The Comanche Empire
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the Spanish empire brushed against Comanchería. Whereas in the 1760s and
1770s Comanches had treated New Mexico and Texas almost as colonial pos-
sessions and nearly destroyed both, coexistence and cooperation now seemed to define Comanche-Spanish relations. Things that only a few years before would have been unthinkable suddenly appeared almost commonplace. Spanish officials supplied guns, uniforms, and staffs of office to Comanche chiefs, who in turn pledged loyalty to their “father,” the king of Spain. Sons of Comanche
elite lived among the Spaniards to learn their customs and language, and several Comanches accepted baptism in New Mexico. Spanish officials fed their
Comanche allies during times of hardship and New Mexicans hunted bison on
Comanche lands. Pedro Vial and other Spanish explorers blazed trails across
Comanchería to connect the hitherto separated San Antonio and Santa Fe,
and Comanches camped freely within the borders of Texas and New Mexico.
Spanish-Comanche-Navajo war parties ranged from Texas to Nueva Vizcaya,
turning Apachería’s expansion into contraction, and Nueva Vizcaya officials believed that the time was ripe to start missionizing the Comanches.⁵⁴
If looked at quickly, Comanchería, New Mexico, and Texas seemed to blur
into a single political and economic entity within which peoples, commodities, customs, and ideas moved fluidly across borders that connected, rather than
separated, the two nations. As one Spanish visitor to Comanchería reported in 1786, Comanches “say that now the Comanches are Spaniards, and Spaniards,
Comanches.”⁵⁵
But that image of the Comanche-Spanish borderlands as a middle ground
in the making was a façade, an elaborate artifice. Beneath the surface of amity and mutual adaptation and respect, a different kind of development was unfolding. Spanish officials were working methodically to reduce the Comanches to dependence and vassalage, using the very acts and institutions—gifts, trade, and political-military collaboration—that seemingly were creating a common
ground between the nations. The embrace the Spaniards offered to Comanches
was fatherly and supportive, but it was also cynical, calculated, restraining, and potentially suffocating. When Bourbon officials cast themselves as fathers for
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Comanche children, they meant to command, not compromise. They intended
to be less benevolent parental figures than authoritarian patriarchs.
Such plans of controlling Indians through commerce and personal diplo-
macy were not new to Spanish policymakers. Progressive officials had debated the merits of war and commerce as the best instrument for controlling Indians since midcentury when an anonymous manuscript, Nuevo sistema de gobierno económico para la Ameríca, began to circulate in the colonies, and frontier officials like Cachupín, Cabello, and Anza had improvised and experimented with
new strategies as they dealt with powerful independent Indians who refused to submit to Spanish arms. But the new policies were not codified in northern New Spain until 1786 when Viceroy Bernardo de Gálvez issued his famous Instructions for Governing the Interior Provinces of New Spain. ⁵⁶
The Instructions of 1786 built on and refined José de Gálvez’s temporary guidelines from 1772, but Bernardo de Gálvez added a distinctively cynical and exploitative streak to his uncle’s orders. As acting governor of Louisiana from 1777 to 1783, Gálvez had observed firsthand how the colony’s French agents
used gifts and trade to induce dependence among Indians and had become
convinced that the French model would allow Spain too to achieve what he
called “peace by deceit.” His Instructions advocated unrestricted trade with Indians as the means to control them. Reiterating the widely held belief that Indians raided Spanish colonies because they were foraging nomads and therefore
chronically poor, Gálvez noted that hunting and warfare “are not enough to
supply the prime necessities of existence. And so, if they do not rob, they perish of hunger and misery.” But the primitiveness and poverty, Gálvez argued, also exposed the Indians to external manipulation: “The interest in commerce binds and narrows the desires of man; and it is my wish to establish trade with the Indians.” He elaborated: “We shall benefit by satisfying their desires. It will cost the king less than what is now spent in considerable and useless reinforcements of troops. The Indians cannot live without our aid. They will go to war against one another in our behalf and from their own warlike inclinations, or they may possibly improve their customs by following our good example, voluntarily embracing our religion and vassalage. And by these means they will keep faith in their truces.”⁵⁷
