Self and Emotional Life
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neurosis. See guilt; hysteria; obsessive disorders
New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (Freud), 101
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 48, 192
object: consciousness as awareness of a disturbance caused by an external object, 30; and joyful and sorrowful affects, 39–40; space of encounter between thought and its object, 45; and wonder, 16–17, 40–41
obsessive disorders, 88–89, 98–99, 103, 152–53
Of Grammatology (Derrida), 21
ontological phenomena: and Damasio’s and Deleuze’s differing readings of Spinoza, 36; ontological generosity, 24–25, 64; and self-preservation, 54–55
organism, 217; body maps and capacity for feeling, 167; and consciousness, 188–89; and debate between naturalism and antinaturalism, 182; joy and sorrow as states of equilibrium/disequilibrium, 54; and mortality, 223–24; as term encompassing both mind and body, 55. See also body-mind connection; homeostasis
pain, 65–66, 166–67
PANIC emotional system, 186, 189
Panksepp, Jaak, xviii, 182, 190–94; denial of compartmentalized anatomical brain loci, 176–77; differences between cognition and emotion, 194; and imprecise vocabulary for affects, 199; Kant and, 190–91; and the protoself, 222; taxonomy of seven primary emotions, 186–87, 201
The Parallax View (Žižek), 162–63, 172, 179, 181
Pascal, Blaise, 83
passions: Descartes and, 12–18, 45–46; external signs of, 45–48; generous people as masters of their passions, 18; passions “in” the soul as consequences of bodily movements, 13–15; passions “of” the soul as related to the soul alone, 15–16; passions “of” the soul defined, 6; and pineal gland, 14–16; primitive and derived passions, 12; Spinoza’s critique of Descartes, 35, 37–38; wonder as first of six primitive passions (Descartes’ concept), 9. See also generosity; wonder
The Passions of the Soul (Descartes), 9, 12–18, 21–22, 30, 47–48, 85
passivity. See activity and passivity
perceptions: adequate and inadequate perceptions, 44; and body-mind connection, 53, 166–67; and the brain, 27; Deleuze and, 67; Descartes and, 14–15; generosity as a perception directed at the self, 18; McDowell and, 86; Spinoza and, 53; as type of passion “in” the soul, 14–15
personality transformation due to brain damage, xiii–xiv, 57–61
phallus, 159–61
Phantoms in the Brain (Ramachandran), 27
philosophy, Continental. See Deleuze, Gilles; Derrida, Jacques; Descartes, René; Spinoza, Baruch
philosophy, theoretical vs. practical, xv, 77
pineal gland, 14–16, 21–23
plane of immanence, 45–46, 53, 54, 64, 67
plasticity of the brain, xi, 26–28, 56–58, 60–62, 190–91, 194, 199, 202. See also brain damage
PLAY emotional system, 186
pleasure, 166–67, 218
pleasure principle, 77–78, 95, 187, 218
politics, 77, 98
Pommier, Gérard, 192
Pontalis, Jean-Bertrand, 102, 136–37, 213
power of acting, 38–40, 41–42, 53
power of existing, 6. See also force of existing
preconscious, 69, 78, 205
pride, 18
primordial affect, 24, 31
principle of inertia, 218
Project for a Scientific Psychology (Freud), 102
protoself, 31–32, 169–72, 217, 219–20, 222–23
psyche, x, 11, 28; and autoaffection, 31, 70; and brain damage, 57, 61–62, 71–72; Descartes and, 45; Freud’s city of Rome analogy for psyche, 60–61; interacting layers of, 198; spatiality of, 64, 69–70. See also body-mind connection; brain; consciousness; Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis; Freudian metapsychology of affects; id-ego-superego triad; Lacan-inspired metapsychology of affects; self; soul; subjectivity
psychic events (Freud’s conception), 28–29, 71
psychoanalysis, clinical practice of, xii, xiv–xv, 76; and brain damage, xiv; and deception, 207–8; doubts raised about affects during analysis, 140–41, 147–48, 151–52; and free association, 142–43; Lacan’s insistence upon cognitive structures as central object of analysis, 124; and Lacan’s lalangue neologism, 141–45; Lacan’s objections to affective life as primary focus of analysis, 120–21; Lacan’s theory of the four discourses (analyst, master, university, hysteric), 139–41, 147; and psychopathologies/psychosis, xiv–xv
psychoanalysis-neuroscience relationship. See neuroscience-psychoanalysis relationship
psychoanalytic theory of affects, 4; resistance to attempts to reconcile psychoanalytic theory with neuroscience, 81. See also affects, unconscious; defense mechanisms; feelings, misfelt; Freud, Sigmund; Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis; Freudian metapsychology of affects; guilt; id-ego-superego triad; Lacan, Jacques; Lacan-inspired metapsychology of affects; unconscious
psychopathologies, xiv
psychosis, xiv–xv
