḫḫe of Babylon was still alive, the old conflict remained unresolved, as is proved by a confrontation in the vicinity of Dur‐Kurigalzu during which the provincial governor Kadašman‐Buriaš was defeated and captured by the Assyrian army (RIMA 2, A.0.89.7: iii 4b–8b). Although the city of Babylon itself is mentioned elsewhere in the text as a target of military activities (iv 38), the passage in question is of a very general character and contains no references to concrete operations. Perhaps it was merely an exercise in martial rhetoric. Aššur‐bel‐kala was aware of how exhausting the confrontation of Tiglath‐pileser with Babylonia was and of how the political stability of the realm was diminished by the end. In the long run, his Babylonian policy aimed at a compromise with Assyria’s southern neighbor. This was impossible during the lifetime of Marduk‐nadin‐aḫḫe, perhaps because the latter had witnessed the looting of Babylon in the reign of Tiglath‐pileser and was thus not interested in an agreement with Assyria. But when Marduk‐šapik‐zeri ascended the Babylonian throne, the situation began to change. The “Synchronistic History” states that Aššur‐bel‐kala reached a political agreement with the new king through diplomatic channels. After the latter’s death, he even managed to install a certain Adad‐apla‐iddina, who clearly did not belong to the ruling family, as king (Grayson 1975: 165:31’–32’). That Adad‐apla‐iddina’s daughter married the Assyrian king brings to mind the era of Aššur‐uballiṭ I. Just as in the 14th century BCE, the people of Assyria and Babylonia were “joined together” (Grayson 1975: 165:36’f.), which implies, according to the Assyrian reading, no less than a claim to an indivisible supremacy in Mesopotamia. After successful campaigns from Babylon to the Mediterranean in the west, and Lake Van in the northeast, Aššur‐bel‐kala saw himself as the “lord of all” (RIMA 2. A.0.89.4:14; A.0.89.7: iv 34b–9).

  But Aššur‐bel‐kala’s apparent successes stood on extremely shaky foundations. It is known for certain that his son, Eriba‐Adad II (1055–1054 BCE), as well as his immediate successors, were no longer able to save what had been achieved in the past. Eriba‐Adad II’s reign marks the beginning of a long period of decline, coming to an end only in the mid‐tenth century BCE.

  Concluding Remarks

  The era of Aššur�
��uballiṭ, who was the first ruler of Ashur to use the royal title šarru “king” since the days of Samsi‐Addu, was regarded as the true moment of the birth of “Assyria” by later generations. Aššur‐uballiṭ confidently claimed admission as a Great King into the “Club of Brothers,” i. e. the great powers of his time. These rulers were ideologically wedded to the idea of territorial expansion: a Great King had to move the borders of his realm into the barbaric world outside of his kingdom, so that it would ideally comprise the whole world. Political realism, on the other hand, led to the conclusion that such an aim could not be realized. Instead, it was imperative to cooperate with the other major powers through diplomatic channels, such as conventions and treaties. This also explains the Babylonian policy of Aššur‐uballiṭ. He avoided any showdowns with his adversary of equal rank, searching instead for diplomatic solutions, whereas smaller and militarily inferior states in Assyria’s neigborhood were made tributary states.

  The Assyrian kings hoped that Assur and the “great gods” would look favorably upon them. To quote Shalmaneser I: “Assur, the lord, faithfully chose me to worship him, gave me the sceptre, weapon, and staff to (rule) the blackheaded people, and granted me the true crown of lordship” (RIMA 1, A.0.77.1:22–6). Ideologically, the Assyrian kings, however powerful they were, depended on the gods. They were the ones who ordered kings to conduct campaigns against the enemies of Assyria and to widen the borders of the land of Ashur (RIMA 2, A.0.87.1: i 46–9). By their favor, the king was enabled to make the right decisions (RIMA 1, A.0.78.1: i 32–3). In battle, the gods stood beside him (RIMA 2, A.0.89.2: i 9’–10’).