Gálvez also authorized the sale of firearms to Indians, arguing that the use of guns would weaken Indians’ fighting ability, because the muzzle-loading rifle was less effective than the bow, which “is always ready to use.” As detailed as they were sweeping, Gálvez’s Instructions specified that guns should have “weak bolts without the best temper” and long barrels, which would “make them awk-
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ward for long rides on horseback, resulting in continual damages and repeated need for mending or replacement.” This, he explained, would make the Natives dependent on the Spaniards for repairs and replacements. When Indians “begin to lose their skill in handling the bow,” he predicted, they would not only lose their military edge; to keep themselves continually supplied with guns, powder, and shot, “they would be forced to seek our friendship and aid.” And if hostilities erupted, Spaniards could simply withhold powder and lead from Indians.⁵⁸
Prompted by Gálvez’s Instructions, Spaniards also adopted a strategy of remolding Native polities in ways that would render them susceptible to external manipulation. Rather than trying to incorporate or contain indigenous societies, the new objective was to transform them into an entity that Spanish agents could understand, manage, and control. In New Mexico and Texas, where Spaniards
were virtually engulfed by ostensibly unorganized nomadic Comanches, the
strategy of imposed political reform became the cornerstone of frontier diplomacy. Bourbon officials had initially thought that more authoritative Comanche leaders were needed to unite unruly Indians behind peace treaties, but once the treaties were formalized, the officials reconceived political centralization as a means to subdue their new allies. Inspired by pragmatic visions of a consolidated New Spain, the Bourbon officials had concluded that they could never bring the empire to Comanchería. Instead, they resolved to bring the Comanches into the empire.
Bourbon officials applied the centralizing pressure most systematically on the western Comanches, whose continuing loyalty they considered critical for the survival of New Mexico and, by extension, the silver provinces of northern New Spain. The policy was first articulated by Anza in 1786 when he argued that
by elevating Ecueracapa “above the rest of his class” Spaniards could reduce the entire Comanche nation to vassalage. The idea was to create a well-defined hierarchical structure extending from principal chiefs to the bottom of Comanche society though strategic distributions of political gifts. Accordingly, Spanish officials in New Mexico and Texas funneled vast amounts of gifts among the
Comanches through Ecueracapa and other head chiefs, hoping to originate a
downward flow of presents from Spanish authorities to principal chiefs, local band leaders, and commoners and, conversely, an upward-converging dependency network on top of which stood the king of Spain. The institution of principal chieftainship, as Pedro Garrido explained, was “the most appropriate instrument that we could desire for the new arrangement of peace, not only to
assure the continuance of the peace celebrated, but also to subject the warlike Comanche nation to the dominion of the king.”⁵⁹
To further induce cen
tralization among the Comanches, Spanish officials also
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arranged informal gift distributions to trading envoys in a hierarchical manner.
Gálvez specified that band leaders, paraibos, should receive fifteen or twenty pesos in “goods, tobacco, provisions, etc.” when visiting New Mexico, while the heads of individual households should receive only one or two pesos worth of presents. Invoices from the late eighteenth century reveal an even more finely grained scale by which the recipients were divided into five classes—generals, captains, little captains ( capitancillos), warriors, and women and children. Although Spaniards distributed gifts to several Indian nations after 1786, Comanches, thanks to their numerical and military strength, received special treatment.