The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (Freud), xiii
pudeur, 82, 157–62
Pulver, Sydney, 113–17
RAGE emotional system, 186
Ramachandran, V. S., 27
rationality, 7–8, 30, 44, 50
reality: and deceptive nature of signifiers, 206–7; Lacan and, 139
religion, 203–4
remorse, 98–99
Repräsentanz, 107, 125–32, 136–37
representation: and confusion caused by translations of Vorstellungsrepräsentanz, Vorstellung, and Repräsentanz, 125–32; symbolic activity in the brain, 213–14, 216, 219–23. See also ideas; ideational representations; language; signifiers
repression: and confusion caused by translations of Vorstellungsrepräsentanz, Vorstellung, and Repräsentanz, 125–32; Copjec and, 155; Damasio and, 168–69; displacement of affect as result of, 155, 212; and drives, 215; Freud and, 105–10, 125–26; Green and, 205; Lacan and, 122, 125–34, 138, 155; and memory, 168; primary repression and secondary repression/repression proper, 125–26, 138
respect, 18
Sacks, Oliver, 27, 71
sadness. See sorrow
Sartre, Jean-Paul, xi
schizophrenia, xiv–xv
SEEKING emotional system, 186, 201
self: and Deleuzian conception of autoaffection, 45; feelings and concern for self-attachment, 51, 59–60; and homeostatic regulation, 217–22; impaired sense of, 33, 58–60 (see also brain damage); self-mapping in the brain, 164–67; self-model and a new conception of materialism, 72; sense of self as state of the organism, 223; and storytelling, 223; structure of (Damasio’s conception), 31–33, 169–72, 217, 219–20, 222–23; structure of (Freud’s conception of consciousness, preconscious, unconscious), 69–70, 78; structure of (Freud’s conception of id, ego, and superego), 69–70, 78; Žižek’s critique of Damasio’s conception, 169–74. See also brain damage; consciousness; identity; personality; psyche; soul; subjectivity
self-preservation, 51–54. See also conatus; homeostasis
self-touching, 221; and definition of autoaffection, 19–21, 63; Deleuze and, 45; Derrida and, 21–24, 64, 69; and Nancy’s nonmetaphysical sense of touch, 23–24; self-touching you, 20, 23–24, 64; and spatiality of the psyche, 69. See also autoaffection
Sellars, Wilfrid, 86
senti-ment (Lacan’s neologism), 141, 146–47, 213
sexuality, 159–61, 214–15
shame, 153–62; and beauty, 160–61; distinction between honte and pudeur, 82, 157–62
signifiers: affects as, 205–10; affects as aftereffects of interactions of signifiers, 123, 135; cross-resonating relations between multiple representations, 128–29; deceptive nature of, 206–9; dichotomy between the signifier and jouissance, 155; and diplomat metaphor, 130–31; existence in sets of two or more, 128–29, 208–9; Green and, 205; and inextricable entanglement of the affective and the intellectual, 121–22; priority of signifier-ideas over affects, 122–24; and repression, 119, 122, 128–30, 155; Saussure and, 208–9; two-way modulation between affects and
signifiers, 200; and the unconscious, 84, 122, 208, 212; Vorstellungen as, 119, 122, 129; and Vorstellungsrepräsentanz, 127–28
sleep, 61–62, 93
Soler, Colette, 82, 141
Solms, Mark, 27–29, 57–58, 71, 186, 200–202, 228n6
somatic markers, theory of, 7
sorrow: as one of six primitive passions (Descartes’ idea), 9, 12; Spinoza’s definition, 39, 54; and states of functional disequilibrium, 54; and variability of conatus, 39–40
soul: activity and passivity of, 15, 22–23; functions of, 15; and generosity, 18; Green and, 203; passions “in” vs. passions “of,” 12–18; passions “of” the soul as related to the soul alone, 15–16; and perception, 15; and pineal gland, 14–16, 21–23; and spatiality, 21–23; as two-sided instance (speaker/listener etc.), 20; and wonder, 9–11, 18. See also autoaffection; body-mind connection; consciousness; existence; mind; psyche; self; subjectivity; specific philosophers
spatiality, 21–23, 46, 64. See also maps, mapping; plane of immanence
Spinoza, Baruch, xvi; and active affect/autoaffection, 45; activity and passivity, 37–41; adequate and inadequate causes, 37; affects and variability of conatus, 37–41; affects as always affects of essence, 35–36, 43–44; affects as natural ontological phenomena, 36; critique of Descartes’ theory of passions, 35; definition of affects as modifications of the power of existing, 6; definition of affects related to the body’s power of activity, 37, 41–42; definition of joy and sorrow, 39, 54; Descartes-Spinoza conflict, 7, 37–38; lack of knowledge of neurobiology, 54; mind and body as expressions of the same substance, 36, 37, 51; mind as the idea of the body, 51, 53; and Nature/God/Being, 36, 53; and power of acting, 38–41, 53; as protobiologist, 50, 52; Solms and, 200–201; three kinds of knowledge/ideas, 44–45, 66–67; translation of affectio and affectus, 4–5; and wonder, 8–10, 40–41. See also Damasio’s reading of Spinoza; Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza
Stanovich, Keith, 182
Studies on Hysteria (Freud and Breuer), 213–14
subject, xvi; and absence of emotions and feeling, 8, 11 (see also affects, detachment from/absence of); and conceptual personae, 48; and definition of autoaffection, 5–6; and heteroaffection, xvi, 7; and icons, 49; Kant on, 5–6. See also autoaffection
subjectivity, xvi–xvii; biological basis of, 55; and brain damage, xiii–xiv, 28, 33–34, 58; and cerebral autoaffection, 223; and denaturalization, 172–74, 178, 180–84, 187–88, 202; disembodiment of, 29–30; Kant and, 170; Lacan’s barred subject ($), 151, 169–74, 187, 200; and language, 200 (see also language); and misfelt feelings, 86 (see also feelings, misfelt); neural subjectivity as a plastic structure, 26–28; and new conception of materialism, 72; and “self-touching you,” 64; and time, 6; wonder and the structure of the self, 32–33; and Žižek’s critique of Damasio’s conception of the self, 169–72. See also consciousness; mind; psyche; self; soul; specific philosophers, psychoanalysts, and neuroscientists
superego: and civilization, 97–98; distinguished from conscience, 92; Freud’s introduction of concept, 78; and moral masochism, 95–97; sadism of, 95–96, 98; and spatiality of the psyche, 69; structural dynamics between ego and superego, 92–93, 99–101; and unconscious guilt, 88, 91, 99–101, 212–13
syncope, 23–24
thought: and Deleuzian conception of autoaffection and “maps,” 45; and free association, 142–43, 166; Freud’s primary and secondary processes, 143–45; Lacan and, 138–39, 142–43; and perceptions, 166–67. See also cognition; ideational representations
Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Nietzsche), 48
time, and autoaffection, 6, 20
touch, 66–67; and activity and passivity of the soul, 22–23; Deleuze and, 66–67; Derrida and, 21–24; Nancy’s nonmetaphysical sense of touch, 23–24; “touching-touched” relationship between me and myself (Merleau-Ponty’s schema), 66, 67. See also self-touching
On Touching (Derrida), 21, 64–65, 68
Turnbull, Oliver, 27–28, 186, 201–2
unconscious: and the brain, 71, 219–21; and conscience, 78–79, 91–92; Damasio and, 163–68, 179–80; and death, 223; and defense mechanisms, 104–10, 124 (see also repression); discovery as revolutionary breakthrough, 83–84, 148–49; distinction between psychoanalytic unconscious and term as used in neuroscience, 177–78; Freud and (see Freud, Sigmund; Freudian metapsychology of affects); and id-ego-superego triad, 78–80, 92–93, 99–101; Lacan and, 82–83, 108, 119, 124–44, 155, 179–80, 208; and lalangue neologism, 143–45; LeDoux and, 188; as negative term for a positive x, 209; Panksepp and, 188; and personal identity, 92; and potential-to-feel, 108–9; repression and the confusion caused by translations of Vorstellungsrepräsentanz, Vorstellung, and Repräsentanz, 125–32; slips of the tongue, jokes, etc., 143, 196; and spatiality of the psyche, 69–70; unconscious sense of guilt (see guilt); and Vorstellungen as signifiers, 122. See also affects, unconscious
“unpleasure principle,” 187
virtue, 17–18, 41
vision, 62
Vorstellungen: confusion caused by translations of Vorstellungsrepräsentanz, Vorstellung, and Repräsentanz, 125–32, 136–37; Green and, 205; and inextricable entanglement of the affective and the intellectual, 121–22; as Lacan’s signifiers, 119, 122, 129; and lalangue neologism, 143; and obsessive disorders, 90; and the unconscious, 122. See also ideational representations
Vorstellungsrepräsentanz, 125–32, 136–37
warfare, 132
What Is Philosophy? (Deleuze), 43, 48, 67
wonder, xv–xvi, 225n10; and alterity, 10; as ambivalent affect, 64; and autoaffection, 9–11, 63–64; and brain damage, 11, 33, 60; Damasio and, 11, 32–33, 64; deconstruction of, 10–11; defined, 8–9, 16; Deleuze and, 64, 71; Deleuze’s reading of Descartes and, 47–48; Derrida and, 11, 23–25, 64, 71; Descartes and, 8–9, 12, 16–18, 25; and facial expressions, 47–48; and fear, 9; function of, 17; and generosity, 17–18, 24–25; and heteroaffection, 9, 11, 63–64; impaired capacity for, 10–11, 17, 33, 60, 64; as intermediary between passion and thought, 47; Lacan and, 70–71; nonjudgmental nature of, 17, 18; as source driving philosophizing, 77; Spinoza and, 8–10, 40–41; and the structure of the self, 32–33; and virtue, 41
Žižek, Slavoj: critique of Damasio, 169–74, 179–84, 190; and debate between naturalism and antinaturalism, 180–84, 190; LeDoux and, 174–79, 190; life 2.0, life 1.0, 172–73, 192–94, 197–98; and misfelt feelings, 141
Žižek’s Ontology: A Transcendental Materialist Theory of Subjectivity (Johnston), 170
zoē, 192–93