Writing in 1794, New Mexico Governor Concha reported that “it is customary
to regale them [Indian visitors] with some clothing, hats, mirrors, orange paint, indigo, knives, cigars, sugarloaves, and so forth. In these gifts the Comanches must be preferred provided they are not in attendance with the other tribes, for in this case the distribution must be equal in order that no preference may be noticed and result in jealousies among them.” The allocation of gifts, Concha further specified, “should be made by the hand of the governor himself, in order that they [Native leaders] may be more grateful.” To monitor that the gifts had the desired political effect, Spaniards dispatched special emissaries—“interpreters”—to Comanchería. It was necessary, Concha argued, to have one agent
in Comanchería at all times “to observe them and to give an account of their movements.”⁶⁰
The policy seemed to succeed in western Comanchería even beyond Spanish
hopes. As Spanish officials saw it, their gifts and guidance cleansed the western Comanche political system of chaos and instability by turning a previously unorganized people into a centralized and orderly polity that was more amenable to control. From 1786 on, the Spaniards believed, the western Comanches were under the command of Ecueracapa, whose status in turn depended on Spanish gifts and backing. It also seemed that the office of head chieftainship had become a permanent institution in western Comanchería. When Ecueracapa
died on a raiding expedition against the Pawnees in 1793, a western Comanche congress elected Encanaguané (Red Fox) as head chief “by universal approba-tion.” Encanaguané was succeeded in 1797 by Canaguaipe, who in turn was fol-
lowed by Quegüe around 1805. Like Ecueracapa, Encanaguané, Canaguaipe,
and Quegüe were all Kotsotekas. In 1812 Tahuchimpia, Ecueracapa’s son who
had returned from New Mexico after seven years, was reported to be holding
the office, although Spanish sources identified Quegüe as a Kotsoteka general until his death in 1818. Tahuchimpia was succeeded by Cordero, who had represented eastern Comanches as Sargento-Cordero. Except for Cordero, all these
principal chiefs asked Spanish authorities to formally recognize their status and
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pledged loyalty to Spain. And during their tenure, the western Comanches kept an unbroken peace with New Mexico.⁶¹
All this convinced Bourbon officials of the success of the Indian new policy.
In their minds, political reform and peace were inherently linked: Comanches observed treaties because they were controlled by powerful leaders, who in
turn were personally attached to the Spanish imperial system. Gifts and careful micromanaging seemed to have domesticated the fierce and formidable
Comanches, reducing them to obedient, pliable subjects. As Concha boasted in 1794: “All the other chiefs and all of the members of this tribe, recognize them
[Encanaguané and his Jupe lieutenant, Paruanaranimuco] as such [head chiefs]
and obey them in their fashion, (that is to say, expressing myself as they do), they listen to their councel [ sic] and follow it in good faith.” Writing five years later, José María Cortés, lieutenant in the Royal Corps of Engineers, reported that the Comanches “are led by a general and lieutenant chosen by a plurality of votes among their countrymen. . . . They listen to the general’s advice with the same subordination and follow it in the same good faith that these Indians keep their treaties.” Taking such self-promoting reports at face value, many historians have concurred.⁶²
But outside appearance of political actions and their internal meaning were
not necessarily one and the same. The office of single supreme chief and the accompanying chain of command of principal and secondary chiefs were novel
ideas, Spanish imports, in Comanche politics, but that does not mean that
Comanche political organization had lost its autonomy or become a mere ap-
pendix of the Spanish empire. In fact, the reordering of the western Comanche political system is best seen as a pragmatic response to a drastically shifted strategic situation.
The late Bourbon-era New Spain was experiencing a dramatic revival, which
manifested itself in New Mexico in burgeoning long-distance trade with Chi-
huahua, rapid economic and population growth, and increasingly forceful for-
eign policies. Facing a suddenly reinvigorated imperial power on their borders, western Comanches responded by creating a pronouncedly hierarchical political system that featured authoritative leaders who could deal as equals with assertive Spanish colonial agents. Boosted by the Bourbon Reforms, New Mexico
was transformed in the late eighteenth century from a wasteland into a dynamic regional economy, and the Comanches needed to find ways to channel that
vitality to their own advantage. To do so, they did what nonsedentary politically flexible pastoral societies have done throughout history: they modified their internal organization to reflect (though not necessarily to copy) the developments of a neighboring state society.⁶³
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Moreover, the notion of Comanche subjugation through external manipu-
lation ignores culture, the meanings Comanches attached to their political actions and institutions. When Comanche head chiefs pledged to be loyal vassals of their “father,” the king of Spain, they were not talking about subordination but rather the familial bonds of mutual care that were to be at the core of any sustained relationship. Despite Spanish assertions, Comanches considered the principal chieftainship not as a real political office but rather as an instrument to derive economic and political favors from Spaniards. Far from being Spanish puppets, western Comanche head chiefs played a double role. They catered to
Spanish expectations by maintaining an illusion of a rigid centralized hierarchy in order to guarantee access to Spanish markets and to streamline the distribution of Spanish gifts, but they made no effort to interfere with the internal politics of the numerous local rancherías. Rather than implementing Spain’s
imperial objectives, they subverted them.
When dealing with Spanish authorities in New Mexico’s colonial centers,
Ecueracapa and other principal chiefs projected an impression of uncompro-
mised authority; they carried staffs of office, wore Spanish uniforms and medals, and invariably promised to control their followers. In internal matters, beyond direct Spanish gaze, however, they behaved in a manner expected of typical
Comanche headmen who were more arbitrators than autocrats. Indeed, Ecuera-
capa seems to have been uneasy with his new role from the outset, as is sug-
gested by his insistence during the Pecos talks that Anza’s staff of office be passed on to Tosacondata. That act must be understood in the context of Comanche
political tradition of collective and diffuse leadership: it was an attempt to share power with other Comanche chiefs. Ecueracapa continued to honor Comanche
political conventions even after he was formally elected “captain general.” He represented the Comanche nation in high-level diplomatic negotiations with
S
panish officials, but there is no evidence that he played any part in the internal Jupe and Yamparika politics. When conferring with Spanish colonists, Ecueracapa was a commanding supreme chief; inside Comanchería, he remained a
typical Kotsoteka headman with limited, clearly defined authority.⁶⁴
The dual role of western Comanche principal chiefs became even more ap-
parent after Ecueracapa’s death in 1793. Unlike Ecueracapa, none of his fol-
lowers appear to have sent envoys touring around Comanchería to endorse their status among all divisions. This alone was enough to reduce the office to honorific title, because power without physical presence was meaningless among
Comanches, who believed that authority could be exercised and validated only in direct face-to-face interaction. Ecueracapa’s successors also ignored the Spanish design of a fixed hierarchy in which Jupe and Yamparika lieutenant gen-
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erals would be subordinate to Kotsoteka supreme chiefs. All Kotsoteka principal chiefs—Ecueracapa, Encanaguané, Canaguaipe, Quegüe, Tahuchimpia, and
Cordero—adhered to the diffuse tradition of Comanche politics and refrained
from interfering with the internal affairs of other divisions. Indeed, Commanding General Ugarte had predicted in 1787 that the Yamparikas and Jupes would not accept subordination to Kotsoteka head chiefs.⁶⁵
Rejecting Spanish demands of political centralization, the Jupes and Yam-
parikas dealt directly with Spanish officials. They even pressured the officials to recognize their own head chiefs. In 1805, for example, three Yamparika captains came to Santa Fe and asked Governor Joaquin Real Alencaster to recognize
Chief Somiquaso as the “general” of the Yamparikas “like Guegue [is] for the Cuchanticas [Kotsotekas].” The Yamparikas, in other words, insisted on separate head chiefs for the Kotsotekas and themselves, and when Alencaster granted
their request, there was no mention of Somiquaso being subordinate to Quegüe.
It is also telling that the Yamparikas accompanied their request for Somiquaso’s appointment with a long list of demands: they wanted Alencaster to “clothe